CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-275(10)

See also, Ayala-Lopez, § 31-275(9), § 31-301 Factual finding, and § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Claimant asserted he was employee of respondent when he was injured at their premises; respondents argued that consistent with Rodriguez v. ED Construction a/k/a E.D. Construction, Inc., 5316 CRB-7-08-1 (May 11, 2009), aff’d, 126 Conn. App. 717 (2011), cert. denied, 301 Conn. 904 (2011), claimant should be deemed an independent contractor as he signed an independent contractor agreement. Trial commissioner concluded he was an employee and CRB affirmed. Evidence was, unlike Rodriguez, claimant was not using his own tools nor working in an autonomous manner when he was injured. Trial commissioner could, consistent with test in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 57, 60, 3001 CRB-3-95-2 (October 18, 1996), aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 441 (1997), aff’d, 245 Conn. 613 (1998), find an employer-employee relationship. See also, DeJesus, § 31-275 (9); § 31-294c; § 31-298; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4; § 31-355.

Gould v. Stamford, 6063 CRB-7-15-12 (November 14, 2016), appeal pending AC 39846.

Claimant injured at city job sought to include earnings from his single member limited liability company in calculation of average weekly wage. Trial commissioner found this was a sole proprietorship that had not elected coverage under Chapter 568; and that an employer-employee relationship was not present. CRB affirmed. Claimant was paid as an independent contractor and filed taxes in this manner, corporate formalities to document an employer-employee relationship not present therefore these earnings were outside Commission jurisdiction. See also, Gould, § 31-275(9), § 31-310.

Claimant injured when he fell off scaffold at job site. He asserted respondent was employer, but trial commissioner found on the facts (no tax withholding, worked for other firms, no set schedule, used own tools, etc.) claimant did not establish an employer-employee relationship. Claimant appealed arguing commissioner did not properly apply “right of general control” test. CRB affirmed; finding result indistinguishable from other precedent where similar claimants were deemed independent contractors. See also, Veilleux, § 31-275(9).

Respondent, found liable in his individual capacity for injuries sustained by claimant in motor vehicle accident, challenged finding that claimant was his employee and contended he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process because he was not afforded reasonable notice that he was potentially liable for workers’ compensation benefits in his individual capacity. CRB affirmed, noting that testimony offered by both claimant and respondent provided reasonable basis for conclusion that claimant satisfied definition of employee per § 31-275(9)(A)(i) C.G.S. given that respondent had authority to direct means and order of work performed by claimant and, by providing transportation to job site, had significant control over the claimant’s schedule. Evidentiary record also supported trier’s conclusions that claimant was regularly employed by respondent to work more than twenty-six hours a week and claimant was not merely a casual employee. CRB rejected respondent’s assertion that he was deprived of due process, noting that claimant had deliberately served Form 30C on respondent in his individual capacity, respondent disregarded repeated recommendations to obtain counsel, and trier had granted respondent’s Motion to Vacate and allowed respondent additional time to file a brief before closing record and issuing second Finding and Award. See also, Melendez, § 31-275(9); § 31-278; § 31-298; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant asserted he sustained leg injuries at 2005 work accident. At formal hearing he submitted no corroborating evidence as to his employment status besides his own testimony. Trial commissioner was not persuaded by claimant an employer-employee relationship existed at time of injury and dismissed claim. CRB affirmed dismissal, citing Reeve v. Eleven Ives Street, LLC, 5146 CRB-7-06-10 (November 5, 2007). See also, Fields, § 31-275(9); § 31-301Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Respondent defended claim on basis claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee; and refused to file a Form 43 arguing that would “abet a fraud.” Trial commissioner found that respondent’s business relationship with claimant had become very intrusive including use of time clocks, required texts, and specific directions as to what was to be done. Therefore as of date of alleged injury an employer-employee relationship existed. Respondent appealed, noting claimant used primarily his own tools and was paid without tax withholding, and received a 1099. CRB affirmed decision; citing right to control test in Covey v. Home Medical Associates, LLC, 5770 CRB-4-12-7 (July 25, 2013). See also, Reid, § 31-275(9); § 31-278; § 31-294c; § 31-298; § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant injured at auto shop. He asserted he was employee of respondent. Evidence before trial commissioner was claimant did not work set hours and was paid 50% of what shop billed customers. Trial commissioner found claimant was not credible and had not proven employee-employer relationship. Claimant appealed and CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Manner of payment, lack of set schedule, and autonomous employment consistent with finding claimant was an independent contractor. See also, Louis, § 31-275(9); § 31-301 Factual findings.

Trier determined employer-employee relationship existed between claimant’s decedent and respondent Jewish Home for the Elderly [“JHE”] relative to claimant’s decedent’s position as medical director of JHE. Claimant’s decedent was also employed as staff physician at JHE and as partner in his own private medical practice housed within JHE. CRB affirmed, noting that despite contract language stating claimant’s decedent was independent contractor, testimony concerning his duties as medical director supported finding that based on “totality of the evidence test” as set forth in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998), claimant’s decedent was JHE employee. In addition, trier determined that in light of claimant’s decedent’s “unique relationship” with JHE, JHE functioned as claimant’s decedent’s principal employer relative to his duties at in-house private medical practice partnership and claimant’s decedent had not opted out of Workers’ Compensation Act. CRB affirmed, holding that evidence adduced relative to employer employee relationship in addition to testimony regarding circumstances surrounding establishment of private medical practice supported trier’s conclusion that statutory requirements of § 31-291 C.G.S. had been satisfied. See also, Covey, § 31-275(1); § 31-291; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Trier concluded that claimant who sustained injury following transfer to employer’s facility in Norfolk, Virginia was not subject to Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act. Claimant had accepted relocation incentives and signed agreement requiring repayment of signing bonuses if claimant left Norfolk employment within one year. Trier determined agreement constituted new contract which contemplated performance of duties outside Connecticut and claimant was not Connecticut resident when contract was signed. CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant and employer had entered into new contract but remanded for additional findings relative to whether circumstances surrounding creation of new contract created a significant relationship between Connecticut and the contract consistent with three-pronged test set forth in Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181 (1991) and Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 262 Conn. 31 (2002). CRB rejected claimant’s contention that trier had concluded Workers’ Compensation Act did not apply to non-residents injured outside Connecticut. See also, Danek, § 31-275(9); § 31-301 Factual Findings; § 31-301-04.

See also, Santiago, § 31-275(9); § 31-301 Factual findings.

See also, Diaz, § 31-275(9); § 31-288; § 31-291; § 31-294c.

See also, Wallace, § 31-275 (9).

Claimant injured while cleaning garage being purchased by respondent. Claimant said he was paid by hour, furnished tools, and expected to be job for a month. Respondent disputed claim. Trial Commissioner found claimant credible and awarded benefits. CRB upheld award. Facts on record sufficient to find employer-employee relationship despite respondent’s argument claimant was independent contractor or casual employee. See also Vignali, § 31-275(9), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant injured while working on roof and asserted he was employee of respondent. Respondent argued claimant was independent contractor. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and found he was employee. Respondent appealed citing Latimer v. Administrator, 216 Conn. 237 (1990). CRB upheld trial commissioner. Controlling precedent is Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998) which calls for a “totality of the factors” test. Sufficient probative evidence was presented on record to sustain trial commissioner’s conclusion. See also, Cruz, § 31-275(9), § 31-288(c), § 31-301. Factual findings.

See also, Brockenberry, § 31-275(9), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.

Claimant injured at construction site. Respondent argued that claimant was only employed by an LLC at time of injury and that Commissioner did not have jurisdiction over him personally. CRB upheld trial commissioner who found liability. Commissioner did not find respondent a credible witness. Record showed respondent treated the maintenance of proper corporate formality as a casual matter and all firms enumerated in award acted as an alter ego of respondent. See also, Caus, § 31-275(9), § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-355(b).

Claimant worked as “chopper” for timber harvesting business and injured on job. Trial commissioner finding of independent contractor status affirmed by the CRB. See also, Jordan, § 31-275(9), § 31-301. Factual findings.

See also, Ojeda, § 31-275(9), § 31-355.

See Schleidt, § 31-275(9), § Sec. 31-301. Appeal procedure.

See Jacobs, § 31- 275(9), § 31- 284(a), § 31-291, § 31-301.Appeal procedure, § 31-355(a), § 31-355(b).

See, Rodriguez, § 31-275(10), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Badawieh v. Federal Express Corp., 5240 CRB-7-07-6 (September 4, 2008), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 30358 (January 15, 2009).

See Badawieh, § 31-310, § 31-275( 9).

See also Maskowsky § 31-275(9); § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Claimant suffered amputation of finger of non-master hand while operating machine at respondent’s shop. Respondent asserted claimant was independent contractor. Trial commissioner found respondent exercised “right of general control” over claimant’s work as per Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998). CRB upheld Finding and Award on appeal. While means of payment were consistent with independent contractor status, respondent told claimant when he could work and owned the machines he worked on; thus trial commissioner properly applied Hanson test. See also, Kocur, § 31-275(9), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Claimant suffered injury while delivering packages for respondent Express Courier. Trial commissioner dismissed claim finding based on precedent in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998) and Dupree v. Masters, 39 Conn. App. 929 (1995); evidence supported finding of independent contractor status. CRB upheld dismissal on appeal. See also Parkman, § 31-275 (9).

See, Reeve, § 31-275(9), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.

See, Bardales, § 31-310 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation is not “employer” within meaning of § 31-275 or § 31-310 C.G.S.)

Personal care assistant injured while working at home of disabled client. Although State Department of Social Services funded service, employer of record was client. State regulations restricted claimant’s working hours to less than 26 hours per week. Trial commissioner concluded that client was actual employer, but believed public policy required finding that claimant was an employee under the Act. CRB reversed the finding that the claimant was covered under the Act. Evidence was that the claimant fell within the exception to coverage for part-time household employees under § 31-275 (9)(B)(iv). Board cannot reach a decision based on public policy concerns when statute is unambiguous, see § 1-2z C.G.S. See also, Muniz, § 31-275(9); § 31-278.

Evidence supported finding respondent was claimant’s employer. See also, Krupa, § 31-275(1); § 31-275(9); § 31-301. Factual findings; 31-307.

Testimony from claimant was deemed credible, and supported finding respondent was claimant’s employer. See also, Slater, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant was self-employed as sole proprietor of Marandino’s. Statute allows sole proprietor to accept provisions of Act by notifying commissioner in writing of his intent to do so. Here, form was not filed with commissioner, so claimant was not covered. Insurance company’s form providing that sole proprietor may elect to be covered could not reasonably be read to bind insurer to cover claimant. See also, Marandino, § 31-294c. Previous decision on motion to submit additional evidence at, Marandino, 3130 CRB-6-95-7 (June 4, 1996), in § 31-275(9) and § 31-301-9 notes.

Commissioner’s determination that Navy Yard exposure to asbestos affected development of claimant’s asbestosis did not amount to a finding that Navy Yard was an “employer” within the meaning of Workers’ Compensation Act. See also, Lowe, § 31-299b.

Russell v. R.N. Russell Welding, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 174, 1173 CRD-5-91-2 (September 1, 1992), aff’d, 226 Conn. 508 (1993).

See, Russell, § 31-275(9).

Altieri v. B.K.S. Excavating, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 1146 CRD-3-90-12 (April 10, 1992).

Reversed. Trier failed to allow S.I.F. the opportunity to litigate whether a potential principal employer liability claim existed pursuant to § 31-291. The fact that the trial commissioner found B.K.S. Excavating the uninsured employer does not eliminate the need to fully litigate and hear evidence regarding a possible § 31-291 principal employer claim. See also, Altieri, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-291 and § 31-355(b).

Chodkowski v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 4, 736 CRD-3-88-5 (December 18, 1989).

The federal government is not an employer under the Act. See also, Chodkowski, § 31-310.

McCully v. Kratzer, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 29, 396 CRD-3-85 (March 29, 1988).

Trial commissioner did not err in finding respondent was the claimant’s employer where respondent was the sole shareholder of corporation doing business under an assumed name and said corporation issued paychecks and W-2 forms to claimant in corporation’s name. Higdon v. James O’Connell Moving Service, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 392 CRD-2-85 (February 27, 1987). Remanded for further proceedings to determine if wife cloaked with authority to re-hire claimant while husband, former employer, was incarcerated.

CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-275(10)

Employer.