THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Churchville v. Bruce R. Daly Mechanical Contractor, 5365 CRB-8-08-8 (August 4, 2009).
Following trial de novo on contested Form 36, trial commissioner awarded permanency benefits to claimant’s estate with credit to respondents for temporary total payments since filing date of Form 36. Respondents appealed, contending, per McCurdy v. State, 227 Conn. 261 (1993), permanency benefits do not vest until claimant affirmatively requests them and disputing trier’s determination that a settlement proposal provided to respondents prior to claimant’s death constituted a sufficient “affirmative request” per McCurdy. Respondents also challenged trier’s findings as to extent of impairment to claimant’s lumbar spine. Claimant’s spouse filed cross appeal contending permanency award should have been made directly to her. CRB affirmed trier’s decision on basis that litigation of Form 36 commenced before claimant’s death and findings made by trier at trial de novo relative to claimant’s work capacity, date of maximum medical improvement and permanency ratings were supported by medical reports in record. CRB rejected respondents’ interpretation of McCurdy relative to vesting of permanency benefits, noting McCurdy states such awards vest when claimant reaches maximum medical improvement but trier retains discretion, per Osterlund v. State, 129 Conn. 591 (1943), to continue temporary total benefits beyond date of maximum medical improvement unless claimant specifically requests payment of permanency award. CRB also affirmed trier’s findings regarding extent of impairment but remanded for additional investigation into the appropriate recipient of award as § 31 308(d) C.G.S. does not provide for payment of permanency benefits to a deceased claimant’s estate and record was silent as to whether trier had determined if Margery Churchville was claimant’s spouse or presumptive dependent. DISSENT (Schoolcraft): Disagreed with scope of remand because Margery Churchville failed to carry burden of proof at trial that she was decedent’s spouse and therefore should not be allowed another opportunity to re-litigate her claim. See also, Churchville, § 31 275 (19), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-307, § 31-308(b).
Flouton v. Can, Inc., 4379 CRB-7-01-4 (March 13, 2002).
Issue: whether decedent’s estate is entitled to receive vested but unmatured (i.e., unaccrued) permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to § 31-308(d). Board reviewed legislative history of P.A. 89-346, which lists class of eligible persons who can receive permanency benefits upon claimant’s death as surviving spouse, dependents, or children of any age. Board concluded that decedents’ estates did not fall within this class.