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THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Barichko v. State/Department of Transportation, 5813 CRB-4-12-12 (January 13, 2014).
Respondents sought repayment of allegedly overpaid compensation to the claimant, citing in part moratorium from third party action and prior orders in the case. Trial commissioner denied claim for reimbursement. On appeal, CRB remanded matter. Record indicated that trial commissioner could have reasonably found respondent’s evidence as to amount sought unpersuasive, but the “law of the case” required implementing certain prior findings barring a change in circumstances. See also, Barichko, § 31-293; § 31-296; § 31-298; § 31-301 Factual findings.
Oliveira v. Braga Painting, 5533 CRB-7-10-3 (April 7, 2011).
Claimant, found to have sustained compensable injury under 2005 Finding and Award, did not receive benefits until 2007 Finding and Award in which trier determined liability rested with principal employer. On appeal CRB reversed principle employer finding and subsequently trial commissioner ordered Second Injury Fund to pay claimant amount equal to benefits paid by principal employer pending appeal and ordered claimant to reimburse principal employer for benefits received plus ten percent annual interest. Fund appealed, arguing that principal employer’s reimbursement request constituted an equitable subrogation claim over which trial commissioner lacked jurisdiction as such claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Fund also argued that trier’s refusal to allow fund’s investigator to offer evidence at trial constituted denial of due process. Claimant cross-appealed trier’s award of interest to principal employer. CRB determined that various provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act conferred jurisdiction upon trier and affirmed payment orders to fund and claimant but reversed interest award to principal employer as claimant had not been denied compensation. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to allow fund’s witness to testify noting that fund had participated fully in prior litigation and CRB decision reversing principal employer finding did not render issue ripe for additional proceedings. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of fund’s Motion to Correct but found erroneous trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Oliveira, § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-301(f), § 31-301-4, § 31-315, § 31-355(b).
Horn v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4764 CRB-3-03-12 (January 24, 2005).
Claimant received benefits pending appeal pursuant to § 31-301(f). Award was subsequently reversed. Following claimant’s discharge in bankruptcy, respondents sought to recover amount paid by claimant to his counsel as attorney’s fee. Trier denied respondents’ motion for repayment and motion to reopen award. CRB affirmed. Transaction between claimant and attorney was separate from respondents’ payment of underlying award, and was not governed by terms of award. Trier had not exercised authority under § 31-327 to rule on fee agreement, so no attorney’s fee award existed to reopen or modify. Chapter 568 does not give trier authority to resolve repayment disputes between respondent and claimant’s payees. See also, Horn, § 31-298, § 31-301(f). Prior decisions at Horn, 4177 CRB-3-00-1 (February 22, 2001), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 5-145a; Horn, 3727 CRB-3-97-11 (December 16, 1998), § 31-294c, § 5-145a.
Bailey v. State, 4744 CRB-1-03-10 (December 3, 2004).
Where Appellate Court reversed award of total disability on ground that respondent had been denied opportunity to conduct independent medical examination in contravention of law, and remanded case for further proceedings, trial commissioner acted prematurely in ordering repayment of award pursuant to § 31-301(g). Proceedings contemplated on remand are more than ministerial, so definition of “final judgment” under State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31 (1983), has not been satisfied. Underlying issue of entitlement to benefits is still pending before this agency, as neither a final award nor a final dismissal has been entered. See also, Bailey, § 31-298, § 31-301(f). Prior decisions at Bailey, 3922 CRB-2-98-10 (November 30, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), § 31-300, § 31-307, § 31-284b, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Factual findings; Bailey, 3694 CRB-1-97-9 (January 12, 1999), rev’d, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure; and at Bailey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 433, 3152 CRB-5-95-8 (September 3, 1996), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Czujak v. Bridgeport, 4371 CRB-4-01-3 (April 8, 2002).
CRB ruled that date of final adjudication resulting in denial of compensation was Supreme Court’s January 19, 2000 denial of certification of appeal. Claimant ordered to begin paying interest on overpayment as of that date. See also, Czujak, § 31-297. Prior decision at Czujak, 3535 CRB-4-97-2 (June 10, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 789 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 920 (2000), § 7-433c, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307a, § 31-315.
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