THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Melillo v. Derby, 6164 CRB-4-16-12 (September 13, 2018).
Claimant challenged trial commissioner’s conclusion, pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 31-349, that respondents were entitled to eight percent credit for permanent partial disability benefits previously collected by claimant in association with motor vehicle accident. CRB affirmed, noting that although medical evidence was somewhat ambiguous, record was devoid of expert opinion suggesting that current rating of fifteen percent was in addition to eight percent previously received by claimant. Claimant also challenged commissioner’s conclusion that permanency potentially owed to claimant because of prior fusion surgery was “subsumed” into current doctors’ ratings; CRB struck this conclusion on basis that it went beyond scope of evidentiary record. CRB affirmed commissioner’s refusal to award interest for disputed portion of permanency benefits but remanded for additional evidentiary proceedings relative to commissioner’s denial of interest for alleged untimely initial permanency payment. CRB found erroneous trier’s denial of reimbursement for costs associated with claimant’s attendance at formal hearing in Connecticut after having relocated to Florida, noting that respondents’ proposed findings suggested that permanency credit should be taken against disability award of ten percent rather than fifteen percent, thereby implicating “extent of disability” as issue for formal hearing. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of reimbursement for costs associated with claimant’s June 2015 office visit with Connecticut doctor on basis that totality of evidentiary record supported trier’s conclusion that visit did not constitute reasonable or necessary medical care. See also, Melillo, § 31-288, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-349.
Corbin v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, 5965 CRB-5-14-10 (July 7, 2015).
Claimant sought livery transportation from home in Waterbury to treater’s office in Middletown; she argued that public transit was unavailable, she did not have access to a family car, and she could not afford to pay a taxi service and await reimbursement. Trial commissioner directed respondent to provide transportation. Respondent appealed arguing remedy beyond scope of the statute. CRB affirmed citing Evensen v. Stamford, 5541 CRB-7-10-4 (March 31, 2011) and Cervero v. Mory’s Association, Inc., 5357 CRB-3-08-6 (May 19, 2009), aff’d, 122 Conn. App. 82 (2010), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 908 (2010). Claimant was entitled to treat for her compensable injury under § 31-394d C.G.S. and commissioner empowered to ascertain reasonable means to enable her to reach this treatment.
Evensen v. Stamford, 5541 CRB-7-10-4 (March 31, 2011).
Retired city employee with compensable injuries relocated to Florida. Claimant did not obtain new treating physician in FL, instead he said he drove to CT on three occasions for medical appointments. Claimant sought travel reimbursement under § 31-312 C.G.S. Trial commissioner found lack of documentation for visits, but allowed claimant to produce documentation to substantiate claim. Trial commissioner directed parties to use more cost-effective means for future travel from FL to CT. Respondent appealed. CRB upheld in part and reversed in part. Claimant entitled under statute to be offered transportation or reimbursement for use of own vehicle; record does not reflect respondent given opportunity to provide transport at own cost. Claimant may not unilaterally decide driving from FL to CT is reasonable; must utilize cost-effective means of transport. On other hand, claimant not automatically compelled to change treating physicians following relocation, decision on issue left to trial commissioner. Claimant may not receive retroactive mileage reimbursement; this Order inconsistent with the rest of Finding & Orders.
Dellarocco v. Old Saybrook, 5324 CRB-8-08-02 (January 16, 2009).
Trial commissioner awarded claimant time and mileage for travel to treating physicians during period he was collecting award for § 31-308(b) permanent partial disability benefits; denied claimant’s bid for payment for visits to unauthorized treater to obtain medication. Both parties appealed. CRB upheld Respondent’s appeal. “Plain language” in statute bars reimbursement during period where claimant is being paid any type of disability award. Claimant’s appeal dismissed; statutory construction of Sec. 31-312 bars this relief; plus commissioner has right to determine what is reasonable and necessary treatment.
Liebel v. Stratford, 5070 CRB-4-06-3 (May 17, 2007).
Claimant who was receiving salary continuation payments under union contract was statutorily eligible for compensation for time spent at medical treatment provided outside of regular working hours. However, Commission does not have authority to enforce or interpret collective bargaining agreement. Agency’s jurisdiction is limited to ensuring that claimant has received total amount of benefits due under provisions of chapter 568. Where claimant received payments greater than those due under chapter 568 during period of total disability, commissioner’s duty was to determine total payments received by claimant during that time period and offset them against total amount of workers’ compensation benefits owed, including mileage reimbursement and compensation for time spent at medical treatment. Remanded for determination of payments made, and also for determination of entitlement to payment for time spent attending formal hearing. See Liebel, § 31-294c, § 31-294d, § 31-295, 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, also cited at Liebel, § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-307.
Blaha v. Logistec Connecticut, Inc., 4544 CRB-3-02-6 (July 9, 2003).
Trier erred by awarding claimant mileage reimbursement for cost of travel to and from formal hearing. Statute only refers to travel to and from required medical appointments. See also, Blaha, § 31-298, § 31-300.
Krajewski v. Atlantic Machine Tool Works, Inc., 4500 CRB-6-02-3 (March 7, 2003).
Board noted that parking costs and taxicab fees are not generally authorized (absent door-to-door transportation that is medically required) as reimbursable costs. See also, Krajewski, § 31-278, § 31-284b, § 31-290a, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9, § 31-313, § 31-315; prior decisions at Krajewski, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 2120 CRB-6-94-8 (November 28, 1995), § 31-308a; Krajewski, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 1387 CRD-6-92-2 (April 1, 1993), § 31-290a.
Romano v. Logistec of Connecticut, 4199 CRB-3-00-2 (May 1, 2001).
Trier properly denied claimant’s request for payment under § 31-312 C.G.S. Claimant did not filed a claim under Workers’ Compensation Act, proceeding instead under Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.
Sweeney v. Waterbury, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 240, 1225 CRD-5-91-5 (January 7, 1993).
Claimant, a school teacher, was paid full salary during the period of temporary total incapacity. During that period claimant received medical treatment. Claimant sought entitlement to both full salary under a collective bargaining agreement and compensation benefits for time spent receiving medical treatment. CRB has limited jurisdiction which does not permit interpretation of contractual agreements. Further, if employer has paid a greater sum than amounts due under § 31-307 and § 31-312 the CRB has no power to order further sums to be paid. See also, Sweeney, § 31-310.
Fournier v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 51, 908 CRD-7-89-8 (February 4, 1991).
Remanded to determine if claimant was receiving or eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits in order to ascertain entitlement for compensation for time lost for medical treatment during non-work hours.