State of Connecticut Workers' Compensation Commission, John A. Mastropietro, Chairman
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CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-275(1)

[Formerly § 31-275(12)]

Arising out of and in the course of employment.

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THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.

The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.

Barbee v. Sysco Food Services, 5892 CRB-8-13-11 (October 16, 2014).

Claimant asserted her knee injury was the result of overuse at work, specifically due to excess work unloading trucks in aftermath of Hurricane Irene. Respondents produced witnesses that contested this narrative and presented surveillance video showing claimant carrying crates and opening and closing doors without apparent discomfort. Trial commissioner found claimant’s narrative not credible and credited testimony of respondent’s witnesses, therefore dismissing claim. CRB affirmed dismissal on appeal. Case found indistinguishable from other cases such as Savageau v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5808 CRB-3-12-12 (November 7, 2013) where video evidence refuted claimant’s account of disability. Effort to claim respondent’s witnesses not credible was not effective, as held in Toroveci v. Globe Tool & Metal Stamping Co., Inc., 5253 CRB-6-07-7 (July 22, 2008) claimant must be a credible witness to prevail and if all witnesses were not credible case must be dismissed. See also, Barbee, § 31-275(16); § 31-301 Factual findings.

Smithwick v. Middlesex Hospital, 5886 CRB-8-13-10 (September 17, 2014).

Claimant was nurse in hospice unit and filed claim for repetitive trauma injuries to back and knees. Trial commissioner denied claim for back injuries but found knee injuries compensable. Commissioner ordered parties to use “best efforts” to resolve issues as compensating the claimant. Respondents appealed, arguing claim was filed in untimely manner and that claimant’s evidence did not establish causation. Claimant cross-appealed seeking remand for hearing on amount of compensation due the claimant. CRB affirmed trial commissioner as to respondent’s appeal but remanded for new hearing on unresolved issues. Claimant’s testimony and reports from treating physician found sufficient to establish compensability as per precedent in Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564 (2010). See also, Smithwick, § 31-294c; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Dauti v. Lighting Services, Inc., 5874 CRB-5-13-8 (September 5, 2014).

Dependent spouse sought benefits from death of husband, who died while at work of cardiac arrest. Trial commissioner concluded that evidence presented, including testimony of medical examiner, did not establish that the death arose out of the claimant’s employment and was merely contemporaneous. On appeal, claimant argued that there was a “presumption of compensability”, citing Allen v. Northeast Utilities, 6 Conn. App. 498 (1986). CRB distinguished the Allen case and applied the “proximate cause” standard of Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012) to affirm the decision. The trial commissioner could reasonably determine that employment was not the proximate cause of the employee’s death. See also, Dauti, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Story v.Woodbury, 5848 CRB-5-13-5 (August 7, 2014).

Compensation review board affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s hearing loss, tinnitus, and vertigo were causally related to an injury sustained when claimant was struck by a motor vehicle. The injury occurred while claimant, a police officer, was directing traffic around a construction site. See also, Story, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Clark v. Metro Roofing Supplies, Inc., 5865 CRB-4-13-7 (July 11, 2014).

Trier concluded that injuries sustained by truck driver in bridge collapse arose out of and in course of employment. Respondents appealed on basis that claimant was outside scope of employment when injured because he had been warned not to drive over bridge and decision to do so constituted willful and serious misconduct. CRB affirmed, noting that trier, having found credible claimant’s testimony that he inspected bridge before driving over it, concluded that incident was “an unfortunate accident.” See also, Clark, § 31-284(a); § 31-301 Factual findings.

Kielbowicz v. Tilcon Connecticut, Inc., 5855 CRB-6-13-6 (June 12, 2014).

Claimant was injured while at work at quarry. He testified he fell off a ladder, but trial commissioner found this account not credible and credited testimony that claimant collapsed of a seizure on level ground. Medical evidence was collapse was due to alcohol withdrawal seizure. Trial commissioner found injury noncompensable as it was merely contemporaneous with employment, and did not arise out of employment. Claimant appealed, asserting injury was compensable pursuant to precedent in Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 122 Conn. 343 (1937). CRB affirmed dismissal. Claimant’s lack of candor made claim subject to dismissal, see Mankus v. Mankus, 4958 CRB-1-05-6 (August 22, 2006), aff’d, 107 Conn. App. 585 (2008) and Vaughan v. North Marine Group, 5695 CRB-4-11-11 (January 4, 2013). Recent precedent also states that idiopathic injuries are not compensable. Pupuri v. Benny’s Home Service, LLC, 5697 CRB-2-11-11 (November 5, 2012). CRB distinguished case from Savage on both factual and legal grounds; claimant was not on ladder and precedent since Birnie v. Electric Boat Corporation, 288 Conn. 392 (2008) requires that a clear nexus of “proximate cause” must exist between the claimant’s employment and their medical condition in order to find compensability. Facts herein did not as a matter of law establish work was a substantial factor in claimant’s injury, hence case more akin to Loehfelm v. Stratford-Board of Education, 5710 CRB-4-11-12 (November 14, 2012) than Tyskiewicz v. Danbury, 5839 CRB-7-13-5 (April 4, 2014). See also, Kielbowicz, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Hadden v. Capitol Region Education Council, 5843 CRB-1-13-5 (May 20, 2014).

Claimant, a school teacher, had pre-existing multiple sclerosis and was hit in the face breaking up a fight at school. Claimant’s condition deteriorated after the assault and she claimed total disability was due to the compensable injury. Trial commissioner weighed competing expert opinions on issue and found claimant’s experts more persuasive and credible. Respondents appealed Finding and Award, arguing claimant’s experts did not have sufficient grounds to opine as they did on causation and pointing to claimant’s extensive previous medical history. Respondents also argued award should be apportioned between compensable and noncompensable injury. CRB affirmed decision. Expert testimony and claimant testimony when considered together reached standard in Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564 (2010) and Madden v. Danbury Hospital, 5745 CRB 7-12-4 (April 22, 2013) as to proximate causation. Precedent in Cashman v. McTernan School, 130 Conn. 401 (1943) banned apportionment for a nonoccupational disease and in any event to consider this issue at this point amounted to piecemeal litigation and respondents had not introduced evidence at the hearing on this issue. See also, Hadden, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Cirino v. United Parcel Service, 5841 CRB-3-13-5 (May 12, 2014).

Claimant appealed dismissal of claim after trier concluded claimant did not sustain compensable injury. CRB affirmed, noting that no treating physician provided causation report and initial treating physician remarked that claimant was vague regarding mechanism of injury. Trier did not find claimant credible regarding narrative given to medical providers and noted claimant had history of symptom magnification relative to prior work injury. Trier did find supervisor’s testimony credible relative to claimant’s episodes of insubordination. CRB also affirmed trial commissioner’s rejection of argument that alleged injury constituted aggravation of earlier work-related injury; record contained no report to that effect and trier did not find that claimant sustained second compensable injury. CRB affirmed denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Cirino, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-349(a).

Tyskiewicz v. Danbury, 5839 CRB-7-13-5 (April 4, 2014).

Claimant, a fire fighter, sustained traumatic injuries at fire scene, but as uncertain as to why they had occurred. Respondents argued that a syncopal event unrelated to fire fighting must have triggered the fall, and injury was only coincidental with employment. Trial commissioner found it more likely claimant slipped, was hit by debris, or had a syncopal event due to work related stress and found injury compensable. CRB affirmed on appeal. Trial commissioner needed to find by preponderance of evidence that the “risks of employment” were proximate cause in claimant’s injury, see Blakeslee v. Platt Bros. & Co., 279 Conn. 239 (2006). Long precedent in CT courts and statutes reflects policy determination that fire fighting is highly stressful, thus it was reasonable to conclude that stress would have triggered the claimant’s collapse if he did not slip or get hit by debris.

Tosado v. B. Lipnick Supply Company, Inc., 5835 CRB-4-13-5 (March 3, 2014).

Claimant asserted that the cause for his leg amputation due to gangrene was a work injury. Medical evidence indicated that claimant had uncontrolled diabetes and trial commissioner noted discrepancies between claimant’s narrative and what treating physician said he had told her. Employers did not corroborate work injury narrative. Commissioner therefore dismissed claim. CRB affirmed on appeal, citing in part Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 910 (2008). See also, Tosado, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Avino v. Stop & Shop Supermarket, 5820 CRB-3-13-2 (February 10, 2014).

Trial commissioner concluded claimant’s employment as meat cutter was substantial contributing factor to need for bilateral knee replacement. Respondents argued claimant’s symptoms were due to prior non-work related injuries and although job activities may have aggravated claimant’s pre-existing condition, they did not substantially contribute to need for surgery. CRB affirmed, noting that expert medical opinion and claimant’s testimony provided adequate basis for trier’s conclusions. CRB also affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Avino, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4.

Talton v. Saint Raphael Healthcare System, 5816 CRB-3-12-12 (January 16, 2014).

Trial commissioner concluded claimed back injury did not arise out of and in course of employment and dismissed claim. Evidentiary record indicated claimant had not been forthcoming with medical providers regarding prior history of back pain and treatment such that medical reports, which also contained differing descriptions of mechanics of injury, were therefore predicated on incomplete and inconsistent information. CRB affirmed, noting that findings regarding credibility and weight of evidence are sole province of trier and not subject to reversal on appeal. See also, Talton, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Cunningham v. Saint Raphael Healthcare System, 5809 CRB-3-12-12 (December 31, 2013).

Claimant sustained injury in fall on sidewalk outside employer’s facility during unpaid lunch break. Trier determined injury did not arise out of or in course of employment because employer neither owned nor controlled premises where incident occurred and purpose of claimant’s activities was to attend to personal comfort rather than for mutual benefit of herself and employer. CRB affirmed, noting that record contained conflicting testimony and credibility findings relative to location and circumstances of incident are not subject to reversal on appeal. CRB also found trier properly rejected argument that premises were under employer’s control because employer “acquiesced” to employees using sidewalk. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Cunningham, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4.

McMorris v. New Haven, 5815 CRB-3-12-12 (November 19, 2013).

Claimant, a police officer, was injured in motor vehicle accident between home and work and claimed injury was compensable based on statutory coverage for commuting injuries. Respondents denied liability as claimant was bringing children to day care at time, claiming claimant was engaged in a “preliminary act” prior to work or a deviation from normal commuting. Trial commissioner found claimant had not deviated from normal commuting route and found compensability. City appealed citing Perun v. City of Danbury, 5651 CRB-7-11-5 (May 15, 2012). CRB affirmed trial commissioner, Perun case only applicable to injuries at claimant’s abode, not injuries after he commenced journey on public highways. Statute governs all commuting injuries by a police officer and does not mandate solo use of private auto. Trial commissioner found no deviation had occurred and precedent makes this factual finding generally impervious to appeal.

Osborn v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 5800 CRB-5-12-11 (October 28, 2013).

Claimant asserted she sustained two work related knee injuries. She testified that she did not immediately file a claim for either injury because employer preferred that she take short term disability. She later filed claim and respondent challenged causation. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and CRB affirmed decision on appeal. See also, Osborn, § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Barbieri v. Comfort and Care of Wallingford, LLC, 5794 CRB-8-12-10 (September 26, 2013).

Claimant injured while employed as companion to elderly client. Employer said they would pay medical bills but did not so and laid off claimant while disabled. Firm later sold. Trial commissioner found claimant suffered compensable injury and found employer uninsured, and levied order on Second Injury Fund to pay award. Second Injury Fund appealed, arguing they had sought to make employer’s principal liable for award as alter ego of employer and to impose liability on employer’s successor firm. Trial commissioner did not rule on these motions. On appeal, CRB remanded to trial commissioner to determine whether facts warranted piercing the corporate veil. See also, Barbieri, § 31-355(a); § 31-355(b).

Kingston v. Town of Seymour, 5789 CRB-5-12-10 (September 10, 2013).

Claimant said he was injured while at work raising lawn mower to truck; and that this incident was a substantial factor in his need for back surgery. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and credited opinion of treating physicians. On appeal, respondents argued they were prejudiced by claim form which stated an inaccurate date of injury. CRB affirmed trial commissioner who determined respondents not prejudiced as claimant actively pursued claim and sought hearings within one year of injury. See also, Kingston, § 31-294c; § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Chowaniec v. Middlefield, 5779 CRB-8-12-9 (September 9, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s award of benefits to volunteer firefighter injured while setting up fundraising booth at Durham Fair, asserting that trier erred in applying provisions of § 7-314(a) C.G.S. CRB affirmed trier’s decision to apply § 7-314(a) C.G.S. but reversed award, holding that because record could not support reasonable inference that claimant’s fundraising activities resulted from an order from a supervising officer, circumstances of injury did not satisfy provisions of statute. CRB recognized that claimant’s activities were for the benefit of the fire company but noted that instant record differed significantly from factual circumstances which gave rise to award of benefits in Evanuska v. Danbury, 285 Conn. 348 (2008). See also, Chowaniec, § 7-314a, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Wilson v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 5780 CRB-5-12-9 (August 28, 2013).

Claimant testified that she sustained foot injury standing up at work after loading a machine on her tiptoes, and the work injury was the reason she needed foot surgery. Commissioner’s examiner agreed with claimant and ascribed tendon tear to that incident. Trial commissioner adopted opinion of commissioner’s examiner and found injury compensable. Respondents appealed claiming case similar to Loehfelm v. Stratford-Board of Education, 5710 CRB-4-11-12 (November 14, 2012), where commissioner found injury did not arise out of employment. CRB affirmed Finding, commissioner could rely on examiner’s opinion to find compensability, citing Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564 (2010).

Covey v. Home Medical Associates, LLC, 5770 CRB-4-12-7 (July 25, 2013).

Trier determined employer-employee relationship existed between claimant’s decedent and respondent Jewish Home for the Elderly [“JHE”] relative to claimant’s decedent’s position as medical director of JHE. Claimant’s decedent was also employed as staff physician at JHE and as partner in his own private medical practice housed within JHE. CRB affirmed, noting that despite contract language stating claimant’s decedent was independent contractor, testimony concerning his duties as medical director supported finding that based on “totality of the evidence test” as set forth in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998), claimant’s decedent was JHE employee. In addition, trier determined that in light of claimant’s decedent’s “unique relationship” with JHE, JHE functioned as claimant’s decedent’s principal employer relative to his duties at in-house private medical practice partnership and claimant’s decedent had not opted out of Workers’ Compensation Act. CRB affirmed, holding that evidence adduced relative to employer employee relationship in addition to testimony regarding circumstances surrounding establishment of private medical practice supported trier’s conclusion that statutory requirements of § 31-291 C.G.S. had been satisfied. See also, Covey, § 31-275(10); § 31-291; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Estate of Robert C. Haburey v. Winchester, 5763 CRB-6-12-6 (June 14, 2013).

Trier concluded that claimant died of sepsis following exposure to Legionella at employer’s sewer treatment plant. CRB affirmed trier’s compensability findings on basis of medical record despite expert’s lack of “absolute certainty” regarding etiology of claimant’s sepsis, and declined to address whether Legionnaire’s Disease constituted occupational disease as contemplated by § 31-275(15) C.G.S. CRB rejected respondents’ claim that trier lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to deficient notice of claim, noting that prior trial commissioner’s Finding and Award regarding sufficiency of notice adequately reflected analysis set forth in Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007). CRB found respondents’ allegations of due process deprivation without merit and also denied claimant’s Motion to Dismiss predicated on respondents’ compliance with instant Finding and Award, noting that dismissal would vitiate appeal provisions codified at § 31-301 C.G.S., et. seq. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Estate of Haburey, § 31-275(15), § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal Procedure, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-04, § 31-306.

Reis-Pereira v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc., 5713 CRB-6-11-12 (May 20, 2013).

Claimant asserted that her back injury was caused by lifting incident at work. Trial commissioner found claimant’s narrative inconsistent and unreliable; also found treating physician who had opined against work bring substantial factor in claimant’s condition the most credible expert witness. CRB affirmed decision. Credibility of a claimant cannot be reconsidered on appeal. Review of witness’s deposition testimony indicates commissioner accurately summarized his opinion.

Disotell v. LVI Services, Inc., 5749 CRB-3-12-4 (April 25, 2013).

Trier dismissed claim after concluding claimant’s failure to use fall protection equipment while operating man lift was reckless, unreasonable and constituted serious and willful misconduct. Trier found claimant’s testimony credible regarding his frustration with equipment and manpower provided by employer but determined it was not credible that worker with claimant’s training and supervisory responsibilities would forget to use safety harness. CRB affirmed, noting that trier’s findings were supported by record and within her discretion. Trier correctly found that willful misconduct is not limited to situations where claimant admits to intentional refusal to ignore safety rules. Trier granted Motion to Correct in part; CRB affirmed trier’s denial of balance of proposed corrections. See also, Disotell, § 31-284(a), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Madden v. Danbury Hospital, 5745 CRB-7-12-4 (April 22, 2013).

Claimant asserted that his bilateral shoulder injuries were due to repetitive trauma caused by his overhead work as an electrician. Treating physicians opined work was substantial factor in ailment. Respondent’s expert and commissioner’s examiner did not agree with treaters. Trial commissioner found injury compensable as work “more than a de minimis factor” in injury, citing Birnie v. Electric Boat Corporation, 288 Conn. 392 (2008). Respondents appealed, citing standard for causation in Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012) which in their view made Birnie unreliable. Respondents also questioned nonreliance on commissioner’s examiner. CRB affirmed award. Review of history of standard on causation indicated that Sapko restated causation standard in place since 1920’s and prior to Birnie; evidence on record reached this standard. CRB found commissioner had right in this case not to rely on commissioner’s examiner, as his opinion on causation was equivocal, but suggested manner decision was worded was not consistent with prior practice; citing Carroll v. Flattery’s Landscaping, Inc., 5385 CRB-8-08-10 (September 24, 2009), this misstep was found as harmless error. See also, Madden, § 31-275(16); § 31-294f; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Albuquerque v. Town of East Hartford, 5741 CRB-1-12-3 (April 9, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s determination that claimant’s motor vehicle accident of 1983 and fusion surgery of 1986 were substantial contributing factors to claimant’s current symptomatology. Trier declined to find that 2001 motor vehicle accident constituted an aggravation as contemplated by Kelly v. Dunkin Donuts, 4621 CRB-4-03-2 (April 5, 2004) such that instant respondents would be relieved of ongoing liability. Trier also rejected respondents’ contention that subsequent accident constituted a superseding cause that broke chain of causation as contemplated by Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012). CRB affirmed, holding that medical record and claimant’s testimony substantiated trier’s findings. CRB found no error in trier’s refusal to invoke Kelly, which concerned apportionment of liability, concluding instead that trier properly focused his analysis on proximate causation. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Albuquerque, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4, § 31-349(a).

Dorenbosch v. Hoffman Landscapes, 5734 CRB-7-12-2 (February 14, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s award of benefits to claimant who had sustained compensable right leg injury and then claimed subsequent injury to right leg was sequela of original wound which had never properly healed. CRB affirmed, holding that despite lack of deposition testimony, medical record provided reasonable basis for trier’s inference that second incident did not constitute new injury and trier retained prerogative to resolve inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony in claimant’s favor. CRB found no error in trier’s refusal to entertain respondents’ challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Dorenbosch, § 31-301; Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Vaughan v. North Marine Group, 5695 CRB-4-11-11 (January 4, 2013).

Claimant alleged back injury was due to lifting sail cloth at work. Trial commissioner found claimant was not credible and dismissed claim. CRB affirmed dismissal on appeal as issues of witness credibility cannot be considered on appeal. This was an unwitnessed accident and CRB cited extensive precedent where these claims are dismissed when claimant found not to be credible. Claimant attacked credibility of respondent’s witness, CRB cited Toroveci v. Globe Tool & Metal Stamping Co., Inc., 5253 CRB-6-07-7 (July 22, 2008) that when both witnesses lacked credibility a claim must be dismissed. Claimant also attacked trial commissioner’s reliance on one expert witnesses’ testimony as “wishy-washy” and unreliable; claiming witness supported his position; after review CRB concluded in totality this testimony was adverse to the claimant’s position.

Hubbard v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 5705 CRB-6-11-12 (November 30, 2012).

Claimant challenged basis of permanent partial disability award and appealed trier’s denial of compensability and temporary total disability benefits. CRB remanded for additional findings. Medical report on which trier relied for permanent partial disability award attributed permanent partial disability to condition trier had found non-compensable. Trier determined that claimant provided no evidence of causation for osteoarthritis but record contained two reports which supported causation and trier’s findings did not specifically address reports’ evidentiary weight. Commissioner’s Examination report on which trier based decision to deny temporary total disability benefits was ambiguous. Denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error. See also, Hubbard, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4; § 31-307; § 31-308(b); § 31-349.

Loehfelm v. Town of Stratford-Board of Education, 5710 CRB-4-11-12 (November 14, 2012).

A compensable the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. An injury that is merely contemporaneous or concurrent with the employment does not satisfy the statutory criteria. Here the claimant suffered a previous non-compensable back injury as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Following the motor vehicle accident claimant underwent back surgery. Sometime after the back surgery and prior to her fall in the stairwell, the claimant began experiencing weakness in her legs. The claimant testified her legs just gave out which is what caused her to fall in the stairwell. See also, Loehfelm, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Duarte v. Franstel of CT Corp., 5692 CRB-7-11-11 (November 13, 2012).

Respondent challenged finding that claimant was employed by respondent when claimant sustained injuries in fall from tree while trimming branches on third party’s property. CRB affirmed. Although testimony of various parties appeared inconsistent with evidentiary submissions, trier retains ultimate discretion to determine credibility of witnesses. Trier reasonably inferred that claimant’s co-worker was authorized to act as respondent’s agent and record supported trier’s determination that requirements were satisfied for establishing employment relationship as set forth in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998). Trier reasonably inferred that evidentiary record did not support finding that legal standard for casual employment was satisfied. CRB deemed meritless respondent’s claim that trier’s Finding and Award was void because trier issued decision on Monday following expiration of statutory one-hundred twenty day deadline which occurred on preceding Saturday. Trier properly denied respondent’s Motion to Correct. See also, Duarte, § 31-275(9); § 31-300; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4.

Pupuri v. Benny’s Home Service, LLC, 5697 CRB-2-11-11 (November 5, 2012).

Claimant asserted back injury was result of lifting rocks at quarry. Respondent and homeowner at job site disputed narrative. Video presented showed claimant able to run or walk quickly. Trial commissioner determined claimant failed to prove injury in course of employment. Claimant appealed dismissal arguing that medical evidence all consistent with claimant’s narrative. CRB upheld dismissal. Trial commissioner did not find claimant credible. Medical evidence reliant on narrative could be discounted. Additionally, treater suggested back issues could be degenerative in nature. See also, Pupuri, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Herbert v. State/Department of Correction, 5547 CRB-8-10-4 (September 13, 2012).

Claimant was correctional social worker who claimed to have contracted respiratory ailments from mold in office. Evidence credited by trial commissioner from industrial hygienist was that leak in office was too new to have created mold, and examination after leak was fixed revealed no hazardous conditions. Commissioner dismissed claim. CRB affirmed on appeal. See also, Herbert, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Miller v. Thyssen Krupp Elevator Corporation, 5669 CRB-7-11-7 (August 29, 2012).

CRB affirmed finding that claimant’s back injury was the natural progression of a 2004 injury for which the claimant failed to file a timely claim and a 2006 injury for which the claimant filed a claim but did not pursue benefits. The 2007 fall from a 2 step ladder for which claimant sought benefits was determined to be a temporary aggravation and a de minimis cause in claimant’s subsequent treatment and indemnity claims. Eggshell plaintiff theory not applicable. See also, Miller, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Shanks v. Greentree Toyota Lincoln-Mercury, 5625 CRB-7-11-2 (August 16, 2012).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s determination that no causal connection existed between claimant’s complaints of double vision and workplace incident in which claimant fell after being struck in forehead by SUV door. Respondents accepted compensability of left shoulder injury allegedly sustained in same incident. CRB affirmed, noting that record contained speculative and conflicting expert opinion but medical evidence upon which trier ultimately relied provided adequate basis for dismissing claim. CRB also affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Shanks, § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Morales v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 5666 CRB-2-11-07 (July 6, 2012).

Claimant had sustained knee injury necessitating nearly full removal of meniscus prior to being hired by respondent. While employed by respondent claimant suffered knee bruise in conveyer belt accident. Claimant treated with primary care doctor and continued working despite pain, and left job for nonmedical reasons. Subsequent to leaving FedEx, claimant’s orthopedic doctor diagnosed need for knee surgery and performed surgery. Claimant’s treater opined work injury reason surgery was necessary, relying on claimant’s narrative. Respondent’s examiner opined nature of knee contusion and degenerative knee problem were unrelated and bone bruise not a substantial factor in need for surgery. Trial commissioner found respondent’s examiner persuasive and dismissed claim for surgery. Commissioner also found “it improbable that the claimant’s left knee was completely asymptomatic prior to” compensable injury. On appeal, CRB stated commissioner’s finding on the claimant’s knee being asymptomatic was unsupported by evidence. CRB affirmed the Finding as the respondent’s examiner offered independent probative evidence supporting the decision. See also, Morales, § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Perun v. City of Danbury, 5651 CRB-7-11-05 (May 15, 2012).

Claimant, a police officer, was injured in fall in his driveway during morning commute. He argued § 31-275(1)(A)(i) C.G.S. made injuries during commuting compensable for police officers. Respondents argues injuries at one’s abode were not compensable pursuant to § 31-275(1)(E) C.G.S. Trial commissioner adopted claimant’s interpretation of law and found injury compensable. On appeal, CRB reversed this decision. Plain meaning of statutes makes commuting from abode to work compensable, and abode is a defined term encompassing driveways and walkways. CRB cited Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, 98 Conn. App. 852 (2006) re; abode definition. Two statutes in question must be read together; no legislative intent was expressed to separate statutes. Claimant’s reliance on Lake v. Bridgeport, 102 Conn. 337 (1925) misplaced; that injury occurred on a public highway, not at claimant’s residence.

Tutunjian v. Burns, Brooks & McNeil, 5618 CRB-6-11-1 (March 21, 2012).

Claimant worked for insurance broker and was home on day with inclement weather, where he was injured mailing a letter. Claimant testified he had home office, was mailing business mail, and firm had policy requiring him to work at home on such days. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and injury compensable. Respondents appealed, asserting injury not sustained in course of employment and CRB upheld decision. Facts support compensability based on test in McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547, 556 (1979). The threshold question was whether “special employment circumstances [exist] that make it necessary rather than personally convenient to work at home”. Facts supported conclusion it was necessary due to weather for claimant to work from home, thus claimant was “where he may reasonably be” at time of injury.

Sosa v. Benchmark Assisted Living, 5592 CRB-3-10-9 (August 17, 2011).

Claimant asserted he suffered unwitnessed knee injury driving respondent’s van. Respondent’s witness testified only indicia of said was incident report form; claimant did not say he was hurt. MRI studies showed no knee injury. Trial commissioner dismissed claim. CRB upheld dismissal. Claimant must be credible witness to prevail and commissioner found claimant not credible. See also, Sosa, § 31-298; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Nalysnyk v. Slawomir Deja d/b/a Deja Construction, 5528 CRB-2-10-2 (February 4, 2011).

Respondent Second Injury Fund appealed finding of compensability and award of temporary total and temporary partial disability to construction worker who sustained back injury after cutting and carrying wood for uninsured employer. Fund also contended trier failed to determine temporary partial wage rate and argued award of temporary partial benefits waiving job searches pending approved Form 36 constituted deprivation of due process. CRB remanded for determination of temporary partial wage rate and struck order waiving job searches but affirmed balance of decision, holding that medical record supported compensability finding and trier had discretion to credit claimant’s testimony over that of employer and witness. CRB found trier’s language regarding Form 36 recited customary utilization procedure and was not a due process deprivation. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct despite identifying two harmless errors. See also, Nalysnyk, § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-308(a).

Roberto v. Partyka Chevrolet, Inc., 5542 CRB-3-10-3 (February 8, 2011).

Claimant said he had sustained fall while at workplace and sought benefits. Respondent’s witnesses said claimant had told them he was hurt moving home computer. Trial commissioner found claimant not credible and concluded claimant had not met burden of establishing injury was compensable. CRB upheld decision on appeal. See also, Roberto, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Anderson v. Meriden Record Journal, 5531 CRB-08-10-03 (January 20, 2011).

Trial commissioner concluded claimant suffered two compensable injuries, but had not proven he was totally disabled from either injury. CRB upheld decision. See also, Anderson, § 31-294d, § 31-294f, § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-307.

Aguirre v. McDonald’s Restaurant, 5482 CRB-7-09-7(August 26, 2010).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s finding and dismissal that claimant’s prior compensable back injury was not a factor in claimant’s need for a second back surgery. The need for a second back surgery was solely the result of a non compensable car accident. Further, the commissioner’s reference to the doctrine of superseding cause did not constitute reversible error given commissioner’s finding that the non compensable. See also, Aguirre, § 31-294(d).

Gioia v. United Parcel Service, 5488 CRB-3-09-8 (August 9, 2010).

Claimant asserted he sustained lumbar spine injuries when delivery truck he was riding in went over large potholes. Claimant did not immediately present for medical treatment and continued working after alleged incident. Respondents’ witnesses, including truck driver, refuted claimant’s narrative. Respondents also pointed to prior chiropractic treatment for lumbar spine prior to employment as well as dispute over hours. Trial commissioner did not find claimant credible and dismissed claim. CRB dismissed appeal on procedural grounds but noted it would have upheld trial commissioner on merits; Finding & Dismissal clearly explained why commissioner could have reasonably discounted claimant’s narrative and if claimant not credible claim is subject to dismissal. See also, Gioia, § 31-301 Appeal procedure, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Connors v. Stamford, 5484 CRB-7-09-7 (July 23, 2010).

CRB affirmed dismissal of claim where conflicting evidence was presented. Claimant argued injury occurred at work, while co-workers testified claimant arrived at work complaining of severe back pain providing a history of injuring his back while working a side job the day before. Further, all other errors alleged on appeal were deemed harmless. See also, Connors, § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Christie v. Stanadyne Automotive Corp., 5486 CRB-1-09-07 (July 27, 2010).

Claimant asserts he injured back lifting parts. Trial commissioner found witnesses did not corroborate narrative and found claimant not credible. Therefore, she dismissed claim as claimant failed to prove injury was in course of employment. CRB upheld decision on appeal, matter was a Fair case. CRB denied respondent’s motion to dismiss appeal for procedural deficiencies; panel not persuaded respondent was prejudiced. See also, Christie, § 31-301 Appeal procedure, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Jones v. Connecticut Children’s Medical Center, 5420 CRB-1-09-1 (July 1, 2010), aff’d, 131 Conn. App. 415 (2011).

Employer appealed from trier’s decision awarding claimant § 31-308(b) benefits. CRB reversed on basis that trier’s factual findings did not support award given that trier had determined doctor’s opinion on which award was predicated was not credible. CRB noted that file did contain approved jurisdictional voluntary agreement stating claimant had sustained a concussion and record indicated respondents had tendered to claimant permanency voluntary agreements which claimant refused to sign, ostensibly because she did not believe she had yet reached maximum medical improvement. CRB reversed trier’s finding of compensability of claimant’s neurogenic bladder because expert who made diagnosis relied upon same doctor’s opinion found not credible by the trier. CRB reversed trier’s determination that claimant’s motor vehicle accident was a substantial contributing factor in her subsequent emotional and psychological issues, concluding such a finding was inconsistent with trier’s other findings relative to claimant’s alleged brain injury. CRB determined trier’s denial of corrections proffered by respondents constituted error. See also, Jones, § 31-301, Factual findings, § 31 301-4, § 31-308(a).

Rosa v. State/DCF, 5475 CRB-8-09-7 (June 22, 2010).

Claimant asserted he fractured his foot restraining child. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and treating physician confirmed causation of injury. CRB upheld decision on appeal; issue of causation in case was a factual matter appellate body could not revisit. See also, Rosa, § 5-142a and § 31-301. Factual findings.

Lettieri v. Tilcon Connecticut, Inc., 5478 CRB-3-09-6 (June 17, 2010).

Claimant injured in compensable accident falling out of truck. Initial injury centered on left shoulder which claimant landed on. Also said he had used right arm to prevent fall. Three years after fall claimant began complaining about right shoulder. Claimant said need for surgery related to initial accident. Respondent’s witness found right shoulder unrelated as rotator cuff tear could have been degenerative in nature. Trial Commissioner found respondent’s witness credible and dismissed claim. CRB affirmed dismissal. This is a “dueling expert” case Dellacamera v. Waterbury, 4966 CRB 5-05-6 (June 29, 2006), and claimant failed in his burden to prove causation. See also, Lettieri, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Goldman v. State/Department of Environmental Protection, 5466 CRB-1-09-5 (May 12, 2010).

Claimant injured when assaulted by co-worker at office. Claimant testified he went to visit co-worker to discuss permit application. Trial commissioner believed claimant and discounted respondent’s assertion the conversation was about a Nissan. CRB upheld claim as compensable. Claimant was rendering a service to employer at time of attack-injury incidental to employment as per Stulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355, 361-62 (1938) and Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408 (1996). See also, Goldman, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Volmut v. General Electric Company, 5439 CRB-4-09-2 (April 7, 2010).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s depressive disorder was compensable on basis that medical reports and claimant’s testimony at trial supported reasonable inference of causation between claimant’s accepted back injury and contested psychiatric claim. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to find undue delay and/or unreasonable contest against respondents relative to their failure to authorize psychiatric evaluation and to pay and/or reimburse claimant for medications prescribed by authorized treater on basis that record in its entirety did not support sanctions. Although CRB considered circumstances surrounding submission of surveillance videotape problematic, board did not find trier’s actions constituted reversible error given that surveillance was not germane to issues on appeal. Trier also properly refused to mark tape as full exhibit and allowed record to remain open pending investigator’s testimony but claimant requested trier close record before that occurred. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to dismiss claimant’s amended Reasons for Appeal given that respondents did not appear to be prejudiced by claimant’s late filing. Both parties filed Motions to Correct which were denied save for two proposed corrections by claimant making two findings consistent with overall award. See also, Volmut, § 31-275(16), § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Fekieta v. Drill Masters, Eldarado Tool, Inc., 5458 CRB-4-09-5 (April 6, 2010).

Claimant head butted by co-worker at place of employment and suffered injuries. Claimant asserted injuries were incidental to employment. Trial Commissioner found claimant had opportunity to defuse confrontation and chose not to do so, therefore finding injury outside scope of employment. Claimant appealed and CRB upheld dismissal. Trial Commissioner found claimant not credible and followed legal standards delineated in Stulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355 (1938) and Ryker v. Bethany, 4780 CRB-3-04-2 (February 16, 2005), aff’d, 97 Conn. App. 304 (2006).

Bode v. Connecticut Mason, The Learning Corridor OCIP, 5423 CRB-3-09-2 (March 3, 2010), aff’d and rev’d in part, 130 Conn. App. 672 (2011), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 942 (2011).

Claimant appealed trier’s dismissal of claims for temporary total disability benefits and compensability of psychiatric disorder allegedly arising from fall in which claimant sustained compensable injuries to lumbar and cervical spine and right master arm. Claimant also appealed determination that he had “demonstrated an unwillingness” to proceed with shoulder surgery and contended trier utilized incorrect standard to assess probative value of medical reports relative to contemplated surgery. CRB affirmed, noting that medical record supported finding claimant had light-duty capacity and was devoid of a report linking claimed psychiatric disorder to compensable back injury. Medical record and testimony by Dr. Barnett supported finding that contemplated shoulder surgery was reasonable and claimant’s testimony at trial demonstrated his continued reluctance to follow through with surgery. Appellate Court affirmed trier’s dismissal of psychiatric claim but reversed dismissal of claim for temporary total disability benefits on basis that trier “summarily disregarded” claimant’s testimony and two vocational reports in reaching his determination that claimant was not temporarily totally disabled. Appellate Court also held that trier’s consideration of claimant’s alleged unwillingness to submit to shoulder surgery relative to his evaluation of claimant’s temporary total disability claim constituted a misapplication of law. See also, Bode, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16)(B)(ii), § 31-294e(b), § 31-301, Factual Findings. § 31-307.

Kummer v. Bic Corporation, 5406 CRB-3-08-12 (December 15, 2009).

Pro se claimant appealed trier’s dismissal of her lumbar spine claim, alleging trial commissioner was “confused” regarding proper date of injury and body part in question. Trier denied proposed corrections in claimant’s Motion to Correct but clarified his Finding and Dismissal to specifically indicate he was dismissing lumbar spine claim. CRB affirmed, noting evidentiary record allowed for reasonable inference that claimant’s injury was not causally related to the alleged workplace incident; trier is free to disregard all or part of a medical opinion and credibility assessments are not subject to second guessing at appellate level. On appeal, claimant filed a timely Petition for Review and submitted two additional documents which were partially accepted insofar as they constituted a rationale for the claimant’s appeal and partially denied insofar as they constituted a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence pursuant to Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9. See also, Kummer, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9.

Kaspern v. Estes Express Lines, 5391 CRB-8-08-11 (November 17, 2009).

Claimant sustained compensable left shoulder injury while employed by Estes Express as a tractor trailer driver for Home Depot. Claimant subsequently left Estes Express and went to work for Lowe’s as a tractor trailer driver. Claimant ultimately sought authorization for surgery to left shoulder and trier assigned liability to Estes Express. Respondent Estes Express appealed, contending claimant’s ongoing symptoms and need for surgery were due to his employment with Lowe’s in light of claimant’s testimony that jobs with Estes and Lowe’s were “identical”. Estes also argued trier erred in failing to find, consistent with Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008), Lowe’s was precluded from contesting liability based on its failure to file Form 43 in response to second Form 30C filed by claimant alleging repetitive trauma. CRB affirmed, citing medical reports in evidence and noting claimant testified he made more than twice as many deliveries per week for Estes and was required to lift heavier objects. CRB declined to address issue of preclusion given it could be reasonably inferred trier concluded claimant was entitled to recovery on basis of first, timely Form 30C and second Form 30C was unnecessary and legally irrelevant. Trier denied Motion to Correct. See also, Kaspern, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-307b, § 31-349.

Williams v. State/Judicial Branch, 5359 CRB-1-08-6 (October 8, 2009), aff’d, 124 Conn. App. 759 (2010).

Claimant, a Juvenile Transportation Officer, appealed trier’s decision dismissing claim on basis that claimant’s aggressive initiation of a physical confrontation with a detention center detainee during a supervised basketball game constituted willful and serious misconduct, an affirmative defense. CRB affirmed, as the trier’s conclusion was dependent upon the weight and credibility he assigned to the evidence which included the testimony of co workers and supervisors as well as surveillance camera footage. Claimant also claimed as error trier’s failure to draw an adverse inference on the basis of spoliation by virtue of respondent’s failure to preserve footage from a second surveillance camera operating in gym during the incident. CRB affirmed trier, noting that an adverse inference determination is factual in nature and respondent provided a credible explanation for its failure to preserve footage from second camera. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to grant corrections, save for scrivener’s errors, in claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Williams § 31-284(a), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Cuadrado v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5360 CRB-7-08-7 (July 2, 2009).

Pro se claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim after finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbar spine injury and alleged workplace lifting incident. Medical reports in evidence seemed to suggest injury may have occurred prior to date of incident, and although claimant did present a medical opinion in support of causation, trier ultimately concluded that neither the claimant nor the doctor in question were credible or persuasive. Respondents submitted employer time cards which also appeared to cast doubt on claimant’s narrative of events surrounding her injury. On appeal, claimant failed to provide Reasons for Appeal or a brief but did submit two documents which were partially accepted insofar as they constituted a rationale for the claimant’s appeal and partially denied insofar as they constituted a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence pursuant to Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9. CRB affirmed trier on basis that determinations relative to credibility of parties are not subject to second guessing at appellate level. See also, Cuadrado, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9.

Drown v. Rochette Quality Home Improvement, LLC, 5369 CRB 8-08-8 (June 29, 2009).

Claimant injured falling off roof at construction site shortly after arriving at 5:30 a.m. Sunday morning. Trial Commissioner credited respondent’s testimony claimant was not directed to be on site at that hour and dismissed claim, citing Edwards v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 4924 CRB-3-05-2 (February 15, 2006). CRB upheld on appeal. Trial Commissioner could find respondent more credible than claimant. Edwards case stands for proposition injury is not compensable if claimant is not scheduled to be working at time of injury. See also Drown § 31- 301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9.

Rakowski v. Marlin Firearms, 5340 CRB-3-08-4 (April 22, 2009).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim after finding no causal connection between claimant’s vocal cord injury and air quality at workplace. Claimant’s allegations relative to constant long term exposure to dust and other airborne contaminants were refuted by industrial hygiene and OSHA studies and by expert testimony from physician who performed IME on claimant and conducted site visit of employer’s facility. Despite lymph node biopsy which was positive for industrial particulates, no evidence of unsafe air quality was discovered at plant, and expert testimony suggested lymph node findings could be partially explained by claimant’s smoking history. Moreover, respondents’ expert could not attribute vocal cord paralysis to lymph node findings. Trier denied claimant’s Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed, noting claimant primarily performed wet rather than dry grinding and medical opinions in record supporting causation were heavily reliant on claimant’s history. See also, Rakowski, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Walsh v. Omni Medical Service, 5323 CRB-3-08-2 (April 22, 2009).

Claimant injured while on lunch hour leaving car in parking lot. Commissioner found injury incidental to employment. Respondents argued claimant was “off the clock” at time of injury; therefore injury not compensable. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Precedent is that when a parking lot is provided to employees, injuries coming or going from parked cars are incidental to employment; see Hughes v. American Brass Co., 141 Conn. 231, 233 (1954); Meeker v. Knights of Columbus, 5115 CRB-3-06-7 (July 3, 2007) and Cimmino v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 4230 CRB-3-00-5 (September 13, 2001). See also Walsh, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Sockbeson v. AJS Enterprise, 5334 CRB-6-08-4 (April 1, 2009).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s Finding and Award ordering temporary total and temporary partial benefits for claimant who sustained a back injury in a workplace lifting incident. Respondents had argued claimant’s symptoms were due to prior injuries to her lumbar spine and/or a motor vehicle accident which occurred after the workplace incident. On appeal, respondents contend claimant was not credible regarding the medical history given to treating physicians and appeared to exaggerate her symptoms during an IME and commissioner’s examination. Respondents also allege, inter alia, lack of due process relative to numerous post-judgment motions which were denied by the trier, who also denied their Motion to Correct in its entirety. At trial, claimant testified plausibly regarding prior incidents involving her back and the motor vehicle accident, and CRB determined evidentiary submissions supported trier’s conclusions regarding causation. CRB also found respondents’ claims of error relative to their post-judgment motions were without merit. See also, Sockbeson, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-301-9.

Sapko v. State/Dept of Correction, 5335 CRB-8-08-4 (March 23, 2009), aff’d, 123 Conn. App. 18 (2010), cert. granted, 298 Conn. 923 (2010), aff’d, 305 Conn. 360 (2012).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that the decedent’s death from multiple drug toxicity due to the interaction of excessive doses of a drug prescribed for a compensable injury and the other drug was prescribed for a non work related condition. See Sapko §§ 31-301, 31-306.

King v. State/Department of Correction, 5339 CRB-8-08-4 (March 20, 2009).

Parole officer was injured driving state-owned car home after completing work hours. Respondents argued case under “coming and going” rule and a noncompensable commuting injury. Trial commissioner found claimant obligated to use specially equipped state owned car and garage the car at home immediately after work; injury occurred while respondent was receiving “mutual benefit”.; thus, injury was incidental to employment. Respondent appealed. CRB affirmed. Claimant was acting at direction of respondent at time of injury; injury was in course of employment, consistent with recent precedent in Brown v. United Technologies Corp., 112 Conn. App. 492 (2009). See also, King, § 31-301. Factual finding.

Lee v. Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc., 5284 CRB-7-07-10 (February 25, 2009).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s back injury arose from his work as a home heating oil delivery person. See, Lee, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Biasetti v. Stamford, 5320 CRB-7-08-2 (February 19, 2009), aff’d, 123 Conn. App. 372 (2010), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 929 (2010).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for benefits for post traumatic stress disorder arising from claimant’s involvement in car chase and gun battle. Claimant also sustained injuries to knee and elbow which respondent accepted. Trier determined claim was controlled by pre July 1, 2005 revision to § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) excluding mental impairments that do not arise from a physical injury or occupational disease and, consistent with our Supreme Court’s holding in Biasetti I, concluded a direct causal relationship must exist between claimed mental impairment and physical injuries sustained by the claimant. Because trier found neither medical evidence nor claimant’s testimony supported such a finding, she dismissed claim. CRB affirmed, citing inter alia the lack of a direct physical assault on claimant and expert testimony that claimant would probably have gone on to develop PTSD irrespective of his physical injuries. See also, Biasetti, § 31-275(16)(B)(ii), § 31-301, Factual findings. § 31-301-4.

Marroquin v. F. Monarca Masonry, 5310 CRB-4-07-12 (December 19, 2008), aff’d, 121 Conn. App. 400 (2010).

Claimant sustained a compensable inguinal hernia in June 2001 for which he underwent surgical treatment. In September 2004, while working for a different employer, claimant alleged he injured himself in a lifting incident and underwent additional surgery in October 2004 and June 2005. Respondents, who were “on the risk” at the time of the original hernia injury, contend second incident represented an aggravation of the hernia injury which, per Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996), constitutes a separate and distinct disability and, consistent with the provisions of § 31-349 C.G.S., confers liability on the employer at the time of the second injury. Trial commissioner determined claimant’s need for surgery in October 2004 and June 2005 arose from complications stemming from prior surgical repair of the 2001 compensable hernia, thereby conferring liability on the respondents, consistent with the provisions of § 31-307b C.G.S. CRB affirmed on basis that matter could be distinguished from Epps in light of evidentiary submissions. Trier also denied Motion to Correct. See also, Marroquin, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-307b, § 31-349.

Hernandez v. Pizzaria 101 and Family, 5254 CRB-2-07-7 (December 8, 2008).

Claimant sustained severe injuries in assault by co-worker which occurred in parking lot of respondent employer restaurant. Other co-workers, including the co-owner who was at the restaurant when the assault occurred, told police they were unaware of any problems between claimant and assailant. Claimant testified he had complained to the employer regarding several job-related issues between him and his assailant, but assailant told police he attacked claimant for allegedly telling people in assailant’s home town in Mexico that he and claimant had had a sexual relationship. Trier denied claim on basis that assault and resulting injuries occurred because of the personal relationship between claimant and assailant and were not due to conditions of employment. Trier also denied Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed. See also, Hernandez, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Flood v. Travelers Property & Casualty, 5267 CRB-1-07-8 (December 8, 2008).

Claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s determination that no causal connection exists between claimant’s neck and back complaints and a workplace incident of March 31, 2000 in which claimant fell on a temporary walkway. Respondents accepted compensability of left shoulder injury sustained at same time. Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct and Amended Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed, concluding trier reasonably relied on expert testimony and drew permissible inferences from the lack of contemporaneous medical records supporting claimant’s assertions relative to her back and neck complaints. CRB declined to address claimant’s request at hearing to submit additional evidence as no motion to that effect had ever been filed and materials in question were duplicative of documents already admitted. See also, Flood, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-301-9.

DaSilva v. Danbury Board of Education, 5263 CRB-7-07-8 (November 5, 2008).

Claimant asserted stress fracture was due to work as physical education teacher, asserting single date of injury. Respondents’ expert testified that injury was due to avascular necrosis and could not have been caused by a single day’s injury. Trial Commissioner concluded injury was due to repetitive trauma and as claimant asserting single accidental injury, dismissed claim. CRB upheld decision. Claimant failed to seek relief based on repetitive trauma theory of recovery. Trial Commissioner could rely on respondent’s expert, who discounted claimant’s theory of recovery. See also, DaSilva, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Vitti v. Richards Conditioning Corp., 5247 CRB-7-07-7 (August 21, 2008).

Pipe fitter suffered heart attack at construction site. Trial commissioner credited expert witness who testified cause of heart attack was unrelated to work. CRB upheld on appeal. See also Vitti, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301, Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.

Dobbs v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 5256 CRB-3-07-8 (August 1, 2008).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s disc herniation was related to a fall that occurred at work some months before and back pain that occurred while the claimant was on vacation was not an intervening event. See also, Dobbs, § 31-294c.

Nettleton v. East Hartford, 5175 CRB-1-06-12 (July 23, 2008).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim as untimely. Claimant became aware of his high blood pressure in January of 1993 but did not file Form 30C until May of 1994. Claimant elected to seek benefits pursuant § 31 275, et. seq., rather than § 7-433c but evidentiary record did not support inference that injury had arisen out of or in the course of employment. Trier also denied Motion to Preclude as moot. See also, Nettleton, § 31-294(c), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Love v. William W. Backus Hospital, 5255 CRB-2-07-8 (June 24, 2008).

Employer appealed from award granting claimant § 31-308(a) benefits, contending medical reports in evidence were legally insufficient to support the trial commissioner’s conclusions regarding causation and whether injury was a substantial contributing factor in her ongoing disability per McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987). Employer argued that several medical reports appeared to be inconsistent; therefore award of benefits was not justified. At trial, claimant testified as to apparent inconsistencies, which were primarily due to her communications with her physician concerning her motivation to return to work. Employer sought to introduce additional medical report obtained after close of trial; motion denied as report was not germane to issues addressed at trial. CRB affirmed. See also, Love, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(a), § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Smith v. Salamander Designs, Ltd, 5205 CRB-1-07-3 (March 13, 2008).

Claimant asserted his shoulder and knee injuries were sustained in a fall at work. Trial commissioner credited respondent’s evidence incident did not aggravate previous injuries; also credited respondent’s witness that a surveillance camera was moved prior to the incident. CRB upheld dismissal of claim, citing Lentini v. Connecticut College, 4933 CRB-2-05-4 (May 15, 2006) and Do v. Danaher Tool Group, 5029 CRB-6-05-12 (November 28, 2006), claimant has burden of proving his injuries were sustained in course of employment. See also, Smith, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Goncalves v. Nutmeg Big Brothers/Big Sisters, 5180 CRB-1-07-1 (January 22, 2008).

Claimant asserted she suffered from Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome (MCSS) which she asserted was due to work related exposures. Trial commissioner dismissed claim as record indicated claimant had suffered similar ailments prior to employment with respondents and respondent’s expert testified her condition was not causally related to work environment. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Claimant failed to prove her condition was work related. See, Lentini v. Connecticut College, 4933 CRB-2-05-4 (May 15, 2006). See also, Goncalves, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-275(16).

Solonick v. Electric Boat Corporation, 5170 CRB-2-06-12 (January 9, 2008), aff’d, 111 Conn. App. 793 (2008).

Claimant has worked career as engineer at Electric Boat. Upon retirement in 2003, he filed claim asserting that job related stress had caused cardiac problems which occasioned his retirement. Major cardiac event was a 1986 heart attack from which he returned to work. Trial commissioner credited respondent’s expert witness as more persuasive, who attributed claimant’s cardiac issues to non-work related factors, and found no employment related triggering event for the 1986 incident. Claimant appealed, arguing trial commissioner misapplied standard in McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987) . CRB upheld trial commissioner. McDonough standard is that of “substantial factor” test; trial commissioner credited expert testimony work related stress was not a substantial factor in claimant’s cardiac illness. See also, Solonick, § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Brown v. United Technologies Corp./Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 5145 CRB-8-06-10 (October 23, 2007), aff’d, 112 Conn. App. 492 (2009), appeal dismissed, 297 Conn. 54 (2010).

Claimant injured while walking around employer’s campus on lunch hour. Trial Commissioner found injury was incidental to employment. CRB reversed. Record provided no evidence that the employer obtained a benefit from claimant’s activity; rather claimant undertook fitness regimen for her own benefit. See also, Brown, § 31-275(16).

Houlihan v. Waterbury, 5141 CRB 5-06-10 (September 26, 2007).

Trial commissioner found injury compensable when police officer injured in motor vehicle accident between home and physical therapist. Claimant injured en route to treatment for previous compensable injury. Trial Commissioner found claimant met “mutual benefit” test in this circumstance, citing obligation to treat under Sec. 31-294c(b). Respondents appealed, alleging no mutual benefit. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Claimant was obligated to attend treatment. Test in Dombach v. Olkon Corp., 163 Conn. 216 (1972) established claimant would not have made trip in which has was injured but for this obligation. Earlier case, Mason v. Alexandre, 96 Conn. 343 (1921) sets out mutual benefit from traveling to treatment. While injury occurred on public road, circumstance is sequelae of previous injury similar to Mana v. Sarah. Inc., 5073 CRB 3-06-3 (March 22, 2007). Trial commissioner’s result consistent with majority view of law. See also Houlihan, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Kronick v. Ansonia Copper & Brass, 5127 CRB-5-06-8 (August 15, 2007).

Claimant suffered aggravation of pre-existing lung ailment at work. Trial commissioner rejected respondent’s argument they should only be obligated for the aggravation suffered at work. CRB upheld. § 31-275(1)(D) C.G.S. only governs apportionment when a previous work related ailment is aggravated. See also Kronick, § 31-308(b) C.G.S.

Asaro v. Waterbury Republican & American, 5121 CRB-5-06-8 (August 8, 2007).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s claim of traumatic brain injury and/or exacerbation of pre-existing psychiatric/emotional disorders was unrelated to fall down embankment while working as a photo-journalist. Conflicting evidence was presented and it was up to the trier to decide what weight and credibility to assign to the various medical opinions.

Mleczko v. Haynes Construction, 5109 CRB-7-06-7 (July 17, 2007), aff’d, 111 Conn. App. 744 (2008).

Claimant was injured crossing public street in downtown Stamford. He alleged his injuries were work-related as he was construction supervisor and said he was traveling between jobsite and office. Respondents alleged he had not returned to job site and had no reason to do so that evening; instead he had left office to eat at an off-site restaurant. Trial commissioner credited respondent’s witnesses and dismissed claim, as claimant “not where he was expected to be” when injured, CRB upheld. Case hinged on credibility and factual findings. CRB rejected claim this was a “premises” injury; Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit, 240 Conn. 788 (1997) does not apply to public streets, where injuries are generally not compensable. Cases where such injuries found compensable such as Meeker v. Knights of Columbus, 5115 CRB-3-06-7 (July 3, 2007) generally involve injury sustained traveling between premises controlled by employer. See also, Mleczko, § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Meeker v. Knights of Columbus, 5115 CRB-3-06-7 (July 3, 2007).

Claimant sustained injuries while walking on public highway from employer’s parking lot to her workplace. Trial Commissioner found injury was compensable as claimant had completed commute and was performing a necessary activity incident to her employment. Respondents appealed, claiming injury outside Commission’s jurisdiction based on “coming and going” rule. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Free parking lot constituted “mutual benefit” to employer and employee; precedent such as Russo v. Stop & Shop, 4002 CRB-6-99-3 (March 22, 2000) and Cimmino v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 4230 CRB-3-00-5 (September 13, 2001) makes injuries sustained by an employee while crossing a public street between workplace and a parking lot compensable. Trial commissioner rejected respondent’s argument claimant was engaged in social or recreational activity when injured. CRB upheld; see Meeker, § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Greene v. Aces Access, 5114 CRB-3-06-7 (July 2, 2007), aff’d, 110 Conn. App. 648 (2008).

Claimant asserting he suffered disc herniation lifting wheelchair. Trial commissioner credited medical evidence herniation predated date of employment and was not materially worsened by claimed injury. CRB upheld trial commissioner who had sufficient evidence to support dismissal. See also, Greene § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-275(16).

Sutton v. Mercy Housing & Shelter Corp., 5085 CRB-1-06-2 (April 27, 2007).

Claimant developed respiratory impairment of lungs due to combination of compensable aggravation of mold allergies and preexisting, non-compensable COPD and coronary artery disease. Trier did not reduce permanency award by portion attributable to non-employment factors, and held § 31-275(1)(D) inapplicable. CRB held that “plain meaning” rule of statutory construction in § 1-2z did not require reinterpretation of “preexisting disease” as used in § 31-275(1)(D), which under Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 259 Conn. 29 (2002), and Cashman v. McTernan School, Inc., 130 Conn. 401 (1943), has been held to include only preexisting occupational diseases. Language of statute is not plain and unambiguous, and stare decisis favors continued recognition of existing interpretation. Also, apportionment was not available based on argument that COPD and coronary artery disease were separate and concurrent disease processes rather than pre-existing conditions. Also cited at Sutton, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-349.

Distassio v. HP Hood, Inc., 5044 CRB-4-06-1 (December 20, 2006).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that a fall sustained by the claimant was a substantial factor in causing the loosening of claimant’s right hip prosthesis. See also, Distassio, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Do v. Danaher Tool Group, 5029 CRB-6-05-12 (November 28, 2006).

Trial commissioner concluded that evidence did not prove claimant had suffered a back injury at work. Claimant argued commissioner failed to credit undisputed evidence. CRB upheld dismissal of claim, if evidence did not persuade trial commissioner CRB could not reach different result on appeal. See also, Do, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Sullo v. State/Judicial Branch, 4796 CRB-1-04-3, 4831 CRB-1-04-7, 4978 CRB-1-05-7 (September 8, 2006).

Trier found that exacerbation of claimant’s congestive heart failure arose out of employment where unsubstantiated sexual harassment allegations against him caused stress that contributed to worsening of heart condition. CRB affirmed. No line could be drawn between sexual harassment allegations and resulting disciplinary action, as stress was directly traceable to allegations themselves. Claimant was not found to have made inappropriate comments about accuser that would have been outside scope of job duties; instead, claimant was found to have allowed inappropriate talk to occur among staff for whom he was responsible as a supervisor. Involvement in charges thus stemmed from supervisory duties. See also, Sullo, § 31-275(16), § 31-301(f), § 31-308(b).

Matteau v. Mohegan Sun Casino, 4998 CRB-2-05-9 (August 31, 2006).

CRB reversed trial commissioner’s holding claimant’s motor vehicle accident arose out of and in the course of employment. CRB panel held trier’s conclusion resulted from a misapplication of law to factual findings. Claimant’s review of building plans at home prior to departure for work in preparation for a meeting to occur later that morning with a vendor did not mark the commencement of her work day as such activities were not at the employer’s express direction or request. Additionally, the suggested criteria in Larson’s Treatise for determining the existence of a home office was not satisfied and thus, the claimant’s home could not be considered an extension of the employer’s premises. CRB held claim was a “coming and going” case and injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. See also, Matteau, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Krupa v. Marenna Amusements, LLC, 4980 CRB-7-05-7 (August 11, 2006).

Evidence supported finding that claimant’s injury occurred during course of employment. See also, Krupa, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10); § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.

Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006).

Trial commissioner determined that claimant’s disc herniation did not occur as a result of his being forced to reload a truck. Respondent produced a number of witnesses who testified claimant told them he was hurt at home falling on ice. Since the trial commissioner found this testimony credible, commission lacks jurisdiction over this injury. See also, Abbotts, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Sullivan v. Madison, 4893 CRB-3-04-12 (June 9, 2006).

Police dispatcher filed claim asserting hypertension was due to job related stress. While job condition was stressful, trial commissioner granted an award based on inadequate medical evidence. Neither doctor who presented evidence testified unequivocally as to either the job causing hypertension or being the substantial factor aggravating a pre-existing condition, as required by the standards of McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust, 204 Conn. 104 (1987) and Hummel v. Marten’s Transport, Ltd., 4667 CRB-5-03-5 (May 3, 2004) appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, 90 Conn. App. 9 (2005), cert. granted, 275 Conn. 913 (2005). CRB therefore sustained respondents’ appeal. See also, Sullivan, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., 4947 CRB-2-05-5 (May 15, 2006).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s application of collateral estoppel doctrine where issue of causation was litigated and decided under the federal Longshore Act. Respondent argued it should not be precluded from litigating compensability where standard of causation under the Longshore Act was whether employment was a “contributing factor” whereas under Chapter 568 standard was whether employment was a “substantial” factor. CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that respondent was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue and that the medical evidence presented in the Longshore claim supported the conclusion decedent’s employment was a substantial factor in the cause of his death. Application of collateral estoppel consistent with CRB’s opinion in Levarge v. Electric Boat Corp., 4884 CRB-8-04-11 (November 30, 2005) and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lafayette v. General Dynamics/Electric Boat Div., 255 Conn. 762 (2001). See also, Birnie, § 31-298.

Duffy v. Greenwich-Board of Education, 4930 CRB-7-05-3 (May 15, 2006).

Claimant, a Greenwich school teacher, suffered fall when leaving school. School had been ordered to close early due to winter storm. Respondent contested liability, despite having no evidence contradicting claimant’s explanation of accident. See also, Duffy, § 31-288(b), § 31-294b, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-308a.

Lentini v. Connecticut College, 4933 CRB-2-05-4 (May 15, 2006).

Claimant alleged elbow injuries due to repetitive stress from computer keyboard use. Respondent’s medical examiner attributed injury to household activities. Situation distinguished from Epps, 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996), as in this case there was medical evidence on which trier could rely in finding computer work did not either create or aggravate her condition. See also, Lentini, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Blizman v. First National Supermarkets, 4864 CRB-3-04-9 (April 26, 2006).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant’s lower back symptoms were causally related to an accepted injury occurring while in the employ of First National and not subsequent acts of repetitive trauma. See also, Blizman, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Doe v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4928 CRB-1-05-3 (April 13, 2006).

See, Doe, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Edwards v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 4924 CRB-3-05-2 (February 15, 2006).

Claimant, a per diem nurse’s assistant, reported to work and punched in on a day when she was not scheduled or needed. After being told to punch out and leave nursing ward, claimant stopped off in employee break room for coffee and was injured falling from chair. Trier found claimant was not within period of employment. CRB affirmed. Claimant was not on premises in conjunction with paid work shift, and was not fulfilling job-related duties at time of injury.

DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 4911 CRB-3-05-1 (January 13, 2006), rev’d, 99 Conn. App. 336 (2007), cert. granted, 281 Conn. 929 (2007).

CRB affirmed Commissioner’s conclusion decedent’s death was causally related to the decedent’s compensable accident. Decedent suffered a compensable injury to his cervical spine. Decedent underwent surgery, but continued to suffer significant pain, which was managed with high levels of narcotics. The decedent’s pain and use of pain medications resulted in a lessening of his physical activity giving rise to morbid obesity which ultimately caused his death. Appellate Court reversed finding of compensability, stating that family practitioner had not determined cause of death within reasonable degree of medical probability, based on lack of autopsy or post-mortem examination of body to determine whether decedent had atherosclerotic disease. Opinion was grounded in speculation given factual gaps in record.

Gomez v. Laidlaw Education Services, 4859 CRB-2-04-9 (December 15, 2005).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s dismissal of claim for respiratory and other physical problems which claimant alleged was the result of the indoor air quality of her office. Conclusion dependent upon weight and credibility assigned to evidence. See also, Gomez, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9.

Claudio v. Better Bedding, 4786 CRB-1-04-2 (October 19, 2005).

See, Claudio, §§ 31-284(a), 31-301. Factual findings, 31-307 and 31-310.

Bravo v. John’s Best, 4801 CRB-7-04-4 (September 15, 2005).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim where evidence was presented indicating claimant injured himself when he fell riding a scooter in the respondent’s parking lot and not as a result of tripping over the scooter while carrying trash to the dumpster. See also, Bravo, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Martinez v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 4836 CRB-1-04-7 (July 22, 2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s determination that on-call police officer’s injury arose out of employment and in course of employment under specific facts of case. Claimant was required by employment contract and by his supervisor to be available for contact, ready for dispatch and within his patrol area when he fell while attending to the personal comfort of obtaining food in his home.

Ryker v. Bethany, 4780 CRB-3-04-2 (February 16, 2005), aff’d, 97 Conn. App. 304 (2006), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932 (2006).

CRB affirmed trier’s determination injury did not arise out of employment where claimant was aggressive to co-worker, had instigated assault, and confrontational incident was not directly caused by claimant’s job duties nor was it incidental to a job duty. See also, Ryker, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Blakeslee v. Platt Brothers & Co., 4761 CRB-5-03-12 (October 8, 2004), rev’d, 279 Conn. 239 (2006).

CRB affirmed trier’s determination that claimant’s injury was not causally connected to claimant’s employment. Claimant was injured because of first aid applied by co-workers while the claimant experienced a seizure caused by a medical condition. The seizure was not caused by any condition of employment. Supreme Court reversed and held claimant’s injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. Aid rendered by co-workers to claimant was incidental to employment as it benefited both the employer and the claimant. Thus, an injury resulting from the aid is compensable.

Dobson v. Thames Valley Sanitation, 4645 CRB-6-03-3 (July 22, 2004).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s award of 35% loss of use of knee. Also held respondents not entitled to apportionment under § 31-275(1)(D) as the 26.25% loss of use of the knee related to a pre-existing injury and, under Cashman v. McTiernan School, Inc., 130 Conn. 401 (1943) apportionment only permitted where the pre-existing disease is a pre-existing occupational disease. See also, Dobson, § 31-300.

Rampulla v. Fox Hill Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, 4696 CRB-1-03-7 (June 23, 2004).

CRB reversed commissioner’s finding claimant’s injury was causally connected to claimant’s employment. Claimant left employer’s premises to pick up food during unscheduled second shift.

Jacobson v. General Dynamics/Electric Boat Div., 4642 CRB-2-03-3 (March 12, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s failure to apportion decedent’s asbestosis and ultimate lung cancer with decedent’s pre-existing lung disease and smoking history. Section 31-275(1)(D) requires that the pre-existing disease be occupational.

Sullivan v. H.W. Sandora & Sons, Inc., 4603 CRB-3-02-12 (December 29, 2003).

See, Sullivan, § 31-301. Factual findings (concerning mechanics of slip-and-fall injury being caused by severe pain attributable to earlier compensable arm injury). See also, Sullivan, § 31-308a.

Strong v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 4563 CRB-1-02-8 (August 25, 2003).

Claimant did not allege that either his work-related asbestosis or his smoking-related emphysema were occupational diseases. No application of provision that allows apportionment for aggravation of pre-existing occupational disease. Board went on to find that there was evidence to show that emphysema indeed pre-existed the development of asbestosis symptoms. However, even if separately identifiable lung damage from asbestosis and emphysema began manifesting concurrently, both conditions contribute to overall lung impairment, and law does not allow apportionment of responsibility. See, Strong, § 31-308(b) (trier had discretion to credit report of physician who was within AMA guidelines in diagnosing claimant with 48% lung impairment, despite evidence that could have supported a lower rating), See also, Strong, § 31-275(15), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-349.

Ciarci v. Niro Brothers/Mason Enterprises, 4536 CRB-1-02-6 (June 17, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion claimant’s cardiac surgery did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Expert medical opinion supported trier’s finding. See also, Ciarci § 31-301.

Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 4529 CRB-7-02-5 (June 3, 2003), rev’d, 84 Conn. App. 220 (2004), cert. granted, 271 Conn. 925 (2004), aff’d, 274 Conn. 219 (2005).

Following remand, CRB reversed trier’s finding that claimant’s apartment was equivalent to satellite office, and that she was in the course of her employment when she was injured en route from the apartment of Atrium Homecare client to client of Norwalk Rehabilitation Services. Insufficient evidence to substantiate legal conclusion that claimant maintained established home workplace. Prior to leaving her apartment, claimant did not engage in any activity that was directly related to her NRS job duties, thereby triggering the start of her workday. Also, claimant would no longer have been in course of employment with NRS once she began tending to Atrium client. Claimant’s entire apartment building could not be deemed premises of employer, as neither claimant nor employer controlled said building. Appellate Court reversed, holding that travel was a substantial part of the home health care service that NRS provided to its clients, thereby putting claimant in the course of an activity integral to her employment at the time of injury. Prior decision at Labadie, 4254 CRB-7-00-6 (June 21, 2001).

Hayes v. Total Fulfillment Services, Ltd., 4482 CRB-4-02-1 (February 5, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim where claimant wounded her hand while rolling up her car window in employer’s parking lot on a cold day. Board held that “personal comfort” doctrine did not mandate finding that injury arose out of employment, as neither of the factors contributing to claimant’s injury (weather and fragile condition of window handle) was attributable to a risk incident to conditions of employment.

Alling v. Davis & Geck, 4483 CRB-7-02-1 (December 20, 2002).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that workplace incident in which claimant was pushed by a co-worker arose out of employment. Trier reasonably credited claimant’s testimony that he did not say anything that was calculated to instigate an altercation with co-worker, and found that critical remarks uttered by claimant prior to shoving incident were related to employment. See also, Alling, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Morneault v. D M & M Restaurants, 4389 CRB-3-01-5 (March 27, 2002).

Trier’s conclusion that waitress’ back injury resulted from lifting box of ketchup affirmed by CRB. Conclusion rested on weight and credibility accorded to testimony. See also, Morneault, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Drivas v. Fair Auto Park, 4383 CRB-7-01-4 (March 1, 2002).

Board affirmed trier’s decision that claimant’s estate was unable to meet minimum burden of proof to show that work stress, or any other work factors, caused decedent’s myocardial infarction that occurred at work. Standard of causation in heart attack cases reviewed, which requires that work factors constitute a substantial cause. Prior decision at Drivas, 2279 CRB-7-95-1 (June 28, 1996), § 31-294c.

Loffredo v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 4369 CRB-5-01-2 (February 28, 2002).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that decedent’s slip and fall injury, which occurred on her own walkway, arose out of and in the course of her employment, as she was responding to an emergency call from respondent employer after being alerted by store alarm. Board looked to Larson’s treatise and other states’ cases, and concluded that under the emergency call exception to the “coming and going” rule, there is portal-to-portal coverage. Additionally, Public Act 95-262 regarding preliminary acts at the claimant’s place of abode did not apply, as that legislation was enacted in response to the growing number of home offices, and was not intended to affect established exceptions to “coming and going” rule.

Green v. United Illuminating Co., 4361 CRB-3-01-2 (February 28, 2002).

Board affirmed trier’s determination that claimant’s alleged Lyme disease was not caused by her employment, as claimant was not aware of any tick bite which occurred at work, and medical evidence was conflicting. Evidence was also conflicting as to whether claimant actually had Lyme disease. See also, Green, § 31-298.

Nunes v. State/Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 4360 CRB-2-01-2 (January 16, 2002).

Claimant’s disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder was not caused by alcohol abuse or illegal drug use; rather, symptoms of extreme anxiety led claimant to use such substances, and there was no evidence that such actions contributed to his psychological state. See also, Nunes, § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Factual findings.

El Ayoub v. Special Testing Laboratories, 4251-CRB-3-00-6 (September 13, 2001).

Claimant fractured knee in motor vehicle accident while driving to construction job site. He contended that accident occurred while he was enroute to the job site after having returned home to pick up a beeper which he had earlier forgotten, and argued that retrieval of the beeper was an act in furtherance of his employment, and that the employer furnished transportation. Commissioner concluded otherwise on both arguments. CRB affirmed trier, further holding that Ballester v. K&D Auto Body Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 35, 528 CRD-3-86 (April 6, 1988), infra, was not dispositive of this matter.

Cimmino v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 4230 CRB-3-00-5 (September 13, 2001).

Trier found claimant’s injuries compensable where he was hit by a car during his lunch break while crossing a public street en route from the hospital to his employer-maintained parking garage. Facts were stipulated by parties, so CRB applied less deferential standard of review. CRB independently determined that claimant, who was walking to the parking garage in order to give a bracket to a repairman who was fixing his car window, was within the course of his employment when he was injured. Public street was constructively considered part of employer premises based on prior case law and fact that claimant had to cross street to get to parking lot. Failure to use crosswalk did not per se place him in an unreasonable location. As per Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit Co., 240 Conn. 788 (1997), claimant’s presence on employer premises on lunch break kept him within course of employment. Act of delivering part to repairman who was fixing car window was incidental to employment, particularly where claimant used car daily for work-related purposes.

Owen v. Diversified Hospitality Group, 4204 CRB-3-00-3 (July 25, 2001).

Decedent’s automobile accident arose out of and in course of employment even though he was apparently on pace to miss scheduled meeting at employer’s restaurant. Decedent had driven 10-12 hours to reach meeting, which employer wanted him to attend; no other purpose for decedent’s trip was alleged. He was driving company car, and travel was significant component of his job. See also, Owen, § 31-275(9), § 31-278.

Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Servs., 4254 CRB-7-00-6 (June 21, 2001).

Home health care worker was injured while traveling from her apartment building, where she had been caring for an Atrium Homecare patient, to the home of an NRS patient. NRS normally reimbursed claimant for travel between homes of NRS patients, but not from her own home to that of her first daily patient. CRB reversed trier’s conclusions that claimant’s work required her to use public highways, and that her bus trip was to the benefit of employer. “Benefit” test by itself cannot justify finding of compensability in standard “coming and going” case. Exception for jobs that require travel on roadways applies to occupations that heavily involve such travel; home health care workers who travel between clients’ homes cannot invoke this exception to “coming and going” rule. Also, trier found that claimant’s home was tantamount to satellite office of NRS. CRB saw insufficient evidence in record to support this finding, analyzed criteria needed to establish home workplace, and warned against subtle, case-by-case abrogation of “coming and going” rule through expansion of boundaries of workplace. Case remanded for further findings regarding degree of work activities at home, and possible interruption of NRS employment by claimant’s undertaking of duties for Atrium on morning of accident. See also, Labadie, § 31-301. Factual findings. Subsequent decision at Labadie, 4529 CRB-7-02-5 (June 3, 2003), rev’d, 84 Conn. App. 220 (2004), cert. granted, 271 Conn. 925 (2004), aff’d, 274 Conn. 219 (2005).

Davis v. State/University of Connecticut, 4212 CRB-2-00-3 (June 8, 2001).

CRB declined to reconsider issues discussed in prior Davis decision, 3822 CRB-2-98-5 (August 17, 1999), infra; See also, Davis, § 31-301-4; where CRB had concluded that entire UConn campus constituted employer’s premises as matter of law. Trier faithfully adhered to remand instructions in finding credible claimant’s testimony regarding employer’s knowledge of and acquiescence to her lunchtime habit of walking to on-campus fast-food restaurant, and ruling that injury thereby occurred in course of employment. Also, trier properly found that state’s jaywalking argument had no merit. Evidence showed that university created walkway in median for pedestrians to use in crossing street, and no proof was adduced that school or local police force considered it illegal or dangerous to cross Fairfield Road at spot where claimant fell.

Criscio v. State/Southern Conn. State Univ., 4271 CRB-3-00-7 (June 1, 2001).

Respondent sought re-consideration and reversal of our Supreme Court’s holding in Cashman v. McTernan School, 130 Conn. 401 (1943). In Cashman the Court read the language now codified at § 31-275(1)(D) so as to permit apportionment for pre-existing occupational disease, although plain language of statute provides for apportionment for any pre-existing disease. CRB held that it lacked authority to adopt respondent’s position on the basis of stare decisis and the existence of binding case law. Additionally, CRB denied Respondent’s Motion to Reserve. See also, Criscio, § 31-324.

Smith v. Connecticut Light & Power, 4135 CRB-5-99-10 (March 29, 2001).

See, Smith, § 31-275(16).

Daubert v. Borough of Naugatuck, 4189 CRB-5-00-2 (February 22, 2001), rev’d, 71 Conn. App. 600 (2002), rev’d, 267 Conn. 583 (2004).

Claimant was a police officer whose cruiser hit a tree while he was on duty. Trier noted numerous contradictions in his testimony regarding accident. Claimant argued on appeal that, as accident occurred while he was on duty, it must be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. CRB disagreed, as it is claimant’s burden to prove that injury arose out of and in course of employment. Board cited trier’s findings that claimant was motivated to intentionally crash his police cruiser into tree, and that he drove straight into tree. Findings thus supported inference that his collision was intentional. Appellate Court reversed, holding that findings and conclusions (as opposed to the subordinate findings of fact) did not support inference that claimant failed to sustain burden of proof. Finding logically suggested that accident arose out of and in course of employment. Testimony regarding claimant’s mental condition was irrelevant, and it was not suggested that he was engaged in activities unrelated to his duties. Finding that claimant had been involved in motor vehicle “accident” precluded wilful misconduct as being a cause of the crash. As respondents had failed to plead wilful misconduct as an affirmative defense, CRB should not have held that such a defense was implied from testimony, or that it was supported by findings and evidence. Supreme Court reversed Appellate Court and reinstated trial commissioner’s finding. Finding that collision arose out of employment did not mandate inference that it occurred while claimant was performing work-related duties. Trier was entitled to find that injury did not occur in the specific manner alleged by claimant, and to conclude that claimant failed to meet burden of proof. See also, Daubert, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Smeraglinolo v. Cardinal Sheehan Center, 4117 CRB-4-99-9 (October 30, 2000).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that decedent remained in the course of his employment as a supervisor and physical education instructor for the Center while officiating basketball games that were being held at the Center during the evening. Though all referees were paid $15 per game, decedent retained additional duties involving supervision of Center that were not applicable to outside referees. Employer benefit found.

Kay v. Hubbard-Hall, Inc., 4092 CRB-5-99-7 (October 20, 2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s determination that decedent’s myocardial infarction was not compensable where neither employment stress nor his activities during an employer-sponsored golf outing were substantial causes of his injury. Issue was one of fact, and was supported by the medical evidence. See also, Kay, § 31-275(16), § 31-300.

DiCocco v. E.I. DuPont Denemours & Co., 4099 CRB-4-99-8 (August 29, 2000).

The board affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury. None of the physicians seen by the claimant wrote a report that, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, connected her right arm and shoulder condition to the incident that occurred on February 20, 1996.

Adams v. Leisure Limousine, 4054 CRB-4-99-6 (August 9, 2000).

Claimant argued on appeal that the undisputed medical evidence indicated that he sustained injuries as a result of an automobile accident. Although the trial commissioner determined that an accident occurred, he nevertheless concluded that the claimant did not sustain any injuries therefrom. CRB affirmed the trier’s decision, explaining that the trier may reject medical evidence as unworthy of belief or find that the opinion was based on subordinate facts that were not proven. Because it was the claimant’s burden to prove a compensable injury, and he did not do so, it is of no moment that the respondents did not present any medical evidence.

Simmons v. Temporary Labor Corp., 3975 CRB-6-99-2 (May 25, 2000).

See, Simmons, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 3943 CRB-8-98-12 (April 18, 2000), rev’d, 255 Conn. 762 (2001).

Claimant failed to persuade trial commissioner that doctrine of collateral estoppel should be invoked to prevent respondents from contesting causal connection between her late husband’s death due to lung cancer and asbestos exposure at his workplace. CRB affirmed. Though claimant prevailed on that issue in Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act proceedings, her burden of proof there was eased due to the presumption of compensability in 33 U.S.C. § 920. No similar advantage is given to a claimant by § 31-275(1). CRB could not tell how much influence said “benefit of the doubt” had on administrative law judge’s findings, and upheld trier’s decision to require a full hearing on the merits. Supreme Court reversed, holding that issue of causal relationship between decedent’s death and his employment was fully litigated, actually decided, and necessarily determined in the federal longshore action; contrary to respondents’ claim, the ALJ there imposed on claimant the burden to prove causal connection by a preponderance of the evidence, without the aid of any presumption allegedly available under the federal act. See also, Lafayette, § 31-298.

Gartrell v. State/Dept. of Correction, 3991 CRB-1-99-3 (March 23, 2000), aff’d, 259 Conn. 29 (2002).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s psychiatric condition was compensable, as it was aggravated by a compensable heart condition. CRB explained law making an employer liable for the sequelae of a compensable injury. In an earlier decision, Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 258 Conn. 137 (2001), the Supreme Court remanded the case in order to limit the compensation for the psychiatric condition to that proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of the pre-existing disease that reasonably may be attributable to the work-related injury, as required under § 31-275(1)(D). That decision was superseded on January 15, 2002, and the CRB was affirmed. See also, Gartrell, § 31-275(16).

Russo v. Stop & Shop Co., 4002 CRB-6-99-3 (March 22, 2000).

Board affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s injury was compensable. Claimant tripped while walking to her car, which was parked on premises contiguous to Stop & Shop supermarket where claimant worked, in a common parking lot used by other retailers. Under Stop & Shop’s lease, the landlord maintained the parking lots as common areas for all tenants. Trier concluded that the area where claimant parked was the customary parking place for claimant, other employees, and management, that this was known to the employer, and was an incidental part of claimant’s employment. Moreover, commissioner found that employer benefited by claimant’s practice of parking in this area because her car did not then take up space in front of the store where customers would park.

Bogrette v. Merriam Motors, 4011 CRB-8-99-3 (February 9, 2000).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that decedent’s fatal injury arose out of and during the course of his employment. Decedent was fatally injured while he was using the employer’s forklift to help a neighboring business. The accident occurred during the period of the decedent’s employment in an area which was under the care, custody and control of respondent employer. Although trier did not find that employer granted decedent explicit permission to use the forklift, the trier was entitled to infer that decedent had a right to use the forklift to help the neighboring business, or that he had done so with the implied permission or acquiescence of the employer. Prior decision at Bogrette, 3538 CRB-8-97-2 (July 22, 1998), infra.

Student v. Corometrics Medical Systems, Inc., 3980 CRB-8-99-2 (February 9, 2000).

Board affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s psychiatric condition was caused by a compensable train accident. Trial commissioner had discretion to rely on claimant’s treating psychiatrist regarding the issue of causation, even though the trier found the psychiatrist’s treatment of the claimant to be unreasonable. See also, Student, § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-308(c).

Lemelin v. New Britain General Hospital, 3978 CRB-6-99-2 (February 1, 2000).

Board affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s injury was compensable, where claimant was injured as a result of a hepatitis B vaccination performed during a post-offer, pre-employment physical examination. The board noted that the offer of a hepatitis B vaccination was required by OSHA regulation, and that the employer, a hospital, would benefit by having its employees inoculated against communicable diseases.

Riebe v. Ralph Silvestro, Jr., 3886 CRB-4-98-9 (November 30, 1999).

Claimant was struck by an automobile while driving lawn equipment from a trailer to be stored in a yard at a work site. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that this injury occurred in the course of claimant’s employment. It was not necessary for the trier to determine the exact instructions given to the claimant, because the trier found that he acted with the reasonable belief that he was protecting his employer’s property by moving it off the trailer into the yard. See also, Riebe, § 31-288.

Desrosins v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 3860 CRB-7-98-7 (November 18, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant sustained a compensable injury when he fell in the employer’s parking lot at the end of his shift while running to his car to avoid a fellow employee. The trial commissioner found that the claimant’s conduct constituted a minor and inconsequential deviation, and did not find it to be horseplay, as argued by the employer.

DeMooy v. Easter Seal Society of CT., Inc., 3852 CRB-4-98-7 (November 2, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s holding that claimant, a young man from Holland who was living on-premises at a summer camp in Hebron while working as a camp counselor, suffered a compensable injury. The claimant felt ill at a time when, though arguably not yet on duty, he was required to be on the premises of the campground. The camp director drove him to the emergency room; on the way back, they were involved in a serious automobile accident. CRB ruled that the trier reasonably concluded that the claimant’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Camp Hemlocks accepted responsibility for providing medical care for employees, and absence of on-premises medical personnel required director to take claimant to hospital.

Valentine v. State/Dept. of Correction, 3862 CRB-1-98-7 (September 3, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that claimant’s heart condition requiring surgical procedures in 1993 and 1994 was a direct result of the claimant’s earlier accepted heart condition. Additionally, board affirmed conclusion that avascular necrosis in claimant’s hips was compensable because it was caused by steroids needed after the compensable heart surgery. Panel held that respondent was seeking to retry the facts of its case by arguing that the claimant’s heart condition subsequent to 1992 was not caused by his prior heart attack, but rather was caused by his personal lifestyle. See also, Valentine, § 31-308(b).

Vizzini v. Norwalk, 3874 CRB-4-98-8 (August 30, 1999).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision that claimant’s slip and fall at a Route 95 McDonald’s rest area occurred in the course of his employment. The claimant had made arrangements to have his car dropped and serviced while he was en route to a meeting. Due to wintry weather, the meeting was cancelled after the claimant arrived at the dealership to drop off his car. Claimant began return trip to his place of employment, stopping at a rest area to telephone for alternate route directions as the main thoroughfare was highly congested. Trial commissioner concluded that the claimant was doing something incidental to his employment at the time of the injury.

Davis v. State/University of Connecticut, 3822 CRB-2-98-5 (August 17, 1999).

Claimant injured on unpaid lunch break while walking (as she often did) from Whetten building on UConn campus to Jonathan’s restaurant, also on UConn campus. Trier found that injury did not arise in course of employment, because claimant was not on employer’s premises at time of injury, and there was no risk incidental to her employment that led to this injury. CRB reversed, holding that entire UConn campus constituted employer’s premises as a matter of law, and remanded case for findings concerning whether or not employer approved or acquiesced to claimant’s lunchtime walks across campus to Jonathan’s restaurant. Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit Co., 240 Conn. 788 (1997), held to be controlling. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) This case more closely resembles Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408 (1996), and Renckowski v. Yale University, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48, 1292 CRD-3-91-9 (March 18, 1993) than it does Mazzone, and was properly ruled noncompensable. Injury did not occur on employer’s premises under facts of this case. See also, Davis, § 31-301-4. Correction of finding. Subsequent decision at Davis, 4212 CRB-2-00-3 (June 8, 2001), supra.

Diluciano v. State/Military Department, 3839 CRB-2-98-6 (June 28, 1999), aff’d, 60 Conn. App. 707 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 926 (2001).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s injury, which was suffered during his trip to work, did not occur during the course of his employment. Trial commissioner specifically found that the claimant was not a “policeman” as that term is used in § 31-275(1)(A). The determination of whether the claimant was a “policeman” pursuant to § 31-275(1)(A) was a factual determination for the trial commissioner, which the CRB did not disturb, as it was fully supported by the findings.

Hannon v. Independent Office Installations, 3781 CRB-6-98-12 (June 28, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that claimant’s motorcycle accident, which occurred on his trip from his home to the job site, did not occur in the course of his employment. Claimant contended that he was paid for his travel time. CRB explained that employer had no control over claimant’s movements, and did not affect the hazards of the claimant’s trip from his home to the job site. As none of the four exceptions to the “coming and going” rule applied in the instant case, the trier’s decision was affirmed.

Card v. Gateway Community, 3745 CRB-3-97-12 (February 23, 1999).

CRB reversed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. Because the employer required its employees to use the coat rack in a certain room, and the claimant’s injury occurred while hanging her coat immediately prior to the start of her work day, the CRB concluded as a matter of law that the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment.

LeBlanc v. Aramark Corp., 3693 CRB-2-97-9 (November 24, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s injury arose out of and in course of her employment. Injury occurred while claimant was smoking a cigarette in a designated smoking area outside a Coast Guard dormitory building. Her employer was the food service subcontractor for the residence hall. CRB ruled that trial commissioner reasonably found that injury occurred on employer’s premises, adopting the definition of “premises” discussed in Larson’s treatise. Smoking is “personal comfort” activity incident to employment, and employer essentially directed the claimant to smoke in that area, as the Coast Guard banned smoking in the building.

Cramer v. Cramer, 3710 CRB-4-97-10 (November 9, 1998).

Trial commissioner found that decedent’s attendance at insurance seminar was for personal rather than business reasons, and ruled that fatal car accident that occurred while decedent was driving home from that seminar was not a compensable injury that occurred within the scope of his law practice. CRB affirmed. As the trier of fact, the commissioner was entitled to determine that the evidence supported findings contrary to the testimony of the claimant and a former associate of the decedent. CRB also denied Motion to Submit Additional Evidence, as the claimant sought to introduce testimony of two witnesses who could have been summoned for the formal hearing. However, trier failed to address the applicability of the “dual purpose” doctrine, and did not make findings as to whether the decedent was returning home for work reasons (he had an office there) or personal reasons when he was killed. Case may fall within exception of Dombach v. Olkon Corp., 163 Conn. 216 (1972). Remanded. See also, Cramer, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4. Correction of Finding, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Luciana v. New Canaan Cemetery Assn., 3644 CRB-7-97-7 (August 12, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim where claimant was injured chopping wood during his lunch break on employer’s premises. Claimant’s woodcutting was permitted by employer, but was part of a separate business endeavor with which he was involved. Not an “activity” within meaning of the discussion in McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547 (1979), concerning activities incidental to employment.

Setterstrom v. C.R. Klewin, Inc., 3643 CRB-2-97-7 (August 12, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant’s fall from a ladder after being pushed by a co-worker did not arise out of his employment. The record supported the trial commissioner’s determination that the assault upon the claimant was for reasons personal to the assailant and the claimant, and was unconnected with the claimant’s employment.

Bogrette v. Merriam Motors, 3538 CRB-8-97-2 (July 22, 1998).

Claimant sustained fatal injury when forklift rolled over while he was helping a neighboring business. Trial commissioner found that the claimant was in the course of his employment, and that helping promote good will between businesses was a benefit to the employer. CRB remanded matter to the trial commissioner to determine whether claimant was authorized to drive forklift to help the neighboring business. Subsequent decision at Bogrette, 4011 CRB-8-99-3 (February 9, 2000), supra.

Roche v. Danbury Hospital, 3592 CRB-7-97-5 (July 13, 1998).

Footnote briefly discusses respondents’ argument that claimant, a secretary, acted outside scope of her employment in preventing injury to elderly hospital patient. See also, Roche, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Tartaglino v. State/Dept. of Correction, 3519 CRB-5-97-1 (June 15, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 190 (1999), cert. denied, 251 Conn. 929 (1999).

Claimant’s mental stress claim was not compensable where it was caused by the closing of the correctional facility and his resultant impending transfer. The cause of the claimant’s injury was not conduct regularly engaged in as an incident to the claimant’s employment.

D’Onofrio v. Orange, 3564 CRB-3-97-3 (June 1, 1998).

Commissioner found that disc herniation suffered while claimant was lifting a bag of light trash in his garage was caused by the effects of three compensable back injuries that occurred a few years earlier. CRB affirmed. Doctor’s opinion supported this finding explicitly, and “trivial incidents” need not be deemed the legal cause of injuries. See also, D’Onofrio, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Ferri v. Double A Transportation, Inc., 3503 CRB-8-96-12 (April 29, 1998).

Trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s injury was compensable affirmed by CRB. Accident occurred while employee, with permission of employer, was driving from her home in a company van to the school where she had to pick up students. Use of company vehicle with permission of employer affords exception to general rule that injuries occurring while traveling to or from work are not compensable.

Greco v. Greco Auto Parts, 3402 CRB-4-96-8 (February 4, 1998).

Claimant was injured while driving to a doctor’s appointment after running two work-related errands. Trial commissioner found injury not compensable, as trip to doctor’s office was personal without benefit to employer, and he did not believe she intended to return to work that day. CRB affirmed. Dombach v. Olkon Corp., 163 Conn. 216 (1972), is distinguishable, because claimant there got into a car accident at a point en route to both the business and personal locations associated with his trip. Here, the work portion of the trip was completed, and the claimant would not have been where she was if she had not been conducting a personal errand. Other exceptions also not applicable.

Eaton v. Main Heating & Cooling, 3473 CRB-3-96-11 (January 30, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s accident, which occurred on his way home after his last assignment, arose out of and in the course of his employment. The employer had provided the claimant with a company vehicle for the joint benefit of claimant and employer, and therefore the use of the vehicle was incidental to the employment. No evidence that claimant deviated from approved usage of vehicle.

Gerke v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 3426 CRB-5-96-9 (January 27, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury did not occur in the course of his employment. The claimant’s injury occurred on a Sunday, a day he was not scheduled to work, at a park which was not owned or controlled by the employer. Although the employer encouraged the claimant to learn to climb trees, the trial commissioner did not find that the claimant’s act of rappelling down a ninety-foot rock ledge was done with the employer’s knowledge or consent.

Beaubien v. Chesebrough Ponds, U.S.A., 3386 CRB-3-96-7 (January 22, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s injury was compensable and was not the result of horseplay. Specifically, the trial commissioner found that the claimant was performing her job duties on a production line when her co-worker hit her knee with a hammer; that the claimant did not provoke the co-worker; and that there were no arguments between the claimant and the co-worker which preceded the incident.

Pothier v. Stanley-Bostitch/The Bostitch Company, 3411 CRB-3-96-8 (January 21, 1998).

See, Pothier, § 31-275(16), See also reference in § 31-301. Factual findings.

Kolomiets v. Syncor International Corp., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 234, 3251 CRB-7-96-1 (June 23, 1997), rev’d, 51 Conn. App. 523 (1999), aff’d, 252 Conn. 261 (2000).

Claimant, a driver who delivered pharmaceutical products, was involved in a car accident while returning to his home to pick up his driver’s license after making a delivery. Pursuant to its license to transport radioactive materials, Syncor maintains a drivers’ manual prescribing written directions as to the manner in which deliveries are made, including routes that should be followed to various facilities. The trier found that the claimant believed he might be assigned to more deliveries that day, and was acting in the best interest of both himself and Syncor in retrieving his license. He concluded that the claimant’s deviation was not so unreasonable as to preclude him from collecting benefits for his accident. The CRB reversed on appeal, as none of the three exceptions to the “coming and going” rule discussed in Dombach v. Olkon Corporation, 163 Conn. 216 (1972) specifically apply to this case. When he had his accident, the claimant was not “on call,” he was not traveling pursuant to express employment duties, and Syncor did not approve and have knowledge of his deviation from his work routine beforehand. Legally, none of those exceptions can apply to these facts. (Wilson, C., DISSENTING) This case is legally identical to Kish v. Nursing and Home Care, 3068 CRB-2-95-6 (November 12, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 620 (1998), aff’d, 248 Conn. 379 (1999) and should not be reversed. Appellate Court reversed CRB decision, stating that the commissioner’s decision had an adequate foundation in the facts, and that the CRB misapplied the law by making employer consent to minor deviations on “joint benefit” trips a prerequisite to compensability. See also, Kolomiets, § 31-301. Factual findings. Subsequent decision at Kolomiets, 4578 CRB-7-02-11 (July 8, 2003).

Richard v. Olsten Temporary Services, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 204, 3250 CRB-7-96-1 (May 22, 1997), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 939 (1998)(per curiam), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 925 (1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s motorcycle accident did not arise out of or during the course of his employment. The trial commissioner found that the claimant was on an unpaid lunch break at the time of the injury and thus was not within the period of his employment. In addition, the trial commissioner found that accident occurred on a private road which was not part of the employer’s premises.

Herman v. Sherwood Industries, Inc., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 183, 3228 CRB-6-95-12 (May 12, 1997), rev’d, 244 Conn. 502 (1998).

Claimant was injured while picking up his toolbox from a loading dock on the business premises immediately after being fired by his employer. Trier found this act was within the course of his employment, and ruled injury compensable. Held: injury occurred after employment contract was terminated, and legislative policy favoring narrower construction of scope of employment period is evident from recent legislative amendment to definition of personal injury. Trial commissioner reversed. (Vargas, C., DISSENTING) This is a physical injury, not an emotional injury, and is not governed by Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 27 Conn. App. 800 (1992). Trier reasonably found that retrieval of toolbox while leaving premises was within period of employment. Reversed by Supreme Court, which held that the claimant’s period of employment did not end abruptly at the instant of discharge, and that he was in the course of his employment when he was injured. Moreover, as keeping personal tools at the work site was a benefit to both the claimant and the employer, and the claimant was directed by the employer to retrieve his tools, the retrieval of the tools was incidental to his employment.

Evans v. Shelton, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 155, 3108 CRB-4-95-6 (May 2, 1997), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 17196 (January 14, 1998).

No automatic separation between repetitive trauma and occupational disease. Claimant’s asthma could have satisfied either or both definitions, depending on whether her asthma fell within the legal definition of those injuries. Trier did not improperly “fuse” the two definitions. See also, Evans, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, notes on Rules of Professional Conduct.

Benlock v. New Haven Terminal/Cilco Terminal, 3034 CRB-4-95-4 (April 25, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 250 (1998)(per curiam).

Discusses stress-related heart attack claim. See also, Benlock, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Leonard v. Danbury, 3159 CRB-7-95-9 (April 14, 1997).

Trier dismissed claim of claimant firefighter who suffered disabling head injuries when he fell in his driveway. He had been given a ride to an auto repair garage after his work shift ended, where he picked up his car. He was injured after driving the car home and stepping out onto the icy driveway. Commissioner ruled injury did not occur “in the course of a direct return from the place of duty to the place of abode.” Affirmed; statutory exception to “coming and going” rule for firefighters and police officers does not encompass every departure during the trip to and from work. Trier is entitled to decide whether a diversion is significant enough to take claimant outside the statute based on the nature of the intervening events and the route traveled.

Fusco v. J.C. Penney Company, 1952 CRB-4-94-1 (March 20, 1997).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof that she suffered any injuries that were causally related to her employment. Record, including report by IME, supported trial commissioner’s determination. It was within the discretion of the trial commissioner, as the trier of fact, to accord greater weight to the opinion of the IME. See also, Fusco, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Masko v. Wallingford Board of Education, 3225 CRB-6-95-12 (January 24, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 515 (1998).

During arbitration hearing between decedent’s union and respondent board of education, decedent collapsed and died from heart attack. Commissioner found causal link between stress of hearing and heart attack, and awarded benefits. Respondent argued on appeal that decedent attended hearing as union representative and for his personal benefit, and that he was not acting in scope of employment when stricken. CRB affirmed award. Arbitration hearing was part of negotiations between employer and union, rather than a members-only union meeting, and decedent was allowed to attend during paid employment hours. Commissioner’s findings were sufficient to support conclusion that heart attack was work-related. Subsequent decision at Masko, 4076 CRB-8-99-7 (July 11, 2000), aff’d, 67 Conn. App. 276 (2001), § 31-349.

Parsons v. Parsons Buick, 3129 CRB-6-95-7 (January 22, 1997).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the decedent was not in the scope of his employment or doing something incidental thereto when he was killed in a motor vehicle accident. The trial commissioner’s conclusion was a factual determination that was dependent upon the weight and credibility of the evidence.

Vallier v. Distinctive Stationery, Inc., 3176 CRB-6-95-10 (January 16, 1997).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury, which occurred while he was shoveling snow, arose out of and in the course of his employment. The employer contended that it did not expressly ask the claimant to shovel said snow. Section 31-275(1) definition of injury includes an injury which occurs “while engaged elsewhere upon the employer’s business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer . . . .” (emphasis added).

Deoliveira v. Ross & Roberts, Inc., 3033 CRB-4-95-4 (December 13, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 919 (1997)(per curiam), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 965 (1998).

Claimant suffered a compensable back injury, which was unreasonably contested by respondent. However, commissioner denied compensation for claimant’s emotional and psychological problems allegedly stemming from the delays in resolving his claim. Affirmed. In order for an injury to be work-related, employment must be a proximate cause of the injury. Although CRB is opposed to an employer’s use of dilatory tactics in contesting claim, the conduct that led to the claimant’s psychological distress was not a direct result of his back injury. Human actions intervened. Thus, the compensable back injury was not legally a substantial factor in causing the claimant’s psychological problems. CRB also noted that § 31-300 prescribes a remedy for unreasonable contest by an employer or insurer, and that it would be inappropriate to infer that an alternative remedy is also available in cases of unusual detrimental effects. See also, Deoliveira, § 31-300.

Sutton v. State/Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 3066 CRB-2-95-5 (November 13, 1996).

The trial commissioner concluded that the claimant’s injury, which occurred at the end of her workday when she reached for her pocketbook, arose out of and in the course of her employment. In support of its appeal, the employer contends that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the claimant’s employment as it occurred during the act of reaching for her pocketbook, a personal belonging, which was not incidental to her job duties. CRB agreed with respondents’ argument and reversed the trial commissioner. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) (trial commissioner’s decision as to whether the claimant’s conduct was incidental to her job duties was an issue of fact, and should be affirmed).

Kish v. Nursing and Home Care, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 3068 CRB-2-95-6 (November 12, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 620 (1998), aff’d, 248 Conn. 379 (1999).

Claimant, a home health care specialist, was en route to pick up a commode for a patient when she saw a postal vehicle and pulled over to the side of the road to mail a greeting card to a friend. While crossing the street, she was struck by an oncoming car. Commissioner found that, despite unwritten agency policy against picking up items for patients, the claimant was acting in the course of her employment in getting the commode, and that her momentary diversion to mail the card did not remove her from acting in the course of her employment. CRB affirmed; Motion to Correct was properly denied, and claimant’s actions in picking up commode did not amount to willful misconduct despite employer policy. Mailing of letter was a deviation from employment duties, but trial commissioner reasonably found that it was inconsequential. (Waldron, C., DISSENTING) (actions in mailing letter were primary cause of accident, and were unrelated to claimant’s employment).

Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 383, 2246 CRB-3-94-12 (August 6, 1996), rev’d and remanded, 240 Conn. 788 (1997).

The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury which occurred while he was eating lunch on an off-duty bus parked on the employer’s premises did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The employer provided a lunchroom for employees to eat their lunches. The claimant was not doing anything while on his lunch break in furtherance of the employer’s business or incidental to it. Supreme Court reversed CRB and held claimant had satisfied the first and third parts of the “in the course of employment” test. See, McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547 (1979) and Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408 (1996). A lunchtime injury sustained on the employer’s premises may be said to have occurred in the course of employment and eating lunch, a necessary element to an employee’s health and comfort, is incidental to employment. Remanded for further articulation by trial commissioner with respect to whether claimant, at the time of his injury, was at a place where he reasonably might have been.

Prescott v. Echlin, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 339, 2242 CRB-3-94-12 (June 25, 1996), appeal dismissed, A.C. 16150 (February 5, 1997).

Claimant bears burden of proving causal relation of injury to employment; commissioner’s decision that claimant did not establish injury by sufficient evidence affirmed. Room for doubt certainly existed, as claimant’s case was based largely on her own testimony. Prior decision at, Prescott, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 191, 2029 CRB-3-94-4 (July 13, 1995).

Janeiro v. State/DMR Region I, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 282, 2234 CRB-6-94-12 (June 20, 1996).

The claimant, a mental retardation worker, injured her ankle on the driveway of a client’s home which she had been visiting as part of her job duties. The CRB found the commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment to be amply supported by the record, including the trial commissioner’s finding that the claimant had completed her work assignment for the day prior to her injury; the finding that she was not reimbursed for travel expenses; and the trial commissioner’s determination that the evidence did not support a finding that the driveway was under the control of the employer.

Thompson v. State/Dept. of Special Revenue, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 178, 2206 CRB-6-94-11 (March 22, 1996), aff’d, 44 Conn. App. 924 (1997)(per curiam).

To establish a stress-related heart claim, a claimant must prove that his employment was a substantial factor in causing his condition by a reasonable medical probability. Here, trial commissioner was not required to credit testimony of physician linking work stress to myocardial infarction. Dismissal affirmed.

Durso v. Colonial Toyota, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 2141 CRB-3-94-9 (December 6, 1995).

Claimant’s flag football injury found compensable by trial commissioner. Affirmed; evidence existed to support conclusion that employer derived benefit from sponsorship of team in the form of advertising and an employee morale boost. (Injury occurred before 1993 amendment took effect.) (Tracy, C., DISSENTING) (no concrete evidence of benefit from flag football).

Hanzlik v. James Freccia Auto Body, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 2, 1984 CRB-7-94-3 (November 1, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 908 (1996)(per curiam).

Trial commissioner found that claimant suffered relapse when he herniated disc picking up three-ounce piece of car molding. Later, correction granted stating that claimant herniated disc at that time. Held, correction not inconsistent with outcome of case. Reference to Colas, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 939 CRD-7-89-11 was misleading; legal causation of injury occurs at time of last event in causation chain, and commissioner was attempting to explain that herniation would have occurred regardless of bending incident. Evidence supports conclusion that bending incident was too minor to be a legal cause.

Rondeau v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 380, 2073 CRB-2-94-6 (October 5, 1995).

Medical report established that primary cause of pulmonary disease was smoking, with asbestosis in an early, mild stage; permanent partial disability of lungs not based on asbestos exposure. Mere presence of minor asbestosis did not entitle claimant to benefits. Affirmed.

Han v. Amgraph Packaging, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 2074 CRB-2-94-6 (September 26, 1995).

Trial commissioner found that claimant permanently aggravated hip condition while standing up from a bending position at work. Respondents argued alleged injury did not arise out of employment as a matter of law. Held, cause of injury is question of fact. Doctor’s opinion that injury affected the course of claimant’s disease supported commissioner’s finding. Although some circumstances are so minor in leading to injury that the law can’t recognize them as causes, when the commissioner decides that an incident did play a causal role, we must defer to that factual decision.

Senoski v. Corometrics, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 344, 1906 CRB-8-93-11 (September 22, 1995), appeal dismissed, A.C. 15289 (April 30, 1996).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s tendonitis was not caused by her use of a glass-pulling machine at work. Commissioner found claimant’s testimony was not credible when compared with a video showing the use of the machine. See also, Senoski, § 31-298.

Ferrigno v. Buffalo Specialty, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 303, 1953 CRB-2-94-1 (September 14, 1995).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that physical assault on claimant, which occurred in the course of her employment, did not arise out of her employment. Commissioner found that the assault was imported into claimant’s employment from her private life. Discussion of case law, including Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988). See also, Ferrigno, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Spatafore v. Yale University, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 310, 2011 CRB-3-94-4 (September 14, 1995), aff’d, 239 Conn. 408 (1996).

Claimant was injured while walking back from union meeting on lunch break; injury did not occur on Yale property, although meeting was held in a Yale building. Commissioner found mutual benefit for Yale and claimant in her attendance at the meeting, and found injury compensable. Held, no evidence supported conclusion that meeting was for benefit of employer; independent evidence of such benefit must be shown before such a conclusion may be reached. Also, injuries occurring off-premises during unpaid lunch break are not normally compensable. Special hazard and personal comfort exceptions inapplicable. See also, Spatafore, § 31-301 for discussion of commissioner’s attempt to vacate award.

Kaplan v. State/Dept. of Health Services, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 296, 2012 CRB-1-94-4 (September 11, 1995).

State employee tripped on off-premises sidewalk during unpaid afternoon lunch break and fractured her ankle. Difficulty of distinguishing whether this case falls into “coming and going” category or “personal comfort” category irrelevant; case is almost identical to Renckowski v. Yale University, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48 (March 18, 1993), except claimant was not getting paid at time of injury. Commissioner’s dismissal of claim affirmed.

Cotton v. Bartlett Nuclear, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 231, 1929 CRB-2-93-12 (August 10, 1995).

Commissioner found that claimant fell at work, sustaining injuries to his face and left cheek and the loss of fourteen teeth. CRB remanded issue of causation because there was no medical opinion in record indicating that claimant’s dental extractions were caused by his fall. See also, Cotton, § 31-307.

Maglieri v. Incorporated Construction, Ltd., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 149, 1947 CRB-1-94-1 (June 20, 1995).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s shoulder injury did not occur in the course of his employment, relying upon commissioner’s credibility determination against claimant’s testimony. Medical notes are not always determinative when as in the instant matter, the trial commissioner found that the claimant did not sustain an injury on the date in question, the medical report was based on claimant’s oral history and the medical reports were admitted into evidence for identification only.

Peters v. Corporate Air, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 91, 1679 CRB-5-93-3 (May 19, 1995).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of benefits where commissioner concluded that claimant failed to sustain burden of proving that back injury occurred in the course of employment. Commissioner found that claimant lacked credibility due to inconsistencies in his testimony and in evidence. See also, Peters, § 31-301. Factual findings, and § 31-298. Conduct of hearings. Evidence.

Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 57, 1733 CRB-7-93-5 (May 11, 1995), rev’d, 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996).

Commissioner accepted doctor’s opinion that workplace exposure did not cause claimant’s condition, but was an “aggravating factor” on pre-existing lung condition. Commissioner also found that claimant’s symptoms did not decrease when he left work and could be triggered by household products as well. Held, commissioner could reasonably interpret doctor’s testimony as supporting conclusion that claimant’s disease was not aggravated within the meaning of § 31-275(1)(D). Distinction drawn between a worsening of a claimant’s condition caused by workplace exposure, which would be compensable, and a tendency of chemicals present at work to irritate a pre-existing condition without causing further permanent damage, as in this case. (Brouillet, C., DISSENTING) (employer takes employee as it finds him; chemical exposure was causal factor which aggravated pre-existing respiratory condition. Employer liable for entire disability, as apportionment not appropriate here). Appellate Court reversed CRB and held statute expressly provides for compensation for proportion of disability caused by aggravation. Facts of case and uncontradicted medical testimony clearly support a finding that claimant’s respiratory condition was aggravated by constant exposure to chemicals.

Niebler v. Waldbaum’s Foodmart, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 61, 1851 CRB-3-93-9 (May 11, 1995).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s determination that claimant’s back injury was caused by repetitive heavy lifting of lobster crates. Respondents contended that proximate cause of disc herniation was a bending incident at home. After discussing “proximate cause” and “substantial cause” CRB concluded that bending incident at home was too trivial to break the chain of causation between work activities and herniation.

Fantasia v. Tony Pantano Mason Contractors, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 36, 1819 CRB-5-93-8 (May 4, 1995), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, A.C. 16088 (October 3, 1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 947 (1996).

Automobile accident on way home from workers’ compensation hearing did not arise out of employment. “Coming and going” rule discussed in Dombach v. Olkon Corp., 163 Conn. 216 (1972), applies; highway use exceptions in McKiernan v. New Haven, 151 Conn. 496 (1964), inapplicable. No evidence presented by claimant that the ride home from the hearing was made for the employer’s benefit with its knowledge and approval. Trier’s decision reversed and matter was remanded for further proceedings. Appeal to the Appellate Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Further proceedings were held below and supplemental findings by the trial commissioner were appealed directly to the Appellate Court. That court found they lacked subject matter jurisdiction as an appeal from the trier’s finding on remand lies with the Compensation Review Board. The Compensation Review Board needs to determine whether the proceedings below were consistent with their opinion. Parties cannot agree to remove the review and appeal directly to the Appellate Court. See, Fantasia v. Tony Pantano Mason Contractors, Inc., 54 Conn. App. 194 (1999), cert. denied, 250 Conn. 927 (1999).

Senatro v. Royal Insurance Co., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 1890 CRB-8-93-11 (May 4, 1995).

Claimant’s psychiatric condition did not arise out of her employment where depression was caused by respondent’s elimination of claimant’s job and inability to arrange a suitable replacement job. See, Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 27 Conn. App. 800 (1992). Conduct relating to actual or potential termination of employment differs from conduct relating to duties of employment or incidental to employment. CRB noted that amendment to § 31-275(16) definition of “personal injury” would exclude this kind of claim in the future.

Bell v. U. S. Home Care Certified of Connecticut, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 294, 1792 CRB-1-93-8 (April 21, 1995), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 934 (1996)(per curiam).

Claimant, a home health care aid, fell during errand to beauty store en route from home of one patient to another. Commissioner found claimant was doing a personal errand and purchased lipstick for patient as an afterthought. Held: commissioner was not required to conclude that trip to beauty store satisfied dual purpose doctrine in Dombach v. Olkon Corp., 163 Conn. 216 (1972), based on his findings. “Personal comfort” doctrine of Lovallo v. American Brass Company, 112 Conn. 635 (1931), similarly not satisfied by findings of commissioner. See also, Bell, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Paternostro v. Turner Construction Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 251, 1723 CRB-5-93-5 (April 18, 1995).

In occupational disease cases in which it is difficult to determine relationship of disease to employment, expert medical opinion is necessary. See, Metall v. Aluminum Company of America, 154 Conn. 48 (1946). See also, Paternostro, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Simmons v. Philip Bonhotel, d/b/a Bonhotel’s Lawn Maintenance, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 234, 1778 CRB-5-93-7 (April 13, 1995), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 278 (1996).

CRB affirmed denial of benefits where alleged injury at work occurred due to horseplay initiated by claimant. See also, Simmons, § 31-298, § 31-294c, and § 31-284(a).

Baccielo v. Business Products, Inc., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 1732 CRB-4-93-5 (March 9, 1995).

Faced with conflicting medical reports, commissioner determined that claimant’s bodybuilding activities, rather than his 1987 compensable injury, likely caused his herniated disc. Held, commissioner’s conclusion supported by report of commissioner’s examiner, which he was entitled to credit as the fact finder, and consistent with claimant’s testimony. CRB will not substitute its conclusions for those of the commissioner. See also, Baccielo, § 31-294f and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Conetta v. Stamford, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 1491 CRB-7-92-8 (December 29, 1994).

Remanded where trier’s denial of police officer’s claim for psychiatric disability fails to disclose whether dismissal was based on claimant’s failure to prove causation or whether claim was time barred. See also, Conetta, § 31-294c and § 31-301. Factual findings. See also, Conetta v. Stamford, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 228, 3231 CRB-7-95-12 (June 23, 1997), appeal dismissed, 246 Conn. 281 (1998).

Smith v. Capiezello, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 37, 1712 CRB-2-93-4 (November 8, 1994).

CRB affirmed finding claimant’s alleged back injury, for which treatment was not sought until several years after the accepted compensable head injury, did not arise out of and in the course of employment. See also, Smith, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

Lee v. Norwalk, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 23, 1626 CRB-7-93-1 (November 7, 1994).

Trier erred in basing the dismissal of claimant’s claim for depression and anxiety, as the result of striking a coworker while operating a sanitation truck, on an IME report improperly entered into evidence. See also, Lee, § 31-294f, § 31-298.

Plitnick v. Knoll Pharmaceuticals, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 26, 1699 CRB-8-93-4 (November 7, 1994).

Respondents claimed injury merely coincidental with employment. Held, question of fact for trial commissioner as to whether injury arose out of and in course of employment. Discusses definitions of both terms. Sufficient evidence existed to find injury work-related here. Failure of physician to specifically use the term “reasonable medical probability” did not preclude said finding; “in best medical probability” was adequate. See also, Plitnick, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Searles v. West Hartford Board of Education, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 414, 1617 CRB-1-93-1 (September 28, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 902 (1996)(per curiam).

Auto accident on public highway did not arise out of employment. Schoolteacher was not required nor requested to drive lesson plan to school after calling in sick. See also, Searles, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Zullo v. Caron Roofing Company, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 357, 1634 CRB-4-93-2 (August 2, 1994).

Injury sustained when chair collapsed while attending class at an approved Division of Workers’ Rehabilitation school arose out of and in the course of employment. CRB affirmed trier’s finding which ordered respondent employer to pay benefits for subsequent injury. See, Cole v. Norwalk Wilbert Vault Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 155, 330 CRD-2-84 (February 26, 1988). See also, Zullo, § 31-283a.

Conroy v. Keri Corporation, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 321, 1534 CRB-3-92-10 (July 5, 1994).

Medical evidence supported finding that a causal connection existed between heart attack, pre-existing arterial blockage, and later angioplasty surgery which caused decedent’s death. See also, Conroy, §. 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-306.

Fusciello v. Ronnie Demeo, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 283, 1535 CRB-6-92-10 (June 7, 1994).

Record supports trier’s findings and conclusions regarding cause of injuries sustained, not as a result of prior injuries with other employers, but during the course of his present employment. See also, Fusciello, § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)] and § 31-307. )]. Subsequent decision at Fusciello, 3406 CRB-8-96-8 (February 4, 1998), § 31-307, § 31-301. Appeal procedure and Fusciello, 4340 CRB-6-01-1 (January 7, 2002), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.

Clark v. Gates GMC Truck, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 263, 1528 CRB-8-92-10 (June 2, 1994).

Claimant, a car salesman injured in a motor vehicle accident after work hours, was found not to be performing a duty which could be considered as a benefit to the employer. Claimant was on a personal recreational trip and therefore his injuries did not arise out of or in the course of his employment.

O’Connor v. Connecticut Light & Power Company, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 265, 1536 CRB-8-92-10 (June 2, 1994).

Claimant’s depression was not caused by work stress but by interpersonal stressors in his life. See also, O’Connor, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Flowers v. Benny’s of Connecticut, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 162, 1527 CRB-2-92-10 (April 26, 1994).

Based on conflicting testimony, mental stress claim as a result of sexual harassment and verbal abuse by a supervisor dismissed. See also, Flowers, § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure and Factual findings.

Spindler v. Med-Center Home Health Center, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 130, 1474 CRB-7-92-7 (February 28, 1994).

Based on credibility, trier properly concluded that claimant’s automobile accident did not arise out of and during the course of her employment. The claimant, a home health care aide, was not credible regarding her testimony that she was driving between two work assignments when the accident occurred. See also, Spindler, § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)].

Moffett v. Tighe Williams Salon, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 1489 CRB-4-92-8 (February 9, 1994).

Injury which occurred when claimant slipped and fell on ice as she stepped from the parking lot onto a curb in front of employer’s premises held not compensable. Trier found injury occurred on property which was neither owned, leased or controlled by the employer. Further, claimant’s injury was not connected to the employment by application of the special hazard doctrine. See also, Moffett, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Peddle v. Finish Line Cafe, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 27, 1396 CRB-2-92-2 (January 18, 1994).

No employer-employee relationship existed at the time claimant sustained injuries to her knee, neck, elbow and head, despite testimony from both claimant and employer that the claimant was an employee when injury occurred. See also, Peddle, § 31-294c, § 31-284(a), § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Nolan v. Brennan Concrete Corporation, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 224, 1362 CRD-7-91-12 (November 4, 1993), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 13041 (January 5, 1994).

Reversed and remanded. Claimant sustained an injury to his right master hand as a result of an altercation with a coworker at his place of employment. Trier failed to address the reason or cause of the altercation in determining claimant’s injury did not arise out of his employment. Discussion of personal injury and Connecticut’s rule in determining whether a workplace assault between fellow employees is considered to arise out of the employment. See also, Nolan, § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)] and § 31-284(a).

Beninato v. Specialty Framing, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 200, 1306 CRD-8-91-9 (September 24, 1993), aff’d, 36 Conn. App. 911 (1994).

Evidence supports trier’s conclusion that claimant’s psychiatric condition and resulting disability were unrelated to the compensable work incident wherein claimant suffered a neck sprain when pushed by a co-worker. See also, Beninato, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Anderson v. State/UConn Health Center, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 197, 1318 CRD-6-91-10 (September 23, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s work environment and accompanying job-related stress was a substantial contributing factor to claimant’s psychiatric disability. Note: Psychiatric disability predates effective date of P.A. 93-228. See also, Anderson, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Lane v. J. Copperfield LTD, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 1293 CRD-2-91-8 (August 23, 1993).

Claimant sustained injuries when a co-worker picked her up, proceeded to carry claimant across kitchen floor of restaurant, slipped, and dropped claimant. Trier determined claim was compensable. Although activity was arguably horseplay, claimant did not provoke, induce or initiate the act. Further, management was aware of horseplay activities and such activity was considered essential to employee morale. CRB affirmed trier’s finding.

Dumont v. State/Southern Connecticut State University, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 122, 1320 CRD-3-91-10 (June 16, 1993).

Trier found based on medical evidence, that decedent, a French professor, while leading a study tour in Europe, suffered a fatal heart attack caused by stress and physical activity. Trier’s conclusion that decedent’s death arose out of and in the course of employment will not be disturbed as medical testimony refers to the standard of reasonable medical probability. Award to dependent widow for benefits pursuant to § 31-306 affirmed. See also, Dumont, § 31-306 and § 31-301c(b).

Boynton v. American Cyanamid, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 58, 1267 CRD-8-91-8 (April 6, 1993).

See, Boynton § 31-301. Factual findings, and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Renckowski v. Yale University, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48, 1292 CRD-3-91-9 (March 18, 1993).

Reversed. Trier erred in finding that claimant’s injury sustained while getting coffee during a paid coffee break off the employer’s premises arose out of and in the course of employment. CRB held while claimant was arguably in the course of her employment she was not fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing something incidental to it.

Moore v. M & L Building, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 23, 1238 CRD-8-91-5 (February 23, 1993).

Trier found claimant, a plumber’s apprentice, alleged back injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment.

Brewer v. National Theatre of the Arts, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 1237 CRD-4-91-5 (January 28, 1993).

Claimant, a stage actress, in a traveling theatre company, injured her knee while climbing a fence around a closed pool at a motel. Trier found that the activity was a frolic and detour and was not part of the employment duties or incidental to the employment. CRB affirmed, as the question of whether an employee has so departed from his employment that the injury did not arise out of it is a factual determination.

Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 255, 1226 CRD-4-91-5 (January 13, 1993), rev’d, 33 Conn. App. 695 (1994), rev’d, 231 Conn. 469 (1994), aff’d on remand, 37 Conn. App. 266 (1995)(per curiam).

See, Muldoon, § 31-275(15), § 31-299b, § 31-315 and § 31-284(a). Subsequent decisions.

Pereira v. State/Dept. of Children & Youth Services, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 229, 1209 CRD-7-91-4 (January 7, 1993), aff’d, 228 Conn. 535 (1994).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that work place stress was not a substantial factor in producing claimant’s mental disability. See also, Pereira, § 31-301. Factual findings and Pereira, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 906 CRD-7-89-8 (January 8, 1991), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 9884 (March 20, 1991).

Crochiere v. Enfield/Board of Education, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 165, 1069 CRD-1-90-7 (August 27, 1992), aff’d, 227 Conn. 333 (1993).

Evidence supports trier’s finding that claimant’s mental injury arose out of and in the course of employment and was not the result of willful misconduct. The claimant had been a music teacher accused of inappropriately touching a student. Resultant publicity and proceedings were alleged to have resulted in claimant’s severe emotional stress. See also, Crochiere, § 31-284(a), § 31-294c, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

Neal v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 1199 CRD-8-91-3 (August 5, 1992).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant failed to prove claimed back injury was the result of a slip and fall from a forklift as there was evidence proffered that claimed back injury was the result of a non-work related softball game.

Prisco v. North & Judd, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 1190 CRD-8-91-3 (June 30, 1992).

As trier found claimant sustained an aggravation of his underlying lung disease, and found the pre-existing impairment was not due to occupational disease, respondent employer is liable for the entire resultant disability and apportionment under § 31-275(12)(D) (now § 31-275(1)(D)) not applicable. See also, Prisco, § 31-294c.

Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 1143 CRD-4-90-12 (June 4, 1992), aff’d, 32 Conn. App. 595 (1993), cert. granted, 227 Conn. 930 (1993), cert. dismissed, 229 Conn. 587 (1994).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that decedent’s (salesman’s) heart attack while shoveling snow from his driveway arose in and out of the course of his employment. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) Evidence does not support trier’s conclusion. Trier erred in failing to grant portions of motion to correct.

Davidowski v. Commercial Painting Co., Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 225, 1082 CRD-7-90-7 (October 21, 1991).

Claimant’s injury sustained while exiting parking lot on his motorcycle found not compensable as parking area was not found to be part of the premises of the employer. Also, claimant contended that since the employer furnished a travel allowance, all travel to and from work arose in and out of the employment. CRD disallowed as transportation allowance is part of wages and paid regardless of manner of transportation chosen. See, Orsinie v. Torrance, 96 Conn. 352 (1921).

Biondi v. West Haven, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 203, 1024 CRD-3-90-5 (September 3, 1991).

Trier’s factual finding that police officer’s gunshot injury while removing his service revolver from its holster at home upon returning from duty did not arise out of or during the course of his employment will not be disturbed on appeal. The CRD may not review de novo the facts as found but can only determine if the conclusions drawn from the facts were contrary to law, without evidence or based on impermissible or unreasonable factual inferences. See, Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).

Cellupica v. Highland Manufacturing, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 206, 969 CRD-5-90-1 (September 3, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s factual finding claimant’s leg injury sustained while participating in an employer sponsored softball game arose in and out of the course of employment.

Benham v. Edgerton, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 169, 977 CRD-4-90-2 (July 17, 1991).

Trier’s finding that claimant suffered a compensable injury which accelerated or triggered an aseptic necrosis of the right hip will not be disturbed where issues raised on appeal concern conflicting evidence and corrections which would not alter the legal outcome.

Tomkus v. Upjohn Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 972 CRD-3-90-1 (June 28, 1991).

Commissioner’s finding that claimant’s myocardial infarction arose in and out of the course of his employment will not be disturbed as there was sufficient medical evidence and testimony to satisfy proximate causation requirements. See also, Tomkus, § 31-294c and § 31-298.

Rivera v. B & D Molded Products, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 76, 912 CRD-4-89-9 (February 20, 1991).

Where claimant accepts alternative ride to work other than company van and employer had no knowledge of the ride and did not authorize alternative means of transportation, injuries sustained while on the way to work held not compensable.

Zane v. Danbury, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 949 CRD-7-89-11 (January 4, 1991).

Injury sustained by police officer, when his gun discharged while dressing at home, found not compensable.

Smeriglio v. Froelich Transportation, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 166, 872 CRD-7-89-6 (October 26, 1990).

Questions of causal relationship are questions of fact and findings on such factual issues will not be set aside unless resulting from an incorrect application of the law, based on illegal or unreasonable factual inferences, or without evidence. See also, Smeriglio, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Belanger v. Bechtel Construction Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 72, 768 CRD-8-88-9 (April 25, 1990).

Affirmed finding of no work related injury. See also, Belanger, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Connell v. Long Line Trucking Co., Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 801 CRD-2-88-12 (March 21, 1990).

See, Connell, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Johnson v. West Haven, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 792 CRD-3-88-12 (March 21, 1990), aff’d, 23 Conn. 818 (1990)(per curiam).

Injuries sustained to a police officer while assigned to a special service job found compensable. See also, Johnson, § 31-284(a).

Spataro v. Mattioli Construction, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 41, 784 CRD-4-88-10 (February 21, 1990).

See, Spataro, § 31-294d.

Kroczewski v. Old Fox Chemical, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 13, 730 CRD-1-88-5 (January 5, 1990).

See, Kroczewski, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Polier v. Colt Industries, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 763 CRD-1-88-8 (December 21, 1989).

Whether the claimant’s medical treatment was related to his previous compensable injury is a question of causation which must be determined by the trial commissioner.

Golymbieski v. GTE Sylvania, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 704 CRD-5-88-3 (September 25, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s findings that claimant’s disabling illnesses resulted from personal problems which pre-existed employment and not from stress in the employment must stand where there is evidence to support such findings.

Polizzi v. Orange, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 675 CRD-3-87 (August 10, 1989), no error, 21 Conn. App. 815 (1990)(per curiam).

Injury sustained by suspended police officer while leaving a disciplinary hearing to which he was summoned arose in and out of the course of employment.

Lombardo v. Harris Graphics, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 33, 639 CRD-2-87 (July 25, 1989).

Injury sustained by claimant, a volunteer fireman, arose in and out of course of employment where employer paid daily wages pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement during claimant’s absence from employment in order to fight fires.

Jagush v. Litton-Winchester Electronics, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 609 CRD-7-87 (June 9, 1989).

See, Jagush, § 31-301, Factual findings.

Bruce v. Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Snow, P.C., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 587 CRD-4-87 (January 26, 1989).

Claimant’s injuries sustained while horseback riding on a company sponsored trip upheld as compensable.

Cruz v. Consolidated Industries, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 92, 580 CRD-5-87 (January 20, 1989).

Claimant failed to meet burden of proof.

Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 593 CRD-2-87 (January 13, 1989), no error, 212 Conn. 441 (1989).

Claimant’s disability due to TMJ and mononucleosis held causally connected to work related exposure to ammonia fumes. See later decision at Besade, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 103, 1383 CRB-2-92-2 (February 28, 1994), aff’d, 37 Conn. App. 903 (1995), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Gallagher v. Edmunds Manufacturing Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 494 CRD-6-86 (June 30, 1988).

See, Hebert, infra.

Ricigliano v. American Freight Systems, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 121, 556 CRD-3-87 (June 24, 1988).

Claimant’s auto accident which occurred late at night after dinner meeting with customer and while driving employer provided vehicle held compensable. However, remanded for determination of whether subsequent noncompensable accident was an intervening event in the chain of causation.

Davis v. Electrolux Corp., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 109, 217 CRD-5-84 (June 20, 1988).

Trial commissioner found that claimant-assistant sales manager’s automobile accident which occurred while claimant was returning home after picking up a bracelet to be used as a sales contest prize arose in and out of course of employment.

Ballester v. K & D Auto Body, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 35, 578 CRD-3-86 (April 6, 1988).

Dependent’s death due to motor vehicle accident was found compensable when trip was occasioned by need to return home to pick up keys to employer’s premises.

Bernier v. Enfield, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 358 CRD-1-84 (March 29, 1988).

Police officer’s fall in driveway held compensable as driveway was not place of abode.

Chavarriaga v. Pathmark, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 16, 363 CRD-7-84 (March 24, 1988).

Assault to claimant in parking garage held compensable where parking area was held to be an annex of employer’s premises.

Hutchinson v. State, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 292 CRD-2-84 (March 23, 1988).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s heart attack was not causally related to job stress will not be disturbed where based on conflicting medical evidence and expert medical opinion relied on was based on reasonable medical probability.

Sager v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 12, 430 CRD-3-85 (March 23, 1988).

Held testimony of physician that job stress was an important factor was the legal equivalent of substantial factor. See also earlier CRD decision re: Sager, 430 CRD-3-85 (April 9, 1986), error, further proceedings, 11 Conn. App. 693 (1987), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Cole v. Norwalk Wilbert Vault Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 155, 330 CRD-2-84 (February 26, 1988).

Held injury sustained by claimant while in training school program pursuant to DWR placement arose in and out of the course of employment.

Hebert v. New Departure Hyatt Bearings, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 300 CRD-6-84 (June 12, 1987), no error, 14 Conn. App. 819 (1988)(per curiam).

Cervical surgery found causally connected to back injury which resulted in herniation of disc at the L-1 level.

Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 71, 289 CRD-4-83 (May 21, 1987), rev’d, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).

CRD held resultant death of employee from attack on employer’s premises by an estranged lover compensable. Reversed by Supreme Court. See also, Fair, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Parandes v. Hartford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 222 CRD-1-83 (April 20, 1987).

Pre-existing psychiatric condition was not aggravated by a work-related head injury.

Irving v. Hoyland, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 249 CRD-7-83 (March 4, 1987).

Employer’s payment of an allowance for transportation did not constitute furnishing of transportation.

Parizeau v. State, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 137, 194 CRD-2-83 (January 22, 1987).

Full pay awarded under § 5-142(a) where member of University of Connecticut police force was injured while walking from his patrol car to the office.

McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 184 CRD-2-82 (April 1, 1986), no error, 204 Conn. 104 (1987).

Claimant’s heart condition held to have arisen from on the job stress.

Zipoli v. Watertown, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 23, 215 CRD-5-83 (January 17, 1986).

Teacher who suffered mental disability resulting from stress at work awarded benefits.

Duncan v. Waterbury, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 168 CRD-5-82 (August 14, 1985).

Off-duty police officer’s intervention in an altercation held compensable even though officer may have had a personal motive in altercation.

Allen v. Northeast Utilities, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 120, 216 CRD-5-83 (February 22, 1985), no error, 6 Conn. App. 498 (1986).

Where claimant was found dead near work site, presumption that death arose in and out of the course of employment must be considered with other facts.

Fusco v. John J. Brennan Construction Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op.107, 280 CRD-5-83 (October 19, 1984).

Injury to claimant which occurred while jump starting employer’s vehicle which co-worker was required to drive to work, held compensable.

DiManno v. Pompei’s Lounge, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 90, 108 CRD-1-81 (July 27, 1984).

Waitress’s injury which was incurred when patron struck her with his car in parking lot on employer’s premises found compensable.

Carafano v. Hamden, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 122 CRD-3-82 (May 30, 1984).

Death due to travel on highway where claimant was traveling from one work premises to another held compensable where travel was incidental to employment.

Luddie v. Foremost Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 30, 220 CRD-6-83 (September 9, 1983), no error, 5 Conn. App. 193 (1985).

Claimant’s car accident held not compensable as facts showed claimant was on a personal frolic at the time of the accident.

Bushey v. Iseli Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 20, 120 CRD-5-82 (May 23, 1983), aff’d, 3 Conn. App. 370 (1985), cert. denied, 196 Conn. 803 (1985).

Public roadway adjacent to employment parking lot was not a reasonable extension of employment premises.

Tosun v. Uniroyal Footwear, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 104 CRD-5-81 (May 13, 1983).

Claim for additional benefits due to increased hearing loss dismissed.

Emhoff v. State, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 139 CRD-2-82 (May 11, 1983).

Commissioner rejected employer’s claim that cause of death was horseplay when claimant fell over the railing of an open stairwell.

Gecewicz v. Sealtest Foods Div., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 195, 77 CRD-1-81 (October 21, 1982).

Heart attack while in the course of employment does not require unusual activity or exertion.

Papageorge v. Bela Magyari & Sons, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 191, 84 CRD-7-81 (September 15, 1982).

Burden of proof as to the issue of employment rests with claimant.

Luddie v. Foremost Insurance Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 187, 90 CRD-6-81 (September 13, 1982).

Remanded. Absence of evidence to support claimant’s car accident was in vehicle furnished by employer.

Coppola v. New Haven, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 160, 75 CRD-3-81 (August 11, 1982).

Death of employee due to fight with co-worker was causally connected to employment.

Tusman v. Spiegel & Zemicnik, Inc., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 63 CRD-3-81 (August 3, 1982).

Employee sustained a compensable injury while assisting an outside salesman in transporting machine.

Perruccio v. Connecticut Employees Union Independent, Inc., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 67, 34 CRD-6-80 (October 30, 1981).

Union president on 24-hour call shot due to union rivalry entitled to benefits.

Donato v. Pantry Pride, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 2 CRD-4-79 (January 26, 1981), aff’d, 37 Conn. Sup. 836 (1981).

Heart attack brought on by job-related stress held compensable.

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