CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-307

Claimant was entitled total disability award, as issue was properly addressed by commissioner. Jurisdictional argument over “sick time” reimbursement implicitly involved total disability finding, and claimant’s lack of work capacity was not in question at time trial briefs were submitted. Given absence of strict pleading rules, listing of various issues in hearing notices that bespoke recognition of entitlement to total disability compensation allowed trier to make such an award. See, Regan, § 31-278, § 31-300.

CRB explained for benefit of pro se claimant that she was not entitled to total disability benefits during period of time where she worked light duty hours and received wage differential benefits under § 31-308(a), regardless of her belief that, in hindsight, doctor might have better served her medical needs by declaring her totally disabled. See, Duddy, § 31-296. Discontinuance of payments; § 31-298; § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding as to the claimant’s period of total disability due to a cerebral vascular accident. CRB also affirmed amount of attorney’s fee award for undue delay. See, Arcano, § 31-301 Factual findings, 31-300.

Trier found claimant totally disabled from effective date of her resignation of employment, rather than date of injury. Though doctors pronounced her totally disabled, claimant in fact performed work from her home, for which she was paid, through date of resignation. CRB agreed that claimant who is performing job duties cannot be fairly labeled as being totally disabled from that job. See, Prescott, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-310.

Trial commissioner permissibly disregarded vocational report of Easter Seals, to whom claimant had been sent by Division of Workers’ Rehabilitation, without explaining his reasons for doing so. Much as a trier may disregard a § 31-294f examiner’s report, trier here was entitled to credit reports by physician and vocational rehabilitation specialist that identified jobs that the claimant was able to perform despite his severe master hand injury. Ultimately, claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, as CRB cannot undo trier’s factfinding discretion.

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s heel and ankle injuries rendered him totally disabled, based upon his medical condition and the report of a vocational specialist. No need to perform work searches given claimant’s pain level and the restrictions inherent in his daily lifestyle. Finding of permanent total disability pursuant to § 31-307(c)(2) reversed, however, as claimant still retained limited use of his feet.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that mentally retarded sufferer of cerebral palsy with compensable hip injury was totally disabled, even though he was able to perform piece work at rehabilitation center. CRB distinguished fitness for light duty job in competitive job market from participation in rehabilitative workshop that offers social and counseling opportunities to mentally retarded clients, while also allowing them to do piece work for a fraction of the minimum wage. Trier was entitled to conclude that claimant had no true earning capacity. See, Covaleski, § 31-294d, § 31-296 Voluntary agreements: discontinuance of payments.

No error in finding that heart attack victim who returned to work after three months of recovery and rehabilitation was entitled to total disability benefits right up until the day he was cleared by doctor to return to full duty. Trier need not apply hindsight by reasoning that claimant must have been capable of light duty work for at least a few weeks before returning to state trooper duties. See, Fuessenich, § 29-4a, § 31-308(b).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that the Social Security offset provision of § 31-307(e) does not apply where the claimant’s date of injury was before the July 1, 1993 effective date of the statute, irrespective of when a given period of disability began. Section 31-307(e) made a substantive change in the law, and neither the statute nor its legislative history contains anything that would rebut the presumption of § 55-3 C.G.S. that such a statute applies only prospectively.

Board affirmed trier’s award of § 31-307 benefits despite respondents’ argument on appeal that videotape showed claimant to be less disabled than she presented herself to be. Board explained that trier specifically addressed issue of video tapes in his findings, including findings that two doctors viewed said tapes and did not alter opinion that claimant was totally disabled. Also, respondents argued it was improper to award total disability benefits beyond the date of the last formal hearing, however, board explained that a trier may award ongoing benefits, with explanation of legal reasoning.

Board remanded case to trier for articulation due to apparent discrepancy where trier, despite finding trial commissioner examiner’s opinion that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled to be credible and persuasive, did not award temporary total disability benefits. See Fantasia, § 31-301, Factual findings.

See, Fusciello, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Board affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant was not temporarily totally disabled where her treating physician opined that she was physically capable of light duty employment.

See, Rayhall, § 31-278 (CRB unable to review constitutionality of § 31-307(e)), § 31-295, § 31-298; also cited at Rayhall, § 31-308(b).

Board affirmed trier’s award of four weeks of temporary total disability benefits. Claimant argued that she was not told by treater that she was released to light duty work. Trier’s determination was supported by deposition testimony of treater, and thus board affirmed said determination. See, LaPierre, § 31-296 and 31-308(a).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for total disability benefits, as trier was not bound to credit opinions of physicians who thought claimant to be totally disabled. Burden of proof remained on claimant to persuade trier that his evidence was credible. See, D’Amico, § 31-301-9. Prior decision in D’Amico, 4029 CRB-5-99-4 (May 19, 2000), cited at § 31-294d.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that, absent specific statutory permission to suspend benefits, an incarcerated claimant remained entitled to receive total disability benefits as long as he can prove continuing absence of work capacity via medical evidence. Lengthy decision; nature of total disability benefits and other states’ decisions discussed in-depth. DISSENT (Mastropietro): Claimant was incarcerated for voluntary act; thus, he has removed himself from labor marketplace. With no work legally available for him anywhere, claimant cannot be deemed “totally disabled” from any given job. Situation of illegal alien distinguished.

See, Audi, § 31-298 (insufficient notice that total disability at issue); § 31-301-9, § 31-315. Also cited at Audi, § 31-296 voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments).

The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant was not totally disabled. The trial commissioner in the incorporated the findings and conclusions of a prior decision (which had not been appealed) into his decision. In that prior decision, the trial commissioner concluded that the claimant’s work-related injuries were not a substantial cause of his inability to work. Subsequently, the trial commissioner in the instant case reviewed the evidence, and concluded that the claimant had failed to sustain his burden of proof that there had been a substantial change in his medical condition with regard to his compensable work-related injuries.

See, Donaldson, § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-301 Factual findings (trier not bound to find claimant permanently disabled due to incurable mental illness).

Nine-month gap in claimant’s visits to treating physician did not prevent commissioner from finding that he was totally disabled during that span of time. Trier was entitled to credit doctor’s opinion that claimant’s condition had not changed based on his familiarity with claimant’s symptoms and history, and the claimant’s own testimony regarding his reasons for not returning promptly to treat.

No error in trial commissioner’s denial of total disability benefits, as he was not persuaded by claimant’s evidence due to inconsistencies in doctor’s testimony. See also, Wierzbicki, § 31-294c, § 31-300.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant was totally disabled on account of knee injury. Medical evidence in record strongly supported that conclusion, even though no discussion of the matter occurred on the record at trial. CRB ruled that disability issue was subsumed within more general question of compensability of psychiatric condition that allegedly stemmed from accepted knee injury. See also, Vetre, § 31-297, § 31-298, § 31-300. Prior decisions in Vetre, 3948 CRB-6-98-12 (February 14, 2000), § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, and Vetre, 3443 CRB-6-96-10 (January 16, 1998), § 31-298.

Record offered sufficient support for early portion of total disability award, as trier had discretion to rely on a particular doctor’s office notes. However, that one-time diagnosis could not sustain four-plus years of total disability, which is a matter of continuing proof. Lack of updated medical reports required CRB to reverse the majority of the award. CRB found no error in trier’s award of benefits dating back to February 1994, where a formal hearing was held in December 1994 on a previous total disability claim. Transcripts, prior award supported trier’s determination that the scope of the previous hearing only concerned total disability through date of October 1992 Form 36. Trier may expand scope of hearing to include total incapacity through present date, but he is not required to do so where parties agree to limit issues. See also, Brown, § 31-298; cited at § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments). Prior decision in Brown, 3100 CRB-2-95-6 (December 23, 1996), § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), also cited at § 31-298.

CRB remanded award of temporary total disability benefits to trial commissioner for clarification where the claimant admitted during his testimony that he returned to work during this period. Medical reports were unclear regarding his disability status, and appeared to indicate that the claimant was partially disabled rather than totally disabled. See also, Gagliardi, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Board affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant continued to be temporarily totally disabled due to her numerous physical restrictions, her need to lie down during the day, and her narcotic pain medication. Trier further found that claimant had a restricted employment history, and had been out of the work force for sixteen years. See also, Agosto, § 31-294f.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant did not meet her burden of proof regarding her claim that she had been totally disabled since 1960. See also, Wlodyka, § 31-298.

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant was no longer totally disabled. Although two physicians testified that he was totally disabled, it was within the discretion of the trier to rely upon the opinion of the physician who testified with reasonable medical probability that the claimant had a work capacity.

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant was temporarily totally disabled after reaching maximum medical improvement. CRB remanded matter to trial commissioner for an order reducing the payment of benefits in accordance with § 31-307(e), which requires that compensation paid to an employee for total incapacity be reduced while he is entitled to receive old age insurance benefits pursuant to the federal Social Security Act.

Trier found claimant was totally disabled from date of her 1991 mental stress injury through January 1994. Respondent argued on appeal that the record did not support his conclusion, as claimant attended school and student-taught during that time. CRB affirmed finding of total disability; claimant’s ability to achieve academic goals and accept certain responsibilities was not solely determinative of work capacity. Psychiatric difficulties left claimant without the autonomy of a normal adult, and there was evidence to indicate that claimant was not prepared to cope with the pressure of returning to the workplace. Claimant’s request for benefits from employer’s “sick leave bank” was not an admission that her disability was not work-related, and it was unclear that the trier had jurisdiction over the issue of reimbursement given the lack of evidence regarding claimant’s union contract, its ancillary nature to the issue of disability, and the limited nature of the proceedings, which were held pursuant to a remand. See prior decision in Bailey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 433, 3152 CRB-5-95-8 (September 3, 1996), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings. Trier’s award of § 31-284b insurance benefits and medical bills was affirmed, however, as entitlement to those benefits was part of her total disability status; no further proof was needed. See also, Bailey, § 31-300; also cited at Bailey, § 31-284b, § 31-294b, § 31-301. Factual findings. Prior decision in Bailey, 3694 CRB-1-97-9 (January 12, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

CRB affirmed trier’s decision that respondent was temporarily totally disabled due to a compensable injury. Board noted that the medical evidence presented by the claimant was “not extremely enlightening” regarding his fitness for any type of reasonable employment. However, respondents presented no evidence to the contrary. Record sufficed to support trier’s decision. See also, Murray, § 31-275(9), § 31-294d.

CRB affirmed trier’s decision claimant was totally disabled for 14-month period in 1994-95. Though neither of the doctors relied upon by the trier directly addressed the period of total disability, it was reasonable to extrapolate from their testimony that claimant suffered from severe, disabling headaches that occurred frequently, and that his right arm injury was severe enough to prevent him from obtaining employment. Claimant, who suffered memory problems due to head injury, testified uncertainly that he thought he had worked during some of the total disability period, but trier was not required to rely on that testimony. See also, Garcia, § 31-308(b).

CRB affirmed trier’s denial of temporary total disability. Where medical evidence is conflicting, decision is one of fact for trial commissioner. See also, Trimachi, § 31-294d; cited at Trimachi, § 31-279(c).

Krevis v. Bridgeport, 3857 CRB-4-98-7 (August 18, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 328 (2001).

Claimant argued that respondent should be estopped from contesting total disability claim, because respondent obtained waiver of claimant’s life insurance premium from the carrier on the ground the claimant was totally disabled under the contract. Trier found that the standards of disability were different, and dismissed that argument. CRB affirmed. It was not patently unreasonable for the respondent to take differing positions regarding total disability where the definition of total disability was less stringent under the insurance contract. Further, claimant did not show that he detrimentally relied on the respondents’ position regarding total disability. See also, Krevis, § 7-433c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Award of total disability benefits beyond February 16, 1997 was undone where CRB reversed finding that February 1997 broken leg was related to compensable back injury of August 1996, and there was no medical evidence that the back injury played a part in any disability after that date. See also, Dengler, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-348.

Respondents contended that claimant’s total disability was caused by her pre-existing hip and left leg condition rather than by the injuries sustained during a compensable fall at work. Board affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant’s total disability was caused by the compensable fall, as this was a factual issue and was supported by the record and by the findings of fact.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s temporary total disability ceased on August 18, 1996, and that his temporary partial disability ceased on October 1, 1996. Determination of the claimant’s periods of disability was dependent upon the weight and credibility of the testimony, including medical evidence, and thus was a matter for the trier as the finder of fact. See also, Rhodes, § 31-308(a).

Trial commissioner found claimant to be totally disabled, reversing decision of another commissioner at emergency informal hearing on Form 36. However, the trial commissioner explicitly found the opinions of two doctors who thought that the claimant could work more credible than the conflicting opinions, and also found that the claimant did not introduce evidence to show that he needed vocational retraining or other special assistance before returning to work. CRB held that the facts did not support a conclusion of total disability, and reversed.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s award of ongoing temporary total disability benefits, despite the claimant’s failure to conduct a work search. Although the claimant may have had a theoretical light duty capability, the commissioner found that her physical restrictions, age, limited education, and lack of transferable skills collectively rendered her labor unmarketable. This conclusion is supported by the opinions of her treating physician and a vocational rehabilitation specialist.

Existence of continuing total disability is a question of fact, and trier was not required to deem credible the medical reports offered by the claimant in support of his claim for continued total disability following maximum medical improvement.

The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant, who sustained a compensable aggravation of her asthma, was temporarily totally disabled. Under the circumstances of this case, including the claimant’s repeated asthma attacks, the opinion of her treating physician that she could not work unrestricted while construction was being done at her place of employment, and the employer’s decision not to allow her to work, it was reasonable for the trial commissioner to infer that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled. In addition, the CRB held that the employer’s request for a reduction of payments (offset) under the employer’s disability plan should be pursued in another forum.

The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant continued to be temporarily totally disabled after reaching maximum medical improvement, even though claimant may have been able to perform “some type of work.”

Trier found that claimant had not been temporarily totally disabled since 1987. Affirmed. Total disability is a question of fact, and the trier found that the claimant had not established that he lacked a light duty capability or the background to take advantage of it. Trier can conclude that work searches are unnecessary given a claimant’s individual circumstances, but is not required to forgo proof that employment cannot be obtained. Here, commissioner’s examiner testified that claimant could work, and the commissioner was not persuaded that the claimant would be unable to find a job that did not involve heavy physical labor. See also, Fusciello, § 31-301. Appeal procedure (no Motion to Correct filed).

Trial commissioner’s denial of continued temporary total disability benefits was based upon the record, and was affirmed by CRB. See also, Degiacomo § 31-307, § 31-308a.

Disability status of a claimant at any given time is a question of fact. Here, trier was entitled to rely on medical report attributing claimant’s unemployability to her psychological state, which was not clearly related to her compensable back injury. See also, Santala, § 31-296.

See, Campbell, § 31-299b, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant must prove total disability as point of fact. Claimant did not present evidence to rebut respondent’s claim that he was not totally disabled, respondent introduced videotape of the claimant working at his coin and jewelry shop on several occasions, and his earning records for the past three years included income from the store. Affirmed. See also, Curtiss, § 31-301. Appeal procedure (claimant failed to file Motion to Correct).

The trial commissioner concluded that the claimant failed to produce credible evidence of temporary total disability for the period from July 2, 1990 through April 10, 1995. CRB affirmed, as the determination was a question of fact for the trial commissioner. See also, Ruiz-Dugue, § 31-308(b) (c).

CRB concluded that the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant was no longer totally disabled was fully supported by the record, including an independent medical examiner’s report. See, Liano, § 31-294c, § 31-297; also cited at § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments). Subsequent decisions at Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999), § 31-300; Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999), § 7-433c; companion decision at Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-279-3, § 31-298, § 31-307; prior decision at Liano, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996), § 7-433b, § 31-300, § 31-310.

Total disability is a factual issue. Respondents presented no evidence to contradict doctor’s testimony that there was no meaningful trade the claimant could pursue. No error in finding of ongoing disability. See also, Barnett, § 31-294e.

See, Ryba, § 31-296 (existence of total disability is an issue of fact).

Dowling v. Slotnik, 3062 CRB-4-95-5, 3277 CRB-4-96-2 (February 5, 1997), aff’d, rev’d and remanded in part, 244 Conn. 781 (1998)(with dissenting opinion).

Fact that claimant was an illegal alien unable to obtain other employment in United States did not prevent her from qualifying for total disability benefits, although once she was medically able to work, she would no longer qualify. See also, Dowling, § 31-275(9), § 31-288, and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant was not temporarily totally disabled for a certain period. Issue was one of fact, and was supported by the record.

Respondents appealed commissioner’s denial of Form 36 on ground that evidence did not support continuation of temporary total disability benefits. Affirmed; total disability is a question of fact, and medical reports could be interpreted as establishing total disability. Commissioner not required to find residual light duty capability. (Tracy, C., dissenting) (insufficient evidence of disability).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury did not render him unable to work, and thus denied the claimant’s request for temporary total disability benefits pursuant to § 31-307 C.G.S. The trial commissioner found that following his injury the claimant continued working until his business closed due to financial difficulties. Furthermore, the claimant’s unrelated civil law suit was the cause of seventy percent of his mental stress, and was the cause of his inability to accept an employment offer.

Gerena v. Rockbestos Co., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 394, 1986 CRB-5-94-3 (October 17, 1995).

The respondents contended that the commissioner improperly awarded the claimant temporary total disability benefits pursuant to § 31-307 despite evidence that the claimant had a capacity to perform limited light duty work. CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision. The commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant was totally incapacitated was supported by the record, including: (1) pain of lower back; (2) the claimant’s physical limitations limit him to a sedentary desk job; (3) the claimant is over sixty years of age, and (4) the claimant has limited education and experience for desk jobs.

Hurley v. Bridgeport, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 366, 2037 CRB-4-94-5 (September 26, 1995).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of permanent partial award of the brain. A claimant’s reduced employability does not require an award of permanent partial disability. See also, Hurley, § 31-296.

In the instant case, the commissioner concluded that the claimant had “failed to produce credible evidence that he is in fact totally disabled from any occupation which his education, training, physical ability and experience might reasonably allow him to pursue,” and denied the claim for total disability. CRB affirmed, as the factual determination regarding the claimant’s alleged total disability was based upon the weight and credibility which the trial commissioner accorded the evidence.

Rose v. Hartford Hospital, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 249, 1980 CRB-1-94-3 (August 30, 1995).

Claimant is totally deaf and is close to illiterate. Practiced carpentry until suffering a 15 percent permanent partial disability of his back. Medical reports established light work capability, but doctor and vocational specialist thought claimant’s labor was in fact unmarketable. Commissioner found claimant totally disabled. Held, total disability and light duty capability are questions of fact for trial commissioner; record supports his findings. Work search advisable, but not specifically required in all cases. Also, no evidence to support reopening of voluntary agreement on ground that it was executed under duress; fact that claimant was totally disabled after June 29, 1993 did not require a finding of total disability before that date as well.

CRB remanded issue of temporary total award made by commissioner because number of weeks of total disability was not supported by the record. See also, Cotton, § 31-275(1).

Although factors cited by claimant, i.e. lack of fluency in English, fifth-grade education, etc., generally support total disability, report of vocational expert and some of the medical evidence suggested otherwise. Commissioner made reasonable factual determination.

Claimant’s entitlement to benefits under § 31-307(e) [now (c)] for total loss of use of legs is unaffected by future wage earning capacity. Claimant’s current employment did not prevent commissioner from properly awarding benefits.

Coutu v. Interroyal Corp., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 215, 1680 CRB-2-93-3 (April 12, 1995), appeal dismissed, A.C. 14694 (October 25, 1995).

Claimant injured in 1974, totally disabled in 1986. Claimant refused back surgery to ease pain. Was practically unemployable, although theoretically capable of light sedentary work. Second Injury Fund filed Form 36 to discontinue payment of total disability benefits, which commissioner approved. Commencement of specific award ordered. Held, existence of total disability is a factual question for the trier of fact; there was testimony that the claimant could do light sedentary work, and had no motivation to return.

Claimant received temporary total disability until 7/10/92 despite evidence that she reached maximum medical improvement on 1/15/92. Held, medical testimony existed to effect that claimant was totally disabled until 7/10/92; fact that maximum medical improvement may have been reached earlier irrelevant, as worker can reach maximum medical improvement and still be entitled to total disability benefits. No suggestion was made that claimant had requested payment of specific award as discussed in McCurdy v. State, 227 Conn. 261 (1993).

Santiago v. Metropolitan Insurance Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 388, 1631 CRB-6-93-1 (September 1, 1994), appeal dismissed (February 3, 1995).

Medical records and physician’s testimony support finding of total disability during period claimed. Approved Form 36 subsequently vacated by trial commissioner. See also, Santiago, § 31-296 and § 31-315.

Maerkle v. Triangle/PWC, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 384, 1572 CRB-2-92-11 (August 17, 1994).

The arbiter of whether a claimant is totally incapacitated is the trial commissioner. Where a hypothetical employment position appears to satisfy claimant’s physical needs, other pertinent evidence relied on by trier supports finding of total incapacity.

Madden v. Moore Special Tool, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 373, 1688 CRB-4-93-4 (August 12, 1994).

Although medical evidence as to incapacity to work was in conflict, determination that claimant was not totally disabled during period claimed was not without evidentiary support.

Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 341, 1542 CRB-1-92-10 (July 11, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 36 (1996).

Within power of trial commissioner to reject opinion of treating physician concerning period of total disability. See also, Cummings, § 31-296, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Orlando v. Makula, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 296, 1556 CRB-3-92-11 (June 13, 1994).

Temporary total benefits payable during period claimant delayed having knee surgery because employer refused to pay for surgery related to the compensable injury. See also, Orlando, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

Fusciello v. Ronnie Demeo, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 283, 1535 CRB-6-92-10 (June 7, 1994).

Evidence presented supports finding of total incapacity. However, CRB corrected trier’s finding of total incapacity beyond the last date claimant saw his treating physician as that finding is not supported by medical evidence. See also, Fusciello, § 31-275(1) and § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)].

Tessier v. Kogut Florist and Nurseryman, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 175, 1435 CRB-8-92-6 (May 2, 1994).

Trier’s post remand finding reversed. Factual findings state claimant was active in business during period of claimed total disability. As the destruction of claimant’s capacity to earn failed to exist, claimant was not totally disabled and must reimburse insurer for benefits paid. See, Tessier, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 276, 1088 CRD-8-90-7 (December 13, 1991).

Granoff v. New Haven, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 166, 1555 CRB-3-92-11 (April 29, 1994).

Temporary total disability benefits denied to school teacher disabled from teaching duties who actively continued to operate his own real estate agency during period he was disabled from teaching.

Prioleau v. Larosa Construction, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 140, 1432 CRB-8-92-6 (April 7, 1994).

Award for total disability affirmed where trier’s award is based on period after claimant received treatment although physician’s testimony supports a finding of total disability prior to receiving treatment. Trier’s inference was reasonable that claimant was not totally disabled prior to seeking treatment. See also, Prioleau, § 31-299b, § 31-308(b) and § 31-349.

Woznicki v. Meriden Yellow Cab, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 238, 1509 CRB-8-92-9 (March 28, 1994).

Where factual foundation for physician’s opinion that claimant was totally disabled was insufficient, commissioner reasonably concluded claimant was capable of light duty work. See also, Woznicki, § 31-308a, Additional compensation.

Dickey v. Harris Graphics, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 218, 1481 CRB-2-92-8 (March 22, 1994).

While treating physician’s opinion would have justified a conclusion claimant was totally disabled, trier was not compelled to reach such a conclusion in light of other evidence before him.

Haugh v. Leake & Nelson, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 1421 CRB-2-92-5 (March 15, 1994).

Determination of total disability is a factual issue to be decided by the trial commissioner. See also, Haugh, § 31-284b, § 31-300, and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Mulligan v. F.S. Electric, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 91, 1424 CRB-4-92-5 (February 15, 1994), rev’d in part, 231 Conn. 529 (1994).

See, Mulligan, § 31-307b and § 31-310.

Lee v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 50, 1416 CRB-4-92-5 (January 27, 1994).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding awarding temporary total benefits during a certain period. Contention that total disability extended beyond that period because the claim was undisputed and no Form 36 was filed erroneous. See also, Lee, § 31-296.

Farkash v. Gerelco, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 1566 CRB-8-92-11 (January 12, 1994).

Period of temporary total disability award upheld where medical evidence supports trier’s finding claimant was totally disabled, although during part of the period in question claimant was being treated by an unauthorized physician. See also, Farkash, § 31-294d.

Maloney v. Russell Manufacturing Co., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 313, 1371 CRB-8-92-1 (December 23, 1993).

Dependent widow’s claim (decedent’s estate) that decedent was entitled to temporary total benefits denied where trier found decedent was already disabled by a stroke prior to being diagnosed with occupational mesothelioma as a result of asbestos exposure in the workplace. See also, Maloney, § 31-306.

Coates v. Turbine Components, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 264, 1365 CRD-3-92-1 (November 18, 1993).

Claimant sought temporary total benefits for period beyond that found by the trial commissioner and also sought to reopen the last evidentiary hearing by filing a motion to correct in order to introduce evidence concerning total incapacity beyond the last evidentiary hearing. CRB held medical evidence although extensive and conflicting supported trier’s finding concerning periods of total incapacity. CRB further held that a motion to correct is not the proper vehicle to introduce additional evidence. A determination of whether claimant remained totally disabled beyond the last evidentiary hearing must be addressed by further proceedings below not before this appellate tribunal. See also, Coates, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Damelio v. Anaconda, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 221, 1363 CRD-5-91-12 (November 3, 1993).

Claimant alleged total incapacity continued due to a myelogram performed in 1972 for a back injury sustained in 1950 wherein claimant contends some of the contrast medium spilled into his brain and has remained there causing multiple symptoms. Medical evidence before trier was conflicting. Trier rejected treating physician’s opinion that claimant remained totally disabled and relied on IME physician’s opinion and concluded claimant’s total disability ceased in 1984 at which time claimant was capable of performing light work. CRB held there was evidence to support such a conclusion.

Graziano v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 1230 CRD-5-91-5 (February 8, 1993).

Claimant entitled to receive § 31-308a benefits for a 1981 injury and temporary total benefits for a separate 1985 injury simultaneously. This is not considered double compensation. Trier found with or without the injury of 1985, claimant’s diminished earning capacity would have continued. Remanded to determine amount of benefits due. See also, Graziano, § 31-296, § 31-308a and § 31-310.

Codding v. Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 4, 1232 CRD-2-91-5 (February 4, 1993).

Remanded where trier found claimant totally disabled during a time he was actively employed although earning less than his previous job paid. See also, Codding, § 31-299b and § 31-349.

Sweeney v. Waterbury, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 240, 1225 CRD-5-91-5 (January 7, 1993).

Claimant, a school teacher, was paid full salary during the period of temporary total incapacity. During that period claimant received medical treatment. Claimant sought entitlement to both full salary under collective bargaining agreement and compensation benefits for time spent receiving medical treatment. CRB has limited jurisdiction which does not permit interpretation of contractual agreements. Further, if employer has paid a greater sum than amounts due under § 31-307 and § 31-312 the CRB has no power to order further sums to be paid. See also, Sweeney, § 31-310 and § 31-312.

Lesczynski v. New Britain Memorial Hospital, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 205, 1289 CRD-6-91-9 (December 2, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant failed to provide any evidence as to an alleged period of total incapacity for a claimed recurrence of a previous compensable back injury. Also, there was insufficient evidence to causally relate certain medical expenses to the original injury or demonstrate a causal relationship between the claimed disability and a previous injury which arose out of and in the course of employment. See also, Lesczynski, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Peterson v. Standard Structural Steel, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 200, 1211 CRD-6-91-4 (November 12, 1992).

Claimant is not entitled to receive concurrent payment of temporary total and permanent partial benefits. See, Paternostro v. Edward Coon Co., 217 Conn. 42 (1991).

Corona v. Briganti, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 113, 1160 CRD-7-91-1, 1240 CRD-7-91-5 (May 8, 1992).

Period of temporary total disability is a factual determination based on the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence presented. See also, Corona, § 31-294d.

Tessier v. Kogut Florist and Nurseryman, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 276, 1088 CRD-8-90-7 (December 13, 1991).

Remanded as trier’s conclusion as to period claimant was eligible to receive and period claimant was not eligible to receive total incapacity benefits inconsistent with facts found and evidence presented. See also, Tessier, § 31-290c, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

Ruh v. Della Construction Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 269, 1034 CRD-7-90-6 (December 5, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding awarding claimant temporary total benefits as there was evidence to support trier’s conclusion. See also, Ruh, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-298.

Corcoran v. Corcoran Moving and Storage, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 237, 1030 CRD-5-90-6 (October 31, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding which awarded claimant total disability benefits for disabling condition which rendered claimant a paraplegic even though claimant sought benefits under § 31-308(b). See also, Corcoran, § 31-301, § 31-284(a) and § 31-308(b).

Holevinski v. State/Southbury Training School, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 215, 988 CRD-5-90-3 (September 12, 1991).

Whether claimant is totally disabled is a factual determination. See also, Holevinski, § 31-296, § 31-300. Remanded on § 31-300 issue.

Lagueux v. Veilleux, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 177, 876 CRD-6-89-6 (August 13, 1991).

Trier’s finding claimant was not totally disabled during period in question will not be disturbed on appeal where there is evidence below which supports the trier’s conclusions. See also, Lagueux, § 31-315, § 31-308a.

Marchitto v. Hamden Upholstery Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 138, 953 CRD-3-89-12 (May 24, 1991).

Trier’s finding claimant continued to be totally disabled due to an occupationally related lung disease despite reaching maximum medical improvement will not be disturbed on appeal where evidence clearly supports commissioner’s finding. Remanded to determine date of lung incapacity and whether compensation rate was properly determined.

Castro v. General Electric, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 73, 904 CRD-6-89-8 (February 20, 1991).

Receipt of social security benefits does not render claimant ineligible to receive § 31-307 benefits. Remanded to determine if claimant remained totally disabled after last evidentiary hearing. See, Neurath v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 725 CRD-6-88-4 (October 20, 1989).

Palmer v. State/Fairfield Hills, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 900 CRD-4-89-7 (February 4, 1991).

Under § 5-142(a), provisions for state employees, claimant cannot elect for collection of benefits pursuant to § 31-307. Remedy for benefits lies under § 5-142(a). See also, Palmer, § 5-142(a). N.B. But see, § 5-142(a) Trinkley v. State of Conn., 220 Conn. 739 (1992); Jones v. State of Conn., 220 Conn. 721 (1992).

Beckwith v. Apollo Design Service, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 34, 903 CRD-1-89-8 (January 17, 1991).

Finding that claimant remained totally disabled supported by evidence.

Sgambato v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 131, 825 CRD-3-89-2 (August 6, 1990).

Determinations as to total disability are factual. See also, Sgambato, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Orcutt v. Ohmweave Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 125, 822 CRD-2-89-2 (August 2, 1990).

Where claimant was not working during the twenty six weeks preceding the diagnosis of an occupational disease, average weekly wage to be determined by last date worked, not the prevailing wage. See also, Orcutt, § 31-294c.

Paternostro v. The Edward Coon Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op.113, 817 CRD-5-89-2 (June 19, 1990), aff’d, 217 Conn. 42 (1991).

Remanded. Temporary total benefits under § 31-307 and specific indemnity benefits pursuant to § 31-308(b) cannot be paid concurrently.

Traylor v. Poquonnock Bridge Fire District, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 59, 788 CRD-2-88-11 (March 23, 1990).

Remanded to correct Finding and Award incapacity benefits where found but not so ordered. See also, Traylor, § 31-308a.

McConnell v. Hewitt Associates, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 764 CRD-7-88-8 (February 5, 1990).

Conclusion as to total incapacity is within trier’s discretion. See also, McConnell, § 31-294d, § 31-307.

French v. Greenwich, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 115, 698 CRD-7-88-2 (November 30, 1989).

Where treating physician testified claimant was capable of light duty, commissioner’s finding denying temporary total benefits will stand.

Neurath v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 725 CRD-6-88-4 (October 20, 1989).

Remanded to determine if claimant’s total incapacity existed beyond date of last evidentiary hearing.

Heyward v. The Joseph Kelly Co., Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 30, 635 CRD-3-87 (July 24, 1989).

Claimant not entitled to temporary total where disability was from former occupation and not work generally. See also, Heyward, § 31-349.

Minotti v. State, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 165, 611 CRD-2-87 (June 2, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s finding as to total incapacity will not be disturbed where evidence was in conflict. See also, Minotti, § 5-142a.

Lepino v. Electrolux Corporation, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 146, 719 CRD-7-88-3 (April 13, 1989).

Calculation of average weekly wage relates to date of incapacity, not date of last risk exposure. See also, Lepino, § 31-310.

Brown v. Bon Dental Lab, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 132, 594 CRD-7-87 (March 28, 1989).

Time of injury shall be date of total or partial incapacity to work as a result of an occupational disease.

Hicks v. State/Dept. of Administrative Services, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 429 CRD-5-85 (February 23, 1989), no error, 21 Conn. App. 464 (1990), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 804 (1990).

Trial commissioner’s conclusions on duration of disability will not be disturbed when supported by medical evidence. See also, Hicks, § 31-300, § 31-308(c), § 31-308a.

Stearns v. First National Supermarkets, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 103, 588 CRD-1-87 (January 26, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion as to continuing total incapacity will not be disturbed where evidence in conflict.

Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 593 CRD-2-87 (January 13, 1989), no error, 212 Conn. 441 (1989).

Remanded for further evidentiary hearings to determine if claimants total incapacity existed beyond the last evidentiary hearing.

Antonucci v. Hartford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 511 CRD-1-86 (July 29, 1988).

See, Antonucci, § 7-433c.

Mazzone v. Norwalk, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 482 CRD-7-86 (June 21, 1988).

Payments of temporary total benefits are dependent upon finding that claimant suffered a total incapacity to work. Claimant’s attendance of DWR rehabilitation program was not inconsistent with a finding that claimant was totally disabled. Also respondents entitled to credit against specific indemnity benefits due for period claimant was paid temporary total but claimant was employed.

Whitney v. Lapoint Garden Center, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 497 CRD-7-86 (April 29, 1988).

Awards for temporary total disability and the time period for which they are to be awarded is a matter within the discretion of the trial commissioner.

Neumann v. Southern Connecticut Gas Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 62, 265 CRD-4-83 (May 8, 1987).

Awards for total disability are based on factual findings and conclusions of trial commissioner.

Damelio v. Anaconda, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 31, 281 CRD-5-83 (March 4, 1987), no error, 15 Conn. App. 805 (1988)(per curiam), cert. denied, 208 Conn. 814 (1988).

A finding that claimant was not totally disabled is a factual finding.

Borg v. Waterford Country School, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 70, 156 CRD-2-82 (July 3, 1984).

Where concurrent causes resulted in disability, apportionment of liability between successive employers is correct.

Kevorkian v. Peter Paul, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 26, 121 CRD-5-82 (July 11, 1983).

Interruption of specific indemnity permitted where claimant was found to be entitled to temporary total disability benefits.

Cable v. Torrington Special Products, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 168, 82 CRD-5-81 (August 18, 1982).

Total disability payments permitted until claimant reached maximum medical improvement, not date of claimant’s ability to do some lifting.

Masse v. Becton Dickinson Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 83 CRD-5-81 (December 8, 1981).

Award under § 31-307 is in commissioner’s discretion after claimant reaches maximum medical improvement.

Moore v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 76, 44 CRD-7-80 (November 10, 1981).

Compensation rate applicable to most recent injury when claimant suffered a series of compensable injuries.

LaBoda v. Watertown, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 63, 51 CRD-5-81 (October 26, 1981).

Commissioner not limited to only awarding benefits under § 31-308 where evidence of total incapacity to work exists.