THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Fusco v. New Haven-Board of Education, 6119 CRB-3-16-7 (October 13, 2017).
Claimant sustained shoulder injury and later died of cardiac arrest while recuperating from surgery. Prior to surgery respondents filed Form 36’s seeking to declare claimant at maximum medical improvement. No permanency award was paid during claimant life but dependent spouse sought an award and trial commissioner awarded her benefits based on permanency rating from treater. Respondents appealed arguing award was inconsistent with McCurdy v. State, 227 Conn. 261 (1993). CRB affirmed finding as consistent with Churchville v. Bruce R. Daly Mechanical Contractor, 299 Conn. 185 (2010) that an award for permanent partial disability vested in this case. Issue of whether respondents were entitled to any credits remanded for factual findings as per Brennan v. Waterbury, 6065 CRB-5-15-12 & 5996 CRB-5-15-3 (October 31, 2016). Respondents moved for reconsideration on issue of credits and CRB denied post-ruling motion.See also, Fusco, § 31-308 (b).
Clark v. Middlesex Corporation, 6041 CRB-1-15-10 (January 30, 2017).
Claimant filed claim for herself and her son after original claimant died as sequalae of compensable injury. Trial Commissioner awarded her benefits as a dependent in fact but denied claim for her son, as his father had been injured long before his birth. She cited precedent in Crook v. Academy Drywall Co., 219 Conn. 28 (1991) as grounds for finding an unborn child at the time of a worker’s injury a “dependent” under the terms of Chapter 568. CRB affirmed Finding. Crook case inapplicable in this case since child was not in utero as of parent’s injury due to “date of injury” rule. CRB found Wislocki v. Prospect, 72 Conn. App. 444 (2002) stands for principle that only dependents as of the date of injury are eligible for § 31-306 benefits.
Quinn v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 6016 CRB-8-15-5 (March 31, 2016).
Claimant was dependent widow of decedent who had filed a timely occupational disease claim. Respondents argued claimant’s bid for § 31-306 benefits was jurisdictionally invalid due to untimely filing; and trial commissioner accepted that position and dismissed claim. On appeal, CRB reversed the dismissal and reinstated claim. Supreme Court decision in McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc., 320 Conn. 299 (2016) ruled that the legal interpretation of § 31-294c C.G.S. trial commissioner relied on in this case was in error. As McCullough ruled claims such as the claimant’s in this case were not subject to statutory filing deadlines, CRB was obligated to apply precedent and reinstate claim. See also, Quinn, § 31-294c.
Sneed v. PSEG Power LLC of CT & United Illuminating, 5988 CRB-3-15-2 (February 18, 2016).
Second Injury Fund challenged trier’s denial of its motion to dismiss claim for survivor’s benefits brought by unmarried domestic partner of claimant’s decedent. Fund argued that in light of claimant’s status, by operation of law she could not be considered either a presumptive dependent or dependent in fact. Trier, having determined that in order for claimant to prevail as dependent in fact pursuant to § 31-275(7) C.G.S., she would first need to prove she qualified as a dependent pursuant to § 31-275(6) C.G.S., agreed to take additional evidence on threshold issue of whether claimant was member of decedent’s family. CRB, noting that none of the precedential cases reviewed by trier would categorically ban claimant from inclusion in definition of family, deemed appeal premature and affirmed.
Larocque v. Electric Boat Corporation, 5942 CRB-2-14-6 (July 2, 2015).
Dependent widow claimed her husband’s death was due to exposure to asbestos at his workplace, and sought to enforce Longshore Act award via collateral estoppel. Employer had stipulated to a dependent’s award in Longshore forum after decedent had previously received award for lung disease. Trial commissioner did not find claimant’s evidence as to causation persuasive and credited respondent’s witnesses that decedent’s death was due to lifelong cigarette use. Commissioner found causation standard for Longshore Act awards too dissimilar in this case to extend force of collateral estoppel. Claimant appealed arguing that Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., 288 Conn. 392 (2008) stood for principle that Longshore award should be given conclusive effect. CRB affirmed dismissal. Precedent since Birnie such as Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012) reiterates it is claimant’s burden to prove causation, and evidence supportive of Longshore stipulation could be deemed inadequate in this forum. In addition, reliance on prior stipulation untenable based on rationale in Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc., 310 Conn 195 (2013.) See also, Larocque, § 31-275(1).
Micale v. State/Dept. of Emergency Services and Public Protection, 5910 CRB-6-14-2 (January 8, 2015).
Claimant is surviving spouse of employee who sustained compensable back injury and was prescribed Fentanyl for pain. She asserted his death was due to fentanyl poisoning and therefore was compensable under § 31-306 C.G.S. Trial commissioner found opinion of medical examiner and respondent’s expert witness supported this conclusion and awarded benefits. Respondent appealed arguing that pursuant to Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012) an overdose of prescription drugs breaks the chain of causation to the original injury. CRB affirmed decision. Unlike Sapko, evidence was claimant adhered to treatment regimen and pursuant to Mana v. Sarah, Inc., 5073 CRB-3-06-3 (March 22, 2007) injuries sustained due to treatment for a compensable injury are also compensable. See also, Micale, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Rock v. State/University of Connecticut, 5891 CRB-2-13-10 (October 16, 2014).
Claimant is the estate of the decedent and appealed from a ruling on a Motion to Dismiss. CRB reversed on issue of jurisdiction and remanded matter for further proceedings, but noted as the claim had not been brought during claimant’s life and he had no presumptive or actual dependents, relief to the estate was limited under the statute, citing Estate of Haburey v. Town of Winchester, 150 Conn. App. 699 (2014). Statute herein limits benefits to non-dependents to burial expenses. See also, Rock, § 31-294c; § 31-307; § 31-308(b); § 31-308(d).
King v. Bridgeport, 5889 CRB-4-13-10 (September 18, 2014).
Claimant was dependent spouse of a Bridgeport police officer who had received a § 7-433c C.G.S. award. Upon his death, she filed a claim for § 31-306 C.G.S. benefits and relied on a death certificate that stated cause of death was coronary arterial disease to assert claim was due to a compensable injury. Trial commissioner issued award and respondents appealed, arguing the death was due to other noncompensable factors. CRB affirmed award, evidence presented by claimant was sufficient to find death herein was due to injury already deemed compensable. See also, King, § 31-275(16); § 31-294c; § 31-301 Factual findings.
McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc., et al, 5875 CRB-4-13-8 (August 5, 2014).
Claim for dependent’s benefits was filed by surviving spouse more than one year from death of original claimant. Respondents challenged claim as untimely, but claimant argued that pursuant to Tolli v. Connecticut Quarries Co., 101 Conn. 109 (1924) her claim was timely. Trial commissioner agreed with claimant and respondent appealed. CRB remanded matter for de novo hearing on jurisdiction. Tolli distinguished from present case on the facts. In addition, as to the law a subsequently adopted statute (§ 31-306b C.G.S.) governs the timeliness of survivor benefits claims. As parties did not litigate whether based on the facts that statute made the claim jurisdictionally valid, matter was remanded. See also, McCullough, § 31-294c C.G.S.
Dsupin v. Town of Wallingford, 5757 CRB-8-12-6 (November 1, 2013).
Decedent was retired police officer with compensable cardiac condition. After his death due to a myocardial infarcation surviving spouse filed claim for survivor benefits. Conflicting expert witnesses presented evidence on cause of death. Trial commissioner found respondent’s witnesses, who attributed underlying cause of death to pulmonary issues unrelated to compensable injury, more persuasive and credible. On appeal CRB affirmed the commissioner, citing in part the causation analysis in Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012). See also, Dsupin, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Estate of Robert C. Haburey v. Winchester, 5763 CRB-6-12-6 (June 14, 2013).
Trier concluded that claimant died of sepsis following exposure to Legionella at employer’s sewer treatment plant. CRB affirmed trier’s compensability findings on basis of medical record despite expert’s lack of “absolute certainty” regarding etiology of claimant’s sepsis, and declined to address whether Legionnaire’s Disease constituted occupational disease as contemplated by § 31-275(15) C.G.S. CRB rejected respondents’ claim that trier lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to deficient notice of claim, noting that prior trial commissioner’s Finding and Award regarding sufficiency of notice adequately reflected analysis set forth in Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007). CRB found respondents’ allegations of due process deprivation without merit and also denied claimant’s Motion to Dismiss predicated on respondents’ compliance with instant Finding and Award, noting that dismissal would vitiate appeal provisions codified at § 31-301 C.G.S., et. seq. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Estate of Haburey, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(15), § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal Procedure, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-04.
Estate of Greenberg v. ABB Combustion Engineering Services, Incorporated, 5521 CRB-1-10-1 (June 11, 2012).
Dependent widow of employee who died of pancreatic cancer filed two notices of occupational disease claim. Respondents contended first notice of claim, filed within one year of employee’s death, was legally insufficient because Form 30C did not contain widow’s name or identify type of benefits being sought. Respondents argued second Form 30C was legally insufficient and untimely as it did not identify type of benefits sought and was filed two and one-half years after employee’s death. Trier found first Form 30C timely and sufficient but found second Form 30C untimely on basis that claimant had “formed a belief” regarding causation of employee’s pancreatic cancer almost two years before filing second Form 30C. Respondents appealed and claimant cross-appealed. CRB affirmed findings relative to first notice of claim, noting that Form 30C clearly indicated employee had died and, consistent with Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007), provided respondents with reasonable notice that survivor’s benefits were being sought. CRB reversed trier’s findings relative to second notice of claim, noting that proper analysis for assessing date of commencement of three-year statute of limitations for occupational disease hinged on identifying date of first manifestation of symptom of occupational disease. Because trier reasonably inferred that “first manifestation” occurred when employee’s son filed application for federal benefits pursuant to Department of Labor’s Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, second Form 30C was timely as it was filed within three years of date of federal filing. CRB also noted that parties attended an informal hearing within this three-year window. See also, Estate of Greenberg, § 31-275(15); § 31-294c; § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-301-04.
Springer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, 5573 CRB-5-10-07 (October 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded, 145 Conn. App. 805(2013).
See also, Springer, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-278.
Dauti v. Lighting Services, Inc., 5553 CRB-5-10-5 (April 25, 2011), aff’d, 137 Conn. App. 795 (2012).
Employee died of heart attack at work; dependent spouse did not commence claim until more than one year after death. Respondent argued claim was brought beyond statutory limitation. Trial commissioner dismissed claim. CRB reversed and found jurisdiction. Statute provides that dependent claims may be brought within two years from the date of the accident, or one year from the date of death, whichever is later. Claim in case within two years of accident and as per precedent in Merenski v. Greenwich Hospital Associates, Inc. a/k/a Greenwich Hospital, 4292 CRB-7-00-9 (September 12, 2001), claim is timely. Appellate Court affirmed decision. See also, Dauti, § 31-294c.
Brooks v. Electric Boat Corporation, et al, 5485 CRB -1-09-8 (August 9, 2010), aff’d, 133 Conn. App. 377 (2012).
Widow of claimant decedent successfully established that her husband’s exposure to asbestos was substantial cause in his death and therefore trial commissioner awarded benefits under § 31-306 C.G.S. Trial commissioner determined that final level of substantial exposure to asbestos occurred when claimant was working in 1988 for W. J. Barney and that later exposure was de minimis for purposes of § 31-299b apportionment. CIGA as successor to W. J. Barney’s insurance carrier appealed on numerous grounds. As to occupational disease issues CRB found trial commissioner’s conclusion rooted in evidence and congruent with holding in Stevens v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 5215 CRB-4-07-4 (March 26, 2008). See also, Brooks, § 31-275(15), § 31-299b, § 31-301 Factual findings
Sapko v. State/Dept of Correction, 5335 CRB-8-08-4 (March 23, 2009).
Claimant not entitled to dependents benefits where decedent’s death due to multiple drug toxicity was not found to be proximately caused by the work related injury. See Sapko, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.
Ferrara v. City of New Haven, 5107 CRB-3-06-6 (July 30, 2008).
Section 1-2z “plain meaning rule” did not permit § 31-284b continuation of group health to be construed as a benefit to a dependent spouse under § 31-306. CRB applied holding of Vincent v. New Haven, 285 Conn. 778 (2008). See also, Ferrara, § 31-284b.
Stevens v. Raymark Industries, 5215 CRB-4-07-4 (March 26, 2008), appeal dismissed, A.C. 29795 (June 26, 2008).
Dependent widow awarded benefits after husband’s death as trial commissioner concluded prior compensable injury substantial factor in his death. Respondent’s challenged sufficiency of medical evidence linking decedent’s death to compensable injury. CRB upheld trial commissioner. No Motion to Correct means facts found must be given conclusive effect. Also, death certificate stated asbestosis was a “significant condition” “contributing to death,” this document when coupled with other medical evidence was sufficient to meet McDonough test of the work related illness being a “substantial contributing factor” to death. See also, Stevens, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-299b, § 31-355(b).
Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corporation, 5167 CRB-8-06-12 (January 17, 2008), aff’d 118 Conn. App. 248 (2009).
Claimant was surviving spouse of worker who died of cardiac arrest. Claimant also had asbestosis. Trial commissioner concluded that claimant failed to produce any expert testimony that asbestosis from work was a substantial or significant factor in spouse’s demise. CRB upheld trial commissioner, who properly applied standard in McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987). Review of claimant’s evidence did not compel trial commissioner to issue an award. See also, Voronuk, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-275(15).
Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007).
Trooper died at home. Claim later filed in name of “Robert Berry, Deceased” by attorney for dependent spouse. Respondents later challenged jurisdiction, asserting claim was inadequate as per Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, 265 Conn. 525 (2003). Trial Commissioner dismissed claim on jurisdictional grounds. CRB reversed on appeal. Kuehl only applies when they is no claim, here factual scenario clearly put respondent on notice as to § 31-306 C.G.S. claim. Tardy v. Abington Constructors, Inc., 4105 CRB-2-99-8 (October 30, 2000), aff’d, 71 Conn. App. 140 (2002) on point, strict compliance not required as long as respondent is placed on notice. . See also, Berry, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.
Hummel v. Marten Transport, LTD., 5080 CRB-5-06-4 (April 19, 2007), aff’d, 114 Conn. App. 822 (2009), cert. denied, Conn. (2009).
CRB affirmed as to sanctions and orders directing payment of dependent’s benefits, remanded for order for interest pursuant to §31-303. Respondents not entitled to offset for payments received by claimant for Social Security survivor’s benefits on the theory of double recovery. See Hummel v. Marten Transport, LTD., 5080 CRB-5-06-4 (April 19, 2007) § 31-288, § 31-300, § 31-301(f), § 31-303, § 31-307(e).
Gorman v. Rogers Corporation, 5059 CRB-8-06-2 (February 21, 2007).
See Gorman, § 31-294c. Claims under this section are new claims in regards to filing requirements. CRB rejected respondent’s argument such claims should be served on employer’s legal counsel and not employer.
Edwards v. Pratt & Whitney, 5030 CRB-1-05-11 (January 9, 2007).
Following death of injured employee in March 2004, dependent spouse was entitled to have COLAs incorporated into compensation rate from the outset of her entitlement to survivor’s benefits. COLAs are calculated by determining change in cost-of-living from date of employee’s injury, rather than date of death. CRB rejected respondent’s argument that operative date of injury is date of death for purpose of survivor’s claim. See also, Edwards, § 31-300, § 31-303.
Chambers v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric Boat Division, 4952 CRB-8-05-6 (June 7, 2006).
Commission lacked jurisdiction over § 31-306 claim where notice of claim for Chapter 568 benefits not filed until after employee’s death, and years after claim would have accrued. Notice filed under federal Longshore Act two decades earlier was inadequate. See also, Chambers, § 31-278, § 31-294c.
Vincent v. New Haven, 4919 CRB-3-05-1 (January 13, 2006).
CRB was asked to overrule earlier holdings in Sansone, infra, and Weymouth, infra, in recognition of 2003 statutory interpretation legislation now codified at § 1-2z. Invitation declined. Relationship between § 31-284b and § 31-306 has been held ambiguous, so no applicability for “plain meaning” rule. Also, legislature has not acted to change the law since Sansone was decided in 1998. See also, Vincent, § 31-284b.
Robichaud v. State/Dept. of Mental Health & Addition Services, 4854 CRB-8-04-9 (September 15, 2005).
CRB affirmed ruling that dependent spouse and children were entitled to benefits as per § 31-284b. See also, Sansone, 3885 CRB-1-98-9 (November 18, 1999) and Weymouth, 4550 CRB-1-02-7 (April 3, 2003).
Gauthier v. State/Uncas-On-Thames, 4779 CRB-2-04-2 (April 1, 2005).
Decedent retired in 1980, was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 1990, signed voluntary agreement in 1992, died in 1993. Widow made separate § 31-306 claim, for which neither an award nor a voluntary agreement was entered. Decision in Green v. General Dynamics Corp., 245 Conn. 66 (1998), infra, was issued in 1998. CRB affirmed trier’s decision that no final judgment had been reached, as dependent’s claim is separate and distinct from underlying claim, and separate award or voluntary agreement is legally necessary to finally resolve pending issues, including compensation rate. CRB also noted plain error in method of calculating COLA where figures from two separate COLA tables had been combined into same calculation. This resulted in remand for recalculation. See also, Gauthier, § 31-296, § 31-307a, § 31-310.
Gagnon v. Cianbro Corp., 4758 CRB-3-03-12 (February 15, 2005).
See, Gagnon, § 31-310.
Stevenson v. Edward W. Stevenson & Sons, 4710 CRB-5-03-8 (December 17, 2004).
Dependent spouse sought § 31-306 benefits. Claim found untimely. See also, Stevenson, 4480 CRB-8-02-1 (January 8, 2003), See, Stevenson, § 31-294c(a).
Jacobson v. General Dynamics/Electric Boat Div., 4642 CRB-2-03-3 (March 12, 2004).
See, Jacobson § 31, 275(1)(D), § 31-299b, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.
Weymouth v. East Windsor-Police Department, 4550 CRB-1-02-7 (April 3, 2003).
CRB reversed trier’s decision to ignore principle of stare decisis and hold that claimant widow was not entitled to continuation of group health insurance benefits pursuant to § 31-284b. Board reaffirmed importance of stare decisis, and reaffirmed holding of Sansone v. Enfield, 3885 CRB-1-98-9 (November 11, 1999), infra, with additional reasoning provided in support of its position. See also, Weymouth, § 31-284b.
Bartlett v. J.B. Williams Soap Factory, 4511 CRB-8-02-3 (March 3, 2003).
See, Bartlett, § 31-294c.
Bergeson v. New London/Police Dept., 4489 CRB-2-02-2 (February 21, 2003), aff’d, 269 Conn. 763 (2004).
See, Bergeson, § 7-433c (City cannot be reimbursed by Fund for COLAs paid to dependent widow where claim arose under § 7-433c).
Stevenson v. Edward W. Stevenson & Sons, 4480 CRB-8-02-1 (January 8, 2003).
See, Stevenson, § 31-294c; See also, Stevenson, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Cunningham v. Monroe Group, 4322 CRB-4-00-12 (December 20, 2001).
CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that Second Injury Fund is required to reimburse respondents for all COLAs paid to claimants/dependents on account of decedent’s March 23, 1997 injury. Board relied on its earlier analysis of COLA-restoration provision of § 31-307a(c).
Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, 4172 CRB-7-00-1 (July 12, 2001), aff’d, 265 Conn. 525 (2003).
Board affirmed trier’s determination that claimant widow failed to file timely notice of her claim for benefits as required by § 31-294c. Board explained that § 31-306 claims require separate notice from original notice of claim for spouse’s injury. See also, Kuehl, § 31-294c.
Wislocki v. Prospect, 4226 CRB-5-00-4 (July 5, 2001), aff’d, 72 Conn. App. 444 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 906 (2002).
CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that surviving spouse who was not yet acquainted with decedent at time of compensable injury was not entitled to dependent’s benefits under § 31-306 when he died years later from effects of that injury.
Collins v. Bridgeport, 4241 CRB-4-00-5 (June 21, 2001).
See, Collins, § 31-308(b).
Tardy v. Abington Constructors, 4105 CRB-2-99-8 (October 30, 2000), aff’d, 71 Conn. App. 140 (2002).
See, Tardy, § 31-294c.
Lesco v. Glass Crafters, 3915 CRB-3-98-10 (January 19, 2000).
See, Lesco, § 31-293.
Sansone v. Enfield, 3885 CRB-1-98-9 (November 18, 1999), appeal dismissed, A.C. 20303 (February 16, 2000).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s ruling that a survivor collecting dependent death benefits under § 31-306 is entitled to continued health insurance coverage under § 31-284b. Dispositive factor was intent behind § 31-284b, which is to maintain the income of employees who suffer work-related injuries, and the fact that dependents are also implicated as intended beneficiaries of § 31-284b. (Frankl. C., DISSENTING) Humanitarian purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act does not permit intentionally distorted readings of statute; benefits under § 31-306 are expressly set forth, and do not include § 31-284b coverage. See also, Sansone, § 31-298, § 31-284b.
Rutledge v. State/Dept. of Public Safety/State Police, 3831 CRB-2-9-5 (June 21, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 370 (2001).
Trier correctly ruled that the COLA calculation formula set forth in Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676 (1997), applies to a widow who was entitled to the maximum compensation rate on account of the decedent’s 1983 injury, through the July 1, 1998 effective date of Public Act 98-104.
Harbec v. Stone & Webster Engineering, 3628 CRB-8-97-6 (October 16, 1998).
See, Harbec, § 31-296. Subsequent decision at Harbec, 4308 CRB-8-00-10 (August 29, 2001), § 31-299b.
Belanger v. American Optical, 3353 CRB-1-96-5 (January 22, 1998).
Decedent developed mesothelioma in 1992, died in 1994. Dependent husband began receiving benefits, along with COLAs, in 1994 per trier’s order. Respondents argued that dependent spouse’s claim was separate, and that date of death should control entitlement to COLAs. CRB affirmed; statute specifically states that dependents receiving compensation based on “death arising from a compensable injury occurring on or after October 1, 1977, and before July 1, 1993” are entitled to COLAs. Language not ambiguous. Further, date of injury rule still functions as presumption of legislative intent within workers’ compensation context.
Krampetz v. Uniroyal, Inc., 3310 CRB-5-96-3 (September 23, 1997).
Claimant had burden of proving she was a surviving dependent of decedent, but failed to offer direct proof of that fact. She failed to refute a notation on doctor’s report stating that decedent lived alone and had separated from his wife. Although relatively weak evidence, trier was entitled to give it weight. See also, Krampetz, § 31-296.
Duni v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 137, 2052 CRB-1-94-5 (June 12, 1995), aff’d, 239 Conn. 19 (1996).
Stipulation provided for full settlement of “all claims due or to become due at any time in favor of anybody” arising out of decedent spouse’s injuries; wife not party to settlement. Held, dependent death claim emanates from same injury that caused death despite difference in class of compensation awarded to dependents. Thus, such a claim can be terminated by settlement. Without a showing of fraud by parties to stipulation, or further exposure to asbestos after date of settlement agreement, said agreement bars § 31-306 claim here.
Green v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 113, 1651 CRB-2-93-2 (January 31, 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 44 Conn. App. 112 (1996), rev’d, 245 Conn. 66 (1998).
Second Injury Fund not required under § 31-306(a)(2) to pay COLAs where injury occurred in 1989. Appellate Court reversed, as failure of decedent to earn any wages during the 26 weeks prior to his incapacity meant that he had no average weekly wage, and therefore dependent spouse was not entitled to benefits. Reversed by Supreme Court, which held that wage calculation should be based upon § 31-310c [Rev. to 1991], as that statute was intended by legislature to clarify a related statute. See also, Green, § 31-309, and § 31-310.
Conroy v. Keri Corporation, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 321, 1534 CRB-3-92-10 (July 5, 1994).
Decedent’s disabled son entitled to benefits as trier found son a presumptive dependent. See also, Conroy, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Factual findings.
Davis v. Norwich, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 272, 1563 CRB-2-92-11 (June 2, 1994), aff’d, 232 Conn. 311 (1995).
See, Davis, § 31-349.
Wannagot v. Shelton, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 256, 1512 CRB-4-92-9 (June 2, 1994), aff’d, 38 Conn. App. 754 (1995), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 919, 920 (1995).
Trier properly determined that claimant widow had been overpaid compensation benefits where benefits were paid at the maximum weekly compensation rate. Section 7-314a sets the average weekly earnings of the decedent as the average weekly earnings of production workers. Claimant widow was entitled to sixty-six and two thirds percent of the average production wage in effect on the date of her husband’s heart attack which caused his death.
LaChance v. United Technologies Corp./Pratt & Whitney Division, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 1345 CRD-1-91-11 (January 27, 1994).
Where decedent’s right to specific payments becomes vested during his lifetime, that portion of specific award allocable to the time period after death is payable to dependents or decedent’s estate. CRB held trier erred in finding decedent’s daughter the sole presumptive dependent as she was married, 25 years of age and no longer dependent on her father at the time of his death. CRB therefore modified trier’s decision to require vested unpaid specific to be paid to decedent’s estate.
McNulty v. Stamford, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 1332 CRD-7-91-10 (January 26, 1994), rev’d, 37 Conn. App. 835 (1995).
CRB reversed trier’s finding that dependent widow was only entitled to cost of living adjustments from the date of decedent’s death. CRB held dependent widow is entitled to cost of living adjustments from the date of decedent’s injury/disease. Further, based on the amendments of § 31-306 as provided in P.A. 92-31 the waiting period provided in § 31-306(1) as it existed at the time of decedent’s injury is inapplicable and the claimant is entitled to the four thousand dollar burial expense. Trier’s finding that claimant was to reimburse the employer for the payment of four thousand dollars reversed. See also, McNulty, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence, § 7-433c (where appellate court reversed CRB and held that the second injury fund was not liable to municipalities for payments pursuant to § 7-433c).
Bush v. Quality Bakers of America, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 24, 1412 CRB-7-92-4 (January 13, 1994).
Retroactive reimbursement through the second injury fund authorized by § 31-306(b) inapplicable where dependent widow was entitled to and received benefits immediately following spouse’s death as injury and death occurred on the same day.
Capen v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 326, 1394 CRB-2-92-3 (December 30, 1993), aff’d, 38 Conn. App. 73 (1995).
See, Capen, § 31-294c, § 31-299b.
Deremer v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 317, 1375 CRB-2-92-1 (December 23, 1993).
Maximum compensation rate received by dependent widow is the rate in effect on the date of decedent’s first incapacity not the maximum in effect at the date of decedent’s last employment. See also, Deremer, § 31-309.
Maloney v. Russell Manufacturing Co., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 313, 1371 CRB-8-92-1 (December 23, 1993).
Trier’s finding that decedent’s wife was regularly receiving support thereby satisfying statutory requirements of § 31-306 will not be disturbed on appeal. See also, Maloney, § 31-307.
Dumont v. State/Southern Connecticut State University, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 122, 1320 CRD-3-91-10 (June 16, 1993).
Trier’s award to dependent widow for benefits pursuant to § 31-306 affirmed. Trier found based on medical evidence, that decedent, a French professor, who while leading a study tour in Europe, suffered a fatal heart attack caused by stress and physical activity. Trier’s conclusion that decedent’s death arose out of and in the course of employment will not be disturbed as medical testimony refers to the standard of reasonable medical probability. See also, Dumont, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301c(b).
Daly v. Sikorsky Aircraft/UTC, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 47, 1104 CRD-4-90-9 (January 29, 1992).
Benefits to surviving dependent children are governed by the law as it existed at the time of injury. Section 31-306 did not provide for benefits to dependent children after reaching eighteen at the time of decedent’s injury. Therefore, the CRB affirmed trier’s ruling dismissing claimant’s claim for continued benefits until age twenty-two.
Mancini v. A. Laugeni & Son, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 45, 739 CRD-5-88-6 (February 4, 1991).
Factual finding claimant is a dependent in fact will not be disturbed on appeal where evidence supports trier’s conclusion. See also, Mancini, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
McCurdy v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 22, 887 CRD-4-89-6 (January 10, 1991), aff’d, 26 Conn. App. 466 (1992), rev’d, 227 Conn. 261 (1993).
Trier’s finding that widow was neither a presumptive dependent nor a dependent in fact was a factual finding which will not be disturbed on appeal. Supreme Court reversed CRB and held that the estate was entitled to the payment of specific benefits although at the time of decedent’s death, due to unrelated causes, he was receiving temporary total benefits. See also, McCurdy, § 31-295, § 31-308(b).
Ancona v. Norwalk, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 49, 810 CRD-7-89-1 (February 26, 1990), aff’d, 217 Conn. 50 (1991).
See, Kachaluba, infra.
Kachaluba v. Greenwich, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 766 CRD-7-88-9 (February 26, 1990), aff’d, 217 Conn. 50 (1991).
Survivor’s benefits pursuant to § 31-306 and balance of decedent’s § 31-308(d) permanent partial award cannot be paid concurrently. Rossomondo v. Ridgewood Nurseries, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 846 CRD-3-89-4 (October 3, 1989). Spousal benefits calculated from date of injury not date of death. See also, Rossomondo, § 31-349.
Simpson v. Northeast Utilities, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 135, 510 CRD-2-86 (July 12, 1988).
Trial commissioner’s finding that claimant did not receive regular support from estranged husband was a factual finding which would not be disturbed on appeal.
Maher v. State, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 374 CRD-4-85 (March 24, 1988).
Claim not time barred as it was the claim of the dependent widow and not of deceased employee.
Brown v. Charles of Vienna, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 152, 462 CRD-2-86 (February 16, 1988).
Appeal dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Iacomacci v. Trumbull, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 126, 351 CRD-4-84 (November 19, 1987), no error, 209 Conn. 219 (1988).
Amendment of § 31-306(i) eliminating waiting period for widowed benefits could not be applied retroactively.
Collier v. Milford, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 121, 261 CRD-3-83 (December 23, 1986), no error, 206 Conn. 242 (1988).
Although claimant and decedent made annual trips to states that recognize common law marriage, their relationship was contracted in Connecticut, the state of their domicile which does not recognize common law marriages. No benefits awarded.