[Includes cases decided under Sec. 31-290b which was repealed.]
THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Williams v. New Haven, 6050 CRB-3-15-10 (October 18, 2016), appeal pending AC 39788.
Respondent municipality challenged trial commissioner’s conclusion that Workers’ Compensation Commission had jurisdiction to hear wrongful termination claim despite prior state labor board decision upholding claimant’s termination for just cause and Superior Court decision declining to vacate arbitration panel ruling. CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that in light of Supreme’s Court majority’s interpretation of § 31-55bb C.G.S. as set forth in Genovese v. Gallo Wine Merchants, Inc., 226 Conn. 475 (1993), doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude claimant from moving forward with claim. CRB rejected various contentions raised by respondent, noting inter alia that : (1) § 31-290a specifically confers right upon claimant to pursue wrongful termination claim in either Superior Court or Workers’ Compensation Commission; (2) scope of standard of review for Motion to Vacate arbitration award is far more narrow than scope of review for appellate review generally; and (3) August 8, 2013 Arbitration Award of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration was devoid of burden shifting analysis required by Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40 (1990). CRB also held that although trier’s drafting of finding relative to § 31-290c C.G.S. was inaccurate, finding did not constitute reversible error given that matter before arbitration board clearly implicated claimant’s alleged fraudulent receipt of benefits and municipality had referred claim to workers’ compensation fraud unit. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Williams, § 31-290a.
Secola v. State/Comptrollers Office, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 121, 1703 CRB-5-93-4 (January 31, 1995).
Respondents contend that claimant violated § 31-290c by failing to disclose that she suffered from terminal cancer, which was unrelated to her compensable injury, when voluntary agreement was made. CRB would not interpret § 31-290c to require claimant to voluntarily offer all potentially relevant information to insurance company. In absence of specific inquiry, claimant’s silence did not constitute fraudulent nondisclosure. See also, Secola, § 31-296, Voluntary Agreements (approval of). See subsequent decision, Secola, 3102 CRB-5-95-6 (February 26, 1997).
Tessier v. Kogut Florist and Nurseryman, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 276, 1088 CRD-8-90-7 (December 13, 1991).
Trier has no criminal jurisdiction to declare claimant committed a Class A misdemeanor. See also, Tessier, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure, § 31-307. Total disability.