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[Repealed]
Gyadu v. D’Addario Industries, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 3058 CRB-4-96-3 (May 2, 1997), appeal dismissed, A.C. 17260 (September 11, 1997), motion for reconsideration denied (October 24, 1997), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 961 (1998).
Claimant alleged entitlement to dependency allowance based on his responsibility for each of two nephews residing in Ghana, Africa. Said duty allegedly springs from an unwritten tribal custom that made him the children’s caretaker when their mother, his sister, died four months before the claimant’s compensable wrist injury. Trier found that the claimant offered insufficient evidence to prove that these children were his “children or stepchildren” within the meaning of the statute, e.g., guardianship documents or evidence of actual support. Affirmed. The legal definitions of “child” and “stepchild” do not contemplate the type of relationship the claimant is alleging with his nephews here. A statutory adoption process of some type would be necessary absent a biological parent-child relationship with the children.
Crook v. Academy Drywall Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 848 CRD-4-89-4 (September 21, 1990), aff’d, 219 Conn. 28 (1991).
Section 31-308b permits payment of dependency benefits at time of birth to a child conceived before the date of injury but born afterwards.
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