Jones v. Middletown Manufacturing

The respondent employer was represented by Vincent Marino, Esq., 800 Plaza Middlesex, Middletown, CT 06457.

This Petition for Review from the August 29, 1991 Finding and Dismissal of Sec. 31-290a claim of the Commissioner at Large acting for the Eighth District was heard June 26, 1992 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Chairman, Jesse Frankl and Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and James Metro.

OPINION

JESSE FRANKL, CHAIRMAN. The claimant has petitioned for review from the Commissioner at Large acting for the Eighth District’s August 29, 1991 Finding and Dismissal of Sec. 31-290a1 claim. Sec. 31-290a prohibits an employer from terminating an employee or otherwise discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee’s pursuit of his or her rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

In Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (decided December 4, 1992) this tribunal concluded that it lacked the requisite statutory jurisdiction to consider appeals relating to Sec. 31-290a2 claims on the basis of the text in 31-290a(b)2 . We think Rondini compels us to conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the instant appeal.

We also note that the claimant has failed to file a Motion to Correct, Reasons of Appeal, or brief and did not appear at oral argument. Assuming arguendo, we had jurisdiction over the instant matter and with full cognizance of the claimant’s pro se status, we think the instant matter is dismissable on the basis of claimant’s failure to prosecute with due diligence. See Practice Book Sec. 4005.

Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and James Metro concur.

1 Sec. 31-290a(a) provides: No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. BACK TO TEXT

2 Sec. 31-290a(b) provides: Any employee who is so discharged or discriminated against may either: (1) Bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the employer has its principal office for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other damages caused by such discrimination or discharge. The court may also award punitive damages. Any employee who prevails in such a civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be taxed by the court: or (2) file a complaint with the chairman of the workers’ compensation commission alleging violation of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Upon receipt of any such complaint, the chairman shall select a commissioner to hear the complaint, provided any commissioner who has previously rendered any decisions concerning the claim shall be excluded. The hearing shall be held in the workers’ compensation district where the employer has its principal office. After the hearing, the commissioner shall send each party a written copy of his decision. The commissioner may award the employee the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he otherwise would have been eligible if he had not been discriminated against or discharged. Any employee who prevails in such a complaint shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees. Any party aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner may appeal the decision to the appellate court. BACK TO TEXT