THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Tina Walsh v. William W. Backus Hospital, 5691 CRB-2-11-11 (October 15, 2012).
Claimant asserted that cause of her back injury was a fall from a defective chair at work. Claimant also testified to prior injuries and back pain. Trial commissioner found claimant not a credible witness, and discounted medical opinions supportive of compensability as he did not believe treaters had been provided with accurate medical history. Claimant appealed and also sought to introduce additional medical evidence supportive of compensability. CRB denied motion to admit additional evidence as piecemeal litigation. See also, Walsh, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Gendron v. Griffin Health Services Corporation, 5686 CRB-4-11-10 (October 11, 2012).
In a wide-ranging appeal, claimant challenged trial commissioner’s failure to find respondents unduly delayed indemnity payments and denial of interest, penalties and attorney’s fees. Claimant appealed trier’s determination that hands-free telephone device, IPad and aquatic therapy did not constitute reasonable or necessary medical care such that claimant was entitled to reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs. CRB affirmed findings relative to indemnity payments and medical care, noting that record supported trier’s inferences regarding claimant’s credibility and trier reasonably relied upon evidence in support of respondents’ assertion that indemnity payments were timely. CRB also held that trier reasonably inferred that claimant did not meet burden of proof necessary to establish that medical treatment for which she sought reimbursement satisfied standard for curative care as articulated in Bowen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 60, 232 CRD-1-83 (June 19, 1984). CRB remanded on issue of whether respondents unduly delayed mileage reimbursements as findings suggested trier may not have reviewed all of claimant’s exhibits in support of that claim of error. CRB denied claimant’s two motions to file additional evidence. See also, Gendron, § 31-288; § 31-294d; § 31-300; § 31-301. Factual findings; § 31-301-4; § 31-308(a).
Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc., 5623 CRB-5-11-1 (March 19, 2012).
Respondent employer appealed trier’s determination that termination agreement signed by claimant purporting to release workers’ compensation claim release was unenforceable in workers’ compensation forum. Trier also concluded claimant received no consideration for release of workers’ compensation claim. Record indicated subject agreement was never presented to trial commissioner for approval and employer ultimately instructed claimant to sign agreement or forfeit severance package. CRB affirmed, noting that claimant and his counsel had attempted unsuccessfully to persuade respondent employer to remove release language from agreement and respondent employer declined to send representative to informal hearing scheduled to address whether provision regarding release of workers’ compensation claim was enforceable absent trial commissioner approval. CRB also held that claimant’s testimony regarding his understanding of method by which respondent employer generally calculated severance packages provided adequate basis for trier’s inference that claimant was not paid consideration for release of workers’ compensation claim. CRB denied respondent employer’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence on basis that proposed testimony of claimant’s supervisor could have been provided during proceedings below. See also, Leonetti, § 31-278; § 31-290; § 31-296; § 31-298.
Jodlowski v. Stanley Works, 5627 CRB-6-11-2 (March 13, 2012).
Claimant sought to add medical records from social worker on appeal. CRB denied motion; no evidence this information could not have been presented at the formal hearing. See also, Jodlowski, § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings.
Anderson v. Target Capital Partners, 5615-CRB-6-10-12 (January 3, 2012).
CRB denied motion to add report of treating physician prepared in 2011 to address whether Form 36 filed in 2008 should be granted. See also, Anderson, § 31-301; § 31-301-3; § 31-301-4; § 31-307.
Lamothe v. Citibank, N.A., 5550 CRB-8-10-5 (October 12, 2011).
Claimant appealed Finding and Award in which trial commissioner declined to enter written award of compensability following respondents’ proffer of voluntary agreement. Claimant also appealed trial’s failure to sanction respondents for unreasonable contest. Respondents moved for dismissal of claim on grounds of untimely filing of Reasons of Appeal. CRB denied motion for dismissal noting that respondents had filed motion for dismissal after ten-day period following expiration of claimant’s deadline and had failed to show prejudice because of claimant’s late filing. CRB affirmed trial commissioner on all grounds. Issuance of approved voluntary agreement does not confer upon trier obligation to find compensability; nor does it constitute a judicial admission. Claimant had opportunity to challenge terms of voluntary agreement in formal proceedings. CRB also held that claimant’s medical history, lack of medical causation report, and circumstances surrounding claimant’s injury, including claimant’s failure to inform her supervisors of the workplace incident, provided adequate support for trier’s determination that respondents did not engage in an unreasonable contest of claim. Trier could reasonably infer that respondents’ failure to produce a witness following a trial commissioner’s order likewise did not constitute unreasonable delay in light of respondents’ initial request for a protective order, claimant counsel’s failure to coordinate deposition scheduling with respondents’ counsel, and witness’s inability to appear because of illness. Respondents’ failure to answer discovery request relative to attendance reports did not compel trier to draw an adverse inference, particularly as respondents’ defense was not solely predicated on claimant’s attendance on date of injury. See also, Lamothe, § 31-278; § 31-296; § 31-300; § 31-301. Appeal Procedure, § 31-301-2.
Kummer v. Bic Corporation, 5406 CRB-3-08-12 (December 15, 2009).
Pro se claimant appealed trier’s dismissal of her lumbar spine claim, alleging trial commissioner was “confused” regarding proper date of injury and body part in question. Trier denied proposed corrections in claimant’s Motion to Correct but clarified his Finding and Dismissal to specifically indicate he was dismissing lumbar spine claim. CRB affirmed, noting evidentiary record allowed for reasonable inference that claimant’s injury was not causally related to the alleged workplace incident; trier is free to disregard all or part of a medical opinion and credibility assessments are not subject to second guessing at appellate level. On appeal, claimant filed a timely Petition for Review and submitted two additional documents which were partially accepted insofar as they constituted a rationale for the claimant’s appeal and partially denied insofar as they constituted a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence pursuant to Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9. See also, Kummer, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.
Ghazal v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 5397 CRB-8-08-11 (November 17, 2009).
Claimant suffered compensable back and psychiatric injuries. After receiving authorization for back surgery in the U.S. from trial commissioner, claimant decided against back surgery and relocated to home nation of Jordan to obtain psychiatric treatment. Respondents challenged reasonableness of treatment. Trial Commissioner found for claimant, and respondent appealed, arguing in part, that deposition of their examiner should be admitted as evidence. At CRB hearing, claimant did not object to admission of deposition. CRB granted motion, but remanded issue to trial commissioner for factual finding. See also, Ghazal, § 31-288, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.
Cuadrado v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5360 CRB-7-08-7 (July 2, 2009).
Pro se claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim after finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbar spine injury and alleged workplace lifting incident. Medical reports in evidence seemed to suggest injury may have occurred prior to date of incident, and although claimant did present a medical opinion in support of causation, trier ultimately concluded that neither the claimant nor the doctor in question were credible or persuasive. Respondents submitted employer time cards which also appeared to cast doubt on claimant’s narrative of events surrounding her injury. On appeal, claimant failed to provide Reasons for Appeal or a brief but did submit two documents which were partially accepted insofar as they constituted a rationale for the claimant’s appeal and partially denied insofar as they constituted a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence pursuant to Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9. CRB affirmed trier on basis that determinations relative to credibility of parties are not subject to second guessing at appellate level. See also, Cuadrado, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.
Drown v. Rochette Quality Home Improvement, LLC, 5369 CRB 8-08-8 (June 29, 2009).
See Drown, § 31-301. Appeal procedure C.G.S.
Sockbeson v. AJS Enterprise, 5334 CRB-6-08-4 (April 1, 2009).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s Finding and Award ordering temporary total and temporary partial benefits for claimant who sustained a back injury in a workplace lifting incident. Respondents had argued claimant’s symptoms were due to prior injuries to her lumbar spine and/or a motor vehicle accident which occurred after the workplace incident. On appeal, respondents contend claimant was not credible regarding the medical history given to treating physicians and appeared to exaggerate her symptoms during an IME and commissioner’s examination. Respondents also allege, inter alia, lack of due process relative to numerous post-judgment motions which were denied by the trier, who also denied their Motion to Correct in its entirety. At trial, claimant testified plausibly regarding prior incidents involving her back and the motor vehicle accident, and CRB determined evidentiary submissions supported trier’s conclusions regarding causation. CRB also found respondents’ claims of error relative to their post-judgment motions were without merit. See also, Sockbeson, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301 4.
Flood v. Travelers Property & Casualty, 5267 CRB-1-07-8 (December 8, 2008).
Claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s determination that no causal connection exists between claimant’s neck and back complaints and a workplace incident of March 31, 2000 in which claimant fell on a temporary walkway. Respondents accepted compensability of left shoulder injury sustained at same time. Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct and Amended Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed, concluding trier reasonably relied on expert testimony and drew permissible inferences from the lack of contemporaneous medical records supporting claimant’s assertions relative to her back and neck complaints. CRB declined to address claimant’s request at hearing to submit additional evidence as no motion to that effect had ever been filed and materials in question were duplicative of documents already admitted. See also, Flood, § 31 275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.
Grant v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Co., 5292 CRB-4-07-11 (October 28, 2008).
Claimant sought to admit additional evidence that she claimed her attorney had failed to present to the trial commissioner. CRB declined motion; claimant failed to establish in accordance with Mankus v. Mankus, 107 Conn. App. 585 (2008) or Diaz v. Jaime Pineda a/k/a Jamie Pineda d/b/a J.P. Landscaping Company, 5244 CRB-7-07-7 (July 8, 2008) there was a good reasons this evidence was not presented at the formal hearing. See also, Grant, 31-301. Factual finding, § 31-308(a), § 31-307, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Diaz v. Jaime Pineda, a/k/a Jamie Pineda d/b/a J.P. Landscaping Company, 5244 CRB-7-07-7 (July 8, 2008).
CRB not persuaded that good cause existed to admit additional evidence, claimant failed to seek authorization to change physicians prior to formal hearing. § 31-307, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-294d, § 31-355(b).
Love v. William W. Backus Hospital, 5255 CRB-2-07-8 (June 24, 2008).
Employer appealed from award granting claimant § 31-308(a) benefits, contending medical reports in evidence were legally insufficient to support the trial commissioner’s conclusions regarding causation and whether injury was a substantial contributing factor in her ongoing disability per McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987). Employer argued that several medical reports appeared to be inconsistent, therefore award of benefits was not justified. At trial, claimant testified as to apparent inconsistencies, which were primarily due to her communications with her physician concerning her motivation to return to work. Employer sought to introduce additional medical report obtained after close of trial, motion denied as report was not germane to issues addressed at trial. CRB affirmed. See also, Love, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301(a).
Gladstone v. Stamford, 5124 CRB-7-06-8 (April 23, 2008).
Motion to Submit personnel accident report as additional evidence denied, as there was no proof it was undiscoverable at trial. See, Gladstone, § 31-294c (request for, and holding of, informal hearing tolled statute of limitations for filing § 7-433c claim). Also cited at Gladstone, § 7-433c.
Vannoy-Joseph v. State/DMHAS, 5164 CRB-8-06-11 (January 29, 2008).
CRB denied motion to submit deposition of surgeon in order to confirm FDA non-approval of multi-level disc replacement surgery. Deposition was offered in response to fax cover sheet that appeared to state artificial disc had been approved by FDA for three-level use. CRB held that respondent did not have good reason for failing to offer deposition during formal hearing, as its choice not to pursue the doctor’s testimony was tactical. Mention of note in trier’s findings not unforeseeable. Also, record already contained evidence accurately explaining status of device approval, and CRB’s reading of Findings indicated that trier was aware device had not been approved for three-level use. See Vannoy-Joseph, §§ 31-294d, 31-298, 31-301-4.
Reeve v. Eleven Ives Street, LLC, 5146 CRB-7-06-10 (November 5, 2007).
Claimant sought to add corroborating evidence of employment status after close of formal fearing. CRB denied. No evidence offered that claimant could not have presented this evidence in a timely manner to the trier of fact, hence it must be barred as per Pantanella v. Enfield Ford, 65 Conn. App. 46, 57-58 (2001) See also, Reeve, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Fratino v. Harry Grodsky & Co., Inc., 5087 CRB-7-06-5 (May 8, 2007).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where movant sought to submit an unsolicited medical report clarifying physician’s earlier opinion after commissioner issued decision. Clarifying report could have been procured during proceedings before trial commissioner. See also, Fratino, § 31-294d and § 31-301. Factual findings.
Gomez v. Laidlaw Education Services, 4859 CRB-2-04-9 (December 15, 2005).
CRB denied claimant’s pre- and post-oral-argument requests to consider additional evidence. The evidence claimant sought to add was either discoverable at the time of the formal proceedings, or cumulative of other evidence. See also, Gomez, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Vetre v. State/Dept. of Children & Families, 4848 CRB-6-04-8 (August 19, 2005).
CRB denied claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where claimant had not yet obtained evidence and had not indicated its nature. See also, Vetre, § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-300, § 31-307a.
Vonella v. Rainforest Cafe, 4788 CRB-6-04-2 (March 16, 2005).
CRB denied claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where claimant had opportunity to provide documents at trial level. See also, Vonella, § 31-301-4, § 31-307.
Scott v. Bridgeport, 4853 CRB-3-04-8 (December 22, 2004).
CRB affirmed trier’s decision to allow new evidence where remand from prior appeal was ordered in order for the claimant to have the “opportunity to present evidence.” See Prior decision at Scott, 4637 CRB-4-03-2 (February 24, 2004).
DelConte v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4766 CRB-8-03-12 (December 8, 2004).
CRB denied claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence. Claimant failed to use due diligence to obtain evidence that was in existence at the time of the formal hearings. See also, DelConte, § 31-294c.
Carney-Bastrzycki v. Hospital for Special Care, 4722 CRB-6-03-9 (September 3, 2004).
CRB refused to allow claimant to submit medical report available prior to formal hearing. See also, Carney-Bastrzycki, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Rurak v. Sweet Life Inc., 4630 CRB-1-03-2 (February 6, 2004).
A Motion to Submit Additional Evidence is the vehicle to submit additional evidence to the Commission Review Board. Claimant’s evidence was submitted at the time of oral argument on the appeal without an indication that it was provided to the opposing party. The evidence will not be considered as part of the record. See also, Rurak, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-296.
Carlson v. United Technologies Int’l, 4533 CRB-1-02-6 (June 3, 2003).
Motion to submit affidavit of claims adjuster denied where materiality was questionable, and no reason was given as to why such an affidavit could not have been obtained during trial. See also, Carlson, § 31-294c.
Krajewski v. Atlantic Machine Tool Works, Inc., 4500 CRB-6-02-3 (March 7, 2003).
Documents sent to CRB along with appeal papers did not meet standards necessary to satisfy admissibility standard of § 31-301-9. See also, Krajewski, § 31-278, § 31-284b, § 31-290a, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-312, § 31-313, § 31-315; prior decisions at Krajewski, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 2120 CRB-6-94-8 (November 28, 1995), § 31-308a; Krajewski, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 1387 CRD-6-92-2 (April 1, 1993), § 31-290a.
Papa v. Jeffrey Norton Publishers, Inc., 4486 CRB-3-02-1 (February 25, 2003).
Respondents moved to submit additional evidence at oral argument by asking CRB to take administrative notice of approved Form 36. As form was part of official record, was not disputed, and had already been noticed by trier, CRB agreed to take notice of the form. See also, Papa, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.
Napolitano v. Bridgeport, 4388 CRB-4-01-5 (September 6, 2002).
CRB noted that police board’s finding regarding disability rating, much like Social Security Administration ruling, is not generally material to determination of permanent partial impairment by Workers’ Compensation Commission. See also, Napolitano, § 31-278, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(b).
Cotugno v. Lexington Caterers, Inc., 4390 CRB-2-01-5 (June 21, 2002).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied. One report was cumulative, and CRB was unconvinced that it could not have been provided to trier before record closed. One report was reasonably disregarded by trier because it was provided by social worker rather than a practitioner of “healing arts” under § 20-1, while related letter should have been introduced earlier, as claimant’s need for detoxification due to narcotics addiction was properly at issue. See also, Cotugno, § 31-294d.
Donlin v. Cytec Industries, Inc., 4415 CRB-7-00-7 (June 5, 2002).
Additional evidence submitted with claimant’s appeal was treated as a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence and was denied, where claimant could have obtained medical reports prior to formal hearing but offered no reason for failing to do so. CRB will not allow trial of cases in piecemeal manner. See also, Donlin, § 31-308(b).
Drew v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 4400 CRB-7-01-5 (May 2, 2002).
CRB denied pro se’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where implicated documents were available long before formal hearing and should have been presented as evidence at trial. See also, Drew, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-315.
Rodrigues v. American National Can, 4329 CRB-7-00-12 (January 2, 2002).
CRB denied Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where claimant sought to introduce medical reports from physicians whom he saw after close of formal hearing. Reports could have been acquired prior to formal. See also, Rodrigues, § 31-279-3, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-298. Prior decision at Rodrigues, 4043 CRB-5-99-4 (July 26, 2000), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, Factual findings, § 31-308a.
Briggs v. American Medical Response, 4302 CRB-3-00-9 (September 24, 2001).
CRB denied motion to submit into evidence doctor’s report and preliminary correspondence between attorneys in re: respondents’ attempt to obtain certain test results. Tests had been performed over a year earlier, and revised medical reportówhich was based solely on those test resultsócould have been obtained before formal hearing if the need had been anticipated. See also, Briggs, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings.
D’Amico v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4287 CRB-5-00-9 (August 3, 2001).
Motion to submit report of rehabilitation hospital doctor denied where discharge summary concerned a time period several months subsequent to closing date of total disability claim. See also, D’Amico, § 31-307. Prior decision at D’Amico, 4029 CRB-5-99-4 (May 18, 2000), § 31-294d.
Audi v. Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, 4234 CRB-3-00-5 (June 26, 2001).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where trier permissibly refused to reopen record to allow witness to testify for second time, and respondent sought to introduce same evidence via appeal route. Witness was available throughout trial. See also, Audi, § 31-298, § 31-315, § 31-296, § 31-307. See prior decision Audi, 3418 CRB-3-96-9 (August 4, 1997), § 31-349. Also see subsequent decision Audi, 4311 CRB-3-00-10, 4624 CRB-3-03-2 (February 10, 2004), § 31-278, § 31-284(b), § 31-288, § 31-300.
Fox-Gould v. Brooks Pharmacy, 4215 CRB-2-00-3 (May 23, 2001).
Board denied Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where claimant did not provide reason for failing to present medical reports during formal hearing, and where evidence appeared to be cumulative. See also, Fox-Gould, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Scott v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4185 CRB-4-00-2 (April 10, 2001).
Where respondents were unable to authenticate Form 43 sufficiently to get it into evidence at trial, CRB did not allow it to be reintroduced on appeal along with certified mail receipts indicating that it was delivered to, and signed for by, an employee of this Commission. Proffered evidence was actually an undated, unstamped copy of a Form 43. Possible error by this agency in processing Form 43 did not excuse respondents’ failure to offer certified mail receipts at trial as proof that notice to contest liability was properly sent and delivered. No “good reason” adduced for failing to present evidence at trial. See also, Scott, § 31-294c.
Kisson v. Shawmut National Bank, 4188 CRB-5-00-2 (March 16, 2001).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where appellant failed to anticipate that doctor’s earlier medical records would be necessary to aid in establishing causation. Scheduling of emergency formal hearing supported basis of motion, but appellants had been disputing origin of elbow condition for well over a year, and were quite aware of causation issues. See also, Kisson, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-299b.
Warren v. Federal Express Corp., 4163 CRB-2-99-12 (February 27, 2001).
Pro se claimant filed Motion to Submit Additional Evidence without describing nature of evidence or reasons for its earlier omission. Despite leniency granted to pro se claimants regarding procedure, CRB denied motion because it lacked necessary information. See also, Warren, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Tomaszek v. Girard Motors, 4166 CRB-2-99-12 (February 23, 2001), aff’d, 70 Conn. App. 122 (2002).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where claimant failed to explain why evidence was offered after record had been closed, and offered no indication that evidence is really new or was undiscoverable with due diligence at time of original hearings. See also, Tomaszek, § 31-315.
Covert v. Patterson, 4094 CRB-3-99-8 (September 29, 2000).
In her Motion to Submit Additional Evidence, claimant sought to submit a Form 36, a Form 43, and a proposed voluntary agreement, all of which she had received well after the last formal hearing. CRB explained that it did not have jurisdiction over these issues, as the proper procedure would be to request an informal hearing, and if no agreement could be reached, a formal hearing could be held. The board explained that an appeal would be possible from the decision of the trial commissioner who would conduct this formal hearing, but that no such appeal had yet reached the board. See also, Covert, § 31-294d, § 31-296 Voluntary Agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-301-4.
Osowiecki v. O & G Industries, 3993 CRB-5-99-3 (April 13, 2000).
Where additional evidence was discoverable at time of trial and alleged reason for failure to present this evidence was inadvertence, CRB denied claimant’s motion. See also, Osowiecki, § 31-294f.
Saleh v. Poquonock Giant Grinder Shop, 4005 CRB-1-99-3 (March 13, 2000).
CRB denied respondent’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where additional evidence was discoverable at the time of trial and no reason was given for failure to present it at that time. See also, Saleh, § 31-279-2, § 31-298, § 31-300, § 31-315.
DiBello v. Barnes Page Wire Products, 3970 CRB-7-99-2 (March 2, 2000), aff’d, 67 Conn. App. 361 (2001).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where insurer and employer were involved in dispute over existence of coverage on date of injury, and employer sought to introduce a form letter from the insurer that implied the existence of an insurer-employer relationship on date of injury. Notice was unlikely to mislead employer at this late stage of the proceedings, and was not material. See also, DiBello, § 31-278, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-348. Subsequent decision at DiBello, 4290 CRB-7-00-9 (September 25, 2001), § 31-300, § 31-308a.
Kearse v. Labor Force of America, 3968 CRB-3-99-1 (February 1, 2000).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant entered into a contract of service with LFA which subsequently lent him to Tait Moving Company. LFA was thus liable to pay compensation for the claimant’s compensable injury pursuant to § 31-292. Though appellants argued in their Motion to Submit Additional Evidence that they were not aware that the lent employee statute was at issue, nevertheless the elements of this statute (whether claimant entered into an employment contract with LFA which then lent his services to Tait Moving Company) were covered in depth during the formal hearing, and the evidence described in appellant’s motion would have been relevant even in the absence of § 31-292. Accordingly, with the additional evidence having been discoverable at the time of trial and no good reason for the failure to present this evidence at that time having been given, the Motion to Submit Additional Evidence was denied. See also, Kearse, § 31-292.
Prioli v. State/Connecticut State Library/Arts Commission, 3955 CRB-6-98-12 (January 13, 2000), aff’d, 64 Conn. App. 301 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 917 (2001).
CRB denied Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where appellant failed to offer desired testimony at formal hearing because of failure to anticipate that commission would not enforce a particular agreement. This was a tactical decision, and appellant must accept the results. See also, Prioli, § 31-278, § 31-290a, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-315, § 31-327. Subsequent ruling in Prioli, 3955 CRB-6-98-12 (October 16, 2000), § 31-301c.
Dudley v. Wadsworth Glen, 3942 CRB-8-98-12 (October 14, 1999), aff’d, 60 Conn. App. 907 (2000)(per curiam).
CRB denied pro se claimant’s request to submit tape recording of physician, where he did not allege a good reason for failing to present such evidence at the formal hearing. See also, Dudley, § 31-294d.
Lyons v. Wasley Products, Inc., 3788 CRB-6-98-3 (June 18, 1999).
CRB denied claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence in the form of a Social Security decision. Board has repeatedly held that decisions regarding Social Security disability are not material to Chapter 568 claims insofar as the standards used by the Social Security Administration differ from those used by the Workers’ Compensation Commission.
Contreras v. Montana Bakery, 3819 CRB-7-98-5 (June 16, 1999).
Documents proffered by successor counsel in attorney’s fee dispute were not material to issue before CRB. See also, Contreras, § 31-327(b).
Crouse v. A.A.I.S., Inc., 3797 CRB-3-98-4 (June 16, 1999).
Claimant sought to submit evidence that was available at the time of trial. Motion denied. See also, Crouse, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Fiore v. House & Garden Shop, 3747 CRB-7-97-12 (April 5, 1999).
CRB denied claimant’s request to submit sketches of employer’s place of business, as such evidence was clearly available at the time of the formal hearing. See also, Fiore, § 31-301. Factual findings. See Subsequent decision at Fiore, 4494 CRB-7-02-2 (February 28, 2003), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-315.
Granata v. Waldbaum’s, 3742 CRB-3-97-12 (March 11, 1999).
Claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence was denied by CRB where the deposition transcript which the claimant sought to submit was in existence at the time of the formal hearing and was not offered into evidence at that time. See also, Granata, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Surozenski v. Glass Container Corp., 3753 CRB-2-97-12 (February 23, 1999).
CRB affirmed trier’s denial of counsel’s Motion to Disappear, and denied motion to submit as additional evidence several letters that explained that counsel and its client, the self-insured administrator, had been discharged by the respondent employer, which was in bankruptcy. Letters were available at time of hearing, and were merely self-serving statements offering legal analysis by interested parties. CRB stressed that law firm had represented both parties throughout claim, and pro se claimant should not be left with no one to negotiate with on the other side (no substitute counsel was offered to represent the employer). (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) Letters are material, as they establish that the firm is no longer acting as counsel in this case. See also, Surozenski, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Harris v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3762 CRB-1-98-1 (February 23, 1999), aff’d, 56 Conn. App. 912 (2000)(per curiam), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 907 (2000).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied, as the admissibility of psychologist’s reports was an issue for the trial commissioner, and a letter sent from the Chairman to the claimant and copied to all parties was part of the record already. See also, Harris, § 31-294f, § 31-315. Prior decision at Harris, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 357, 3143 CRB-5-95-8 (June 26, 1996), § 31-275(17), § 31-298.
Perry v. Carewell Rest Home, 3713 CRB-3-97-10 (December 29, 1998).
CRB denied claimant’s request to submit additional evidence, where the evidence was available at the time of the formal hearing, but not admitted into evidence. There was no evidence in the transcript to support the claimant’s contention that her attorney was confused and inadvertently failed to include several medical reports in a binder which was submitted as an exhibit. See also, Perry, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Gouborn v. United Illuminating, 3594 CRB-3-97-4 (November 17, 1998).
CRB granted Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where evidence consisted of proof that notice was delivered to Second Injury Fund before October 1, 1995 filing deadline. See also, Gouborn, § 31-349.
Cramer v. Cramer, 3710 CRB-4-97-10 (November 9, 1998).
See, Cramer, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings. Section 31-301-4. Correction of finding.
Rhodes v. Bourdon Forge Company, Inc., 3720 CRB-2-97-11, 3650 CRB-2-97-7 (October 13, 1998).
The claimant sought to submit an additional medical report subsequent to the last formal hearing. The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s denial of that request, as the evidence was not really new or undiscoverable with due diligence prior to the close of the formal hearing.
Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July 17, 1998).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence and Testimony sought to submit medical report that was issued after last formal hearing. Claimant did not demonstrate that this report was undiscoverable earlier, and description of evidence suggested that it might prove to be cumulative. Motion denied. See also, Pallotto, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Willett-Pine v. Community Residences, 3534 CRB-8-97-2 (May 20, 1998).
Medical provider appealed from ruling of trial commissioner that respondents were not liable for claimant’s medical bills. Provider attempted to offer additional evidence, but the only reason it was not submitted at the formal hearing was that the provider failed to appear on its own behalf. Motion denied. See also, Willett-Pine, § 31-301. Factual findings.
DeMartino v. L.G. Defelice, Inc., 3524 CRB-4-97-1 (February 18, 1998).
Claimant could not introduce additional evidence. Medical report from 1997 was a clarification of earlier report, and could have been obtained earlier. Letters from attorney were not material to central issue in case, and previous award is already part of the record. See also, DeMartino, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Koscak v. Agentry Employment Systems, 3438 CRB-6-96-10 (February 9, 1998).
Respondent temporary employment agency was found to be the employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Trier also found that there was no persuasive evidence making the company that used the claimant’s services an employer. Respondents sought to introduce as additional evidence a Superior Court decision that held that the company that used the claimant’s services could not be sued in Superior Court because it was an employer under the Act, and a civil suit was barred by the exclusivity provision in § 31-284(a). Motion granted. Importance of consistency in decision-making discussed; Superior Court decision was relevant evidence. Also, it was unclear that the respondents knew about the Superior Court decision before the date proposed findings were due. (Trier’s decision was issued after the Superior Court decision came out).
Cortesi v. Warner, 3598 CRB-1-97-5 (October 27, 1997).
Claimant moved to submit as additional evidence an affidavit by a Federal Express employee establishing that its petition for review was delivered to the District Office on the ninth day after notice of the commissioner’s decision was sent. Petition for review had not been stamped “received” until four days later, and was apparently late. Motion granted, appeal not dismissed. See also, Cortesi, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Thibodeau v. Rizzitelli, 3373 CRB-4-96-7 (October 14, 1997).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence granted where commissioner found that insurer had canceled insurance policy coverage on May 15, 1994, and appellant sought to introduce a civil complaint seeking payment of unpaid premium for coverage provided between September 29, 1993 and September 29, 1994. See also, Thibodeau, § 31-348.
Reeder v. Zohne Industries, 3313 CRB-5-96-3 (August 21, 1997), aff’d, 49 Conn. App. 904 (1998)(per curiam).
Claimant did not show that he or his doctor ever attempted to obtain safety data sheets before the formal hearing. CRB cannot now grant request to admit those reports as additional evidence. See also, Reeder, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Roy v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 3284 CRB-1-96-2 (April 14, 1997), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 924 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 907 (1998).
CRB concluded that the claimant has failed to show good reason for presenting medical records after the formal hearing had been closed, and thus denied the claimant’s request to submit additional evidence. Moreover, the claimant offered no indication that the proffered evidence was really new or that it was undiscoverable with due diligence at the time of the original hearings. See also, Roy, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Abdule v. Walnut Hill Convalescent, 3383 CRB-6-96-7 (March 25, 1997).
CRB denied claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where evidence was available and could have been obtained with due diligence during formal hearing. The claimant sought to present a letter from the treating physician.
Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 3320 CRB-1-96-4 (March 12, 1997).
CRB granted the claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence, a doctor’s report, pursuant to Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9. The trial commissioner had found that the reports issued by said doctor did not substantiate the claimant’s claim that she had a shoulder condition which was caused by the compensable injury. The doctor’s report submitted by the claimant had been issued after the formal hearing and contradicted his prior reports which were relied upon by the trial commissioner. The CRB also noted that the claimant had acted pro se. But see later Bryan after remand, 3730 CRB-1-97-11 (May 7, 1999), rev’d, 62 Conn. App. 733 (2001); See also later case in which board, pursuant to Appellate Court remand, considered claimant’s appeal from trier’s original decision and affirmed said decision- Bryan, 3320 CRB-1-96-4 (January 29, 2002), aff’d, 74 Conn. App. 901 (2002), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 916 (2003), § 31-301. Factual findings.
Ryba v. West-Con, 3196 CRB-2-95-10 (February 27, 1997).
See, Ryba, § 31-296.
Pronovost v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3166 CRB-6-95-9 (February 11, 1997).
Claimant’s need for additional medical reports was due to failure to anticipate the nature of respondents’ contradictory evidence at trial. Not a good reason for failing to present evidence at formal hearing. Also, evidence regarding bias is not backed up by concrete information, and mere allegations are not enough to warrant reopening case on appeal. Motion denied. See also, Pronovost, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Bailey v. Stripling Auto Sales, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 3095 CRB-2-95-6 (June 28, 1996).
See, Bailey, § 31-278. See subsequent decision Bailey, 3461 CRB-3-96-11 (April 9, 1998), § 31-315 and Bailey, 4516 CRB-2-02-4 (May 8, 2003), § 31-298, § 31-307a.
Alicea v. Tamarack Country Club, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 265, 3088 CRB-7-95-6 (June 4, 1996).
In their Motion to Submit Additional Evidence, the respondents seek to submit further medical reports in support of their contention that the claimant’s pre-existing condition materially and substantially contributed to his injury. The respondents contend that such evidence should be allowed on the basis that subsequent to the trial commissioner’s Finding and Order, the Supreme Court of Connecticut issued Rowe v. Plastic Design, Inc., 37 Conn. App. 131 (March 7, 1995). CRB denied the motion as the evidence was not undiscoverable during the course of the proceedings below, and was cumulative.
Marandino v. Marandino’s d/b/a John Marandino, 3130 CRB-6-95-7 (June 4, 1996).
The trial commissioner found that the decedent was a sole proprietor at the time he suffered a fatal heart attack on May 20, 1992, and thus was not covered under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial commissioner further found that the claimant had not elected to be covered under the workers’ compensation system pursuant to § 31-275(10). The claimant seeks to present evidence regarding “the customary practice... for an insurance agent to take care of any filings concerning election of coverage forms with the Workers’ Compensation Commission....” CRB denied motion as such evidence was available at time of formal hearing. See also, Marandino, § 31-275(9).
Smith v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3134 CRB-3-95-6 (June 4, 1996).
In her Motion to Submit Additional Evidence, the claimant seeks to present a medical opinion from her treating physician regarding the claims for neck and low back injuries which were dismissed by the trial commissioner. In support of the claimant’s motion, the claimant contends that her physician refused to examine her because of an unpaid balance of approximately $109. During the formal hearing process, the claimant did not advise the trial commissioner that she was unable to obtain a medical examination from her treating physician, nor did the claimant raise this issue at the formal hearing in the form of a motion for a continuance until she could obtain such evidence. As the claimant has not preserved this issue on the record, but rather is raising it now for the first time on appeal, CRB denied the motion.
Ross v. Swift, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 2292 CRB-6-95-2 (April 23, 1996).
Respondents sought to introduce evidence of their bankruptcy, even though it was available at time of formal hearing. CRB normally rejects such evidence; however, the federal bankruptcy statute and relevant case law specifically provide that a discharge in bankruptcy renders any judgment on a discharged debt null and void. Purpose of law is to make it unnecessary for the discharged debtor to do anything at all in state court action. Thus, employer’s failure to plead Chapter 7 discharge as a defense to the claimant’s claim does not preclude assertion of that defense here. Remanded for findings as to actual scope of discharge.
Falkowski v. International Fuel Cells Corp., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 119, 3016 CRB-1-95-2 (January 11, 1996).
The respondents filed a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence in order to present evidence of the decedent’s earnings prior to his retirement, contending that the decedent’s benefit rate was improperly determined. At oral argument, claimant did not deny that his benefit rate was incorrect. Therefore, CRB construed respondents’ motion as a motion to reopen pursuant to § 31-315 and remanded for a new determination of the benefit rate.
Kennedy v. Heavy Duty Nelson Electric, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 2139 CRB-5-94-9 (December 8, 1995).
Pro se claimant had counsel at time of formal hearing, and counsel chose not to pursue certain evidence due to cost of producing it. That decision was tactical, and additional evidence offered by claimant was thus available at time of formal hearing. Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied. Also, trial commissioner’s acceptance of the testimony of claimant’s co-workers over that of other witnesses was permissible, as it is commissioner’s job to determine credibility. Commissioner’s dismissal of back injury claim affirmed.
Krajewski v. Atlantic Aerospace Textron, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 2120 CRB-6-94-8 (November 28, 1995).
See, Krajewski, § 31-308a for discussion of Motion to Submit Additional Evidence.
Fusco v. J.C. Penney Company, 1952 CRB-4-94-1 (November 1, 1995).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence granted, in part, where despite attempts by the claimant and the Respondent to obtain presence of treater at the formal hearings, he consistently made himself unavailable and impossible to subpoena. This board is troubled by this alleged conduct on the part of a treating physician.
Dunn v. Roadway Express, Inc., 3005 CRB-3-95-2 (September 18, 1995).
Claimant sought to introduce September 1994 videotape of claimant’s activities. Motion denied; issue was claimant’s condition on August 18, 1993, the alleged date of injury, and whether medical treatment the following day was necessary. Inference videotape might create as to claimant’s credibility would not likely affect decision on reasonableness of treatment.
Lopez v. Chieppo Charter, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 378, 2269 CRB-3-95-1 (September 18, 1995).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied. Although the claimant contended that he attempted to subpoena the witness but that he could not be located for service of a subpoena prior to the formal hearing, the trial commissioner found that the witness was employed by the respondent and was available at the time of the formal hearing. See also, Lopez, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Swegel v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 316, 2270 CRB-1-95-1 (September 14, 1995).
Due to compelling circumstances, board exercised its equitable powers by construing the claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence as a motion to modify the award based on changed conditions of fact under § 31-315. The compelling circumstances included the fact that subsequent to the close of the formal hearing, the claimant’s treater and an IME (requested by the employer) both agreed that surgery was necessary. The trial commissioner had found that surgery was not necessary.
Ayres v. United Methodist Home of Conn., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 228, 1743 CRB-4-93-6 (August 10, 1995), aff’d, 44 Conn. App. 927 (1997)(per curiam), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 934 (1997).
CRB denied pro se claimant’s second Motion to Submit Additional Evidence which was presented for the first time at oral argument before this board. Claimant sought to introduce evidence that her disability worsened. CRB advised claimant that she should present such evidence in a motion to reopen under § 31-315.
Ayres v. United Methodist Home of Conn., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 220, 1743 CRB-4-93-6 (August 7, 1995), aff’d, 44 Conn. App. 927 (1997)(per curiam), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 934 (1997).
CRB denied pro se claimant’s request to introduce numerous documents, which were available at the time of her formal hearings, immaterial, or cumulative. CRB explained requirements of § 31-301-9.
Prescott v. Echlin, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 191, 2029 CRB-3-94-4 (July 13, 1995).
See, Prescott, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Walter v. State/Services for the Blind, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 107, 1694 CRB-2-93-4 (June 2, 1995), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 1 (2001).
Commissioner did not err in granting state’s motion to reopen where state had alleged that it did not receive timely notice of hearing, claimants could not show prejudice, and commissioner had not yet issued award. Commissioner has considerable discretion on motions to reopen, and Admin. Reg. § 31-297(b)-1 gives commissioner power to waive filing requirements of the party opposing the Motion to Preclude. Section 31-301-9 not applicable here, as motion to reopen not made to CRB. See also, Walter, § 31-294c. Subsequent decision at Walter, 3785 CRB-2-98-3 (June 18, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 1 (2001), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Kasperski v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 2106 CRB-6-94-7 (May 15, 1995).
A Motion to Submit Additional Evidence may not properly be used to alter a party’s evidentiary decisions based on trial tactics or lack of diligence regarding the presentation of evidence at a formal hearing. Therefore, CRB denied claimant’s request to submit a medical report that opined the percentage of permanent disability attributable to the compensable injury.
Casanovas v. ACME United Corp., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 235, 2179 CRB-4-94-10 (May 10, 1995).
The claimant sought to introduce live testimony from his treater to establish that he initially complained of certain injuries which the commissioner held not to be causally related to the claimant’s compensable chemical burn. CRB denied motion, as it was claimant’s burden to prove causation and claimant chose to present medical reports rather than live testimony at the trial level. See also, Casanovas, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Holle v. The William Backus Hospital, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 169, 2039 CRB-2-94-4 (May 10, 1995).
Commissioner held that claimant, a nurse, failed to sustain her burden of proving that she suffered injuries as a result of a vaccine administered by the employer. At time of formal hearings, claimant’s treater was unable to render an opinion regarding causation because of several “unanswered questions.” Claimant sought to introduce, as new evidence, the treater’s recent opinion regarding causation. CRB held that the recent medical opinion was not undiscoverable, nor was the opinion itself based upon new or undiscoverable information, and that claimant failed to act with due diligence by waiting three years to procure the opinion. Distinguished from Canfield v. Consolidated Freightways, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 59, 1127 CRD-7-90-10 (1992).
Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 2154 CRB-3-94-9 (May 4, 1995).
The claimant/appellee, who was awarded benefits by the commissioner, sought to introduce a medical report in order to respond to issues raised by employer/appellant on appeal. CRB denied request, as evidence was cumulative and could have been procured at time of trial.
Calinescu v. CFD Associates, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 298, 1794 CRB-8-93-8 (April 21, 1995), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 912 (1996).
Cumulative evidence will not be admitted unless likely to produce a different result. Motion denied. See also, Calinescu, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Brockett v. Branford Paving, Inc., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 271, 1840 CRB-3-93-9 (April 19, 1995).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence will not be considered where appeal is dismissed as untimely. See also, Brockett, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Glenn v. Glenn Fence Company, 2132 CRB-1-94-8 (April 10, 1995).
Claimant sought to introduce testimony of out-of-state witnesses whose whereabouts were unknown at time of hearing. Because the reason for the absence of those witnesses at trial was the claimant’s failure to anticipate their necessity, claimant was not relieved of responsibility for their presence. No showing made that witnesses could not have been located and deposed before the formal hearing. Not a “good reason;” motion denied. See also, Glenn, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 249, aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 906 (1997)(per curiam), § 31-301. Factual findings.
Sharkey v. Triangle/PWC, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 127, 2111 CRB-6-94-7 (March 21, 1995).
In support of his Motion to Submit Additional Evidence, the claimant sought to introduce testimony from his supervisor and a co-worker, neither of whom appeared at the trial level, to testify that the claimant’s injury occurred during the course of his employment. The claimant contended that those witnesses were not presented at the formal because the claimant was not aware that the issue of “in the course of” was disputed by the respondents. CRB denied motion, and noted that claimant was aware, through the Form 43, that respondents disputed his claim that the injury occurred at work.
Rapuano v. Standard Builders, Inc., 1975 CRB-5-94-2 (January 13, 1995).
Claimant’s vocational expert not relied on by commissioner because expert had not inquired into claimant’s prior work history, I.Q., dexterity, etc. Held, claimant could not introduce report taking those factors into account, as evidence could have been made available at trial. Failure to anticipate necessity or relevance of evidence not a “good reason.” Claimant also alleged evidence immaterial, which conflicts with § 31-301-9.
Cappelletti v. Charles Construction, 1958 CRB-5-94-1 (December 13, 1994).
Out-of-court statement proffered by respondent contradicting claimant’s testimony inadmissible; no cross-examination had been allowed. Also, respondent’s need to leave hearing early to pick up his son was not a “good reason” to fail to offer evidence; continuance could have been requested. Statement available at time of hearing. Motion denied.
Carr v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 1846 CRB-3-93-9 (November 4, 1994), appeal dismissed, A.C. 14126 (January 18, 1995), cert. denied, 233 Conn. 910 (1995).
Appellant’s failure to have available medical reports introduced into evidence and marked either for identification or full exhibits below is not “good reason” for CRB to grant Motion to Submit Additional Evidence at appellate level. See also, Carr, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Searles v. West Hartford Board of Education, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 414, 1617 CRB-1-93-1 (September 28, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 902 (1996)(per curiam).
CRB denied pro se claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence where evidence sought to be admitted existed prior to trial proceedings. Additionally, claimant failed to state why evidence was material and why it was not submitted below. See also, Searles, § 31-275(1), § 31-294c and § 31-301. Factual findings.
Miller v. TVCCA, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 348, 1675 CRB-2-93-3 (July 29, 1994), aff’d, 39 Conn. App. 935 (1995).
Motion to submit additional medical records fails to state good reasons for failure to present below. See also, Miller, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 341, 1542 CRB-1-92-10 (July 11, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 36 (1996).
Claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence failed to satisfy administrative requirements. See also, Cummings, § 31-296, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-307.
Ocasio v. Toyotomi, USA, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 330, 1668 CRD-7-93-2 (July 5, 1994).
Claimant sought to challenge the credibility of certain eyewitness testimony, to add additional medical evidence, truck shipping records and some evidence as to worker harassment. CRB found evidence was readily discoverable at the time of the proceedings below. Further, reasons given for failing to present the evidence below insufficient.
Soares v. Glass Industries, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 189, 1377 CRB-3-92-1 (May 4, 1994).
Claimant’s motion to submit additional documents and request that said documents be admitted into evidence granted where parties appearing before the CRB agreed to submission. Respondent’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied.
Vetro v. Banton Dry Wall, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 1316 CRD-3-91-10 (April 22, 1994).
Appellant’s motion contending it was denied the opportunity to participate and present evidence below denied as CRB found record shows appellant was afforded the opportunity to participate, and further, a representative of respondent employer was present at hearings below. See also, Vetro, § 31-298 and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Morris v. A & A Acoustics, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 221, 1488 CRB-7-92-8 (March 22, 1994).
Motions to submit additional evidence denied. See also, Morris, § 31-298 and § 31-301. Factual findings.
Burgos v. United Technologies/Sikorsky Aircraft Division, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 204, 1441 CRB-4-92-6 (March 15, 1994).
Request to submit additional evidence denied where claimant failed to satisfy requirements of administrative regulation. See also, Burgos, § 31-294d and § 31-308a.
McNulty v. Stamford, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 1332 CRD-7-91-10 (January 26, 1994), rev’d, 37 Conn. App. 835 (1995).
CRB held evidence which respondent employer sought to add was unnecessary given the conclusion reached on the merits. See also, McNulty, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-306, § 7-433c (where appellate court reversed CRB and held that the second injury fund was not liable to municipalities for payments pursuant to § 7-433c).
Peddle v. Finish Line Cafe, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 27, 1396 CRB-2-92-2 (January 18, 1994).
CRB granted respondents’ Motion to Submit Additional Evidence thereby admitting into evidence copies of documents stemming from a third party action filed in superior court. See also, Peddle, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-294c.
Ortiz v. United Sewing, Inc., 1760 CRB-4-93-6 (December 21, 1993).
Issues raised by respondents’ Motion to Submit Additional Evidence moot where trier vacates his supplemental finding.
Peterson v. The Hartford Courant, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 296, 1389 CRB-1-92-3 (December 8, 1993), aff’d, 36 Conn. App. 937 (1994)(per curiam).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where motion failed to identify evidence, its materiality or the reasons why it was not presented below. See also, Peterson, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Milardo v. Shuck Petroleum, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 279, 1559 CRB-8-92-11 (November 22, 1993).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where movant failed to satisfy the requirements of Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9. See also, Milardo, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Cooper v. Seymour, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 274, 1336 CRD-5-91-11 (November 19, 1993).
Motion to submit additional evidence denied where movant failed to satisfy the requirements of Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9. See also, Cooper, § 7-433c.
Coates v. Turbine Components, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 264, 1365 CRD-3-92-1 (November 18, 1993).
Motion to correct is not the proper vehicle to introduce additional evidence. See also, Coates, § 31-307.
Lederman v. Friendly Ice Cream Corporation, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 180, 1420 CRB-5-92-5 (September 3, 1993).
Claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied due to claimant’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Adm. Reg. § 31-301-9. See also, Lederman, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
D’Anna v. Kimberly Clark Corporation, 1580 CRB-7-92-12 (August 31, 1993).
Claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied on the basis of Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9 and CRB’s holding in Daniele v. Angelo Monarca, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 519 CRD-3-86 (1988). Here, claimant sought to introduce into evidence the trial commissioner’s notes from an informal hearing. As claimant did in fact testify at a formal hearing below, any information claimant wished to proffer concerning her decision to delay surgery should have been introduced through her own testimony.
Busak v. Stamford, 1562 CRB-7-92-11 (August 31, 1993).
Claimant sought to present additional medical evidence of either testimony or a report of IME physician. CRB denied claimant’s motion as reasons why evidence was not submitted below failed to satisfy the requirements of Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9.
O’Connor v. Connecticut Light & Power Company, 1536 CRB-8-92-10 (May 27, 1993).
Motion to submit additional evidence denied where movant failed to satisfy the requirements of Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9.
Boynton v. American Cyanamid, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 58, 1267 CRD-8-91-8 (April 6, 1993).
Where there exists no explanation as to why the medical testimony sought to be proffered was not presented in the initial proceedings below, in the reopened proceedings below, why such testimony was not available to be presented below, nor does it appear to be new evidence, CRB will not disturb trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Submit New Evidence. See also, Boynton, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Factual findings.
Castlevetro v. Gravymaster, 1463 CRB-3-92-7 (April 5, 1993).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied where movant failed to satisfy the requirements of Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9.
Haugh v. Leake-Nelson, 1421 CRB-2-92-5 (April 5, 1993).
Claimant sought to enter additional medical evidence to support his claim for temporary total benefits. CRB denied claimant’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence. CRB found medical evidence was not “of such character and force that it would be likely to cause a different result.” Metall v. Aluminum Co. of America, 154 Conn. 48, 53 (1966).
Lange v. J & B Excavating & Paving, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 42, 1249 CRD-3-91-6 (March 18, 1993).
Failure of claimant’s former counsel to appreciate the probative effect of live testimony by claimant’s treating physician insufficient reason for granting Motion to Submit Additional Evidence. See also, Lange, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Byars v. Whyco Chromium Company, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 39, 1257 CRD-5-91-7 (March 10, 1993), dismissed, lack of final judgment, 33 Conn. App. 667 (1994).
Affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s request to submit new evidence as record fails to demonstrate trier abused his discretion. See also, Byars, § 31-294, § 31-296 and § 31-300.
Krouse v. Holmgren Subaru, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 37, 1251 CRD-2-91-6 (February 26, 1993).
Remanded where trial commissioner denied claimant, a car salesman, now employed as a security guard, partial wage loss benefits based on evidence before him. On appeal pro se claimant in a motion to correct and before the CRB offered evidence concerning salespersons average weekly wages contrary to evidence presented below. CRB concluded claimant should be afforded the opportunity to present the evidence and the trier must consider this new evidence before reaching a final determination. See also, Krouse, § 31-308(a).
Fitzpatrick v. Wellington’s Auto Ranch, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 247, 1194 CRD-4-91-3 (January 11, 1993).
Claimant alleges evidence was proffered below but was not admitted by the trial commissioner. CRB denied Motion to Submit Additional Evidence holding evidence should have accompanied Motion to Correct as claimant sought to show evidence was excluded by the trial commissioner and would support corrections sought. See also, Fitzpatrick, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Lesczynski v. New Britain Memorial, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 205, 1289 CRD-6-91-9 (December 2, 1992).
Claimant claims testimony of treating physician was not presented at proceedings below as claimant failed to recognize the importance of securing counsel. CRB found claimant’s inability to appreciate the impact of not providing testimony of a treating physician in the proceedings before the trial commissioner fails to demonstrate the evidence was material or a good reason for failing to present that testimony in the proceedings before the trial commissioner. See also, Lescznyski, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-307.
In Re: Employee Staffing Of America, 1395 CRB-3-92-3 (November 24, 1992).
Motion to Submit Additional Evidence and testimony denied where movant failed to satisfy the requirements of Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9. Further, movant failed to appear before CRB at scheduled date of oral argument.
Murach v. New Britain, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 1172 CRD-6-91-2 (April 20, 1992).
Motion to present additional evidence denied where claimant failed to provide good reasons why evidence was not offered below. See also, Murach, § 7-433c and § 31-294c.
Nasinka v. Ansonia Copper and Brass, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 85, 1153 CRD-5-90-12 (April 20, 1992).
CRB remanded trier’s finding with direction to grant claimant’s Motion to Reopen. Medical reports of independent medical exam ordered by trial commissioner and received subsequent to conclusion of formal hearings below must be entered into evidence. Additionally, trier cannot base his conclusions on medical reports not entered into evidence. See also, Nasinka, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-315.
Canfield v. Consolidated Freightways, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 59, 1125 CRD-7-90-10 (February 21, 1992).
Remanded as medical evidence proffered is of such force and character that it may result in a different conclusion. Record fails to indicate whether trial commissioner considered medical report of treating physician which was not available at the time of the trier’s decision. As trier previously based his decision on treating physician’s medical report and that same treating physician in a later medical report is now not certain that surgery is reasonable or necessary, trier must consider new evidence. See also, Canfield, § 31-294d and § 31-301. Factual findings.
Gurski v. Concessionair, Division of Delaware North, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 282, 1218 CRD-7-91-4 (December 16, 1991).
Where claimant gave CRD no reason why evidence was not available and submitted at evidentiary hearing below and CRD found evidence cumulative of other testimony, claimant’s request to submit statement of additional witness denied. See also, Gurski, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Grey v. Greenwood Health Care Center, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 266, 1062 CRD-1-90-6 (December 5, 1991).
Remanded as additional medical evidence offered is material and relevant and was not discoverable in the evidentiary proceedings below.
Sgambato v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 131, 825 CRD-3-89-2 (August 6, 1990).
CRD would not grant Motion to present additional evidence where evidence was immaterial. See also, Sgambato, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.
Rogers v. Mitchell, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 90, 803 CRD-7-88-12 (May 14, 1990).
Commissioner accorded considerable latitude in deciding Motions to Submit Additional Evidence. See also, Rogers, § 31-275(9). See, Spataro v. Mattioli Construction, infra.
Spataro v. Mattioli Construction, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 41, 784 CRD-4-88-10 (February 21, 1990).
Motion to submit additional evidence denied where claimant failed to demonstrate materiality and was given prior opportunities to present evidence below. See also, Spataro, § 31-294d.
Kroczewski v. Old Fox Chemical, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 13, 730 CRD-1-88-5 (January 5, 1990).
Failure to permit additional evidence was not an abuse of discretion where it is obvious the trial commissioner exhaustively reviewed the voluminous record. See also, Kroczewski, § 31-275(1).
Tanner v. Walgren Tree Experts, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129, 748 CRD-8-88-7 (March 27, 1989).
Motion To Submit Additional Evidence denied because the poor quality of the transcript could not be expected to make a difference in the result of the case.
Murdock v. Squires, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. 64, 550 CRD-7-87 (December 1, 1988).
Affirmed trial commissioner’s ruling denying motion to present additional evidence where evidence was not new or undiscoverable with due diligence at time of original hearing.
Lindholm v. Moscowitz, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 527 CRD-7-86 (August 18, 1988).
Affirmed trial commissioner’s ruling denying Motion to Present Additional Evidence where the reason for failure to present it in earlier proceedings was a failure to appear due to a mistake as to the date of the hearing.
Brusca v. Color Tech, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 81, 50 CRD-7-81 (November 6, 1986).
Commissioner is granted considerable discretion in decisions regarding Motions to Submit Additional Evidence, therefore under Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9 it was proper to deny claimant’s motion.
Chapo v. Westport, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 170 CRD-4-82 (August 20, 1985).
Under Administrative Regulation § 31-301-9. Additional evidence will only be considered by the Compensation Review Division if material.
Woehrle v. Bridgeport, 2 Conn. Worker’s Comp. Rev. Op. 35, 175 CRD-4-82 (October 4, 1983).
Claimant not permitted to present new evidence where more than a year had passed since decision and claimant had not indicated the nature of the new evidence.
Baker v. Colt Industries, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 4, 106 CRD-1-81 (May 13, 1983).
Compensation Review Division refused to admit additional evidence.