[Formerly § 31-351]
THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.
The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.
Barbieri v. Comfort and Care of Wallingford, LLC, 5794 CRB-8-12-10 (September 26, 2013).
Claimant injured while employed as companion to elderly client. Employer said they would pay medical bills but did not so and laid off claimant while disabled. Firm later sold. Trial commissioner found claimant suffered compensable injury and found employer uninsured, and levied order on Second Injury Fund to pay award. Second Injury Fund appealed, arguing they had sought to make employer’s principal liable for award as alter ego of employer and to impose liability on employer’s successor firm. Trial commissioner did not rule on these motions. On appeal, CRB remanded to trial commissioner to determine whether facts warranted piercing the corporate veil. See also, Barbieri, § 31-275(1); § 31-355(b).
Ojeda v. Forty-Five Pool Services, 5387 CRB-4-8-10 (September 8, 2009).
See also, Ojeda, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10).
Jacobs v. James Dwy d/b/a New Home Exteriors, 5327 CRB-5-08-3 (May 28, 2009).
See, Jacobs, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10), § 31-284(a), § 31-291, § 31- 301. Appeal procedure, § 31-355(b).
Matey v. Dember, 3153 CRB-5-95-8 (January 10, 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 256 Conn. 456 (2001).
Commissioner did not have authority to order payment from Fund until award was first made against employer, and not paid. Case remanded to trial commissioner for entry of such an order. Supreme Court, in n.11 of its opinion, stated that there was no clear basis for CRB’s finding that an award had not been entered against employer, though such an order is generally necessary before Fund may be ordered to pay. See also, Matey, § 31-301. Appeal procedure and § 31-315. Prior decision at Matey, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 104, 516 CRD-5-86 (June 14, 1988), appeal dismissed, 210 Conn. 626 (1989)(per curiam), § 31-278, § 31-310, Matey, 1189 CRD-5-91-3 (April 5, 1991), § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Subsequent decision at Matey, 3848 CRB-7-98-6 (July 7, 1999), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 256 Conn. 456 (2001), § 31-355(b), Matey, 4488 CRB-7-02-2, 4532 CRB-5-02-5 (May 14, 2003), appeal dismissed for failure to comply with Supreme Court’s directive, 85 Conn. App. 198 (2004).
Powers v. Savage, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 178, 892 CRD-4-89-7 (November 30, 1990).
See, Kluttz v. Howard, infra.
Kluttz v. Howard, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 51, 664 CRD-4-87 (March 8, 1990).
Reversed where trial commissioner erred in not allowing the Second Injury Fund, the real party in interest, to participate in proceedings below involving jurisdictional issues.
Cordero v. Ramon Sanchez, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 760 CRD-6-88-8 (December 28, 1989).
Notice is a necessary prerequisite for jurisdiction. Sec. 31-351 mandates that the Second Injury Fund be notified of hearings on matters for which it may be liable.
Sorbello v. Gagnon, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 567 CRD-6-87 (August 12, 1988).
Trial commissioner should not issue order against Second Injury Fund for the liability of a dissolved corporation where the Fund did not receive notice of hearing.