THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Clark v. Waterford, 6339 CRB-2-19-7 (July 15, 2020).
Respondent municipality appealed finding of compensability pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433c for myocardial infarction sustained in 2017 by claimant who did not become a full-time firefighter until 1997. Respondent contends that the commissioner’s decision to adopt the commonly-accepted definition of word “member,” rather than definition set forth in General Statutes § 7-425 (5), which restricts “member of a paid municipal fire department” to employees who work at least twenty hours per week, constituted abuse of discretion. CRB affirmed, holding that although the record did not provide adequate basis for inference that claimant was employed for more than twenty hours per week prior to becoming full-time, board was not persuaded that legislature intended to restrict heart and hypertension benefits solely to full-time firefighters. CRB noted that provisions of § 7-433c do not distinguish between part-time and full-time employment, and claimant testified that employment requirements, job descriptions, professional duties and uniforms were same for both full-time and part-time firefighters. CRB also noted that legislature, via passage of General Statutes § 7-314a (d), extended rebuttable presumption to volunteer firefighters, and concluded that wide ranging opening disclaimer of heart and hypertension legislation allowed for result reached by commissioner. CRB affirmed denial of motion to correct. DISSENT (Watson): Disagreed with award of § 7-433c benefits on basis that principles of statutory construction compel adoption of definition of member provided by § 7-425 (5) given that legislature did not place heart and hypertension legislation in another part of statutes. Dissent also noted that although evidentiary record reflected that claimant was uniformed, record did not support inference that claimant, prior to promotion to full-time firefighter in 1987, was member of fire department as contemplated by heart and hypertension legislation. See also, Clark, § 7-314; § 31-301 Factual findings.
Krevis v. Bridgeport, 6321 CRB-4-19-4 (May 28, 2020).
Claimant, a retired police officer, asserted that his pacemaker surgery was compensable as he had a perfected hypertension claim. Trial commissioner however discounted expert testimony from treater linking the need for a pacemaker to hypertension and found respondent’s expert, who opined to the contrary, persuasive. On appeal, claimant challenged need to prove causation and challenged reliance on respondent’s witness. CRB affirmed. Case on point with Coughlin v. Stamford Fire Dept., 334 Conn. 857 (2020), retired claimant with perfected § 7-433c claim must prove causation for sequalae injuries. Commissioner could have reasonably reached assessment as to weight of medical evidence she reached, especially as claimant failed to object to respondent’s expert witness.
Diaz v. Bridgeport, 6333 CRB-4-19-6 (April 29, 2020).
Respondents challenged commissioner’s decision to commute final 123 weeks of claimant’s permanent partial disability award, arguing that commutation would allow claimant’s recovery to exceed maximum compensation rate, constitute double recovery, and violate statutory ceiling on heart and hypertension benefits set forth in General Statutes § 7-433b (b). CRB affirmed, noting that the commutation award could not be distinguished from any other lump-sum payment pursuant to commutation award, and § 7-433b (b) ceiling would only be implicated if cumulative amount of claimant’s weekly permanency benefits and pension payment exceeded statutory guidelines. CRB noted that municipality was entitled to customary three percent actuarial discount, and provisions of General Statutes § 31-302 afford commissioner considerable discretion in granting commutation awards. CRB affirmed denial of motion for articulation, holding that order was not ambiguous, and motion to correct, holding that proposed corrections recited same arguments made at trial. See also, Diaz, § 7-433b; § 31-302.
Mascendaro v. Fairfield, 6304-CRB 4-19-1 (March 13, 2020).
Retired police officer sustained a hemorrhage and asserted it was sequalae of prior compensable hypertension claim. Commissioner found expert witness for claimant credible and awarded benefits. Respondents appealed, arguing award was barred by precedent in Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., 323 Conn. 607 (2016) and Staurovsky v. Milford Police Dept., 164 Conn. App. 182 (2016), appeal dismissed, cert. improvidently granted, 324 Conn. 693 (2017), this was a new injury and retired officer could not seek benefits. CRB affirmed as recent Supreme Court cases in Dickerson v. Stamford, 334 Conn. 870 (2020) and Coughlin v. Stamford, 6218 CRB-5-17-9 (February 15, 2019), aff’d, 334 Conn. 857 (2020), clearly support the commissioner’s decision herein. See also, Mascendaro, § 31-275; § 31-301 Factual findings.
Wilson v. Stamford, 6309 CRB-7-19-2 (December 13, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 43718 (December 18, 2019).
Claimant is surviving spouse of a police officer who had received a § 7-433c award and died after retirement of heart condition. Respondents appealed award on grounds in Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., 323 Conn. 607 (2016) and Staurovsky v. Milford Police Dept., 164 Conn. App. 182 (2016), appeal dismissed, cert. improvidently granted, 324 Conn. 693 (2017) barred relief. CRB affirmed award finding facts and law indistinguishable from Costanzo v. Stamford, 6274 CRB-7-18-5 (May 3, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 42968 (May 20, 2019) and Gentle v. Stamford, 6264 CRB-3-18-4 (May 30, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 43055 (June 12, 2019). Reviewing evidence CRB found sufficient evidence supported trial commissioner’s decision on causation, distinguishing case from Dsupin v. Wallingford, 5757 CRB-8-12-6 (November 1, 2013). See also, Wilson, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-306.
Arlio v. Trumbull, 6284 CRB 4-18-8 (July 25, 2019).
Claimant had compensable hypertension claim and later developed kidney disease. Claimant’s expert opined this was a sequela of the hypertension and commissioner found kidney disease compensable under § 7-433c, respondent appealed and CRB affirmed; respondent’s reliance on a Holston argument against compensability inconsistent with Dickerson v. Stamford, 6215 CRB-7-17-8 (September 12, 2018), appeal transferred, S.C. 20244 (January 30, 2019) and Coughlin v. Stamford, 6218 CRB-5-17-9 (February 15, 2019), appeal transferred, S.C. 20319 (June 26, 2019). See also, Arlio, § 31-275 (1); § 31-301 Factual findings.
Gentle v. Stamford, 6264 CRB 3-18-4 (May 30, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 43055 (June 12, 2019).
Dependent widow had been receiving survivorship benefits subsequent to husband’s demise. Husband had received award for § 7-433c benefits. Subsequent to Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., 323 Conn. 607 (2016), respondents terminated benefits. Commissioner found that Holston did not bar award of survivorship benefits. On appeal CRB affirmed decision, finding case indistinguishable on the facts and the law from Costanzo v. Stamford, 6274 CRB-7-18-5 (May 3, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 42968 (May 20, 2019).
Costanzo v. Stamford, 6274 CRB-7-18-5 (May 3, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 42968 (May 20, 2019).
Original claimant was Stamford police officer who had compensable heart and hypertension claim and post retirement he died and his dependent spouse obtained survivorship benefits. Subsequent to court decisions in Holston v. New Haven, 5940 CRB-3-14-5 (May 27, 2015), aff’d, 323 Conn. 607 (2016) and Staurovsky v. Milford Police Dept., 164 Conn. App. 182 (2016), respondent filed Form 36 to terminate benefits. Trial commissioner denied this motion. CRB affirmed this decision on appeal. Survivor benefits are derivative of the original claim, Biederzycki v. Farrel Foundry & Machine Co., 103 Conn. 701 (1926) and pursuant to McCullough v. Swan Engraving Inc., 320 Conn. 299 (2016), original claim preserves jurisdiction over a survivor claim. Jones v. Redding, 296 Conn. 352 (2010), stands for principle that future court decisions cannot undo an existing vested claim. See also, Costanzo, § 31-306.
Martinoli v. Stamford Police Dept., 6271 CRB-7-18-5 (April 24, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 42889 (May 2, 2019).
Claimant had compensable § 7-433c claim filed while police officer and sustained atrial fibrillation and a stroke after retirement. Parties stipulated this injury was caused by the prior compensable heart disease. Commissioner found post-retirement heart disease was compensable manifestation of approved claim. Respondent appealed claiming Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., 5940 CRB-3-14-5 (May 27, 2015), aff’d, 323 Conn. 607 (2016) and Staurovsky v. Milford Police Dept., 164 Conn. App. 182 (2016), appeal dismissed, 324 Conn. 695 (2017), rendered claim noncompensable. For similar reasons as cited in Dickerson v. Stamford, 6215 CRB-7-17-8 (September 12, 2018), appeal transferred, S.C. 20244 (January 30, 2019), CRB affirmed award to claimant.
Mangione v. West Hartford, 6268 CRB-6-18-4 (April 12, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 42883 (May 1, 2019).
Motion for extension of time to file motion to correct filed within appeal period rendered the appeal timely. See also, Mangione, § 3-301 Appeal procedure.
Perry v. Danbury, 6209 CRB-4-17-8 (February 25, 2019).
Claimant filed claim for § 7-433c benefits within one year of when he testified he had been diagnosed for hypertension. Respondents argued that over one year earlier he had been examined repeatedly for elevated blood pressure readings, had discussed possible medication with physician, and physician would have explained reason for repeated examinations. Trial commissioner accepted this version of events and determined pursuant to Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) claim was untimely. CRB affirmed on appeal. See also, Perry, § 31-294c; § 31-301 Factual findings.
Coughlin v. Stamford, 6218 CRB-5-17-9 (February 15, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 42668 (March 5, 2019).
Respondent municipality challenged commissioner’s award of § 7-433c benefits to claimant who successfully prosecuted claim for hypertension while employed and developed coronary artery disease post retirement. Respondents contended that pursuant to Holston v. New Haven, 5940 CRB-3-14-5 (May 27, 2015), aff’d, 323 Conn. 607 (2016), and Staurovsky v. Milford, 5906 CRB-4-14-1 (January 30, 2015), rev’d, 164 Conn. App. 182 (2016), appeal dismissed, cert. improvidently granted, 324 Conn. 695 (2017), claimant’s coronary artery disease constituted “separate and distinct pathology” requiring new notice of claim. CRB affirmed, distinguishing Holston on basis that hypertension claim in Holston was unperfected and untimely and Staurovsky on basis that instant claimant manifested both disease of hypertension and associated disability while still employed. CRB was also not persuaded that Holston analysis regarding initiation of § 7-433c claims was applicable to matters implicating causation, and noted that Holston court did not conclude that claimant was barred from seeking benefits for coronary artery disease because medical evidence indicated claimant’s hypertension had been significant contributing factor to development of coronary artery disease. See also, Coughlin, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Vitti v. Milford, 6246 CRB-4-18-2 (January 17, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 42543 (January 30, 2019).
CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that permanent partial disability rating should be on the transplanted heart and not his native heart pursuant to § 31-308(b). See also, Vitti, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-308(b).
Dickerson v. Stamford, 6215 CRB-7-17-8 (September 12, 2018), appeal pending, A.C. 42161 (September 28, 2018).
Claimant had perfected claim for hypertension and then years later sustained a myocardial infarction. Claimant did not file a new notice of claim after the infarction. Respondents argued that pursuant to Holston v. New Haven, 5940 CRB-3-14-5 (May 27, 2015), aff’d, 323 Conn. 607 (2016) claimant was obligated to file a new notice of claim. After considering joint stipulation of facts trial commissioner agreed with respondent and dismissed claim. Claimant appealed arguing case was a sequalae of initial perfected claimed injury and under Chapter 568 no new claim was required. CRB reversed and remanded. Pursuant to cases such as Brocuglio v. Thompsonville Fire District #2, 6165 CRB-1-16-12 (December 21, 2017), appeal pending, A.C. 41237 (January 9, 2018) and McGinty v. Stamford Police Department, 6197 CRB-4-17-6 (July 17, 2018), trial commissioner must engage in a independent review of the facts to determine if the claimant sustained a “new injury” and the equivocal stipulation provided did not enable her to engage in such inquiry.
McGinty v. Stamford Police Department, 6197 CRB-4-17-6 (July 17, 2018).
Claimant sustained peripheral vascular disease and then subsequently coronary artery disease. Filed claim for coronary artery disease. Trial commissioner found claim compensable. The respondents appealed contending that the claimant’s ailment was systemic and, therefore, did not constitute compensable heart disease, citing Brooks v. West Hartford, 4907 CRB-6-05-1 (January 24, 2006). CRB found case clearly distinguishable from Brooks and more congruent with Brocuglio v. Thompsonville Fire District #2, 6165 CRB-1-16-12 (December 21, 2017), appeal pending, A.C. 41237 (January 9, 2018), in which the trial commissioner determined that the claimant’s mitral valve ailment was separate from and unrelated to his prior hypertension and pericarditis.
Korn v. Guilford, 6178 CRB-3-17-3 (March 21, 2018).
Claimant appealed commissioner’s conclusion that claimant did not suffer from hypertension during stress test in 2001 when claimant experienced elevated blood pressure readings. CRB affirmed, noting that record was ambiguous regarding whether treating physician had prescribed Atenolol to treat exercise induced hypertension or palpitations caused by Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome. CRB also noted that treating physician testified that diagnosis of hypertension was predicated on claimant’s narrative. CRB affirmed trier’s rejection of contention that exercise-induced hypertension constitutes “covered condition” as contemplated by General Statutes § 7-433c in light of expert testimony indicating that exercise induced hypertension is a risk factor for hypertension. Respondent filed post-judgment motion seeking affirmance of trier’s dismissal on alternative grounds that notice of claim was untimely. CRB declined to address argument, other than to note that respondent’s contentions appeared to be at variance with court’s analysis in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010). See also, Korn, § 31-301. Factual Findings.
Brocuglio v. Thompsonville Fire District #2, 6165 CRB-1-16- 12 (December 21, 2017).
Claimant sustained cardiac event and filed for § 7-433c benefits. Respondent argued that as claimant had prior incident of pericarditis for which he had not filed a claim, that claim for heart disease now was untimely under § 31-294c and precedent in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 5098 CRB-3-06-6 (April 1, 2008), rev’d, 299 Conn. 265 (2010). Trial commissioner determined that expert opinion supported finding claimant’s earlier pericarditis was unrelated to current ailment and had resolved earlier, and that precedent in McNerney v. New Haven, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 330, 2098 CRB-3-94-7 (June 25, 1996) made new cardiac event compensable. Respondent appealed and CRB determined Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., 5940 CRB-3-14-5 (May 27, 2015), aff’d, 323 Conn. 607 (2016), was directly on point and supported trial commissioner’s decision.
Vitti v. Milford, 6066 CRB-4-15-12 (April 21, 2017).
After remand, trial commissioner concluded claimant’s Giant Cell Myocarditis was a “heart disease” under terms of the statute, finding claimant’s treating physician persuasive. On appeal, respondent challenged decision to apply 2010 version of statute to the claim and adequacy of claimant’s evidence. CRB determined that as it had determined in Vitti v. Milford, 5877 CRB-4-13-8 (September 16, 2014) “date of injury” rule applied this was the “law of the case.” CRB also relied on O’Brien v. Stamford Fire Department, 5945 CRB-7-14-7 (September 11, 2015) as supportive of result in this case. See also, Vitti, § 31-301 Appeal procedure.
Stackpole v. Stamford, 6062 CRB-7-15-12 (November 17, 2016), appeal pending AC39872.
Claimant filed for heart and hypertension benefits, respondents argued that there was evidence of hypertension in pre-employment physical and the claimant had been diagnosed with hypertension more than one year before filing his claim. Trial commissioner was not persuaded and awarded benefits. CRB affirmed decision, finding circumstances similar to Kohn v. Wilton, 5894 CRB-7-13-11 (March 11, 2015) and Conroy v. Stamford, 5900 CRB-7-13-12 (November 24, 2014).
Brennan v. Waterbury, 6065 CRB-5-15-12 & 5996 CRB-5-15-3 (October 31, 2016), appeal pending AC 39819.
Trial commissioner granted motion to substitute widow of original claimant as claimant as the executrix of his estate and directed unpaid balance of the permanent partial disability award to be paid to the estate. City appealed arguing that pursuant to Morgan v. East Haven, 208 Conn. 576 (1988) an estate is not a legally qualified recipient of funds from an award under § 7-433c C.G.S. Claimant argued subsequent legislative amendments overruled Morgan. CRB concluded that they did not and that as Morgan was still good law matter must be remanded to ascertain appropriate beneficiaries under statute. City also challenged the substance of the permanency award but CRB found trial commissioner justified reliance on a medical opinion he found persuasive. CRB also remanded for calculation of benefits. See also, Brennan, § 31-275(19); § 31-308(b).
Collins v. Wilton, 6023 CRB-7-15-8 (August 19, 2016), appeal withdrawn, 39587 (2017).
Respondent municipality challenged trial commissioner’s determination that § 7-433c C.G.S. claim for heart disease benefits was timely; respondent also claimed as error trier’s refusal to apply rebuttable presumption imposed by P.A. 92-81which was in effect when claimant was hired but had been abolished prior to claimant’s date of injury. CRB affirmed, noting that although medical reports in evidence indicate that doctors informed claimant about elevated blood pressure readings and attempted to address condition with lifestyle modifications, it was not improper for trier to rely upon deposition testimony in order to determine precise date when claimant was diagnosed with hypertension. CRB also held that trier correctly concluded that rebuttable presumption was inapplicable, noting that neither language of § 7-433c nor relevant precedent suggests that date of hire should supplant customary reliance upon date of injury rule in determining which version of statute applies. See also, Collins, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Liano v. Bridgeport, 6010 CRB-4-15-4 (April 22, 2016).
Claimant appealed from denial of bid for temporary total disability benefits. He has had a long standing claim for an injury in the 1970’s, and argued trial commissioner failed to properly apply law in force at that time. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Statutory interpretation used by trial commissioner is the “law of the case”, see Liano v. Bridgeport, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (1999). Claimant’s argument that Second Circuit opinion in Green v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F3rd 142 (1995) compels reversal of trial commissioner unpersuasive; Green case only addressed the Internal Revenue Code and did not address precedent such as Revoir v. New Britain, 2 Conn. App. 255 (1984) requiring similarly situated claimants to prove disability. Medical evidence credited by trial commissioner supported her conclusion that claimant’s incapacity was due to factors beyond his cardiac injuries and his cardiac condition had not deteriorated. See also, Liano, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-307.
O’Brien v. Stamford Fire Department, 5945 CRB-7-14-7 (September 11, 2015).
Claimant sought benefits for hypertension and arrhythmia. Trial commissioner found hypertension compensable and denied claim for arrhythmia. Claimant appealed arguing that pursuant to Salmeri v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 4066 CRB-5-99-6 (August 9, 2000), aff’d, 70 Conn. App. 321 (2002), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919 (2002) he established his arrhythmia claim was compensable. CRB remanded as trial commissioner found witness who opined as to claimant’s arrhythmia credible on other issues and did not rule on his testimony on this issue, nor was it clear the standard in Salmeri was applied.
Holston v. New Haven, 5940 CRB-3-14-5 (May 27, 2015), appeal pending, 38012.
Respondent municipality appealed trial commissioner’s determination that § 7-433c C.G.S. claim for heart disease benefits was timely, contending that evidentiary record contained medical report indicating doctor had diagnosed Stage I hypertension in 2009 and testimony from medical experts opining that claimant’s pre-existing hypertension was significant contributing factor to claimant’s heart disease and myocardial infarction. However, expert testimony also indicated there were additional substantial contributing factors to claimant’s heart disease and record contained no evidence that claimant had been diagnosed with heart disease prior to myocardial infarction. CRB affirmed, holding that evidentiary record in its totality provided reasonable basis for inference that claimant’s hypertension and heart disease were “two separate maladies” and claimant’s notice of claim for heart disease was therefore timely. Claimant cross-appealed, challenging trier’s determination that § 7-433c C.G.S. claim for hypertension benefits was untimely filed. Record indicated that although treating physician could not recall “exact details” of conversation he had with claimant at time of diagnosis, doctor testified it was his standard protocol to discuss diagnoses of hypertension when made. CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s notice of claim for § 7-433c C.G.S. hypertension benefits was untimely in accordance with Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010). See also, Holston, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Kohn v. Wilton, 5894 CRB-7-13-11 (March 11, 2015).
Respondent appealed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s pre-employment physical in 1976 revealed no evidence of heart disease or hypertension and claim for § 7-433c C.G.S. benefits in 2007 was therefore timely. Record indicated that doctor who performed pre-employment physical recorded a blood pressure reading of 120/90 but reported that claimant’s examination was normal and claimant was qualified for position as fireman. CRB affirmed, noting that no additional information from examining physician was submitted into record, claimant’s treating physician since 2002 was equivocal as to whether he ever informed claimant he was hypertensive, and claimant testified that prior to the angiogram of 2007, despite elevated blood pressure readings over the years, he was never told he had hypertension or heart disease or instructed to make lifestyle changes. See also, Kohn, § 31-294c(a), § 31-301 Factual findings.
Staurovsky v. Milford - Police Department, 5906 CRB-4-14-1 (January 30, 2015), appeal pending, AC 37670.
Claimant was long time police officer, retired for non-medical reasons, and sustained heart attack about one month after retirement. Claimant had experienced no cardiac disability while employed, but filed for heart & hypertension benefits as doctor opined he sustained cardiac injury prior to retirement. Respondents cited Gorman v. Waterbury, 4 Conn. App. 226 (1985) as standing for the proposition that unless a claimant is disabled with a cardiac illness or hypertension while employed as a police officer or fire fighter they lack standing to receive an award under § 7-433c C.G.S. Trial commissioner originally accepted this position; but granted a motion for reconsideration finding that pursuant to Arborio v. Windham Police Department, 103 Conn. App. 172 (2007) disability was not a prerequisite to filing a § 7-433c claim. Respondents appealed award and CRB affirmed award. Arborio and Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) stand for proposition that claimant has one year from sustaining an injury to file a claim for benefits. CRB determined this was not terminated due to the claimant not sustaining a disability prior to his retirement. See also, Staurovsky, § 31-298.
Conroy v. Stamford, 5900 CRB-7-13-12 (November 24, 2014).
Respondent appealed trial commissioner’s determination that § 7-433c C.G.S. claim brought by Deputy Fire Chief was timely filed. Record indicated that although claimant had history of elevated blood pressure readings and treating physician had recommended lifestyle changes in 2008, claimant did not file notice of claim until after hospitalization for high blood pressure four years later. CRB affirmed, noting that in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010), Supreme Court held that one-year statute of limitations in hypertension cases does not commence until medical professional informs claimant of hypertension diagnosis and record contained unambiguous testimony from treating physician that he had not diagnosed claimant with systemic hypertension prior to claimant’s hospitalization. See also, Conroy, § 31-294c(a); § 31-301 Factual findings.
Vitti v. Milford, 5877 CRB-4-13-8 (September 16, 2014).
Issue presented for review was whether the trial commissioner erred in failing to find the respondent municipality successfully rebutted the presumption of compensability pursuant to § 7-433c(b) Rev. 1992. The claimant’s claim for benefits was prompted by the claimant’s development of a heart condition resulting from a very rare condition, Giant Cell Myocarditis. As a result of claimant’s cardiac symptoms he underwent a heart transplant. The date of injury was determined to be in 2010 and thus, the CRB held that the law of the date of injury applied and § 7-433c Rev. 2010 was the controlling statute. Thus, the trial commissioner’s ruling was vacated and further proceedings consistent with the compensation review board’s opinion were directed.
Henry v. Ansonia, 5832 CRB-4-13-4 (August 6, 2014).
On remand from CRB, trial commissioner reached determination as to whether claimant’s § 7-433c claim was jurisdictionally valid. Claimant had felt ill and was transported by co-worker to hospital, and was not diagnosed with hypertension until later date. Claimant had not filed Form 30C within one year of those events, but claimed as employer “furnished medical care” notice statute had been satisfied. Trial commissioner concluded to contrary and dismissed claim due to noncompliance with notice statute. CRB affirmed decision, distinguishing case on the facts from Hodges v. Federal Express Corporation, 5717 CRB-7-12-1 (January 4, 2013). See also, Henry, § 31-294c.
Arsenault v. Shelton, 5679 CRB-4-11-9 (September 6, 2012).
Respondent municipality challenged trial commissioner’s decision to exclude claimant’s service-connected retirement pension earnings from calculations for temporary partial disability benefits. CRB affirmed pursuant to Rinaldi v. Enfield, 82 Conn. App. 505 (2004) in which Appellate Court distinguished between treatment of service-connected pensions and disability pensions when calculating temporary partial disability benefits. CRB found trier properly rejected respondent’s assertion that decision violated public policy against double recovery given that § 7-433b (b) C.G.S. prevents claimants who bring claims under § 7-433c C.G.S. from receiving “windfalls.” CRB held that depriving claimants who receive service connected retirement pensions of § 31-308a C.G.S. benefits would punish claimants for having been injured. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of respondent’s Motion to Correct. See also, Arsenault, § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-308a.
Neron v. City of Meriden, 5689 CRB-8-11-10 (September 4, 2012).
Claimant was auxiliary police office for City of Meriden prior to July 1, 1996. He claimed that he was within the scope of municipal heart and hypertension act. Trial commissioner found terms of the statute limited coverage to those who were “regular members of a paid police department.” Based on the facts of this case, where claimant was not paid and had limited hours and duties, claimant was not a “regular member” and not within scope of statute. CRB affirmed decision on appeal. Claimant’s focus on police certification immaterial, commissioner could appropriately focus inquiry on actual duties performed. In addition, record indicated claimant had not had pre-employment physical performed. CRB found this as an indicia claimant was not deemed a “regular member” of police force. Claimant’s reliance on Genesky v. East Lyme, 4600 CRB-8-02-12 (December 8, 2003), aff’d, 275 Conn. 246 (2005), and Bucko v. New London, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Ops. 112, (December 5, 1986), aff’d, 13 Conn. App. 556 (1986) unpersuasive; cases too dissimilar to support reversal of commissioner’s decision.
Tesla v. City of Bridgeport, 5460 CRB 4-09-5 (August 26, 2011).
Claimant filed for heart & hypertension benefits and respondents obtained dismissal at trial level; asserting claim was filed too late. Claimant appealed asserting Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) would cause claim to be found timely. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Applying Ciarlelli to facts on record still supports dismissal; claimant had received unequivocal diagnosis of hypertension more than one year prior to filing claim. CRB rejected claimant’s argument Ciarlelli stood for a “medication standard” wherein only prescription of medication triggered obligation to file a claim; plain language of Supreme Court decision stood for “diagnosis standard.” See also, Tesla, § 31-294c.
Rodriguez v. City of Bridgeport, 5577 CRB 4-10-7 (July 27, 2011).
Claimant filed notice of claim for § 7-433c claim; respondent argued claim was untimely, pointing to numerous high blood pressure readings known to claimant more than one year prior to filing claim. Claimant argued he filed claim within one year of being diagnosed with hypertension. Trial commissioner dismissed claim as untimely. Claimant appealed, claiming decision inconsistent with Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010). CRB ordered remand. Decision not reached applying appropriate test, trial commissioner must apply test in Savo v. Bridgeport, 5451 CRB 4-09-4 (July 8, 2011) to evidence on record. See also, Rodriguez, § 31-294c.
Savo v. City of Bridgeport, 5451 CRB 4-09-4 (July 8, 2011).
Claimant filed for § 7-433c benefits. Respondent claimed claim untimely, citing numerous high blood pressure readings by physician more than one year prior to filing claim. Respondent’s expert said claimant should have been diagnosed with hypertension years earlier. Trial commissioner found claim untimely and dismissed claim, as he found claimant’s testimony he was unaware he was hypertensive at earlier dates not credible. Claimant appealed. CRB remanded matter for new findings. While Finding & Dismissal might well have been sound under prior precedent, Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010), establishes new test for when a § 7-433c C.G.S. claim is jurisdictionally timely. Trial commissioner directed to determine specific date claimant diagnosed with or treated for hypertension. See also, Savo, § 31-294c C.G.S.
Rizzo v. State/Judicial Department, 5522 CRB-6-10-1 (January 10, 2011).
Respondent appealed trier’s conclusions that claimant’s § 5-145a claim was timely filed and respondent failed to rebut presumption that claimant’s heart disease was causally connected to his employment as a Judicial Marshal. CRB affirmed, relying in part on Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) in which Supreme Court held that one-year statute of limitations in hypertension cases commences when medical professional informs claimant of hypertension diagnosis. CRB determined that medical record did not support respondent’s contention that claimant’s heart disease pre dated his employment as Judicial Marshal or that claimant received a definitive diagnosis of heart disease prior to his emergency medical procedures in December 2005. CRB determined trier’s findings relative to subject matter jurisdiction were legally sufficient and affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct, concluding that although trier inaccurately used term “heart attack” and quoted an incorrect date of hire in his findings, both errors were harmless. See also, Rizzo, § 5-145a, § 31-294c(a), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-3, § 31-301-4.
Luddy v. New Britain, 5447 CRB-8-09-3 (April 12, 2010).
Trial commissioner concluded employee who received heart /hypertension benefits could not receive continued health insurance benefits due to ERISA. On appeal, CRB reversed. Plain language of ERISA clearly exempts public sector employees. See also, Luddy, § 31-284b.
Gladstone v. Stamford, 5427 CRB-7-09-02 (January 13, 2010), aff’d, 125 Conn. App. 907 (2011)(Per Curiam).
Matter remanded for jurisdictional question. Respondent argued claimant’s hypertension claim untimely as claimant had scienter of high blood pressure problems more than one year prior to bringing claim. Trial Commissioner believed claimant, who testified he had not been advised of hypertension and discounted treating physician’s testimony; thus finding claim timely. Respondent appealed. CRB upheld decision. Job of trial commissioner is to weigh evidence. Claimant presented evidence he did not know of hypertension prior to filing his claim, thus result is consistent with precedent in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 5098 CRB-3-06-6 (April 1, 2008).
Smith v. Waterbury, 5326 CRB-5-08-03 (February 4, 2009).
Trial commissioner concluded evidence did not support finding that claimant was totally disabled. CRB upheld. See also Smith, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.
Gioelli v. Stamford, 5313 CRB-7-08-1 (December 23, 2008).
Claimant filed for heart and hypertension after being prescribed medication for hypertension. Trial Commissioner found claimant had numerous elevated blood pressure readings years earlier and had been directed to take diet and lifestyle changes. Trial commissioner found claim untimely. CRB upheld. Case indistinguishable from Chernak v. Stamford Police Department, 5012 CRB-7-05-10 (December 13, 2006).
Jones v. Redding, 5223 CRB-7-07-4 (October 15, 2008), aff’d, 296 Conn. 352 (2010).
Parties entered into two stipulated agreements to pay claimant heart and hypertension benefits pursuant to § 7 433c C.G.S. Following publication of Genesky v. East Lyme, 4600 CRB 8 02 12 (December 8, 2003), employer sought to modify awards pursuant to provisions of § 31-315 C.G.S. arguing that trier never had subject matter jurisdiction to approve the awards because provisions of § 7- 433c C.G.S. were not applicable to the Redding police department. Trier agreed both stipulated agreements were void ab initio but, per Salmeri v. Department of Public Safety, 70 Conn. App. 321 (2002), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919 (2002), determined claimant’s initial incorrect selection of statutory remedy was irrelevant and, per DeMello v. Cheshire, 3633 CRB-8-97-6 (August 26, 1998), claimant’s Form 30C provided employer with sufficient notice of his application for benefits. Trier ordered parties to administer claim as if it had been brought pursuant to Chapter 568; trier also concluded respondent employer had improperly terminated payments and ordered further proceedings to determine amount of additional benefits due the claimant. CRB found conditions for modification pursuant to § 31-315 C.G.S. were not satisfied, in that publication of Genesky neither constituted a “changed condition of fact” nor warranted extension of equitable relief to respondents because of accident, mistake of fact, or fraud. CRB reversed and remanded. See also, Jones, § 31-294c, § 31 296 (discontinuance of payments), § 31-315.
Wabno v. Derby, 5283 CRB-4-07-10 (September 12, 2008), aff’d, 133 Conn. App. 232 (2012), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 931 (2012).
Claimant sought hypertension benefits in 2005. Respondents argued claim was untimely pursuant to §31-294c C.G.S. Trial Commissioner concluded claimant had been treated for hypertension between 1999 and 2004, and determined claim was untimely. Claimant appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Case on the facts is indistinguishable from Chernak v. Stamford-Police Department, 5012 CRB-7-05-10 (December 13, 2006). Appellate Court affirmed finding decision consistent with subsequent standard in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010). See also Wabno, § 31-294c C.G.S.
Biehn v. Bridgeport, 5232 CRB-4-07-6 (September 11, 2008).
CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant developed hypertension during pregnancy in 2001 which in subsequent years appeared to resolve only with medication. Trier determined claimant’s application for benefits filed in September of 2004 was untimely. Claimant argued McNerney v. New Haven, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 330, 2098 CRB-3-94-7 (June 25, 1996) (ten year lapse between manifestations of claimant’s hypertension symptoms led to finding that second manifestation was new injury) should have controlled. Claimant also filed Motion for Articulation seeking clarification of the category of injury, per § 31-294c, trier had used to determine applicable statute of limitations, which motion was denied. See also, Biehn, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Young v. Bridgeport, 5266 CRB-4-07-08 (August 22, 2008).
CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion claimant met requirements of passing a physical exam that did not show evidence of hypertension. The claimant underwent 2 physical exams in the course of his hiring. The first exam administered in September, 1976 showed a blood pressure reading of 140/90. However, due to a federal lawsuit and a court imposed injunction on hiring of firefighters, the claimant was not hired until August 1977. In June, 1977 another examination was performed as the first examination’s results were deemed stale. The second exam showed claimant’s blood pressure was 130/82. Respondent argued that the first exam showed evidence of hypertension and thus, claimant ineligible for 7-433c benefits. CRB held that under plain meaning rule the relevant exam results were those of the exam performed “on entry” into the fire department. The exam which most closely satisfied that criteria was the June 1977 examination. See also, Young, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Thompson v. New Canaan, 5228 CRB-7-07-5 (August 21, 2008).
CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim for lack of jurisdiction. Trier determined notice of claim was untimely as claimant was diagnosed with hypertension in May of 2003 but did not file application for benefits until June of 2004. Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct because proposed corrections primarily sought to reconfigure factual findings in a light more favorable to claimant. See also, Thompson, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.
McCarthy v. East Haven, 5174 CRB-3-06-12 (May 22, 2008).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that consistent high blood pressure readings were symptoms of hypertension requiring claimant to file notice of claim more than one year prior to actual filing. Board discussed inapplicability of repetitive trauma injury classification to § 7-433c hypertension claims, expanding on discussion in Ciarlelli, infra. Incorporation of scienter requirement into determination of statute of limitations for filing claim is necessary, as workplace exposure to trauma (which would be the trigger under chapter 568) is not required under § 7-433c, and cases have held that disability need not exist before notice must be filed. Claimant did not meet burden of proving that statute of limitations had been satisfied here. Ultimate decision was dependent on trier’s credibility assessments as to medical evidence. See McCarthy, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Brymer v. Clinton, 5135 CRB-3-06-9 (April 23, 2008), rev’d, 302 Conn. 755 (2011).
Claimant’s doctor, K., diagnosed hypertension in June 2000, discussed it with claimant, and stated that medication would be prescribed if blood pressure remained high. When pressure showed a decrease at July 2000 examination (though diastolic reading was a bit high), K. stated no further treatment was necessary. Claimant was diagnosed with hypertension by a different physician in July 2003. Trier found claimant was not credible in testifying that he was not made aware of hypertension diagnosis in June 2000, and found that the June 2000 medical exam and report were credible. Trier did not rely on subsequent testimony by K. stating that claimant was not hypertensive for multi-year period between 1995 and 2002, and agreeing that claimant did not have hypertension that should have been treated medically in 2000, beyond the one high blood pressure reading. Whether or not blood pressure reading constituted evidence of hypertension was a factual question, and trier was entitled to rely on medical report of K. while placing his testimony in context and giving it less weight. Supreme Court reversed on appeal; found result inconsistent with Ciarlelli v. Hamden 299 Conn. 265 (2010).
Gladstone v. Stamford, 5124 CRB-7-06-8 (April 23, 2008).
See, Gladstone, § 31-294c (by requesting informal hearing, claimant tolled statute of limitations for filing hypertension claim); § 31-301-9 (denial of motion to submit additional evidence).
Roohr v. Cromwell, 5122 CRB-8-06-8 (April 23, 2008), aff’d, 302 Conn. 767 (2011).
Claimant presented elevated blood pressure reading and was informed by treating physician that he suffered from hypertension more than one year before filing of claim. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal, and cited Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 5098 CRB-3-06-6 (April 1, 2008), with regard to several of claimant’s legal arguments. Supreme Court affirmed decision; claimant had received hypertension diagnosis more than one year prior to filing his claim.
Casimiro v. Westport, 5099 CRB-4-06-6 (April 25, 2008).
CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that § 7-433c claim was timely filed. Commissioner was entitled to find credible claimant’s testimony that he did not know about high blood pressure readings or hypertension prior to June 2001, even though claimant’s doctor testified that he had told claimant about high blood pressure, and doctor’s notes indicate awareness of high readings in 1998-2000. Claimant testified that he was told by doctor that his ocular blood vessels showed no signs of high blood pressure, and EKG results were normal. Doctor also testified that he had no specific recall telling claimant he had hypertension, instead stating that if his notes said “hypertension,” it means that he discussed it. Trier not required to explain basis of credibility determination under § 31-301-3.
Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 5098 CRB-3-06-6 (April 1, 2008), rev’d, 299 Conn. 265 (2010).
Trial commissioner dismissed May 2004 notice of hypertension claim as untimely because claimant had “multiple hypertension blood pressure readings” prior to 2003, and was given repeated advice from treating physician that he had “elevated and/or borderline blood pressure readings” and that he should change diet, lose weight, and monitor blood pressure at home. CRB affirmed. Trier was entitled to evaluate credibility of witnesses and medical reports and draw inference that claimant had sufficient notice that symptoms of hypertension were present. CRB undertook detailed discussion of governing law and case history regarding § 7-433c notice, confirming that disability need not exist before claimant is required to file notice of claim, as per Pearce v. New Haven, 76 Conn. App. 441 (2003), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 913 (2003), and Arborio v. Windham Police Dept., 103 Conn. App. 172 (2007). Hypertension claim under § 7-433c could not be classified as repetitive trauma for purposes of defining date of accidental injury, as no actual exposure to workplace trauma exists to trigger statutory definition. DISSENT (Doyle): No evidence that enough information was communicated to claimant to put him on notice that high blood pressure readings were symptoms of hypertension. Supreme Court reversed and held that the statute of limitation for such claims required the filing of a claim within one year from the date the claimant was informed by a medical professional that he suffered from hypertension.
Carter v. Clinton, 5185 CRB-3-07-1 (March 12, 2008), aff’d, 304 Conn. 571 (2012).
See, Carter, § 31-294c (untimely notice filed for allegedly misdiagnosed coronary artery disease claim, and medical care exception was not satisfied).
Balfore v. Windsor Locks, 5024 CRB-1-05-11 (January 31, 2007).
Claimant filed for § 7-433c benefits. Evidence at hearing was claimant had been advised of numerous elevated blood pressure readings during the 1990s and directed to return for additional tests, which claimant neglected. Trial commissioner dismissed claim as untimely under § 31-294c C.G.S. as per Peck and Pearce cases. CRB upheld dismissal. Record indicates that claimant’s filing was untimely even if one applies claimant’s counsel’s view of § 31-294c C.G.S; as facts are virtually identical to Chernak v. Stamford, 5012 CRB-7-05-10 (December 13, 2006), this claim must also be dismissed as untimely.
Chernak v. Stamford, 5012 CRB-7-05-10 (December 13, 2006).
Trial commissioner found notice of claim for hypertension was time barred. Claimant had had a number of elevated blood pressure readings in prior years, was advised to take remedial action, and had not done so. CRB upheld trial commissioner, citing precedent in Kaminski, infra. CRB also rejected argument claim was for repetitive trauma injury; claimant had not pursued that theory of recovery at the formal hearing.
Arborio v. Windham, 5009 CRB-2-05-10 (October 4, 2006).
CRB affirmed commissioner’s determination that § 7-433c hypertension claim was untimely. Relied on legal analysis provided in Kaminski, infra.
Kaminski v. Naugatuck, 4956 CRB-5-05-6 (June 28, 2006).
CRB held that Pearce v. New Haven, 76 Conn. App. 441, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 913 (2003), did not create departure from established case law that should be applied only prospectively. One-year statute of limitation is not mechanically triggered as soon as claimant has high blood pressure reading; as was the case prior to Pearce, reading must be determined to be evidence of hypertension, and isolated event would not trigger duty to file § 7-433c claim. Board also held that, where trier made no finding regarding causal distinction between hypertension and tachycardia claims, trier’s dismissal of hypertension claim as untimely entitled trier to dismiss heart disease claim as well. No discussion in record concerning interrelationship or lack thereof between those symptoms, which were occurring contemporaneously. Claimant did not meet burden of proof that heart disease claim was separate causal entity. See also, Kaminski, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Rigoulot v. Wallingford, 4874 CRB-8-04-10 (March 14, 2006), appeal dismissed, A.C. 27533 (June 15, 2006).
See, Rigoulot, § 31-310 (claimant receiving benefits under § 7-433c is owed concurrent employment benefits from municipality, but Second Injury Fund is not liable to reimburse municipality); § 31-278.
Brooks v. West Hartford, 4907 CRB-6-05-1 (January 24, 2006).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that decedent did not die of heart disease within meaning of § 7-433c. Sarcoidosis is a systemic disease involving body tissues, whereby inflammatory nodules form and invade various organs. Here, nodules took root in claimant’s right ventricle and intraventricular septum, which created electrical conduction problems that stopped heart from functioning. Insufficient evidence to override trier’s interpretation of disease process.
Mattson v. New London, 4711 CRB-2-03-8 (September 28, 2005).
CRB affirmed trier’s finding reasoning heart disease as a separate malady from prior hypertension citing Mayer, 4620 CRB-3-03-2 (March 3, 2004). CRB affirmed trier’s use of date of diagnosis of heart disease as date of injury.
Pribesh v. Bridgeport, 4842 CRB-4-04-8 (August 12, 2005).
Two pre-employment physical examinations were performed in 1987, prior to claimant’s hire. One blood pressure reading of claimant at rest was 132/80, and one was 140/90. All other results of both tests were normal. CRB held that trier did not commit error by failing to construe as evidence of hypertension the 140/90 reading, together with doctor’s description of that reading as “mild hypertensive range.” Other information present in pre-employment physical examinations allowed room for trier to credit lower reading as a more accurate reflection of claimant’s condition, as trier had authority to choose which medical report was more credible. CRB also noted that trier can look at parol or external evidence to help ascertain whether ambiguous information contained within four corners of pre-employment physical exam constitutes evidence of hypertension under circumstances of case.
Hallock v. Westport, 4829 CRB-4-04-7 (July 22, 2005), appeal dismissed, A.C. 26823 (September 26, 2006).
See, Hallock, § 31-294c, § 31-294e.
Scharf v. Seymour, 4767 CRB-5-03-12 (July 15, 2005).
See, Scharf, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Collingwood v. Branford, 4787 CRB-3-04-2 (July 6, 2005).
Municipality was required to provide physical examination to applicant prior to his hire as a uniformed firefighter. Town could not circumvent effects of § 7-433c by omitting exam from hiring process, and then citing claimant’s failure to pass examination as ground for denying hypertension claim.
Peck v. Somers, 4640 CRB-1-03-2 (March 5, 2004).
CRB upheld trial commissioner’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim as untimely. Claimant had knowledge of his hypertension and failed to file notice of claim within a year. See also, Peck, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4. Correction of Finding.
Mayer v. East Haven, 4620 CRB-3-03-2 (March 3, 2004), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 25244 (September 15, 2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 918 (2005).
CRB found § 7-433c claim timely, claimant’s hypertension and heart disease were separate maladies. Section 7-433c does not bar claimant from collecting benefits for heart disease when he was previously diagnosed with hypertension.
Hunt v. Naugatuck, 4607 CRB-5-02-12 (February 9, 2004), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 25129 (April 21, 2004), cert. granted, 269 Conn. 916 (2004), rev’d and remanded Appellate Court’s dismissal for lack of final judgment, 273 Conn. 97 (2005).
CRB found claim for § 7-433c benefits timely. Claimant filed first Form 30C after high blood pressure reading, which could have led to a claim for benefits. Any incorrect date of injury was a defect, rather than a bar to the claim. Respondents had constructive notice of the claim within one year of the date of injury via attendance at informal hearings. Whether pre-employment physical examination revealed any evidence of hypertension or heart disease is a factual issue the trial commissioner reasonably decided. Supreme Court reversed Appellate Court on lack of final judgment issue only and remanded case to Appellate Court to review substance of appellate issues. See also, Hunt, § 31-294c.
Genesky v. East Lyme, 4600 CRB-8-02-12 (December 8, 2003), aff’d, 275 Conn. 246 (2005).
CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that a constable for the municipality was not eligible for benefits as he was not a “regular member of a municipal police department” as that term was construed in Zimmer v. Essex, 38 Conn. Sup. 419 (1982).
Ruffino v. Middletown, 4508 CRB-8-02-3 (March 12, 2003).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s ruling that the claimant was not entitled to a late payment penalty pursuant to § 31-295 and § 31-303 for permanent partial disability benefits where claimant was paid pension benefits during period following approval of a Voluntary Agreement. A period of some four months during which claimant received actual dollar payments although arguably mischaracterized as pension benefits does not constitute a late payment under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See also, Ruffino, § 31-303.
Bergeson v. New London/Police Dept., 4489 CRB-2-02-2 (February 21, 2003), aff’d, 269 Conn. 763 (2004).
Reversal of trier’s order that Second Injury Fund assume liability for COLAs being paid by city to dependent widow as per § 31-306(a)(2)(A). Claim arose under § 7-433c, which takes it outside Workers’ Compensation Act as per McNulty v. Stamford, 37 Conn. App. 835 (1995). See also, Bergeson, § 31-306.
Rinaldi v. Enfield, 4459 CRB-1-01-11(December 27, 2002), aff’d, 82 Conn. App. 505 (2004).
No error where trier allowed respondent to provide claimant with full medical coverage for heart-related care by either paying bills directly, or by instructing claimant to process bills through employer-provided group insurance policy, and reimbursing claimant for co-pay costs. As § 7-433c benefits are not technically workers’ compensation that self-insured employer was obligated to insure under § 31-284, alternate means of paying benefits could be devised by town. However, trier erred by finding that § 7-433b(b) cap did not apply to combination of claimant’s retirement pension and § 31-308a benefit entitlement. See also, Rinaldi, § 31-278, and § 31-308a.
Durso v. New Haven, 4393 CRB-3-01-5 (June 5, 2002).
CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant did not suffer from hypertension, and thus denied claim for hypertension benefits under § 7-433c. Factual issue for trier whether several high blood pressure readings and receipt of prescription for blood pressure medication constitutes high blood pressure.
Pearce v. New Haven, 4385 CRB-3-01-5 (March 28, 2002), aff’d, 76 Conn. App. 441 (2003), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 913 (2003).
CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s consistently high blood pressure readings from 1988-1990 constituted symptoms of hypertension under the circumstances of the case, rendering 1998 notice of claim untimely. Appellate Court stated in affirming that employee need not be disabled at time notice is filed that hypertension- or heart-disease-related symptoms are being experienced, because notice is required to alert employer to potential claim.
Demarest v. Stamford, 4370 CRB-7-01-3 (March 14, 2002).
CRB discussed proper means of calculating § 7-433b(b) cap on compensation, and held that retired Stamford patrol officer’s cap should be based upon salaries of patrol officers at same pay step claimant was at when he retired. See also, Demarest, § 31-278.
Zalot v. Bristol, 4256 CRB-6-00-6 (March 16, 2001).
CRB affirmed ruling that claimant’s prior high blood pressure readings were due to transitory symptoms rather than pathological hypertension; thus, 1997 notice was timely. Case controlled by Elumba v. Stamford, 4084 CRB-7-99-7 (August 10, 2000), infra.
Cefaratti v. Wethersfield, 4179 CRB-6-00-1 (February 27, 2001).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s ruling that claimant’s pre-employment physical revealed no evidence of hypertension, and that respondents had failed to rebut presumption of compensability. Burden is on claimant to establish necessary criteria to qualify for benefits; however, once pre-employment physical has been offered into evidence, trier is not required to construe “borderline” blood pressure readings as hypertensive, as if respondents had benefit of the doubt. Instead, parties stand on equal footing in trying to persuade trier to draw inferences from the readings in evidence. No per se legal hypertension line in Connecticut. Trier entitled to reject opinion of sole doctor who testified that moderately high blood pressure readings were indicative of hypertension. Other doctors found claimant fit for employment and attributed abnormal pressure readings to nerves.
Hyatt v. Milford, 4127 CRB-3-99-9 (November 7, 2000).
CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s dismissal of the claimant’s § 7-433c claim where the claimant’s pre-employment physical examination revealed moderate hypertension. In support of his appeal, the claimant argued that the medical community’s 1976 standard (when the pre-employment physical was performed) did not presume that a 140/86 blood pressure reading indicated hypertension. The trial commissioner fully addressed this issue in his decision, specifically finding that an expert medical witness opined that it was medically reasonable for the claimant’s 140/86 reading to be considered hypertensive in 1976. Moreover, the physician who performed the pre-employment physical indicated on the pre-employment report that the claimant had “mod. hypertension.” Prior decision at Hyatt, 3646 CRB-3-97-7 (August 28, 1998), aff’d, 57 Conn. App. 472 (2000), infra.
Elumba v. Stamford, 4084 CRB-7-99-7 (August 10, 2000).
Medical evidence supported trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s 1984 high blood pressure reading was a transitory symptom related to illness, and fact that medication was provided to treat that condition did not trigger the claimant’s obligation to file a claim for hypertension benefits.
Obier v. North Haven, 4020 CRB-3-99-4 (August 4, 2000).
Trier awarded claimant (dependent widow) benefits under § 7-433c, but held that employer was entitled to a credit for payments made to her under its pension plan. In support of her appeal, claimant contended that she is entitled to receive both workers’ compensation benefits and pension benefits without any offset, and also contended that trial commissioner did not have jurisdiction to interpret the town’s pension plan contract. Board reaffirmed its holding in Sbona v. Middletown, 3449 CRB-8-96-10 (April 23, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 906 (1999)(per curiam) as follows: “Whether a municipal employees’s pension plan may be reduced due to receipt of workers’ compensation benefits is an issue for a superior court to determine.” Discussion regarding legislative history and proposed (but rejected) legislation which would have allowed reduction of heart and hypertension benefits due to receipt of pension benefits.
Auger v. Stratford, 3944 CRB-4-98-12 (January 14, 2000), rev’d, 64 Conn. App. 75 (2001).
See, Auger, § 31-284b, § 31-300, § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments).
Pernacchio v. New Haven, 3911 CRB-3-98-10 (September 27, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 570 (2001).
CRB affirmed conclusion that claimant provided timely notice of hypertension claim pursuant to § 31-294c. See also Pernacchio, § 31-294c.
Krevis v. Bridgeport, 3857 CRB-4-98-7 (August 18, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 328 (2001).
Relying primarily on the interpretation of Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1 (1998), in Czujak v. Bridgeport, 3535 CRB-4-97-2 (June 10, 1998), CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that claimant was not entitled to a retroactive or prospective adjustment to his § 7-433b(b) cap. That issue had been settled in 1989, and was not appealed. See also, Krevis, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, and § 31-307.
Anzidei v. Cheshire, 3782 CRB-8-98-3 (April 23, 1999).
CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim. Two “mildly elevated” blood pressure readings at time of physical examination were evidence of hypertension, as was Acknowledgment of Physical Defect form listing “mild elevation of blood pressure” as defect.
Kelly v. Bridgeport, 3761 CRB-4-98-1 (March 11, 1999), rev’d, 61 Conn. App. 9 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 933 (2001).
See, Kelly, § 31-275(4), § 31-284b.
Graves v. Manchester, 3741 CRB-8-97-12 (February 18, 1999).
See, Graves, § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (approval of).
King v. New Britain, 3703 CRB-6-97-10 (January 12, 1999).
No error in finding that claimant did not receive medical treatment for hypertension before his January 4, 1996 heart attack. Doctor attributed mildly high blood pressure readings to momentary stress, and trier was not required to interpret a 140/90 reading as hypertensive. Evidence supported finding that claimant was not informed of hypertension or treated for such a condition in past. Also, even assuming that doctor placed claimant on low-salt diet, that would not necessarily be medical treatment under § 31-294c. See also, King, § 31-284(a), § 31-294c.
Hyatt v. Milford, 3646 CRB-3-97-7 (August 28, 1998), aff’d, 57 Conn. App. 472 (2000), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 901 (2000).
Claimant filed a Form 30C that, on its face, would have been satisfactory for either a § 7-433 claim or a Chapter 568 claim. He then agreed to an award of § 7-433c benefits. Due to the effects of the § 7-433b(b) cap, the claimant received far less for his specific indemnity award than he would have under Chapter 568. He filed a lawsuit against his employer, which the courts dismissed on the ground that the claimant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See, Hyatt v. City of Milford, 26 Conn. App. 194 (1991), aff’d, 224 Conn. 441 (1993). The claimant then filed with this Commission a motion to reopen the original award, which the trial commissioner denied, stating that the claimant had elected to receive benefits under § 7-433c. CRB affirmed that decision. The principle of election applies here, as a contrary result would leave otherwise settled claims open indefinitely. The claimant did not have the right to proceed under Chapter 568 without first reopening the claim under § 31-315. As for the denial of the motion to reopen, the claimant did not allege a valid ground for reopening the award, and the commissioner did not abuse his discretion. See also, Hyatt, § 31-315.
DeMello v. Cheshire, 3633 CRB-8-97-6 (August 26, 1998).
See, Demello, § 31-294c.
Gillette v. Monroe, 3500 CRB-4-97-1 (July 13, 1998), rev’d, 56 Conn. App. 235 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 932 (2000).
Claimant had surgery at age eight for coarcted descending aorta. Eighteen years later, he joined the Monroe police force. The police surgeon who examined him had also been the claimant’s personal physician since childhood. He stated in a letter that the claimant was in good condition, without elaborating in any way on the claimant’s examination results. In 1994, the claimant developed a heart problem as a result of the aortic valve problem. He also developed hypertension. The trier found that the doctor and claimant both knew of his pre-existing heart disease when he was hired as a police officer, and dismissed the claim for § 7-433c benefits. CRB affirmed trier’s decision. Section 7-433c was not in effect on date of examination, and trier had reason to believe that the claimant’s doctor would have noted a congenital heart defect in his examination had he known it was necessary to provide a thorough description of the claimant’s physical condition. Trier was not limited to language of two-sentence “yes or no” letter under circumstances of this case. (Metro, C., DISSENTING) Trier can not look beyond pre-employment examination itself in deciding whether claimant had heart disease at the time he was hired. His successful passage of the examination should be determinative. Reversed and remanded by Appellate Court, which ruled that the trial commissioner should not have considered information beyond that in the plaintiff’s pre-employment physical examination report. Although § 7-433c was not in effect at time of examination, a similar predecessor was, and the town was on notice that the existence of symptoms of heart disease or hypertension had possible future ramifications.
Czujak v. Bridgeport, 3535 CRB-4-97-2 (June 10, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 789 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 920 (2000).
Claimant’s award was issued in 1984. The trial commissioner ruled that the claimant should have his § 7-433b(b) cap adjusted retroactive to date of Supreme Court’s decision in Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552 (1990), thus including overtime pay in that cap. Commissioner also awarded attorney’s fee and interest for undue delay. CRB reversed. Supreme Court decision in Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1 (1998), holds that an award may not be modified under § 31-315 because of a mistake of law once a final judgment has been rendered. Commissioner’s decision to adjust cap from date of Szudora decision forward must be reversed, along with award of fees and interest. CRB also noted, however, that claimant was entitled to COLAs under § 31-307a since his disability commenced. Case remanded. See also, Czujak, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307a, § 31-315. Subsequent decision at Czujak, 4371 CRB-4-01-3 (April 8, 2002), § 31-297, § 31-301(g).
Sbona v. Middletown, 3449 CRB-8-96-10 (April 23, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 906 (1999)(per curiam).
Whether a municipal employee’s pension plan may be reduced due to receipt of workers’ compensation benefits is an issue for a trial court to determine. The employer is obligated to pay the claimant the full workers’ compensation benefits, and the employer may pursue the reduction of the pension benefits in another forum.
O’Neill v. Danbury, 3510 CRB-7-97-1 (March 31, 1998).
See, O’Neill, § 31-284b.
Tarzia v. Stamford, 3409 CRB-7-96-8 (March 18, 1998).
Trier did not err by finding that claimant suffered from hypertension. No requirement exists that the claimant be treated with medication for symptoms of hypertension in order for a compensable injury to have occurred. Doctor’s reports detailing high readings of diastolic blood pressure supported the trier’s conclusions.
Liano v. Bridgeport, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (1999)(per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999).
The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant was no longer temporarily totally disabled and that the respondents were entitled to a credit for said payments. The CRB dismissed the claimant’s contention that because his claim was made under § 7-433c that therefore the Workers’ Compensation Act (including the procedure for filing a Form 36 and the burden of proof regarding temporary total disability benefits) did not apply to his claim. Claims made under § 7-433c are indeed governed by the procedures contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Subsequent decision at Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999), § 31-300. Prior decisions at Liano, 3299 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-294c, § 31-297, § 31-301. Factual findings; Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-279-3, § 31-298, § 31-307; Liano, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996), infra and at § 31-300, § 31-310.
Leary v. Stamford, 3280 CRB-7-96-3 (September 17, 1997).
No error in commissioner’s finding that claimant timely notified respondent of hypertension claim. No uncontradicted diagnosis of hypertension was made prior to 1993. Blood pressure reading of 140/85 or 140/90 is not a bright hypertension line under Connecticut law, even if some doctors consider it mildly hypertensive. Claimants who are close to the borderline must be evaluated by a doctor based on all factors. See also, Leary, § 31-298.
Tanner v. Wilton, 3197 CRB-7-95-11 (February 5, 1997).
Commissioner erred in dismissing claims for heart attack and stroke. Claim submitted in 1973 for claimant’s first heart attack was not shown to be somehow limited to Chapter 568 claim rather than § 7-433c claim; pursuant to Collins v. West Haven, 210 Conn. 423 (1989), a claimant is not specifically required to refer to heart and hypertension statute in notice of claim for benefits. Commissioner must presume notice legally sufficient; case remanded.
Marone v. Waterbury, 3117 CRB-5-95-7 (January 10, 1997), aff’d, 244 Conn. 1 (1998).
Claimant retired because of hypertension in 1982, and was awarded benefits in 1983. Overtime earnings were not included in claimant’s benefit rate. In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552, ruling that overtime pay should be included in “weekly compensation.” Respondent adjusted claimant’s benefit cap in September 1993 to include overtime, and paid him overtime retroactive to April 17, 1990, the date of the Supreme Court decision. Claimant now seeks overtime not paid between 1982 and 1990. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s rejection of that claim. Commissioner properly applied test in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), to determine that retrospective application of Szudora was inadvisable; key factor was burdensome financial impact on towns and state taxpayers. Moreover, claimant did not appeal 1983 decision on benefit rate, so case had become final; our legal system does not contemplate resurrection of long-settled cases as a corollary to principle that judicial decisions generally apply retroactively. Supreme Court affirmance not based on financial impact factor. Instead, Court held that, as case was not pending when Szudora was decided, the award was final and recalculation was inappropriate. Modification unavailable under § 31-315 for subsequent changes of law, such as the Szudora decision. See also, Marone, § 31-315.
McNerney v. New Haven, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 330, 2098 CRB-3-94-7 (June 25, 1996).
CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s notice of claim was timely. Although the claimant had previously been suffering from hypertension, it was “cured” and his subsequent hypertension constituted a new injury in March of 1991.
Riccio v. Windsor, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 279, 2232 CRB-1-94-12 (June 20, 1996).
The commissioner found that the claimant, a police officer, failed to give notice of his claim for heart and hypertension benefits as required by § 31-294c C.G.S., and therefore dismissed the claim. CRB noted that the Appellate Court recently held that a § 7-433c hypertension claim is not presumed to be an occupational disease. Zaleta v. Fairfield, 38 Conn. App. 1, 7 (1995), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917 (1995). The commissioner specifically found that the employer-provided routine medical examination, along with a referral for an echocardiogram, did not constitute the furnishing of medical treatment so as to obviate the need for filing a proper notice of claim. See also, Riccio, § 31-294c.
Riccitelli v. New Haven, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 138, 2090 CRB-3-94-7 (January 18, 1996), aff’d, 44 Conn. App. 903 (1997)(per curiam).
Claimant was a firefighter for the respondent town, who alleged that he suffered hypertension pursuant to § 7-433c. CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the notice of claim was late, as the statute of limitation began running as of the date claimant was taking prescription medication under his physician’s direction for the treatment of hypertension. The Appellate Court held that a § 7-433c hypertension claim is not presumed to be an occupational disease. Zaleta v. Fairfield, 38 Conn. App. 1, 7 (1995), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917 (1995). As there was no evidence presented that the claimant’s hypertension constituted an occupational disease, nor even any evidence that it was causally related to his employment, the one-year limit applied.
Liano v. Bridgeport, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996).
Fitzgerald, infra, followed regarding inclusion of “outside overtime” in § 7-433b(b) cap. Also, CRB held that Mulligan, 231 Conn. 529 (1994), applies to § 7-433c cases. The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s benefit rate should include both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ overtime pursuant to Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552 (1990) for 1990 onward, but was not entitled to an adjustment in his benefit rate from 1983 to 1990 because he failed to present sufficient evidence regarding overtime for that time period.
These issues were addressed by the Appellate Court in Liano v. Bridgeport, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999). The Appellate Court found Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1 (1998) to be controlling. The Appellate Court explained that the issue to be decided was whether the claimant (Liano’s) case was pending at the time that Szudora was decided by the Supreme Court, and that if it was not pending, then the only way to modify it would be via § 31-315. The Appellate Court held that Liano’s case was not pending when Szudora was issued, because none of the parties had appealed from the trial commissioners’ decisions issued in 1983, 1986, and 1988.
Next, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial commissioner’s decision, which had become final due to lack of an appeal, was not subject to modification based upon a change in legal interpretation (in this case, the Szudora decision) pursuant to § 31-315, citing Marone, supra. The court explained the limits of § 31-315. The court thus reversed the CRB’s decision which allowed the claimant to include overtime wages in the computation of the § 7-433b(b) cap for 1990 onward. See also, Liano, § 31-300, § 31-310. Subsequent decisions at Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999), § 31-300; Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999), § 7-433c; Liano, 3299 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-294c, § 31-297, § 31-301. Factual findings; Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-279-3, § 31-298, § 31-307.
Fitzgerald v. Bridgeport, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 198, 2121 CRB-4-94-8 (July 21, 1995).
Claimant correctly argued that city owed him additional benefits based on failure to include “outside overtime” earned by active police officers in § 7-433b(b) cap on weekly payments. Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552 (1990), controls; commissioner affirmed.
Carriero v. Naugatuck, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 1690 CRB-5-93-4 (May 26, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 773 (1996), rev’d, 243 Conn. 747 (1998).
CRB held that cap under § 7-433b(b) inapplicable to claimant’s retirement pension based solely on length of service. Claimant was not receiving retirement pension under § 7-433c as a result of death or disability, and was not receiving pension from the city or state. Purpose of cap discussed. Reversed by Supreme Court, which held that the § 7-433b(b) cap provision applies to cumulative payments of disability and retirement benefits where, as here, any portion of those payments has been awarded under § 7-433c.
Fortin v. Naugatuck, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48, 1898 CRB-5-93-11 (May 4, 1995).
Commissioner properly awarded benefits under § 7-433c where police officer suffered from hypertension after having successfully passed a physical exam when hired. The only issue which the employer raises on appeal is the contention that the claimant’s hypertension did not constitute a disability because it was controlled by medications and did not cause him to miss any time from work. CRB affirmed award, noting that claimant’s hypertension required medical care and prescription drugs.
Zaleta v. Fairfield, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 125, 1453 CRB-4-92-7 (February 28, 1994), rev’d, 38 Conn. App. 1 (1995), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917 (1995).
CRB held hypertension is an occupational disease governed by a three-year limitation period for filing a claim. Court reversed CRB’s conclusion that hypertension was presumptively an occupational disease based upon language of § 7-433c. Court held claimant failed to produce evidence that hypertension was an occupational disease, therefore three-year statute of limitation did not apply. See also, Zaleta, § 31-294c.
McNulty v. Stamford, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 1332 CRD-7-91-10 (January 26, 1994), rev’d, 37 Conn. App. 835 (1995).
Claim for benefits pursuant to § 7-433c entitles claimant to receive compensation and medical care in the same amount and same manner as provided in Chapter 568. Therefore, dependent widow was entitled to cost of living adjustments and the second injury fund was liable for reimbursement to the employer pursuant to § 31-354. Appellate Court reversed CRB and held § 7-433c is separate and distinct from the Workers’ Compensation Act (Chapter 568). Section 7-433c does not reference the Fund, and clearly limits the source of benefits to be paid by only the municipal employer. Therefore, the Fund cannot be liable for COLAs or any other payments made pursuant to § 7-433c. See also, McNulty, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence, § 31-306. Dependents compensation.
Cooper v. Seymour, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 274, 1336 CRD-5-91-11 (November 19, 1993).
Dependent widow’s claim for § 7-433c benefits denied where pre-employment physical exam revealed an elevated systolic pressure. Trier concluded there was disqualifying evidence of hypertension even though physician who performed the exam concluded the elevated blood pressure reading was not significant in light of other blood pressure readings. CRB affirmed trier’s finding as medical evidence provided a sufficient basis to conclude there was some evidence of hypertension in the pre-employment physical examination. See also, Cooper, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.
Romanski v. West Hartford, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 253, 1222 CRD-1-91-4 (January 13, 1993), aff’d, 34 Conn. App. 307 (1994).
Once claimant is eligible for § 7-433c benefits, he is entitled to benefits identical to those available under Chapter 568, including any under § 31-308(d). See also, Romanski, § 31-308(d) Now § 31-308(c).
Paccadolmi v. Newtown, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 116, 1270 CRD-4-91-8 (May 13, 1992).
CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant knew or should have known he had heart disease as early as 1985 when medical treatment was rendered. Claim filed in 1989 does not meet § 31-294’s statutory limitations.
Murach v. New Britain, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 1172 CRD-6-91-2 (April 20, 1992).
CRB reversed trier’s finding awarding claimant § 7-433c benefits. Trier found 1988 notice of claim timely as hypertension was controlled by medication from 1978 through claimant’s first manifestation of a symptom, an aortic aneurysm in 1988. CRB found first manifestation was in 1978 as claimant’s condition was then disabling as claimant required medication to continue to work. Therefore, notice in 1988 was untimely filed. See also, Murach, § 31-294c and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.
Suprenant v. New Britain, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 250, 1014 CRD-6-90-4 (November 19, 1991), aff’d, 28 Conn. App. 754 (1992).
CRD reversed trier’s finding granting claimant § 7-433c benefits as factual findings revealed there was evidence that claimant had hypertension at the time of his pre-employment physical. A condition precedent to eligibility for § 7-433c benefits is no evidence of hypertension or heart disease at the pre-employment stage. See, Gatewood v. Hartford, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 220, 1006 CRD-1-90-4 (October 21, 1991) and Horkheimer v. Stratford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 139, 163 CRD-4-82 (December 31, 1987).
Gatewood v. Hartford, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 220, 1006 CRD-1-90-4 (October 21, 1991).
Trier’s finding that fireman’s pre-employment physical revealed evidence of hypertension thereby denying claim for § 7-433c benefits based on evidence. See, Horkheimer v. Stratford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 139, 163 CRD-4-82 (December 31, 1987). See also, Gatewood, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Crossway v. Newington, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 167, 978 CRD-6-90-2 (June 28, 1991).
CRD affirmed trier’s finding claimant, a senior canine patrol officer, was not a regular member of the municipality’s police force as the findings are based on sufficient evidence. See also, Crossway, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Traylor v. Poquonnock Bridge Fire District, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 59, 788 CRD-2-88-11 (March 23, 1990).
See, Traylor, § 31-307, § 31-308a.
Deck v. Groton, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 745 CRD-2-88-6 (December 12, 1989).
See, Deck, § 31-294c.
Bellagamba v. Ridgefield, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 113, 708 CRD-7-88-3 (November 30, 1989).
Evidence insufficient to support a claim under § 7-433c where claimant suffered no health impairment, disability or economic loss due to claimed hypertension.
Cousins v. Hartford, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 101, 676 CRD-1-87 (November 8, 1989).
See, Cousins, § 31-294c.
Felia v. Westport, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 84, 703 CRD-4-88-3 (September 25, 1989), aff’d, 214 Conn. 181 (1990).
Section 7-433c benefits include specific indemnity benefits pursuant to § 31-308(d). Section 7-433c benefits are Chapter 568 benefits for the purpose of calculating benefits due.
Deschnow v. Stamford, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 706 CRD-7-88-3 (September 25, 1989), aff’d, 214 Conn. 394 (1990).
See, Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181 (1990), 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 84, 703 CRD-4-88-3 (September 25, 1989) and Griffin v. Groton, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 425 CRD-2-85 (March 23, 1988).
Szudora v. Fairfield, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 72, 681 CRD-8-88-1 (August 28, 1989), aff’d, 214 Conn. 552 (1990).
Remanded. Method of determining cap pursuant to § 7-433b(b) on compensation benefits allowed under heart/hypertension act is to calculate the average weekly earnings, including overtime, of police officers in similar positions during the compensation period.
Costello v. Fairfield, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 629 CRD-4-87 (June 30, 1989), aff’d, 214 Conn. 189 (1990).
Section 7-433b salary cap does not apply to specific indemnity benefits paid to an active working police officer receiving full pay.
Antonucci v. Hartford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 511 CRD-1-86 (July 29, 1988).
Temporary total benefits may be awarded for period during which claimant was to receive permanent partial benefits pursuant to a voluntary agreement where there was a change in claimant’s physical condition, § 31-315.
Macsata v. Stamford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 144, 377 CRD-7-85 (July 22, 1988).
An award for § 7-433c benefits does not require an award for total disability as opposed to permanent partial disability benefits. Matter remanded for finding as to whether disease which preexisted statute’s enactment was worsened after law was in effect.
Connors v. West Haven, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 477 CRD-3-86 (May 20, 1988).
As claimant’s date of disability clearly preceded the effective date of the Act, the commissioner was without jurisdiction to award benefits. CRD remanded to determine if claim was compensable under law in existence at time of myocardial infarction.
Foley v. New Britain, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 404 CRD-7-85, Gavin v. New Britain, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 405 CRD-7-85 (April 28, 1988), no error, 17 Conn. App. 834 (1989)(per curiam).
Trial commissioner found heart attacks suffered by claimants were not causally connected and, therefore, benefits did not lie.
Charland v. Hartford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 417 CRD-1-85 (April 8, 1988).
Found claimant’s aneurysm was not caused by heart disease or hypertension.
Leppert v. Hartford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 58, 408 CRD-1-85 (April 8, 1988), no error, 17 Conn. App. 633 (1989).
Heart and Hypertension Act is substantive and therefore will not be given retroactive application.
Collins v. West Haven, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44 (1988), no error, 210 Conn. 423 (April 7, 1988).
Ruling on a Motion to Reopen is a matter within the trial commissioner’s discretion. Also claimant’s use of Notice of Claim form with language containing term “arising out of and in the course of employment” did not constitute an election of remedies under Chapter 568 when injury was described as “acute myocardial infarction hypertension, heart disease.”
Griffin v. Groton, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 425 CRD-2-85 (March 23, 1988).
Specific award for 25% loss of use of cardiovascular system permitted under Heart and Hypertension Act.
Horkheimer v. Stratford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 139, 163 CRD-4-82 (December 31, 1987).
Trial commissioner erred in awarding benefits where preinduction physical examination showed labile hypertension.
Gimler v. Orange, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 381 CRD-3-85 (June 12, 1987).
A physical examination given to claimant nine months prior to entry on municipal police force by an unrelated private employer did not satisfy statute’s elements.
Marino v. West Haven, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 34, 240 CRD-3-83 (March 16, 1987).
Claimant permitted benefits for cardiac surgery scar.
Bucko v. New London, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 112, 140 CRD-2-82 (December 5, 1986), no error, 13 Conn. App. 566 (1988).
Claimant was appointed a full-time temporary patrolman during World War II and considered a regular member of paid municipal police department. Employment status was full time and claimant was only subject to release if a returning serviceman reclaimed his position and displaced claimant.
Raucci v. West Haven, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 233 CRD-3-83 (November 17, 1986).
Trial commissioner properly dismissed municipality’s appeal that no Chapter 568 ruling will be made where claimant has elected to pursue his claim under § 7-433c.
Murphy v. West Haven, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 126 CRD-3-82 (November 13, 1986).
CRD will not permit multiple reviews in disputes which are ultimately centered on the burden of liability as between municipalities and insurance companies.
Zimmer v. Meriden, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 253 CRD-6-83 (February 5, 1986).
Claimant who held position as Director of Traffic Signals in municipal fire department but was hired as a fireman and wore a fire uniform when required, was entitled to benefits under § 7-433c.
Spragg v. West Haven, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 125 CRD-3-82 (July 27, 1984), no error, 6 Conn. App. 265 (1986), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 805 (1986).
See, Cuccuro, infra.
Cuccuro v. West Haven, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 103 CRD-3-81 (July 27, 1984), no error, 6 Conn. App. 265 (1986), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804 (1986).
Election of remedies under § 7-433c or Chapter 568 is up to the claimant, not the municipal employer. See, Spragg v. West Haven, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, no error, 6 Conn. App. 265 (1986), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 805 (1986).
Gallucci v. Waterbury, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 76, 313 CRD-5-84 (July 24, 1984).
Section 7-433c benefits apply to regular members of municipal police departments which were created by Special Act legislation preceding enactment of Home Rule Act.
Watson v. Bristol, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 76, 315 CRD-6-84 (July 24, 1984).
See, Gallucci, supra.
Piantedosi v. Bridgeport, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 45, 254 CRD-4-83 (May 16, 1984).
Section 7-433b(b) maximum ceiling not applicable to disfigurement award after claimant returns to work.
Kelley v. Waterbury, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 40, 40 CRD-5-80 (November 23, 1983).
While Heart and Hypertension Act cannot be applied retroactively due to substantive nature; where claimant may have been disabled after effective date, case must be remanded for additional fact finding.
Gorman v. Waterbury, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 17, 39 CRD-5-80 (May 20, 1983), no error, 4 Conn. App. 226 (1985).
Heart and Hypertension Act cannot be applied retroactively due to its substantive nature.
Meaney v. Waterbury, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 30 CRD-5-80 (May 20, 1983).
See, Gorman, supra.
Janco v. Fairfield, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 189, 102 CRD-4-81 (September 13, 1982), rev’d and remanded, 39 Conn. Sup. 403 (1983).
Section 31-294 applicable to § 7-433c claims, thus, furnishing of medical care through group health plan was sufficient notice. Appellate court reversed and remanded.
Foley v. New Britain, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 147, 47 CRD-6-81 (August 3, 1982).
Where trial commissioner died prior to ruling on claimant’s Motion to Correct, claimant was entitled to hearing de novo.
Gavin v. New Britain, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 46 CRD-6-81 (August 3, 1982).
See, Foley, supra.
Adams v. New Haven, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 121, 49 CRD-3-81 (March 19, 1982), no error, 39 Conn. Sup. 321 (1983).
Statute cannot be applied retroactively and commission has no jurisdiction to construe benefits under municipal charter.
Moore v. West Haven, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 103, 31 CRD-3-80 (January 25, 1982).
See, Bakelaar, infra.
Cerniglia v. Bristol, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 60 CRD-6-81 (December 29, 1981).
See, Bakelaar, infra.
Zimmer v. Essex, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 71, 42 CRD-2-80 (November 2, 1981), aff’d, 38 Conn. Sup. 419 (1982).
To secure benefits claimant must be a regular member of a police force organized under § 7-274.
LaBoda v. Watertown, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 63, 51 CRD-5-81 (October 26, 1981).
Commissioner has no power to reduce statutory benefits because of other pension or social security benefits, and is not limited to awarding benefits only under § 31-308 C.G.S.
Stachelczyk v. Norwalk, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 51, 19 CRD-7-80 (August 20, 1981).
Evidence of disability required.
Bakelaar v. West Haven, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 27, 8 CRD-3-80 (April 9, 1981), appeal remanded with direction to render judgement, 38 Conn. Sup. 359 (1982), no error on remand, 193 Conn. 59 (1984).
Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear claims brought under § 7-433c and Chapter 568 in the same hearing.