THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Frantzen v. Davenport Electric, 5990 CRB-7-15-2 (February 24, 2016).
Appellant, one of several attorneys who represented claimant during pendency of claim, challenged trial commissioner’s subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate dispute between counsel over division of approved attorneys’ fee. CRB, noting that appeal implicated scope of trier’s authority rather than subject matter jurisdiction, affirmed on basis that plain language of § 31-327(b) C.G.S. states that “all” attorneys’ fees “shall be subject to the approval of the commissioner.” Appellant also claimed as error trial commissioner’s decision to split escrowed fee 50/50 absent a full evidentiary hearing. Noting that trier’s statements at formal hearing indicated her inquiry would be limited to an examination of Commission’s authority to adjudicate fee dispute, and appellant had never submitted statement of time and charges substantiating claim for attorneys’ fees, CRB reversed fee apportionment findings and remanded for additional proceedings. CRB also denied Motion to Dismiss for appellant’s failure to timely file Reasons of Appeal, holding that appellee was not unduly prejudiced by three-week delay and dismissal would cause needless delay given that escrow disbursement could not occur except by agreement of parties, deemed unlikely, or additional litigation. See also, Frantzen, § 31-301 Factual Findings; § 31-327.
Lamothe v. Citibank, N.A., 5550 CRB-8-10-5 (October 12, 2011).
Claimant appealed Finding and Award in which trial commissioner declined to enter written award of compensability following respondents’ proffer of voluntary agreement. Claimant also appealed trial’s failure to sanction respondents for unreasonable contest. Respondents moved for dismissal of claim on grounds of untimely filing of Reasons of Appeal. CRB denied motion for dismissal noting that respondents had filed motion for dismissal after ten-day period following expiration of claimant’s deadline and had failed to show prejudice because of claimant’s late filing. CRB affirmed trial commissioner on all grounds. Issuance of approved voluntary agreement does not confer upon trier obligation to find compensability; nor does it constitute a judicial admission. Claimant had opportunity to challenge terms of voluntary agreement in formal proceedings. CRB also held that claimant’s medical history, lack of medical causation report, and circumstances surrounding claimant’s injury, including claimant’s failure to inform her supervisors of the workplace incident, provided adequate support for trier’s determination that respondents did not engage in an unreasonable contest of claim. Trier could reasonably infer that respondents’ failure to produce a witness following a trial commissioner’s order likewise did not constitute unreasonable delay in light of respondents’ initial request for a protective order, claimant counsel’s failure to coordinate deposition scheduling with respondents’ counsel, and witness’s inability to appear because of illness. Respondents’ failure to answer discovery request relative to attendance reports did not compel trier to draw an adverse inference, particularly as respondents’ defense was not solely predicated on claimant’s attendance on date of injury. See also, Lamothe, § 31-278; § 31-296; § 31-300; § 31-301. Appeal Procedure, § 31-301-9.