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CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-301-4

[Administrative Regulation]

Correction of Finding.


Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.

The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.

DeJesus v. R.P.M. Enterprises, Inc., 6324 CRB-2-19-5 (April 29, 2020), appeal pending, A.C. 44111 (May 19, 2020).

Appellant’s failure to file a motion to correct in DeJesus v. R.P.M. Enterprises, Inc., 6201 CRB-1-17-7 (November 8, 2018) [DeJesus I], an earlier appeal in the same matter, precluded review under doctrine of collateral estoppel where motion to correct in matter under review sought same corrections as could have been brought in DeJesus I. As to other corrections which the Appellant sought, the motion failed to state with sufficient specificity where in the evidentiary record support could be found. Also, many of corrections sought were merely the Appellant’s preferred statement of findings and would not compel a different outcome even if granted. See also, DeJesus, § 31-288; § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-355 (b).

Malinowski v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 6216 CRB-8-17-8 (August 26, 2019).

Respondents challenged commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s need for total left-knee replacement surgery was due to repetitive work activities which aggravated underlying preexisting degenerative changes. Respondents contended that medical opinion upon which commissioner relied was not based on evidence, did not discuss role of claimant’s workplace activities, and failed to establish causal link between those activities and need for knee replacement surgery. CRB held that although expert opinion was necessary to establish connection between claimant’s left-knee meniscectomy and subsequent development of arthritis, once claimant’s susceptibility to arthritis was established, it was within commissioner’s discretion to rely on medical reports by treating physician, along with claimant’s testimony regarding his physical condition and the strenuous nature of his job duties, in concluding that workplace activities aggravated preexisting left-knee condition and resulted in need for total left-knee replacement. CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of Motion for Articulation and Motion to Correct, and denied respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration and Re-Argument. See also, Malinowski, § 31-275 (1), § 31-301 Factual findings.

Lionetti v. Paul G. Messineo, L.L.C., 6207 CRB-7-17-7 (June 7, 2019), appeal pending, A.C. 43112 (June 27, 2019).

CRB reversed denial of medical treatment, noting that commissioner misstated “reasonable or necessary” medical treatment standard, pursuant to § 31-294d, as “reasonable and necessary” and denied three-level fusion on basis that medical evidence demonstrated recommended surgery was reasonable but not necessary. CRB affirmed decision to allow RME after commencement of formal proceedings and denial of claimant’s second motion for extension of time to file motion to correct on basis that §§ 31-278 and 31-298 afford commissioners wide discretion relative to conduct of hearings and submission of evidence. CRB declined to reach claim of error alleging deprivation of due process arising from denial of opportunity for claimant to submit rebuttal evidence following RME. CRB affirmed denial of deduction from respondents’ moratorium certain medical expenses and costs associated with claimant’s bankruptcy filing, noting that claimant failed to establish that said expenses and costs constituted “reasonable and necessary expenditures” as contemplated by § 31-293 (a). CRB affirmed denial of motion to correct, noting that proposed corrections reiterated arguments made at trial which were ultimately unavailing. CRB denied respondents’ motion to dismiss given that motion was not filed until after expiration of ten-day deadline which began to run when claimant failed to timely file her reasons for appeal. CRB found respondents waived any alleged defect and failed to demonstrate that claimant’s late filing had prejudiced their ability to defend claim. See also, Lionetti, § 31-278, § 31-293, § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-301-2.

DeJesus v. R.P.M. Enterprises, Inc., 6201 CRB-1-17-7 (November 8, 2018).

Respondents did not file a motion to correct the trial commissioner’s findings. On appeal CRB required to give these findings conclusive effect if they were supported by evidence. See also, DeJesus, § 31-275 (9); § 31-275(10); § 31-294c; § 31-298; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-355.

Keyes v. Branford, 6183 CRB-3-17-3 (April 25, 2018).

After the trial commissioner found respondent’s expert more persuasive and dismissed the claim; claimant sought an extension of time to file a Motion to Correct. Trial commissioner denied this motion and the claimant argued it was legal error to decline to extend time for this purpose, citing Scott v. Bridgeport, 4637 CRB-4-03-2 (February 24, 2004) and Mason v. Dale Construction, Inc., 4476 CRB-3-01-12 (April 28, 2003). CRB found that Krevis v. Bridgeport, 63 Conn. App. 328 (2001) dealt with this specific issue and this was a matter left to the trial commissioner’s discretion. See also, Keyes, § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Anthony v. Aramark Corporation, 6168 CRB-2-17-1 (December 29, 2017), appeal pending A.C. 41255 (January 16, 2018).

Claimant sustained compensable injury to right shoulder in 2003, resulting in surgery, and sought authorization for additional surgery in 2015, which respondents denied. Trial commissioner initially issued Finding and Award but subsequently granted respondents’ Motion to Correct, resulting in reversal of finding of causation. Claimant appealed, contending decision to grant motion was based on application of incorrect legal standards and resulted in ambiguous, inconsistent findings unsupported by evidentiary record. CRB, while noting that procedural history of claim was “somewhat unconventional,” affirmed on basis of Appellate Court holding in Buccieri v. Pacific Plumbing Supply Co., 53 Conn. App. 671 (1999), after ascertaining that evidentiary record provided adequate basis for granting proposed corrections. See also, Anthony, § 31-275 (1), § 31-301. Factual Findings.

Grant v. LeafGuard of Southern CT, L.L.C., 6147 CRB-5-16-10 (October 5, 2017), appeal pending AC40961 (2017).

Respondents challenged trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant, who underwent surgery for work related injury to left knee and subsequently required right-knee replacement, had also sustained compensable right-knee injury. Respondents contended that trier, in evaluating credibility of medical experts, drew unreasonable inferences from subordinate facts, relied on evidence outside record, and applied incorrect legal standard. CRB affirmed, noting that although finding was “inartfully drafted,” record contained expert medical opinion indicating that stress to claimant’s right knee caused by left-knee injury and surgery had worsened claimant’s pre-existing arthrosis. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion for Articulation and Motion to Correct. See also, Grant, § 31-275 (1), § 31-301. Factual Findings.

Vallier v. Cushman & Wakefield, 5822 CRB-1-13-2 (February 21, 2014).

Claimant argued that he was totally disabled as a result of work injury. Trial commissioner dismissed claim for disability benefits, finding claimant had work capacity and cited reliance on respondent’s examiner as stating claimant did not need additional medical treatment. Claimant moved to correct this finding which was denied. On appeal, CRB determined that correction should have been granted and remanded on the medical treatment issue. Review of witnesses’ testimony which commissioner found reliable was that the claimant still needed certain treatment modalities. See also, Vallier, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-294d; § 31-307.

Avino v. Stop & Shop Supermarket, 5820 CRB-3-13-2 (February 10, 2014).

Trial commissioner concluded claimant’s employment as meat cutter was substantial contributing factor to need for bilateral knee replacement. Respondents argued claimant’s symptoms were due to prior non-work related injuries and although job activities may have aggravated claimant’s pre-existing condition, they did not substantially contribute to need for surgery. CRB affirmed, noting that expert medical opinion and claimant’s testimony provided adequate basis for trier’s conclusions. CRB also affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Avino, § 31-275(1), § 31-301 Factual findings.

Cunningham v. Saint Raphael Healthcare System, 5809 CRB-3-12-12 (December 31, 2013).

Claimant sustained injury in fall on sidewalk outside employer’s facility during unpaid lunch break. Trier determined injury did not arise out of or in course of employment because employer neither owned nor controlled premises where incident occurred and purpose of claimant’s activities was to attend to personal comfort rather than for mutual benefit of herself and employer. CRB affirmed, noting that record contained conflicting testimony and credibility findings relative to location and circumstances of incident are not subject to reversal on appeal. CRB also found trier properly rejected argument that premises were under employer’s control because employer “acquiesced” to employees using sidewalk. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Cunningham, § 31-275(1); § 31-301-4.

Estate of Robert C. Haburey v. Winchester, 5763 CRB-6-12-6 (June 14, 2013).

Trier concluded that claimant died of sepsis following exposure to Legionella at employer’s sewer treatment plant. CRB affirmed trier’s compensability findings on basis of medical record despite expert’s lack of “absolute certainty” regarding etiology of claimant’s sepsis, and declined to address whether Legionnaire’s Disease constituted occupational disease as contemplated by § 31-275(15) C.G.S. CRB rejected respondents’ claim that trier lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to deficient notice of claim, noting that prior trial commissioner’s Finding and Award regarding sufficiency of notice adequately reflected analysis set forth in Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007). CRB found respondents’ allegations of due process deprivation without merit and also denied claimant’s Motion to Dismiss predicated on respondents’ compliance with instant Finding and Award, noting that dismissal would vitiate appeal provisions codified at § 31-301 C.G.S., et. seq. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Estate of Haburey, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(15), § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal Procedure, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-306.

Danek v. Electric Boat Corporation, 5760 CRB-2-12-6 (June 5, 2013).

Trier concluded that claimant who sustained injury following transfer to employer’s facility in Norfolk, Virginia was not subject to Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act. Claimant had accepted relocation incentives and signed agreement requiring repayment of signing bonuses if claimant left Norfolk employment within one year. Trier determined agreement constituted new contract which contemplated performance of duties outside Connecticut and claimant was not Connecticut resident when contract was signed. CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant and employer had entered into new contract but remanded for additional findings relative to whether circumstances surrounding creation of new contract created a significant relationship between Connecticut and the contract consistent with three-pronged test set forth in Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181 (1991) and Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 262 Conn. 31 (2002). CRB rejected claimant’s contention that trier had concluded Workers’ Compensation Act did not apply to non-residents injured outside Connecticut. See also, Danek, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10); § 31-301 Factual Findings.

Disotell v. LVI Services, Inc., 5749 CRB-3-12-4 (April 25, 2013).

Trier dismissed claim after concluding claimant’s failure to use fall protection equipment while operating man lift was reckless, unreasonable and constituted serious and willful misconduct. Trier found claimant’s testimony credible regarding his frustration with equipment and manpower provided by employer but determined it was not credible that worker with claimant’s training and supervisory responsibilities would forget to use safety harness. CRB affirmed, noting that trier’s findings were supported by record and within her discretion. Trier correctly found that willful misconduct is not limited to situations where claimant admits to intentional refusal to ignore safety rules. Trier granted Motion to Correct in part; CRB affirmed trier’s denial of balance of proposed corrections. See also, Disotell, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Albuquerque v. Town of East Hartford, 5741 CRB-1-12-3 (April 9, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s determination that claimant’s motor vehicle accident of 1983 and fusion surgery of 1986 were substantial contributing factors to claimant’s current symptomatology. Trier declined to find that 2001 motor vehicle accident constituted an aggravation as contemplated by Kelly v. Dunkin Donuts, 4621 CRB-4-03-2 (April 5, 2004) such that instant respondents would be relieved of ongoing liability. Trier also rejected respondents’ contention that subsequent accident constituted a superseding cause that broke chain of causation as contemplated by Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012). CRB affirmed, holding that medical record and claimant’s testimony substantiated trier’s findings. CRB found no error in trier’s refusal to invoke Kelly, which concerned apportionment of liability, concluding instead that trier properly focused his analysis on proximate causation. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Albuquerque, § 31-275 (1), § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-349(a).

Dorenbosch v. Hoffman Landscapes, 5734 CRB-7-12-2 (February 14, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s award of benefits to claimant who had sustained compensable right leg injury and then claimed subsequent injury to right leg was sequela of original wound which had never properly healed. CRB affirmed, holding that despite lack of deposition testimony, medical record provided reasonable basis for trier’s inference that second incident did not constitute new injury and trier retained prerogative to resolve inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony in claimant’s favor. CRB found no error in trier’s refusal to entertain respondents’ challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Dorenbosch, § 31-275(1), § 31-301 Factual findings.

Tanguay v. Rent-A-Center, Incorporated, 5714 CRB-8-11-12 (January 8, 2013).

Respondent filed “pre-emptive” Form 43 which incorrectly referenced injury to claimant’s left, rather than right, knee. Trier granted Motion to Preclude. CRB reversed. Although Form 43 requires body part be listed, statutory provisions of § 31-294c(b) C.G.S. do not specifically articulate that body part be listed in notice of contest. Trier could not reasonably infer that claimant was prejudiced by deficiency. Denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error. See also, Tanguay, § 31-294c.

Hubbard v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 5705 CRB-6-11-12 (November 30, 2012).

Claimant challenged basis of permanent partial disability award and appealed trier’s denial of compensability and temporary total disability benefits. CRB remanded for additional findings. Medical report on which trier relied for permanent partial disability award attributed permanent partial disability to condition trier had found non-compensable. Trier determined that claimant provided no evidence of causation for osteoarthritis but record contained two reports which supported causation and trier’s findings did not specifically address reports’ evidentiary weight. Commissioner’s Examination report on which trier based decision to deny temporary total disability benefits was ambiguous. Denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error. See also, Hubbard, § 31-275(1); § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-307; § 31-308(b); § 31-349.

Duarte v. Franstel of CT Corp., 5692 CRB-7-11-11 (November 13, 2012).

Respondent challenged finding that claimant was employed by respondent when claimant sustained injuries in fall from tree while trimming branches on third party’s property. CRB affirmed. Although testimony of various parties appeared inconsistent with evidentiary submissions, trier retains ultimate discretion to determine credibility of witnesses. Trier reasonably inferred that claimant’s co-worker was authorized to act as respondent’s agent and record supported trier’s determination that requirements were satisfied for establishing employment relationship as set forth in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998). Trier reasonably inferred that evidentiary record did not support finding that legal standard for casual employment was satisfied. CRB deemed meritless respondent’s claim that trier’s Finding and Award was void because trier issued decision on Monday following expiration of statutory one-hundred twenty day deadline which occurred on preceding Saturday. Trier properly denied respondent’s Motion to Correct. See also, Duarte, § 31-275(1); § 31-275(9); § 31-300; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Gendron v. Griffin Health Services Corporation, 5686 CRB-4-11-10 (October 11, 2012).

In a wide-ranging appeal, claimant challenged trial commissioner’s failure to find respondents unduly delayed indemnity payments and denial of interest, penalties and attorney’s fees. Claimant appealed trier’s determination that hands-free telephone device, IPad and aquatic therapy did not constitute reasonable or necessary medical care such that claimant was entitled to reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs. CRB affirmed findings relative to indemnity payments and medical care, noting that record supported trier’s inferences regarding claimant’s credibility and trier reasonably relied upon evidence in support of respondents’ assertion that indemnity payments were timely. CRB also held that trier reasonably inferred that claimant did not meet burden of proof necessary to establish that medical treatment for which she sought reimbursement satisfied standard for curative care as articulated in Bowen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 60, 232 CRD-1-83 (June 19, 1984). CRB remanded on issue of whether respondents unduly delayed mileage reimbursements as findings suggested trier may not have reviewed all of claimant’s exhibits in support of that claim of error. CRB denied claimant’s two motions to file additional evidence. See also, Gendron, § 31-288; § 31-294d; § 31-300; § 31-301. Factual findings; § 31-301-9; § 31-308(a).

Tedesco v. Decorator Services, 5693 CRB-4-11-11 (September 27, 2012).

Claimant originally appealed trial commissioner’s decision she should undergo detoxification at out of state facility; issue deemed moot by time of CRB hearing. She also appealed trial commissioner’s decision after granting a Motion to Correct that work searches were prerequisite to § 31-308a benefits. CRB remanded on work search issue. Precedent was work searches not requirement prior to receipt of benefits. Parties had previously dealt with issue and the record at the formal hearing did not establish the issue was fully considered by the litigants before commissioner reached a decision. At appeal hearing, parties announced claimant agreed to this treatment. See also, Tedesco, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-294d; § 31-308a.

Arsenault v. Shelton, 5679 CRB-4-11-9 (September 6, 2012).

Respondent municipality challenged trial commissioner’s decision to exclude claimant’s service-connected retirement pension earnings from calculations for temporary partial disability benefits. CRB affirmed pursuant to Rinaldi v. Enfield, 82 Conn. App. 505 (2004) in which Appellate Court distinguished between treatment of service-connected pensions and disability pensions when calculating temporary partial disability benefits. CRB found trier properly rejected respondent’s assertion that decision violated public policy against double recovery given that § 7-433b (b) C.G.S. prevents claimants who bring claims under § 7-433c C.G.S. from receiving “windfalls.” CRB held that depriving claimants who receive service connected retirement pensions of § 31-308a C.G.S. benefits would punish claimants for having been injured. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of respondent’s Motion to Correct. See also, Arsenault, § 7 433b, § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-308a.

Miller v. Thyssen Krupp Elevator Corporation, 5669 CRB-7-11-7 (August 29, 2012).

See also, Miller, § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Shanks v. Greentree Toyota Lincoln-Mercury, 5625 CRB-7-11-2 (August 16, 2012).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s determination that no causal connection existed between claimant’s complaints of double vision and workplace incident in which claimant fell after being struck in forehead by SUV door. Respondents accepted compensability of left shoulder injury allegedly sustained in same incident. CRB affirmed, noting that record contained speculative and conflicting expert opinion but medical evidence upon which trier ultimately relied provided adequate basis for dismissing claim. CRB also affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Shanks, § 31-275(1), § 31-301 Factual findings.

Briggs v. Waterbury, 5665 CRB-5-11-7 (July 6, 2012).

Trier dismissed claim for medical treatment on grounds that medications sought were palliative rather than curative and did not constitute reasonable or necessary treatment. Claimant, a former firefighter, contended that contested medications allowed him to perform his daily activities and continue working part-time at neighborhood bar which he co-owned with three other partners. CRB affirmed, noting that medical records attributing claimant’s lumbar issues to degenerative disk disease and indicating that contested medications were not likely to be curative provided a reasonable basis for trier’s dismissal of claim. CRB also found that trier could have reasonably inferred that claimant’s limited workplace activities and discretionary employment schedule did not satisfy standard for curative treatment as articulated in Bowen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 60, 232 CRD-1-83 (June 19, 1984). CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Briggs, § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Estate of Greenberg v. ABB Combustion Engineering Services, Incorporated, 5521 CRB-1-10-1 (June 11, 2012).

Dependent widow of employee who died of pancreatic cancer filed two notices of occupational disease claim. Respondents contended first notice of claim, filed within one year of employee’s death, was legally insufficient because Form 30C did not contain widow’s name or identify type of benefits being sought. Respondents argued second Form 30C was legally insufficient and untimely as it did not identify type of benefits sought and was filed two and one-half years after employee’s death. Trier found first Form 30C timely and sufficient but found second Form 30C untimely on basis that claimant had “formed a belief” regarding causation of employee’s pancreatic cancer almost two years before filing second Form 30C. Respondents appealed and claimant cross-appealed. CRB affirmed findings relative to first notice of claim, noting that Form 30C clearly indicated employee had died and, consistent with Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007), provided respondents with reasonable notice that survivor’s benefits were being sought. CRB reversed trier’s findings relative to second notice of claim, noting that proper analysis for assessing date of commencement of three-year statute of limitations for occupational disease hinged on identifying date of first manifestation of symptom of occupational disease. Because trier reasonably inferred that “first manifestation” occurred when employee’s son filed application for federal benefits pursuant to Department of Labor’s Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, second Form 30C was timely as it was filed within three years of date of federal filing. CRB also noted that parties attended an informal hearing within this three-year window. See also, Estate of Greenberg, § 31-275(15); § 31-294c; § 31-301; Factual findings, § 31-306.

Bass v. AT & T, 5621 CRB-7-11-1/5634 CRB-7-11-3 (May 3, 2012).

Claimant challenged multiple rulings by trier associated with the issuance of a “form” fine letter imposing sanctions pursuant to § 31-288(b)(2) C.G.S. arising from counsel’s failure to appear at informal hearing. Trier initially denied claimant’s Motions to Correct and Articulate and, following penalty hearing in which trier determined no grounds existed to vacate sanctions, denied claimant’s Motions to Vacate, Recuse, and Reargue and Open Hearing. On appeal, claimant’s counsel asserted that entry of order for sanctions prior to evidentiary hearing constituted due process violation and also alleged that trier erroneously: denied Motions to Correct, Articulate, Vacate, and Reargue and Open Hearing; scheduled “moot” evidentiary hearing after penalty was assessed; refused to allow counsel to present legal argument at penalty hearing; failed to disqualify herself or allow herself to be called as a witness; and found facts not in evidence. Consistent with Flamenco v. Independent Refuse Service, Inc., 130 Conn. App. 280 (2011), CRB reversed, noting that because neither fine letter nor trier’s ruling on Motion to Vacate contained specific findings relative to circumstances surrounding claimant’s counsel’s failure to appear at penalty hearing, record did not substantiate trier’s conclusion that counsel’s failure was unreasonable or without good cause. See also, Bass, § 31 288; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Gonzalez v. Premier Limousine of Hartford, 5635 CRB 4-11-3 (April 17, 2012).

Claimant did not file a Motion to Correct. Facts thus found were given conclusive effect. Stevens v. Raymark Industries, Inc. et al., 5215 CRB-4-07-4 (March 26, 2008). Denial of Respondent’s Motion to Correct indicates trial commissioner resolved factual issues in adverse manner to respondent. Brockenberry v. Thomas Deegan d/b/a Tom’s Scrap Metal, Inc., 5429 CRB-5-09-2 (January 22, 2010), aff’d, 126 Conn. App. 902 (2011)(Per Curiam). See also, Gonzalez, § 31-300; § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-294d.

Anderson v. Target Capital Partners, 5615-CRB-6-10-12 (January 3, 2012).

Claimant appealed granting of Form 36 asserting commissioner needed to explain why he did not rely on opinions of treating physicians. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Commissioner need not have granted Motion to Correct if he found these opinions unreliable. Vitti v. Richards Conditioning Corp., 5247 CRB-7-07-7 (August 21, 2008). If claimant’s credibility in question, trial commissioner may find treating physician’s opinions unreliable. Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 910 (2008). Trial commissioner must only reference the facts he relied upon and his conclusions in his finding, and need not explain why he chose not to rely on other evidence. Cable v. Bic Corp., 270 Conn. 433, 440 (2004). See also, Anderson, § 31-301; § 31-301-3; § 31-301-9; § 31-307.

Flamenco v. Independent Refuse Service, 5600 CRB-7-10-10 (November 2, 2011).

Claimant challenged trier’s imposition of sanctions due to counsel’s failure to appear at informal hearing. Claimant initially appealed sanctions letter on basis that trier had taken no evidence which would substantiate findings of undue delay; CRB remanded citing lack of formal record. Claimant next appealed order arising from penalty hearing in which trier determined no grounds existed to vacate sanctions. Claimant alleged multiple due process violations, citing as error trier’s failure to disqualify herself, scheduling of evidentiary hearing after penalty was assessed, issuance of sanctions letter prior to evidentiary hearing, and inadequate notice of penalty hearing. Claimant also appealed trier’s failure to grant Motion to Correct. Following parties’ appearance before CRB at oral argument but prior to release of CRB opinion, Appellate Court handed down Flamenco v. Independent Refuse Service, Inc., 130 Conn. App. 280 (2011) holding that original CRB remand was in error as sufficient record existed for CRB to rule on the matter. Appellate Court also found record failed to substantiate trier’s findings of undue delay and remanded matter with directive to vacate sanction. See also, Flamenco, § 31-288; § 31-300; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Chimblo v. Connecticut Light & Power, 5574 CRB-7-10-7 (July 21, 2011).

Respondent appealed from award of temporary total disability benefits, contending trier’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because record was devoid of medical evidence to support claim. Respondent argued that claimant’s prior role as property manager for family’s closely held real estate business, and his remuneration therefrom, supported finding a work capacity in that primary reason for claimant’s removal from employment was alleged financial mismanagement and not physical incapacity. CRB affirmed, noting that medical evidence in its entirety supported award pursuant to Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498 (1949). CRB also held that circumstances surrounding claimant’s cessation of employment were not relevant to his claim for benefits given that claimant was no longer employed by family business during claimed period of disability. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of respondent’s Motion to Correct. See also, Chimblo, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-307.

Lubrano v. Mohegan Sun Casino, 5560 CRB-2-10-6 (June 3, 2011), aff’d, 138 Conn. App. 812 (2012), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 942 (2012).

Claimant, rendered quadriplegic following workplace neck injury, and spouse settled third-party lawsuit in which award was almost evenly split between claimant and spouse’s loss of consortium claim. Respondents challenged trier’s determination that he lacked jurisdiction to review reasonableness of settlement or reallocate spouse’s portion. CRB affirmed based on holding of Soracco v. William Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86 (2009) in which Supreme Court held that because rights of an employer in third party action are defined by § 31-293(a) C.G.S., employer does not have standing to challenge allocation of settlement proceeds between claimant and spouse and courts do not have authority to dictate terms of such settlements. Respondents also challenged trier’s determination that respondents were not seeking repayment of workers’ compensation benefits paid to claimant. CRB affirmed, noting counsel for respondents had specifically stated same at trial. CRB also affirmed trier’s denial of respondents’ Motion to Correct. See also, Lubrano, § 31-293(a).

Oliveira v. Braga Painting, 5533 CRB-7-10-3 (April 7, 2011).

Claimant, found to have sustained compensable injury under 2005 Finding and Award, did not receive benefits until 2007 Finding and Award in which trier determined liability rested with principal employer. On appeal CRB reversed principle employer finding and subsequently trial commissioner ordered Second Injury Fund to pay claimant amount equal to benefits paid by principal employer pending appeal and ordered claimant to reimburse principal employer for benefits received plus ten percent annual interest. Fund appealed, arguing that principal employer’s reimbursement request constituted an equitable subrogation claim over which trial commissioner lacked jurisdiction as such claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Fund also argued that trier’s refusal to allow fund’s investigator to offer evidence at trial constituted denial of due process. Claimant cross-appealed trier’s award of interest to principal employer. CRB determined that various provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act conferred jurisdiction upon trier and affirmed payment orders to fund and claimant but reversed interest award to principal employer as claimant had not been denied compensation. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to allow fund’s witness to testify noting that fund had participated fully in prior litigation and CRB decision reversing principal employer finding did not render issue ripe for additional proceedings. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of fund’s Motion to Correct but found erroneous trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Oliveira, § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-301(f), § 31-301(g), § 31-315, § 31-355(b).

Nalysnyk v. Slawomir Deja d/b/a Deja Construction, 5528 CRB-2-10-2 (February 4, 2011).

Respondent Second Injury Fund appealed finding of compensability and award of temporary total and temporary partial disability to construction worker who sustained back injury after cutting and carrying wood for uninsured employer. Fund also contended trier failed to determine temporary partial wage rate and argued award of temporary partial benefits waiving job searches pending approved Form 36 constituted deprivation of due process. CRB remanded for determination of temporary partial wage rate and struck order waiving job searches but affirmed balance of decision, holding that medical record supported compensability finding and trier had discretion to credit claimant’s testimony over that of employer and witness. CRB found trier’s language regarding Form 36 recited customary utilization procedure and was not a due process deprivation. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct despite identifying two harmless errors. See also, Nalysnyk, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-308(a).

Rizzo v. State/Judicial Department, 5522 CRB-6-10-1 (January 10, 2011).

Respondent appealed trier’s conclusions that claimant’s § 5-145a claim was timely filed and respondent failed to rebut presumption that claimant’s heart disease was causally connected to his employment as a Judicial Marshal. CRB affirmed, relying in part on Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) in which Supreme Court held that one-year statute of limitations in hypertension cases commences when medical professional informs claimant of hypertension diagnosis. CRB determined that medical record did not support respondent’s contention that claimant’s heart disease pre dated his employment as Judicial Marshal or that claimant received a definitive diagnosis of heart disease prior to his emergency medical procedures in December 2005. CRB determined trier’s findings relative to subject matter jurisdiction were legally sufficient and affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct, concluding that although trier inaccurately used term “heart attack” and quoted an incorrect date of hire in his findings, both errors were harmless. See also, Rizzo, § 5-145a, § 7-433c, § 31-294c(a), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-3.

Callender a/k/a Woodbury v. Reflexite Corporation, 5504 CRB-6-09-10 (October 8, 2010), rev’d, 137 Conn. App. 324 (2012), cert. granted, 307 Conn. 915 (2012), appeal withdrawn, S.C. 19040 (9/27/13).

CRB affirmed dismissal of Motion to Preclude. Claimant filed first notice of claim for repetitive trauma injuries but continued working for seventeen months during which time she received workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant filed second notice of claim for additional repetitive trauma injuries when she was no longer able to work and respondents failed to disclaim second notice. Claimant continued to receive benefits after she stopped working. CRB affirmed finding that preclusion did not lie based on Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973) and its progeny which suggest that preclusion was intended to address “threshold failure” by employers to respond to claims and is not applicable to contests over extent of claimant’s disability. CRB also noted that because claimants are not required to file additional notices for new injuries arising from same incident, respondents should not be obligated to respond to unnecessary notices. CRB affirmed denial of Motion to Correct. Appellate Court reversed, holding that board improperly affirmed trier’s dismissal of Motion to Preclude on basis of merits of claim; because second notice of claim appeared to allege a new and separate injury and the employer failed to either file a new notice of contest or commence payment on the new claim within twenty-eight days, trial commissioner had no choice under statute but to grant motion to preclude. Callender v. Reflexite Corp., 137 Conn. App. 324 (2012). See also, Callender, § 31-301-4.

Tarte v. Essex Meadows Health Center, 5472 CRB-8-09-6 (July 21, 2010).

Employer appealed from award granting claimant § 31-307 benefits, contending medical reports in evidence were insufficient to support trial commissioner’s conclusions regarding claimant’s ongoing total disability. Respondents also appealed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed, noting expert testimony substantiated trier’s findings as did claimant’s testimony regarding her physical limitations. See also, Tarte, § 31-301 Factual findings, § 31-307.

Gage v. Western Connecticut State University, 5470 CRB-7-09-6 (July 8, 2010).

Claimant, who sustained injuries when struck by a motor vehicle and ultimately entered into a third party settlement, appealed trier’s findings relative to disposition of credit/moratorium due State of Connecticut. CRB determined remand for clarification was necessary given that trier appeared to reach two mutually inconsistent conclusions as to whether state’s lien had been satisfied or remained outstanding. Evidentiary record was also inconclusive because neither party provided documentation memorializing final disposition of lien, although claimant did offer correspondence provided by Attorney General’s office setting forth its intent to waive lien in exchange for credit against future workers’ compensation benefits. CRB determined trier’s failure to grant corrections sought by claimant likewise constituted reversible error. See also, Gage, § 31-293(a), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Jones v. Connecticut Children’s Medical Center, 5420 CRB-1-09-1 (July 1, 2010), aff’d, 131 Conn. App. 415 (2011).

Employer appealed from trier’s decision awarding claimant § 31-308(b) benefits. CRB reversed on basis that trier’s factual findings did not support award given that trier had determined doctor’s opinion on which award was predicated was not credible. CRB noted that file did contain approved jurisdictional voluntary agreement stating claimant had sustained a concussion and record indicated respondents had tendered to claimant permanency voluntary agreements which claimant refused to sign, ostensibly because she did not believe she had yet reached maximum medical improvement. CRB reversed trier’s finding of compensability of claimant’s neurogenic bladder because expert who made diagnosis relied upon same doctor’s opinion found not credible by the trier. CRB reversed trier’s determination that claimant’s motor vehicle accident was a substantial contributing factor in her subsequent emotional and psychological issues, concluding such a finding was inconsistent with trier’s other findings relative to claimant’s alleged brain injury. CRB determined trier’s denial of corrections proffered by respondents constituted error. See also, Jones, § 31-275(1) § 31-301, Factual findings, § 31-308(a).

Volmut v. General Electric Company, 5439 CRB-4-09-2 (April 7, 2010).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s depressive disorder was compensable on basis that medical reports and claimant’s testimony at trial supported reasonable inference of causation between claimant’s accepted back injury and contested psychiatric claim. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to find undue delay and/or unreasonable contest against respondents relative to their failure to authorize psychiatric evaluation and to pay and/or reimburse claimant for medications prescribed by authorized treater on basis that record in its entirety did not support sanctions. Although CRB considered circumstances surrounding submission of surveillance videotape problematic, board did not find trier’s actions constituted reversible error given that surveillance was not germane to issues on appeal. Trier also properly refused to mark tape as full exhibit and allowed record to remain open pending investigator’s testimony but claimant requested trier close record before that occurred. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to dismiss claimant’s amended Reasons for Appeal given that respondents did not appear to be prejudiced by claimant’s late filing. Both parties filed Motions to Correct which were denied save for two proposed corrections by claimant making two findings consistent with overall award. See also, Volmut, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16), § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Spencer v. Manhattan Bagel Company, 5419 CRB-8-09-1 (January 22, 2010).

Claimant appealed dismissal of claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after trier concluded claimant neither filed a Form 30C within one year of the date of injury nor satisfied statutory conditions required to waive formal written notice. Record indicated claimant verbally informed employer of injury twice and on second occasion employer responded by driving claimant to chiropractor. Claimant contended requirements of medical care exception per § 31-294c(c) C.G.S. were satisfied but trier dismissed claim after determining employer did not pay medical bill associated with chiropractic visit. CRB reversed, citing Gesmundo v. Bush and Kulis v. Moll for proposition that applicability of medical care exception does not hinge upon payment of medical invoice but, rather, requires global assessment of factual circumstances to establish whether employer could reasonably expect that workers’ compensation claim might arise from workplace incident which prompted claimant’s need for medical care. CRB also held that denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error to the extent it was predicated on assumption that payment of medical invoice was required to invoke medical care exception. See also, Spencer, § 31 294c(a) & (c).

Brockenberry v. Thomas Deegan d/b/a Tom’s Scrap Metal, Inc., 5429 CRB-5-09-2 (January 22, 2010), aff’d, 126 Conn. App. 902 (2011)(Per Curiam).

Trial commissioner denied claimant’s Motion to Correct to find presence of employer-employee relationship. When a trial commissioner denies such a motion, we may properly infer that the commissioner did not find the evidence submitted probative or credible. See also, Brockenberry, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Damon v. VNS of CT/Masonicare, 5413 CRB-4-08-12 (December 15, 2009).

Claimant failed to file Motion to Correct following commissioner’s decision to grant respondent’s Form 36. On appeal, CRB must therefore accept validity of all facts found by trial commissioner. Claros v. Keystone Pipeline Services, 5399 CRB-1-08-11 (October 28, 2009). See also Damon, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-294f.

Kaspern v. Estes Express Lines, 5391 CRB-8-08-11 (November 17, 2009).

Claimant sustained compensable left shoulder injury while employed by Estes Express as a tractor trailer driver for Home Depot. Claimant subsequently left Estes Express and went to work for Lowe’s as a tractor trailer driver. Claimant ultimately sought authorization for surgery to left shoulder and trier assigned liability to Estes Express. Respondent Estes Express appealed, contending claimant’s ongoing symptoms and need for surgery were due to his employment with Lowe’s in light of claimant’s testimony that jobs with Estes and Lowe’s were “identical”. Estes also argued trier erred in failing to find, consistent with Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008), Lowe’s was precluded from contesting liability based on its failure to file Form 43 in response to second Form 30C filed by claimant alleging repetitive trauma. CRB affirmed, citing medical reports in evidence and noting claimant testified he made more than twice as many deliveries per week for Estes and was required to lift heavier objects. CRB declined to address issue of preclusion given it could be reasonably inferred trier concluded claimant was entitled to recovery on basis of first, timely Form 30C and second Form 30C was unnecessary and legally irrelevant. Trier denied Motion to Correct. See also, Kaspern, § 31 275(1), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-307b, § 31-349.

Cascella v. State/Department of Correction, 5390 CRB-4-08-10 (October 28, 2009).

Claimant, a corrections officer, sustained compensable lower back injury in falldown while responding to “code white” for prison inmate attempting suicide. Trial commissioner awarded hazardous duty benefits pursuant to § 5-142(a) C.G.S. for six-month period immediately following the injury and subsequent three year period during which claimant underwent two surgeries. Respondent filed Motion to Correct which was denied in its entirety. CRB reversed, concluding correspondence from claimant’s prior counsel to workers’ compensation commissioner constituted unambiguous election of temporary total incapacity benefits pursuant to § 31-307 C.G.S. CRB declined to address claimant’s eligibility for hazardous duty based on particular circumstances under which claimant sustained injury. See also, Cascella, § 5-142(a), § 31-307.

Williams v. State/Judicial Branch, 5359 CRB-1-08-6 (October 8, 2009).

Claimant, a Juvenile Transportation Officer, appealed trier’s decision dismissing claim on basis that claimant’s aggressive initiation of a physical confrontation with a detention center detainee during a supervised basketball game constituted willful and serious misconduct, an affirmative defense. CRB affirmed, as the trier’s conclusion was dependent upon the weight and credibility he assigned to the evidence which included the testimony of co workers and supervisors as well as surveillance camera footage. Claimant also claimed as error trier’s failure to draw an adverse inference on the basis of spoliation by virtue of respondent’s failure to preserve footage from a second surveillance camera operating in gym during the incident. CRB affirmed trier, noting that an adverse inference determination is factual in nature and respondent provided a credible explanation for its failure to preserve footage from second camera. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to grant corrections, save for scrivener’s errors, in claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Williams § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Dahle v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5356 CRB-6-08-6 (June 5, 2009).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claimant’s request for additional medical care on grounds that pain management regimen sought was palliative and not curative and therefore did not constitute reasonable or necessary treatment. Claimant contended trial commissioner’s reliance on orthopedic surgeon’s opinion was in error as orthopedic specialist was not qualified to comment on efficacy of pain management. CRB determined that expert testimony contained in evidentiary record, along with medical reports from several experts, including a pain management specialist, provided adequate support for trial commissioner’s inferences regarding utility of pain management regimen. Trial commissioner also found claimant eligible for benefits pursuant to § 31-308a C.G.S. and awarded attorneys’ fees due to respondents’ unreasonable contest, which findings were not challenged on appeal. The claimant filed a Motion to Correct, which was denied in its entirety. See also, Dahle, § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual Findings.

Rakowski v. Marlin Firearms, 5340 CRB-3-08-4 (April 22, 2009).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim after finding no causal connection between claimant’s vocal cord injury and air quality at workplace. Claimant’s allegations relative to constant long term exposure to dust and other airborne contaminants were refuted by industrial hygiene and OSHA studies and by expert testimony from physician who performed IME on claimant and conducted site visit of employer’s facility. Despite lymph node biopsy which was positive for industrial particulates, no evidence of unsafe air quality was discovered at plant, and expert testimony suggested lymph node findings could be partially explained by claimant’s smoking history. Moreover, respondents’ expert could not attribute vocal cord paralysis to lymph node findings. Trier denied claimant’s Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed, noting claimant primarily performed wet rather than dry grinding and medical opinions in record supporting causation were heavily reliant on claimant’s history. See also, Rakowski, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Sockbeson v. AJS Enterprise, 5334 CRB-6-08-4 (April 1, 2009).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s Finding and Award ordering temporary total and temporary partial benefits for claimant who sustained a back injury in a workplace lifting incident. Respondents had argued claimant’s symptoms were due to prior injuries to her lumbar spine and/or a motor vehicle accident which occurred after the workplace incident. On appeal, respondents contend claimant was not credible regarding the medical history given to treating physicians and appeared to exaggerate her symptoms during an IME and commissioner’s examination. Respondents also allege, inter alia, lack of due process relative to numerous post-judgment motions which were denied by the trier, who also denied their Motion to Correct in its entirety. At trial, claimant testified plausibly regarding prior incidents involving her back and the motor vehicle accident, and CRB determined evidentiary submissions supported trier’s conclusions regarding causation. CRB also found respondents’ claims of error relative to their post-judgment motions were without merit. See also, Sockbeson, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9.

Biasetti v. Stamford, 5320 CRB-7-08-2 (February 19, 2009).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for benefits for post traumatic stress disorder arising from claimant’s involvement in car chase and gun battle. Claimant also sustained injuries to knee and elbow which respondent accepted. Trier determined claim was controlled by pre July 1, 2005 revision to § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) excluding mental impairments that do not arise from a physical injury or occupational disease and, consistent with our Supreme Court’s holding in Biasetti I, concluded a direct causal relationship must exist between claimed mental impairment and physical injuries sustained by the claimant. Because trier found neither medical evidence nor claimant’s testimony supported such a finding, she dismissed claim. CRB affirmed, citing inter alia the lack of a direct physical assault on claimant and expert testimony that claimant would probably have gone on to develop PTSD irrespective of his physical injuries. See also, Biasetti, § 31-275 (1), § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), § 31-301, Factual findings.

Abrahamson v. State/Dept. of Public Works, 5280 CRB-2-07-10 (February 26, 2009).

Trial commissioner ordered interest on late payment of permanency pursuant to both § 31-295(c) C.G.S. and § 31-300 C.G.S. CRB remanded, seeking clarification as to which statute constituted basis for award and whether there had been undue delay. On remand, trier found no undue delay and awarded interest pursuant to 31-300 C.G.S. only. Claimant appealed, arguing respondents improperly contested permanency because of apportionment reimbursement concerns and claimant was therefore entitled to mandatory interest pursuant to § 31-295(c) C.G.S. plus interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to § 31-300 C.G.S. CRB upheld award of interest pursuant to § 31-300 C.G.S. noting permanency continued to be litigated after claimant was rated due to complications in claimant’s medical history and a potential statute of non-claim defense. CRB also determined that unlike § 31-303 C.G.S, neither § 31-295(c) C.G.S. nor § 31-300 C.G.S. allow for simultaneous payment of interest. CRB upheld trier’s finding of no undue delay on grounds that, in addition to medical record issues, claimant’s availability for litigation was hampered by his ill health and residence out-of-state for part of the year. Trier denied claimant’s Motion to Correct in its entirety. See also, Abrahamson, § 31-295(c), § 31-300, § 31-301, Factual Findings. § 31-303.

Marroquin v. F. Monarca Masonry, 5310 CRB-4-07-12 (December 19, 2008).

Claimant sustained a compensable inguinal hernia in June 2001 for which he underwent surgical treatment. In September 2004, while working for a different employer, claimant alleged he injured himself in a lifting incident and underwent additional surgery in October 2004 and June 2005. Respondents, who were “on the risk” at the time of the original hernia injury, contend second incident represented an aggravation of the hernia injury which, per Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996), constitutes a separate and distinct disability and, consistent with the provisions of § 31-349 C.G.S., confers liability on the employer at the time of the second injury. Trial commissioner determined claimant’s need for surgery in October 2004 and June 2005 arose from complications stemming from prior surgical repair of the 2001 compensable hernia, thereby conferring liability on the respondents, consistent with the provisions of § 31-307b C.G.S. CRB affirmed on basis that matter could be distinguished from Epps in light of evidentiary submissions. Trier also denied Motion to Correct. See also, Marroquin, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-307b, § 31-349.

Mele v. Hartford, 5286 CRB-1-07-10 (October 10, 2008), rev’d in part, 118 Conn. App. 104 (2009).

Claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s finding on remand that no causal connection exists between claimant’s current hip condition and need for surgery and two compensable injuries which occurred in October of 1996 and December of 2001. [See Mele v. Hartford, 4870 CRB-1-04-10 (September 29, 2005).] Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct and rejected findings of Commissioner’s Examiner. CRB affirmed, concluding trier reasonably relied on expert testimony and drew permissible inferences from the lack of contemporaneous medical records in file which would support claimant’s assertions relative to her hip condition. See also, Mele, § 31-294f, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Vitti v. Richards Conditioning Corp., 5247 CRB-7-07-7 (August 21, 2008).

Pipe fitter suffered heart attack at construction site. Trial commissioner credited expert witness who testified cause of heart attack was unrelated to work. Claimant sought numerous corrections to findings; only some were granted and did not change outcome of case. CRB upheld on appeal commissioner had factual basis to uphold prior findings he did not grant corrections on. See also, Vitti, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-275(1).

Thompson v. New Canaan, 5228 CRB-7-07-5 (August 21, 2008).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim for lack of jurisdiction. Trier determined notice of claim was untimely as claimant was diagnosed with hypertension in May of 2003 but did not file application for benefits until June of 2004. Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct because proposed corrections primarily sought to reconfigure factual findings in a light more favorable to claimant. See also, Thompson, § 7-433c, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Carter v. Clinton, 5185 CRB-3-07-1 (March 12, 2008).

See, Carter, § 31-294c (trier declined to correct findings in accordance with motion to correct, implying trier was not persuaded of factual assertion).

LaMontagne v. F & F Concrete Corporation, 5198 CRB-4-07-2 (February 25, 2008).

Claimant asserted need for spinal fusion surgery due to compensable injury while employed by respondent F & F Concrete. Respondent argued some percentage of causation due to subsequent injury sustained by working for Haynes Construction and tried to introduce evidence on issue. Trial commissioner ruled evidence inadmissible and denied Motion to Correct on this issue. CRB upheld trial commissioner as she has discretion as to whether evidence is admissible. See, LaMontagne, § 31- 301 Factual findings, § 31-301 Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

Vannoy-Joseph v. State/DMHAS, 5164 CRB-8-06-11 (January 29, 2008).

Where no Motion to Correct, trier was not given opportunity to clarify meaning of potentially ambiguous finding. CRB read finding to be consistent with other findings in record, and with physician’s opinions, as ambiguous finding should be interpreted with goal of sustaining trier’s conclusion in light of supporting evidence. See, Vannoy-Joseph, §§ 31-294d, 31-298, 31-301-9.

Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007).

Trial commissioner did not rule on claimant’s motion to correct, for purposes of appeal this is the functional equivalent of a denial. See Spatafore v. Yale University, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 310, 312 2011 CRB-3-94-4 (September 14, 1995), aff’d, 239 Conn. 408 (1996). See also Berry, § 31-306, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-294c.

Rizzo v. Stanley Works/Hand Tools Division, 5106 CRB-6-06-6 (November 21, 2007).

Following issuance of a Finding and Award, respondent filed Motion to Correct asserting medical evidence supported an earlier date of maximum medical improvement and justified ratification of a Form 36 approved at an informal hearing. Trial commissioner approved Motion to Correct and claimant appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner, as he had legal authority as per Wooten v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3674 CRB-6-97-9 (May 7, 1999) to grant correction and testimony could reasonably support the requested corrections. See also, Rizzo, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.

Lema v. Eoanou, 5056 CRB-4-06-2 (January 29, 2007).

Respondent appealed from denial of Motion to Correct rather than finding and award. CRB review limited to error in denial of motion. Appeal from ruling on Motion to Correct is considered in same capacity as trier’s factual findings by CRB, with appropriate deference to credibility determinations. See also, Lema, § 31-275(9), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

McMahon v. Emsar, Inc., 5049 CRB-4-06-1 (January 16, 2007).

Claimant’s failure to request correction regarding medical necessity of sought-after pain management treatment in Motion to Correct made it difficult to ascertain scope of trier’s order. See also, McMahon, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-315, also cited at McMahon, § 31-294d.

Numan v. Warnaco, Inc., 5007 CRB-4-05-10 (September 22, 2006).

Trial commissioner is not required to explain reasons for denying requested corrections. See also, Numan, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Samaoya v. William Gallagher, 4951 CRB-7-05-6 (April 26, 2006).

Respondent did not file Motion to Correct factual finding of the trial commissioner. CRB bound to find such facts admitted for purposes of appeal. See also, Samaoya, § 31-291, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Wilcox v. Danbury Hospital, 4838 CRB-7-04-8 (October 17, 2005).

See, Wilcox, § 31-301. Factual findings (trier granted requested corrections that produced inconsistency in findings, but any error was harmless, as trier did not rely on medical opinion affected by corrections). See also, Wilcox, § 31-308(b).

Capezzali v. Bridgeport, 4858 CRB-4-04-9 (September 7, 2005).

CRB explained it was limited to trier’s findings where no Motion to Correct was filed. See also, Capezzali, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Lanteri v. New London Police Dept., 4752 CRB-2-03-11 (May 19, 2005).

Trial commissioner construed pro se claimant’s Reasons of Appeal as Motion to Correct, in light of claimant’s pro se status. Motion was denied. See also, Lanteri, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Ferrin v. Glen Orne Leasing/Webster Trucking, 4802 CRB-8-04-4 (March 28, 2005).

Where appellant failed to file a Motion to Correct CRB was limited on review to existing factual findings. See also, Ferrin, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Vonella v. Rainforest Cafe, 4788 CRB-6-04-2 (March 16, 2005).

CRB limited its review to legal error where claimant failed to file Motion to Correct. See also, Vonella, § 31-301-9, § 31-307.

Brown v. State/DMR, 4748 CRB-6-03-11 (October 18, 2004).

Commissioner’s denial of Motion to Correct affirmed where there was evidence supporting trier’s findings and the granting of other corrections sought would not compel a different result. Additionally, the appellant’s motion failed to provide the trier with specific references in the record supporting the corrections sought. See also, Brown, § 31-298, § 31-308a.

Jacobson v. General Dynamics/Electric Boat Div., 4642 CRB-2-03-3 (March 12, 2004).

CRB affirmed denial of Motion to Correct where evidence existed supporting the trier’s not making the factual finding requested by appellants. Additionally, the trier had two opportunities to find as per the appellant’s request, one at the conclusion of the proceedings and when presented with the Motion to Correct. Thus, trier’s failure to find in accordance with appellant’s request cannot be attributed to oversight.

Peck v. Somers, 4640 CRB-1-03-2 (March 5, 2004).

Trial commissioner need not grant corrections irrelevant to the outcome of the case. See also, Peck, § 7-433c, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Soto-Velez v. Michael’s Chrysler Plymouth, 4628 CRB-2-03-2 (February 3, 2004).

Where claimant fails to a file a Motion to Correct CRB’s review is limited to existing factual findings. See also, Soto-Velez, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Brown v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4609 CRB-1-03-1 (December 17, 2003), aff’d, 89 Conn. App. 47 (2005), cert. denied, 274 Conn. 914 (2005).

Motion to Correct should be used to dispute factual accuracy of a commissioner’s findings. See also, Brown, § 31-275(16). Personal Injury.

Fiorillo v. Bridgeport, 4585 CRB-4-02-11 (December 17, 2003), appeal dismissed for lack of a final judgment, A.C. 24991 (May 5, 2004).

Corrections seeking to add findings based on allegedly undisputed testimony of witnesses need not be granted where outcome of case would not be affected. See also, Fiorillo, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307a. See also, Fiorillo, § 31-307. Prior decision at Fiorillo, 4337 CRB-4-01-1 (November 19, 2001), vacated, S.C. 16736 (December 16, 2002).

Burke v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 4503 CRB-6-02-3 (August 25, 2003), appeal dismissed, A.C. 24693 (February 17, 2004).

CRB found no error in trier’s refusal to grant claimant’s Motion to Correct as the changes sought were either in dispute or would not compel a different outcome. See also, Burke § 31-301. Factual findings.

Nau v. Polycast Technology Corp., 4555 CRB-7-02-8 (August 25, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s partial denial of a Motion to Correct and noted that testimony of a fact that is not directly contradicted is not in itself sufficient to show that the fact was admitted or undisputed. See also, Nau § 31-301. Factual findings.

Beedle v. Don Oliver Home Improvement, 4491 CRB-3-02-2 (February 28, 2003).

Denial of corrections implies that trier was not persuaded by underlying testimony; CRB cannot draw contrary inference on appeal. See also, Beedle, § 31-275(9).

Robare v. Robert Baker Companies, 4328 CRB-1-00-12 (January 2, 2002).

CRB has subject matter jurisdiction over appeal from denial of a Motion to Correct where no papers were filed within ten days of underlying decision. However, board expressed hesitance to allow “back door” route to review of merits, and thus limited scope of review to errors in denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Robare, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Brinson v. Finlay Brothers Company, Inc., 4307 CRB-1-00-10 (November 1, 2001), aff’d, 77 Conn. App. 319 (2003).

No error in denial of Motion to Correct. Requested findings involved medical opinions in which two doctors allegedly questioned causation, while third physician had opined with reasonable medical certainty that claimant’s condition was caused by employment. Additionally, where physician opined with reasonable medical certainty that ailment was work-related, trier could deny requested finding that doctor admitted that there was no conclusively proven cause of fibromyalgia. See also, Brinson, § 31-296, 31-308(a).

Christoforo v. Christoforo’s Northford Gardens, 4260 CRB-3-00-06 (July 2, 2001).

Board affirmed trier’s decision that claimant did not sustain compensable injury. Claimant argued on appeal that trier erred by not making findings regarding his contention that he was on Florida business trip when his knee injury manifested itself. However, in his Motion to Correct claimant requested finding that he was on said trip. By denying that motion, trier was indicating that she was not so persuaded. See also, Christoforo, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Gary v. State/Department of Correction, 4208 CRB-8-00-3 (January 4, 2001), rev’d, 68 Conn. App. 590 (2002).

Discussion regarding Motion to Correct when requested changes are based upon credibility of evidence. See also, Gary, § 31-315.

Covert v. Patterson, 4094 CRB-3-99-8 (September 29, 2000).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s partial denial of Motion to Correct. Claimant was essentially trying to retry her case, and it was the duty of the fact-finder to consider the testimony and exhibits in the record, assess their credibility, and draw inferences and legal conclusions based on his impressions. When the trier reviews a Motion to Correct, he must evaluate the proposed changes in that same capacity. See also, Covert, § 31-294d, § 31-296 Voluntary Agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-301-9.

Costa v. Torrington Company, 4097 CRB-5-99-8 (July 28, 2000).

CRB denied claimant’s Motion to Dismiss one of respondents’ amended Reasons for Appeal. Whether or not an extension of time to file said reasons was sought in order for trier to rule on Motion to Correct, an appellant is entitled to amend reasons for appeal at any time, absent prejudice, under Practice Book § 63-4(b), and denial of Motion to Correct may be assigned as a reason for appeal under § 31-301-6 and § 31-301-7. A separate appeal need not be filed from denial of Motion to Correct. Also, trier did not err by denying request to correct findings, as trier did not mischaracterize doctor’s opinion and the nature of safety information regarding chemical toxicity. See also, Costa, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Burke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4037 CRB-2-99-4 (July 11, 2000).

Respondents argued that the trial commissioner erred in denying their Motion to Correct, which sought to add findings regarding claimant’s health subsequent to date of injury. Trier had denied this request, noting that respondents sought to add information from claimant’s deposition, which had not been admitted into evidence. Respondents argued that the deposition had been admitted into evidence, as it was entered as part of a set of documents which were reviewed by a physician along with his deposition, which was marked as an exhibit. CRB explained that it need not determine whether the deposition was entered into evidence because the respondents’ proposed correction was immaterial. It addressed the claimant’s condition subsequent to her injury, while the only issue at the formal hearing was the compensability of the injury itself. See also, Burke, § 31-275(16).

Davis v. State/University of Connecticut, 3822 CRB-2-98-5 (August 17, 1999).

See, Davis, § 31-275(1). See subsequent decision at Davis, 4212 CRB-2-00-3 (June 8, 2001), § 31-275(1).

Cramer v. Cramer, 3710 CRB-4-97-10 (November 9, 1998).

See, Cramer, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Courtright v. State/Connecticut Valley Hospital, 3573 CRB-6-97-4 (June 5, 1998).

Claimant did not request certain findings regarding increased disability or changed conditions of fact in her Motion to Correct, and did not provide specific enough information regarding requested corrections to support her claim for continued total disability. Trial commissioner affirmed. See also, Courtright, § 5-142(a), § 31-315.

Baribault v. Harben Flooring Co, Inc., 3579 CRB-7-97-3 (June 4, 1998).

Claimant did not request corrections regarding circumstances surrounding injury, so finding that injury arose out of and in the course of employment must stand, even though little discussion of subordinate facts was present in decision. See also, Baribault, § 31-278, § 31-288.

Buccieri v. Pacific Plumbing Supply Co., 3286 CRB-7-96-3 (December 30, 1997), aff’d, 53 Conn App. 671 (1999).

Appeal from trial commissioner’s granting of Motion to Correct, which changed the trial commissioner’s conclusion. Contrary to claimant’s contention, a trial commissioner may grant a motion to correct which changes both findings of fact and the ultimate conclusion regarding compensability. The claimant’s appeal from the granting of the motion to correct survives even though the original appeal was withdrawn following the granting of the motion to correct. See also, Buccieri, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.


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