Sec. 31-284. Basic rights and liabilities. Civil action to enjoin noncomplying employer from entering into employment contracts. Notice of availability of compensation. (a) An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.
(b) Each employer who does not furnish to the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission satisfactory proof of his solvency and financial ability to pay directly to injured employees or other beneficiaries compensation provided by this chapter shall insure his full liability under this chapter, other than his liability for assessments pursuant to sections 31-345 and 31-354 in one of the following ways: (1) By filing with the Insurance Commissioner in form acceptable to him security guaranteeing the performance of the obligations of this chapter by the employer; or (2) by insuring his full liability under this part, exclusive of any liability resulting from the terms of section 31-284b, in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state; or (3) by any combination of the methods provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection as he may choose, subject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. If the employer fails to comply with the requirements of this subsection, an employee may bring an action against such employer for damages on account of personal injury sustained by such employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, except that there shall be no liability under this section to an individual on the part of the employer if such individual held himself out to the employer as an independent contractor and the employer, in good faith, relied on that representation as well as other indicia of such status and classified such individual as an independent contractor. In case of an alleged noncompliance with the provisions of this subsection, a certificate of noncompliance under oath, by the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, shall constitute prima facie evidence of noncompliance.
(c) Each employer who does not furnish to the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission satisfactory proof of his solvency and financial ability to pay directly to the State Treasurer the assessments required in sections 31-345 and 31-354 shall insure his full liability for the assessments in one of the following ways: (1) By filing with the Insurance Commissioner in form acceptable to him security guaranteeing the payment of the assessments by the employer; (2) by insuring his full liability for the assessments in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state; or (3) by any combination of the methods provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection as he may choose, subject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. The payment of the assessments required under sections 31-345 and 31-354 is a condition of doing business in this state and failure to pay the assessments, when due, shall result in the denial of the privilege of doing business in this state or to self-insure under subsections (b) and (c) of this section. If the liability for the assessments is insured, the insurance shall be by endorsement to a policy meeting all of the requirements of the Insurance Commissioner, or by a separate policy insuring the liability for the assessments, and otherwise meeting all of the requirements of the Insurance Commissioner. In the case of any employer who files acceptable security guaranteeing the liability for the assessments, failure to pay the assessments, when due, shall result in the denial of the privilege to self-insure under subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
(d) Any employer to whom a certificate of self-insurance has been issued pursuant to this section who fails or is unable to pay any compensation mandated by the provisions of this chapter, thereby requiring payment from the Second Injury Fund pursuant to section 31-355, shall be prohibited from self-insuring his liability under this chapter for a period of ten years from the date of the payment. The employer shall be required during the ten-year period to insure his full liability under this part, exclusive of any liability resulting from the terms of section 31-284b, in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state. Failure to so insure his liability shall result in the denial of the privilege of doing business in this state.
(e) Whenever an employer fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford to enjoin the employer, until such time as he fully complies with such requirements, from entering into any contracts of employment as a result of which he will employ additional employees.
(f) Each employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall post, in a conspicuous place, a notice of the availability of compensation, in type of not less than ten-point boldface. The notice shall contain, at a minimum, the information required by regulations adopted pursuant to section 31-279.
(1949 Rev., S. 7417, 7418, 7419, 7453, 7461; 1949, S. 3038d, 3050d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-148, 31-149, 31-150, 31-180, 31-189; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 1—3, 15, 17, 20, 21; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 10; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 4; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 202, 348; P.A. 82-398, S. 2; P.A. 85-184, S. 2; 85-189, S. 1; 85-349, S. 1; P.A. 86-165; 86-403, S. 64, 132; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 91-32, S. 7, 41; 91-339, S. 11, 55; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4—6; P.A. 96-65, S. 1; 96-216, S. 2, 5.)
History: 1959 act increased fine from $100 to $250, required that fines be paid over to second injury and assurance fund or its successor and replaced references to specific sections, parts, etc. with references to chapter; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act added proviso protecting employee’s right to secure additional benefits from employer in Subsec. (a); P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within the department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that same department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 reinstated insurance division as an independent department with commissioner as its head following abolition of department of business regulation; P.A. 82-398 excluded liability resulting from terms of Sec. 31-284b in Subsec. (b)(2); P.A. 85-184 amended Subsec. (b) to require that proof of solvency be filed by employers with the board of compensation commissioners, rather than with an individual commissioner; P.A. 85-189 added Subsec. (c), which establishes the liability of employers for the assessments required for the various funds under workers’ compensation, and permits the purchasing of insurance for such liabilities; P.A. 85-349 added Subsec. (d), which prohibits employers from self-insuring their workers’ compensation liability for 10 years if payment from the second injury fund has been required; P.A. 86-165 added Subsec. (e), empowering the attorney general to bring a civil action to enjoin any employer who doesn’t comply with the issuance requirements of the section from entering into new employment contracts; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (c); P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes and added Subsec. (f) re notice of the availability of compensation; P.A. 91-339 changed “board of compensation commissioners” to “chairman of the workers’ compensation commission” and made technical changes; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-65 amended Subsec. (a) to exempt employers who comply with the requirements of Subsec. (b) from liability and amended Subsec. (b) to allow an employee to bring an action against an employer who fails to comply with the subsection, replacing provision imposing $1,000 fine; P.A. 96-216 amended Subsec. (b) to change the penalty for an employer from a fine to the penalties in Subsecs. (c) and (d) of Sec. 31-288, effective June 4, 1996, but failed to take effect, P.A. 96-65 having deleted the penalty provision in its entirety.
An employee seeking workmen’s compensation has burden of proving that he sustained an injury, not merely in the course of his employment, but arising out of, that is, caused by his employment. 150 C. 328. Burden of proving injury sustained in course of employment on claimant. 151 C. 430. Cited. 153 C. 410; 156 C. 280, 281. Persons employed by board of education deemed town employees. 164 C. 65. Summary judgment for defendant employer sustained where plaintiff employee, injured while parking his car in the employees parking lot by a fellow employee driving the employer’s truck, had claimed and been paid benefits pursuant to Workmen’s Compensation Act. 167 C. 621. Cited. 169 C. 646; 175 C. 174. To be compensable, injury must, inter alia, occur while employee is reasonably fulfilling duties of employment or engaged in activity incidental to it; activity is incidental if regularly engaged in on employer’s premises within period of employment, with employer’s approval and acquiescence. 176 C. 547. Cited. 178 C. 371; 179 C. 662; 183 C. 508; 185 C. 616; 189 C. 671; Id., 701. Court declined to extend an exception to statute to include injuries to employees resulting from “intentional” or “willful” or “reckless” violation by employees of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws such as OSHA. 196 C. 91. Cited. 203 C. 34; 204 C. 104; 206 C. 495; 212 C. 138; Id., 427; Id., 814; 219 C. 439; 221 C. 465; 223 C. 336; 229 C. 99; 237 C. 1; 238 C. 285; 242 C. 255. Maximum $10,000 penalty imposed on first-time offender who failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance coverage for single employee within first two weeks of employee’s engagement deemed excessive. 244 C. 781. Purpose. 245 C. 66. Exculpatory agreements in the employment context violate Connecticut public policy. 280 C. 494. Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendants intended to injure him or that they knew or believed that his injury was substantially certain to occur as a result of their conduct, including their violation of certain safety and labor regulations. 300 C. 733. Employee of municipal animal control district created under Sec. 7-330 was employee of member municipalities because member municipalities created, controlled and wholly funded the district, therefore act provided the exclusive remedy for employee’s injuries. 304 C. 462.
Cited. 3 CA 16; Id., 547; 5 CA 193. By granting immunity to employees from loss of consortium suits, statute does not violate due process clause of federal or state constitutions. Id., 369. Cited. 7 CA 296; 10 CA 618; 15 CA 615; 16 CA 660. Bars receipt of uninsured motorist’s benefits by plaintiff in receipt of workers’ compensation benefits from same circumstances. 19 CA 169. Cited. 24 CA 739; 25 CA 492; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 744. Does not bar employee in receipt of compensation benefits from also obtaining uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits reduced by compensation benefits paid or payable. Id., 651; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 769. Cited. 27 CA 800; 30 CA 630; 34 CA 521; 44 CA 1; 46 CA 346. Section, absent an exception, bars plaintiff from claiming underinsured motorist coverage under his employer’s policy despite fact that he is a named insured. 87 CA 416.
Cited. 27 CS 280. Action in negligence, against insurer of employer who has paid compensation to plaintiff employee for failure of insurer to inspect dangerous machinery in shop, is precluded by merger of identities of employer and insurer and policy of workmen’s compensation acts. 28 CS 1. Cited. 30 CS 126. An employer cannot be sued as a joint tortfeasor by a third party whom his employee is suing for negligence, absent a separate contractual relation with third party. 31 CS 322. The Workmen’s Compensation Act is not a bar to indemnity where such a right can be predicated on some legal relationship between the third party and employer giving rise to a duty on the part of the employer to the third party which is either contractually or tortiously breached. 32 CS 96. Cited. 38 CS 359; Id., 607; 39 CS 408; 42 CS 168.
Cited. 176 C. 320; 179 C. 215. Personal injuries are compensable under workers’ compensation when incurred while walking from employer-furnished transportation to employer-furnished lodging. Id., 501. Cited. 189 C. 550; 196 C. 529. Did not bar plaintiff administrator’s wrongful death action where minor illegally hired in violation of public policy; 131 C. 157 overruled to the extent inconsistent. 203 C. 34. Cited. Id., 324; 205 C. 219; 208 C. 589; 209 C. 59; 218 C. 531; 220 C. 721; 221 C. 356. Construing uninsured motorist coverage as “exception” to workers’ compensation act is irreconcilable with language of section; judgment of appellate court in 25 CA 492 reversed. 222 C. 744. Section bars work-related claim for uninsured motorist benefits under insurance policy procured by employer including employer’s personal automobile liability insurance; judgment of appellate court in 25 CA 651 reversed. Id., 769. Cited. Id., 775; 223 C. 917; 226 C. 282; Id., 404; 227 C. 333; 234 C. 51; 235 C. 790. Employee not barred from recovering uninsured motorist coverage benefits against employer’s insurer in regard to accident occurring prior to effective date of P.A. 93-297. 238 C. 285. P.A. 93-297 cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 694. Limitation on remedies under tort law is appropriate trade-off for benefits provided by workers’ compensation. 252 C. 215. Tort actions for emotional injuries that are not compensable under act are not barred by exclusivity provisions of act. 259 C. 729. Cause of action in tort against insurer for bad faith processing of compensation claim barred by exclusivity provision of section, and remedies are limited to those afforded under Secs. 31-288(b) and 31-300. 273 C. 487. Plaintiff’s assertion that intentional tort exception to section was applicable because defendant intentionally failed to correct several dangerous conditions which led to death of employee who was struck and killed after being sent to cut grass under roller coaster failed because evidence was not sufficient to establish intent to create an injury-causing situation. 277 C. 113. Assignment of plaintiff’s CUTPA action to an estate would transform the action into a wrongful death action that is barred by the exclusivity provision of Workers’ Compensation Act. 289 C. 1.
Cited. 2 CA 363; 3 CA 40; 6 CA 60; 28 CA 660; 32 CA 16; 45 CA 324; 46 CA 699. Employee is barred from bringing negligence claim against employer. 52 CA 1. Court applied standard of “substantial causative factor” to the affirmative defense of willful and serious misconduct, declining to apply a standard of “sole proximate cause”. 56 CA 215. Exception to exclusive remedy provision of Subsec. did not apply where plaintiff’s complaint did not allege that city of New Haven intended to injure plaintiff or that the city directed or authorized city employee to injure plaintiff. 92 CA 558. Defendants’ ordering deceased employees to enter oxygen-deficient manhole without safety equipment did not constitute willful misconduct because plaintiffs failed to establish substantial certainty of decedents’ deaths or that defendants knew of dangers of confined space entry. 100 CA 781. Although exclusivity provision speaks solely in terms of employers, the Supreme Court has extended provision’s protection in the context of the workers’ compensation claims process to insurers and third party administrators, therefore plaintiff’s action against “independent third party” is barred. 122 CA 230. Intoxication of the employee as cause of injury remains, as it has for nearly 100 years, an affirmative defense with the burden of proof resting on the employer. 136 CA 258.
Not a bar to an action for indemnification by a bailee against an employer where the action is based on breach of a warranty of fitness under the bailment contract. 32 CS 210. Cited. Id., 213. Breach of an independent duty is sufficient to overcome the defense based on the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Id., 214. In absence of special relationship, workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy against an employer. 35 CS 268. Cited. 38 CS 324; 39 CS 250. Police officer struck by uninsured motorist while directing traffic in course of his employment was not “occupying” a motor vehicle for purposes of Sec. 38a-336(f) and is therefore limited to workers’ compensation benefits. 51 CS 326; judgment affirmed, see 117 CA 656.