State of Connecticut Workers' Compensation Commission, John A. Mastropietro, Chairman
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CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-301

Factual findings.

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THESE ANNOTATIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Full texts of opinions, statutes and court decisions should be consulted and all citations and references fully researched by the reader.

The Annotations to Compensation Review Board Opinions are presented “as is” and the Commission makes no warranties as to the suitability of this information for any given purpose.
Please note also that Annotations change periodically due to several factors including, but not limited to, Appellate and Supreme Court decisions issued in workers’ compensation cases.

Mauriello v. Greater New Haven Transit, 5845 CRB-3-13-5 (March 28, 2014).

Claimant was injured in motor vehicle accident at work and claimed knee replacement surgery was due to accident, and that he was totally disabled. Claimant’s physicians also recommended revision surgery. Trial commissioner found medical evidence that one of claimant’s knees was not injured in accident persuasive. She also credited medical witness that claimant had a sedentary work capacity. She suspended total disability benefits until claimant decided whether to pursue new surgery. On appeal, CRB affirmed trial commissioner. See also, Mauriello, § 31-307.

Pagan v. Carey Wiping Materials, Inc., 5829 CRB-6-13-4 (March 28, 2014).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude. CRB held that unlike the factual scenario in Monaco-Selmer v. Total Customer Service, 5622 CRB-3-10-12 (January 19, 2012) the respondents in this matter paid benefits timely and proffered a voluntary agreement to the claimant thereby preserving its right to defend the claim. Further the facts found by the commissioner did not result from an abuse of discretion. See also, Pagan, § 31-294c(b).

Van Fleet v. Balfour Beatty Construction, 5801 CRB-4-12-11 (March 17, 2014).

Claimant asserted various dental injuries were related to compensable injury. Trial commissioner found claimant’s evidence on issue unpersuasive. CRB affirmed on appeal. See also, Van Fleet, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-294d; § 31-315.

Tosado v. B. Lipnick Supply Company, Inc., 5835 CRB-4-13-5 (March 3, 2014).

Claimant asserted that the cause for his leg amputation due to gangrene was a work injury. Medical evidence indicated that claimant had uncontrolled diabetes and trial commissioner noted discrepancies between claimant’s narrative and what treating physician said he had told her. Employers did not corroborate work injury narrative. Commissioner therefore dismissed claim. CRB affirmed on appeal, citing in part Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 910 (2008). See also, Tosado, § 31-275(1).

Vallier v. Cushman & Wakefield, 5822 CRB-1-13-02 (February 21, 2014).

Claimant argued that he was totally disabled as a result of work injury. Trial commissioner dismissed claim for disability benefits, finding claimant had work capacity and cited reliance on respondents examiner as stating claimant did not need additional medical treatment. On appeal, CRB determined opinions presented from expert witnesses supported the Finding as to the claimant’s work capacity, but a correction should be granted so as to conform the Finding to the evidence supporting additional medical treatment. See also, Vallier, § 31-294d; § 31-301-4; § 31-307.

Jeremy M. Reid v. Sheri A. Speer d/b/a Speer Enterprises, LLC, 5818 CRB-2-13-1 (January 28, 2014).

Respondent defended claim on basis claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee; and refused to file a Form 43 arguing that would “abet a fraud.” Trial commissioner found that respondent’s business relationship with claimant had become very intrusive including use of time clocks, required texts, and specific directions as to what was to be done. Therefore as of date of alleged injury an employer-employee relationship existed. Respondent appealed, noting claimant used primarily his own tools and was paid without tax withholding, and received a 1099. CRB affirmed decision; citing right to control test in Covey v. Home Medical Associates, LLC, 5770 CRB-4-12-7 (July 25, 2013). CRB also affirmed decision on Motion to Preclude, Form 30C was sufficient to create jurisdiction for the Commission. See also, Reid, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10); § 31-278; § 31-294c; § 31-298; § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Barichko v. State/Department of Transportation, 5813 CRB-4-12-12 (January 13, 2014).

Respondents sought repayment of allegedly overpaid compensation to the claimant, citing in part moratorium from third party action and prior orders in the case. Trial commissioner denied claim for reimbursement. On appeal, CRB remanded matter. Record indicated that trial commissioner could have reasonably found respondent’s evidence as to amount sought unpersuasive, but the “law of the case” required implementing certain prior findings barring a change in circumstances. See also, Barichko, § 31-296; § 31-298; § 31-293; § 31-301(g).

Savageau v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5808 CRB-3-12-12 (November 7, 2013).

Claimant asserted that he was totally disabled and sought benefits under a Osterlund theory. Trial commissioner reviewed surveillance footage of claimant activities at a bar, and claimant’s testimony, and found claimant had a work capacity. On appeal, claimant argued his expert witness should have been credited that he lacked a work capacity but CRB found as respondent produced expert testimony contesting this claim, commissioner had basis to sustain decision. Issue of § 31-308a benefits remanded for additional findings. See also, Savageau, § 31-307; § 31-308a.

Dsupin v. Town of Wallingford, 5757 CRB-8-12-6 (November 1, 2013).

Decedent was retired police officer with compensable cardiac condition. After his death due to a myocardial infarcation surviving spouse filed claim for survivor benefits. Conflicting expert witnesses presented evidence on cause of death. Trial commissioner found respondent’s witnesses, who attributed underlying cause of death to pulmonary issues unrelated to compensable injury, more persuasive and credible. On appeal CRB affirmed the commissioner, citing in part the causation analysis in Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012). See also, Dsupin, § 31-306.

Louis v. Reborn Autobody, 5807 CRB-4-12-12 (November 1, 2013).

Claimant injured at auto shop. He asserted he was employee of respondent. Evidence before trial commissioner was claimant did not work set hours and was paid 50% of what shop billed customers. Trial commissioner found claimant was not credible and had not proven employee-employer relationship. Claimant appealed and CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Manner of payment, lack of set schedule, and autonomous employment consistent with finding claimant was an independent contractor. See also, Louis, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10).

Osborn v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 5800 CRB-5-12-11 (October 28, 2013).

Claimant asserted she sustained two work related knee injuries. She testified that she did not immediately file a claim for either injury because employer preferred that she take short term disability. She later filed claim and respondent challenged causation. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and CRB affirmed decision on appeal. CRB also affirmed commissioner’s decision that knee replacement surgery was warranted; decision was supported with opinions from expert witnesses. See also, Osborn, § 31-294d; § 31-275(1).

Ritch v. Connecticut Materials Testing Labs, 5766 CRB-7-12-7 (October 24, 2013).

Claimant injured while falling into manhole, asserted knee injury and then, at later date, asserted back injury later due to incident. Medical witnesses in reliance on claimant’s narrative opined both injuries were compensable. Claimant also asserted no work capacity. Respondents produced surveillance video showing claimant performing variety of tasks at a nightclub, and pointed to discrepancies in the medical records as to alleged back pain. Trial commissioner found claimant not credible and found evidence as to compensability of back injury unreliable. Commissioner also found claimant had work capacity. Trial commissioner also said mechanism of manhole incident unlikely to produce a back injury and claimant most likely sustained a new injury to his back subsequent to filing claim. CRB affirmed decision but admonished trial commissioner not to include findings or conclusions based on surmise or conjecture. An inclusion of findings in this case unsupported by evidence on the record was harmless error in light of trial commissioner’s evaluation of claimant’s credibility. See also, Ritch, § 31-300; § 31-307.

Kingston v. Town of Seymour, 5789 CRB-5-12-10 (September 10, 2013).

Claimant said he was injured while at work raising lawn mower to truck; and that this incident was a substantial factor in his need for back surgery. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and credited opinion of treating physicians. On appeal, respondents argued they were prejudiced by claim form which stated an inaccurate date of injury. CRB affirmed trial commissioner who determined respondents not prejudiced as claimant actively pursued claim and sought hearings within one year of injury. See also, Kingston, § 31-294c; § 31-294d; § 31-275(1).

Chowaniec v. Middlefield, 5779 CRB-8-12-9 (September 9, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s award of benefits to volunteer firefighter injured while setting up fundraising booth at Durham Fair, asserting that trier erred in applying provisions of § 7-314(a) C.G.S. CRB affirmed trier’s decision to apply § 7-314(a) C.G.S. but reversed award, holding that because record could not support reasonable inference that claimant’s fundraising activities resulted from an order from a supervising officer, circumstances of injury did not satisfy provisions of statute. CRB recognized that claimant’s activities were for the benefit of the fire company but noted that instant record differed significantly from factual circumstances which gave rise to award of benefits in Evanuska v. Danbury, 285 Conn. 348 (2008). See also, Chowaniec, § 7-314a, § 31-275(1).

Wilson v. Maefair Health Care Centers, 5773 CRB-4-12-8 (August 8, 2013).

Claimant sustained two compensable injuries, one in 2010 and second in 2011. Evidence presented was that claimant was a surgical candidate prior to the second injury, but had not been rendered unable to perform job. Following second injury claimant unable to perform job. Trial commissioner concluded that pursuant to Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279 (2003) the insurance carrier on the risk at time of second injury responsible for all medical treatment and indemnity benefits. Carrier appealed and CRB affirmed Finding. Evidence on record could reasonably lead trial commissioner to conclude claimant’s condition made materially and permanently worse as a result of second injury; expert witnesses ascribed enough weight to second injury as cause for surgery to support “substantial contributing factor” test. See also, Wilson, § 31-294d; § 31-308(a).

McClaren v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 5775 CRB-2-12-8 (August 8, 2013).

Claimant asserted various injuries were sustained as a result of a compensable work injury. Trial commissioner found commissioner’s examiner credible and persuasive who opined those injuries were self-limiting and no further treatment was warranted, nor any permanency benefits. CRB upheld Finding on appeal.

Covey v. Home Medical Associates, LLC, 5770 CRB-4-12-7 (July 25, 2013).

Trier determined employer-employee relationship existed between claimant’s decedent and respondent Jewish Home for the Elderly [“JHE”] relative to claimant’s decedent’s position as medical director of JHE. Claimant’s decedent was also employed as staff physician at JHE and as partner in his own private medical practice housed within JHE. CRB affirmed, noting that despite contract language stating claimant’s decedent was independent contractor, testimony concerning his duties as medical director supported finding that based on “totality of the evidence test” as set forth in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998), claimant’s decedent was JHE employee. In addition, trier determined that in light of claimant’s decedent’s “unique relationship” with JHE, JHE functioned as claimant’s decedent’s principal employer relative to his duties at in-house private medical practice partnership and claimant’s decedent had not opted out of Workers’ Compensation Act. CRB affirmed, holding that evidence adduced relative to employer employee relationship in addition to testimony regarding circumstances surrounding establishment of private medical practice supported trier’s conclusion that statutory requirements of § 31-291 C.G.S. had been satisfied. See also, Covey, § 31-275(1); § 31-275(10); § 31-291.

Estate of Robert C. Haburey v. Winchester, 5763 CRB-6-12-6 (June 14, 2013).

Trier concluded that claimant died of sepsis following exposure to Legionella at employer’s sewer treatment plant. CRB affirmed trier’s compensability findings on basis of medical record despite expert’s lack of “absolute certainty” regarding etiology of claimant’s sepsis, and declined to address whether Legionnaire’s Disease constituted occupational disease as contemplated by § 31-275(15) C.G.S. CRB rejected respondents’ claim that trier lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to deficient notice of claim, noting that prior trial commissioner’s Finding and Award regarding sufficiency of notice adequately reflected analysis set forth in Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007). CRB found respondents’ allegations of due process deprivation without merit and also denied claimant’s Motion to Dismiss predicated on respondents’ compliance with instant Finding and Award, noting that dismissal would vitiate appeal provisions codified at § 31-301 C.G.S., et. seq. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Estate of Haburey, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(15), § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal Procedure, § 31-301-04, § 31-306.

Danek v. Electric Boat Corporation, 5760 CRB-2-12-6 (June 5, 2013).

Trier concluded that claimant who sustained injury following transfer to employer’s facility in Norfolk, Virginia was not subject to Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act. Claimant had accepted relocation incentives and signed agreement requiring repayment of signing bonuses if claimant left Norfolk employment within one year. Trier determined agreement constituted new contract which contemplated performance of duties outside Connecticut and claimant was not Connecticut resident when contract was signed. CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant and employer had entered into new contract but remanded for additional findings relative to whether circumstances surrounding creation of new contract created a significant relationship between Connecticut and the contract consistent with three-pronged test set forth in Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181 (1991) and Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 262 Conn. 31 (2002). CRB rejected claimant’s contention that trier had concluded Workers’ Compensation Act did not apply to non-residents injured outside Connecticut. See also, Danek, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10); § 31-301-04.

Moore v. Alfred Paciotti d/b/a Empire Remodeling, et al, 5777 CRB-2-12-9 (June 3, 2013).

See also, Moore, § 31-310; § 31-355(b).

Aylward v. City of Bristol/Board of Education, 5756 CRB-6-12-5 (May 15, 2013).

Claimant sustained three compensable injuries while employed by respondent. She sought continued pain management treatment. Respondents argued claimant was at maximum medical improvement and further treatment was palliative, as claimant was not seeking employment despite a light duty work capacity. Trial commissioner agreed with respondents. CRB affirmed decision. CRB provides great deference to trier of fact to determine when medical care is curative. See Palumbo v. Bridgeport, 4991 CRB-4-05-9 (September 7, 2006). See also, Aylward, § 31-294d; § 31-307; § 31-308(b); § 31-310.

Disotell v. LVI Services, Inc., 5749 CRB-3-12-4 (April 25, 2013).

Trier dismissed claim after concluding claimant’s failure to use fall protection equipment while operating man lift was reckless, unreasonable and constituted serious and willful misconduct. Trier found claimant’s testimony credible regarding his frustration with equipment and manpower provided by employer but determined it was not credible that worker with claimant’s training and supervisory responsibilities would forget to use safety harness. CRB affirmed, noting that trier’s findings were supported by record and within her discretion. Trier correctly found that willful misconduct is not limited to situations where claimant admits to intentional refusal to ignore safety rules. Trier granted Motion to Correct in part; CRB affirmed trier’s denial of balance of proposed corrections. See also, Disotell, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-301-4.

Madden v. Danbury Hospital, 5745 CRB-7-12-4 (April 22, 2013).

See also, Madden, § 31-275(1); § 31-275 (16); § 31-294f.

Albuquerque v. Town of East Hartford, 5741 CRB-1-12-3 (April 9, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s determination that claimant’s motor vehicle accident of 1983 and fusion surgery of 1986 were substantial contributing factors to claimant’s current symptomatology. Trier declined to find that 2001 motor vehicle accident constituted an aggravation as contemplated by Kelly v. Dunkin Donuts, 4621 CRB-4-03-2 (April 5, 2004) such that instant respondents would be relieved of ongoing liability. Trier also rejected respondents’ contention that subsequent accident constituted a superseding cause that broke chain of causation as contemplated by Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (2012). CRB affirmed, holding that medical record and claimant’s testimony substantiated trier’s findings. CRB found no error in trier’s refusal to invoke Kelly, which concerned apportionment of liability, concluding instead that trier properly focused his analysis on proximate causation. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Albuquerque, § 31-275 (1), § 31-301-4, § 31-349(a).

Dorenbosch v. Hoffman Landscapes, 5734 CRB-7-12-2 (February 14, 2013).

Respondents appealed trier’s award of benefits to claimant who had sustained compensable right leg injury and then claimed subsequent injury to right leg was sequela of original wound which had never properly healed. CRB affirmed, holding that despite lack of deposition testimony, medical record provided reasonable basis for trier’s inference that second incident did not constitute new injury and trier retained prerogative to resolve inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony in claimant’s favor. CRB found no error in trier’s refusal to entertain respondents’ challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Dorenbosch, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-4.

Olwell v. State/Dept. of Developmental Services, 5731 CRB-7-12-2 (February 14, 2013).

Claimant asserted that her present disability was the result of an accepted compensable injury. Trial commissioner did not find claimant or her medical witnesses persuasive, and adopted opinions of commissioner’s examiners that claimant had a limited work capacity as a result of her compensable injury, and her disability was the result of other factors unrelated to the injury. On appeal, claimant argued that commissioner failed to properly credit the evidence on the record. CRB affirmed the commissioner. Cases such as Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440 (2001) and Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564 (2010) stand for proposition that claimant must prove their disability is the result of their compensable injury. See also, Olwell, § 31-307.

Putney v. Town of Guilford, 5732 CRB-3-12-2 (February 5, 2013).

Claimant sought to continue medical treatment. Trial commissioner found further treatment unwarranted and found claimant reached maximum medical improvement. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Claimant argued that trial commissioner should not have found that date as commissioner’s examiner, whom trier relied on, affixed a different date of MMI. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Trial commissioner permitted to find a witness persuasive on one issue but another witness more persuasive on another issue. Record supported opinion of witness trier relied on. See also, Putney, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-294c; § 31-307.

Mancini v. Masonicare, 5729 CRB-2-12-2 (January 29, 2013).

See also, Mancini, § 31-288; § 31-300; § 31-307.

Bryant v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 5723 CRB-7-12-1 (January 24, 2013).

Trial commissioner found claimant, who suffered compensable injury years earlier, was totally disabled and should receive pain management treatment. Respondents appealed findings. CRB affirmed trial commissioner as sufficient evidence was present to sustain the award. See also, Bryant, § 31-294d; § 31-296; § 31-307; § 31-349.

Santiago v. Junk Busters, LLC, 5721 CRB-6-12-1(January 8, 2013).

See also, Santiago, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10).

Hubbard v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 5705 CRB-6-11-12 (November 30, 2012).

Claimant challenged basis of permanent partial disability award and appealed trier’s denial of compensability and temporary total disability benefits. CRB remanded for additional findings. Medical report on which trier relied for permanent partial disability award attributed permanent partial disability to condition trier had found non-compensable. Trier determined that claimant provided no evidence of causation for osteoarthritis but record contained two reports which supported causation and trier’s findings did not specifically address reports’ evidentiary weight. Commissioner’s Examination report on which trier based decision to deny temporary total disability benefits was ambiguous. Denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error. See also, Hubbard, § 31-275(1); § 31-301-4; § 31-307; § 31-308(b); § 31-349.

Montenegro v. Palmieri Food Products, 5701 CRB-3-11-11 (November 15, 2012).

Claimant suffered serious work injuries which included near amputation of thumb. After injury, claimant said he could not use hand. Surveillance video showed claimant using injured hand at gas station, holding hands et al. Trial commissioner relied on expert opinions claimant had work capacity and granted Form 36’s. Claimant argued trial commissioner erred in not approving additional surgery and determining he had a work capacity. CRB upheld, trial commissioner’s decision consistent with expert testimony she found persuasive. See also, Montenegro, § 31-294d; § 31-300; § 31-288(b); § 31-307.

Loehfelm v. Town of Stratford-Board of Education, 5710 CRB-4-11-12 (November 14, 2012).

The finding of the trial Commissioner that the claimant’s injury from a fall in a stairwell in her employer’s premises did not arise out of and in the course of her employment is a factual determination dependent upon the weight and credibility assigned to the evidence. Further, the weight accorded to a particular medical report is within the trier’s discretion. The weight and credibility the trier accorded a report prepared for the purposes of the third-party motor vehicle lawsuit was a matter within her discretion. See also, Loehfelm, § 31-275(1).

Duarte v. Franstel of CT Corp., 5692 CRB-7-11-11 (November 13, 2012).

Respondent challenged finding that claimant was employed by respondent when claimant sustained injuries in fall from tree while trimming branches on third party’s property. CRB affirmed. Although testimony of various parties appeared inconsistent with evidentiary submissions, trier retains ultimate discretion to determine credibility of witnesses. Trier reasonably inferred that claimant’s co-worker was authorized to act as respondent’s agent and record supported trier’s determination that requirements were satisfied for establishing employment relationship as set forth in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998). Trier reasonably inferred that evidentiary record did not support finding that legal standard for casual employment was satisfied. CRB deemed meritless respondent’s claim that trier’s Finding and Award was void because trier issued decision on Monday following expiration of statutory one-hundred twenty day deadline which occurred on preceding Saturday. Trier properly denied respondent’s Motion to Correct. See also, Duarte, § 31-275(1); § 31-275(9); § 31-300; § 31-301-4.

Pupuri v. Benny’s Home Service, LLC, 5697 CRB-2-11-11 (November 5, 2012).

Claimant asserted back injury was result of lifting rocks at quarry. Respondent and homeowner at job site disputed narrative. Video presented showed claimant able to run or walk quickly. Trial commissioner determined claimant failed to prove injury in course of employment. Claimant appealed dismissal arguing that medical evidence all consistent with claimant’s narrative. CRB upheld dismissal. Trial commissioner did not find claimant credible. Medical evidence reliant on narrative could be discounted. Additionally, treater suggested back issues could be degenerative in nature. See also, Pupuri, § 31-275(1).

Walsh v. William W. Backus Hospital, 5691 CRB-2-11-11 (October 15, 2012).

Claimant asserted that cause of her back injury was a fall from a defective chair at work. Claimant also testified to prior injuries and back pain. Trial commissioner found claimant not a credible witness, and discounted medical opinions supportive of compensability as he did not believe treaters had been provided with accurate medical history. Claimant appealed and also sought to introduce additional medical evidence supportive of compensability. CRB denied motion to admit additional evidence as piecemeal litigation. CRB also affirmed trial commissioner. Trial commissioner could, in accordance with Do v. Danaher Tool Group, 5029 CRB-6-05-12 (November 28, 2006) and Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 910 (2008), decide not to rely on medical opinions he found rooted in an unreliable claimant narrative. See also, Walsh, § 31-301-9.

Gendron v. Griffin Health Services Corporation, 5686 CRB-4-11-10 (October 11, 2012).

In a wide-ranging appeal, claimant challenged trial commissioner’s failure to find respondents unduly delayed indemnity payments and denial of interest, penalties and attorney’s fees. Claimant appealed trier’s determination that hands-free telephone device, IPad and aquatic therapy did not constitute reasonable or necessary medical care such that claimant was entitled to reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs. CRB affirmed findings relative to indemnity payments and medical care, noting that record supported trier’s inferences regarding claimant’s credibility and trier reasonably relied upon evidence in support of respondents’ assertion that indemnity payments were timely. CRB also held that trier reasonably inferred that claimant did not meet burden of proof necessary to establish that medical treatment for which she sought reimbursement satisfied standard for curative care as articulated in Bowen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 60, 232 CRD-1-83 (June 19, 1984). CRB remanded on issue of whether respondents unduly delayed mileage reimbursements as findings suggested trier may not have reviewed all of claimant’s exhibits in support of that claim of error. CRB denied claimant’s two motions to file additional evidence. See also, Gendron, § 31-288; § 31-294d; § 31-300; § 31-301-4; § 31-301-9; § 31-308(a).

Tedesco v. Decorator Services, 5693 CRB-4-11-11 (September 27, 2012).

Claimant originally appealed trial commissioner’s decision she should undergo detoxification at out of state facility. At appeal hearing, parties announced claimant agreed to this treatment. CRB deemed issue moot and sustained trial commissioner. She also appealed trial commissioner’s decision after granting a Motion to Correct that work searches were prerequisite to § 31-308a benefits. CRB remanded on work search issue. Precedent was work searches not requirement prior to receipt of benefits. Parties had previously dealt with issue and the record at the formal hearing did not establish the issue was fully considered by the litigants before commissioner reached a decision. See also, Tedesco, § 31-294d; § 31-301-4; § 31-308a.

Lessard v. Dattco, Inc., 5685 CRB-6-11-9 (September 17, 2012).

CRB vacated and ordered a trial de novo. The trial commissioner granted the respondents Forms 36 on the basis that the claimant had a work capacity. In the trier’s findings he commented on his personal observation of the claimant as the claimant exited the building where the formal hearing was held. The trier noted the seeming discrepancy in the manner of claimant’s ambulation and demeanor from what was claimed and expressed in the formal hearing. In his findings and conclusions the trial commissioner referenced his observation of the claimant. It appears that the claimant was not made aware of the trier’s observation outside the formal hearing setting until the trier issued his decision. As the claimant was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to challenge by cross examination the trier’s personal impressions and observations, the matter must be remanded for a trial de novo. See also, Lessard, § 31-298.

Herbert v. Department of Correction, 5547 CRB-8-10-4 (September 13, 2012).

See also, Herbert, § 31-275(1).

Arsenault v. Shelton, 5679 CRB-4-11-9 (September 6, 2012).

Respondent municipality challenged trial commissioner’s decision to exclude claimant’s service-connected retirement pension earnings from calculations for temporary partial disability benefits. CRB affirmed pursuant to Rinaldi v. Enfield, 82 Conn. App. 505 (2004) in which Appellate Court distinguished between treatment of service-connected pensions and disability pensions when calculating temporary partial disability benefits. CRB found trier properly rejected respondent’s assertion that decision violated public policy against double recovery given that § 7-433b (b) C.G.S. prevents claimants who bring claims under § 7-433c C.G.S. from receiving “windfalls.” CRB held that depriving claimants who receive service connected retirement pensions of § 31-308a C.G.S. benefits would punish claimants for having been injured. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of respondent’s Motion to Correct. See also, Arsenault, § 7 433b, § 31-301-4, § 31-308a.

Miller v. Thyssen Krupp Elevator Corporation, 5669 CRB-7-11-7 (August 29, 2012).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that the respondents were not liable for the claimed consequences of a 2007 injury where evidence as to causation was conflicting and dependent upon the weight and credibility accorded the evidence. Further trier applied the correct standard as to proximate causation. See also, Miller, § 31-275(1); § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Clukey v. Century Pools, 5683 CRB-6-11-09 (August 22, 2012).

Claimant had compensable injuries but treating physician opined claimant had work capacity. Surveillance tape showed claimant banging cement mixer with hammer and directing workers on pool project. Claimant denied he had work capacity and said this pool project was an unpaid social activity. Trial commissioner found claimant not credible and that claimant had work capacity, therefore commissioner approved Form 36. CRB affirmed decision on appeal. Facts in case akin to Smith v. Federal Express Corporation, 5405 CRB-7-08-12 (December 1, 2009). See also, Clukey, § 31-296.

Shanks v. Greentree Toyota Lincoln-Mercury, 5625 CRB-7-11-2 (August 16, 2012).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s determination that no causal connection existed between claimant’s complaints of double vision and workplace incident in which claimant fell after being struck in forehead by SUV door. Respondents accepted compensability of left shoulder injury allegedly sustained in same incident. CRB affirmed, noting that record contained speculative and conflicting expert opinion but medical evidence upon which trier ultimately relied provided adequate basis for dismissing claim. CRB also affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Shanks, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-4.

Martinez-McCord v. State/Judicial Branch, 5647 CRB-7-11-4 (August 1, 2012).

Claimant appealed from denial of claim for temporary total disability benefits from alleged RSD ailment. Trial commissioner concluded medical evidence she found credible and persuasive did not establish claimant had RSD, and that claimant had a work capacity. Claimant appealed, arguing she had moved for trial commissioner to recuse herself at start of the hearing, and this motion should have been granted. Claimant argued that as same trial commissioner had heard case in Martinez-McCord v. State/Judicial Branch, 5275 CRB-7-07-9 (September 12, 2008) commissioner had biased view of claimant’s credibility. CRB affirmed Finding and Dismissal. Precedent disfavors recusal of workers’ compensation commissioners and leaves it to their discretion to ascertain if they believe they have a personal bias in a case. Knowledge from a earlier proceeding does not require recusal under CT law (see State v. Rizzo 303 Conn. 71 (2011)) unless circumstances are “extreme or unusual.” Review of findings indicates trial commissioner reached conclusions entirely consistent with commissioner’s examiner in case; hence, decision well founded. CRB also upheld permanent partial disability award herein. See also, Martinez-McCord, § 31-294f; § 31-298; § 31-278; § 31-307; § 31-308(b).

Briggs v. Waterbury, 5665 CRB-5-11-7 (July 6, 2012).

Trier dismissed claim for medical treatment on grounds that medications sought were palliative rather than curative and did not constitute reasonable or necessary treatment. Claimant, a former firefighter, contended that contested medications allowed him to perform his daily activities and continue working part-time at neighborhood bar which he co-owned with three other partners. CRB affirmed, noting that medical records attributing claimant’s lumbar issues to degenerative disk disease and indicating that contested medications were not likely to be curative provided a reasonable basis for trier’s dismissal of claim. CRB also found that trier could have reasonably inferred that claimant’s limited workplace activities and discretionary employment schedule did not satisfy standard for curative treatment as articulated in Bowen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 60, 232 CRD-1-83 (June 19, 1984). CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Briggs, § 31-294d; § 31-301-4.

Morales v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 5666 CRB-2-11-7 (July 6, 2012).

Claimant had sustained knee injury necessitating nearly full removal of meniscus prior to being hired by respondent. While employed by respondent claimant suffered knee bruise in conveyer belt accident. Claimant treated with primary care doctor and continued working despite pain, and left job for nonmedical reasons. Subsequent to leaving FedEx, claimant’s orthopedic doctor diagnosed need for knee surgery and performed surgery. Claimant’s treater opined work injury reason surgery was necessary, relying on claimant’s narrative. Respondent’s examiner opined nature of knee contusion and degenerative knee problem were unrelated and bone bruise not a substantial factor in need for surgery. Trial commissioner found respondent’s examiner persuasive and dismissed claim for surgery. Commissioner also found “it improbable that the claimant’s left knee was completely asymptomatic prior to” compensable injury. On appeal, CRB stated commissioner’s finding on the claimant’s knee being asymptomatic was unsupported by evidence. CRB affirmed the Finding as the respondent’s examiner offered independent probative evidence supporting the decision. See also, Morales, § 31-275(1); § 31-294d.

Estate of Greenberg v. ABB Combustion Engineering Services, Incorporated, 5521 CRB-1-10-1 (June 11, 2012).

Dependent widow of employee who died of pancreatic cancer filed two notices of occupational disease claim. Respondents contended first notice of claim, filed within one year of employee’s death, was legally insufficient because Form 30C did not contain widow’s name or identify type of benefits being sought. Respondents argued second Form 30C was legally insufficient and untimely as it did not identify type of benefits sought and was filed two and one-half years after employee’s death. Trier found first Form 30C timely and sufficient but found second Form 30C untimely on basis that claimant had “formed a belief” regarding causation of employee’s pancreatic cancer almost two years before filing second Form 30C. Respondents appealed and claimant cross-appealed. CRB affirmed findings relative to first notice of claim, noting that Form 30C clearly indicated employee had died and, consistent with Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007), provided respondents with reasonable notice that survivor’s benefits were being sought. CRB reversed trier’s findings relative to second notice of claim, noting that proper analysis for assessing date of commencement of three-year statute of limitations for occupational disease hinged on identifying date of first manifestation of symptom of occupational disease. Because trier reasonably inferred that “first manifestation” occurred when employee’s son filed application for federal benefits pursuant to Department of Labor’s Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, second Form 30C was timely as it was filed within three years of date of federal filing. CRB also noted that parties attended an informal hearing within this three-year window. See also, Estate of Greenberg, § 31-275(15); § 31-294c; § 31-301-04; § 31-306.

Bass v. AT & T, 5621 CRB-7-11-1/5634 CRB-7-11-3 (May 3, 2012).

Claimant challenged multiple rulings by trier associated with the issuance of a “form” fine letter imposing sanctions pursuant to § 31-288(b)(2) C.G.S. arising from counsel’s failure to appear at informal hearing. Trier initially denied claimant’s Motions to Correct and Articulate and, following penalty hearing in which trier determined no grounds existed to vacate sanctions, denied claimant’s Motions to Vacate, Recuse, and Reargue and Open Hearing. On appeal, claimant’s counsel asserted that entry of order for sanctions prior to evidentiary hearing constituted due process violation and also alleged that trier erroneously: denied Motions to Correct, Articulate, Vacate, and Reargue and Open Hearing; scheduled “moot” evidentiary hearing after penalty was assessed; refused to allow counsel to present legal argument at penalty hearing; failed to disqualify herself or allow herself to be called as a witness; and found facts not in evidence. Consistent with Flamenco v. Independent Refuse Service, Inc., 130 Conn. App. 280 (2011), CRB reversed, noting that because neither fine letter nor trier’s ruling on Motion to Vacate contained specific findings relative to circumstances surrounding claimant’s counsel’s failure to appear at penalty hearing, record did not substantiate trier’s conclusion that counsel’s failure was unreasonable or without good cause. See also, Bass, § 31 288; § 31-301-04.

Butler v. Frito Lay, 5620 CRB-2-11-01 (May 3, 2012).

Claimant sustained numerous orthopedic injuries to both knees. After 2003 injury respondent filed Form 36 in 2008. Trial commissioner concluded claimant had work capacity and approved a Form 36. Claimant appealed. CRB upheld. There was sufficient evidence on the issue of work capacity presented by witnesses the trier found credible. Neither party submitted vocational evidence but none was required to reach a decision, see Romanchuk v. Griffin Health Services, 5515 CRB-4-09-12 (October 20, 2010). See also, Butler, § 31-296; § 31-307.

Perun v. City of Danbury, 5650 CRB-7-11-05 (May 3, 2012).

Claimant had received Finding and Award determining that a 2007 injury was a new compensable injury. In that decision, the trial commissioner found the claimant’s treater credible and did not rely on respondent’s expert witness. After hearing on level of permanent disability, another trial commissioner did not find the treater credible and determined respondent’s expert was persuasive on level of permanent impairment. Claimant appealed asserting initial trial commissioner decision as to witness credibility controlled all further proceedings. CRB upheld Finding. Trial commissioner could find a witness credible on one issue and not another. Trial commissioner adequately explained her rationale for not relying on treating physician. In addition, CRB upheld commissioner decision present employer responsible for entire permanency award; no prior award was “paid or payable” to the claimant. See also, Perun, § 31-298; § 31-308(b); § 31-349.

Gonzalez v. Premier Limousine of Hartford, 5635 CRB 4-11-3 (April 17, 2012).

CRB rejected arguments from both the claimant and respondent that trial commissioner erroneously evaluated evidence as to causation, extent of disability, and undue delay. See also, Gonzalez, § 31-300; § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-294d; § 31-301-4.

Turrell v. State/DMHAS, 5640 CRB-8-11-3 (March 21, 2012).

Claimant suffered trauma at work but also had degenerative disc ailment to cervical spine. Based on evidence presented, trial commissioner concluded that claimant’s need for surgery was not due to compensable injury. CRB upheld on appeal, commissioner’s examiner provided sufficient supportive testimony for this conclusion. CRB also upheld date of maximum medical improvement; voluntary agreement could be relied upon. See also, Turrell, § 31-294d; § 31-298; § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Jodlowski v. Stanley Works, 5627 CRB-6-11-2 (March 13, 2012).

Claimant injured when tool box fell on him. Injury accepted as compensable, but parties disputed extent of injury and whether claimant’s various medical treatments related to incident. Trial commissioner found claimant’s hernia surgery and shoulder surgery compensable; found other injuries and psychiatric care not compensable. Both parties appealed. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Claimant’s appeal essentially sought to retry the facts and the record supported the decision with probative supportive evidence. Trial commissioner’s factual decision also governed respondent’s appeal. See also, Jodlowski, § 31-294d; § 31-301-9.

Zbras v. Colonial Toyota, 5631 CRB-4-11-02 (February 14, 2012).

Claimant told co-workers he was leaving work early to play golf; but testified he did not play golf. Later than weekend claimant said sneezing aggravated previous compensable back injury. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and awarded benefits but originally found respondent’s had good faith basis to defend claim due to claimant’s lack of candor with co-workers. However, trial commissioner granted Motion to Correct which found respondent’s unreasonably contested liability. On appeal, CRB ordered remand for additional findings. McFarland v. Department of Development Services, 115 Conn. App. 306 (2009) requires factual predicate exist before sanctions may be levied. Factual basis for trial commissioner’s decision not apparent from the record. See also, Zbras, § 31-300.

McClaren v. Fed/Ex Ground Package System, Inc., 5619 CRB 1-11-1 (January 24, 2012).

Claimant asserted numerous work-related injuries and sought additional treatment. Commissioner’s examiner opined claimant was at maximum medical improvement and no additional treatment warranted. Trial commissioner relied on this opinion and claimant appealed. CRB upheld decision. Trial commissioner normally provides deference to opinions of a commissioner’s examiner Damon v. VNS of CT/Masonicare, 5413 CRB-4-08-12 (December 15, 2009). If claimant’s condition deteriorates she may make new request to trial commissioner to authorize treatment. Serluca v. Stone & Webster Engineering, 5118 CRB-8-06-8 (July 13, 2007). See also, McClaren, § 31-294d.

Anderson v. Target Capital Partners, 5615 CRB-6-10-12 (January 3, 2012).

Claimant was totally disabled but respondents filed Form 36 based on medical opinion claimant had work capacity. Neighbor observed claimant engaged in active endeavors around home. Claimant relied on treating physician’s opinions, but trial commissioner found claimant not fully credible based on demeanor at hearing. Claimant appealed granting of Form 36 asserting commissioner needed to explain why he did not rely on opinions of treating physicians. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Commissioner sole judge of credibility and demeanor of witness. Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007). If claimant’s credibility in question, trial commissioner may find treating physician’s opinions unreliable. Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 910 (2008). Trial commissioner must only reference the facts he relied upon and his conclusions in his finding, and need not explain why he chose not to rely on other evidence. Cable v. Bic Corp., 270 Conn. 433, 440 (2004). Case indistinguishable from Smith v. Federal Express Corporation, 5405 CRB-7-08-12 (December 1, 2009). See also, Anderson, § 31-301-3; § 31-301-4; § 31-301-9; § 31-307.

Flamenco v. Independent Refuse Service, 5600 CRB-7-10-10 (November 2, 2011).

Claimant challenged trier’s imposition of sanctions due to counsel’s failure to appear at informal hearing. Claimant initially appealed sanctions letter on basis that trier had taken no evidence which would substantiate findings of undue delay; CRB remanded citing lack of formal record. Claimant next appealed order arising from penalty hearing in which trier determined no grounds existed to vacate sanctions. Claimant alleged multiple due process violations, citing as error trier’s failure to disqualify herself, scheduling of evidentiary hearing after penalty was assessed, issuance of sanctions letter prior to evidentiary hearing, and inadequate notice of penalty hearing. Claimant also appealed trier’s failure to grant Motion to Correct. Following parties’ appearance before CRB at oral argument but prior to release of CRB opinion, Appellate Court handed down Flamenco v. Independent Refuse Service, Inc., 130 Conn. App. 280 (2011) holding that original CRB remand was in error as sufficient record existed for CRB to rule on the matter. Appellate Court also found record failed to substantiate trier’s findings of undue delay and remanded matter with directive to vacate sanction. See also, Flamenco, § 31 288; § 31 300; § 31-301-04.

Chimblo v. Connecticut Light Power, 5417 CRB-7-09-1 (December 30, 2009).

See, Chimblo, § 31-294d, § 31-301 Appeal Procedure.

Jordan v. Reindeau & Sons Logging, LLC, 5388 CRB-2-08-10 (December 18, 2009).

Claimant worked as “chopper” for timber harvesting business and injured on job. Trial commissioner determined that facts supported independent contractor status, CRB affirmed. See also, Jordan, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10).

Damon v. VNS of CT/Masonicare, 5413 CRB-4-08-12 (December 15, 2009).

Claimant asserted continuing total disability and Respondents filed Form 36’s to contest. Commissioner’s examiner and respondent’s vocational expert found claimant had work capacity and were found persuasive and credible by trial commissioner. CRB affirmed decision on appeal. Trial commissioner did not find claimant fully persuasive and credible; claimant has burden to establish total disability under an Osterlund theory; see Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007) and Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007). See also Damon, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-294f, § 31-307, § 31-301-4.

Kummer v. Bic Corporation, 5406 CRB-3-08-12 (December 15, 2009).

Pro se claimant appealed trier’s dismissal of her lumbar spine claim, alleging trial commissioner was “confused” regarding proper date of injury and body part in question. Trier denied proposed corrections in claimant’s Motion to Correct but clarified his Finding and Dismissal to specifically indicate he was dismissing lumbar spine claim. CRB affirmed, noting evidentiary record allowed for reasonable inference that claimant’s injury was not causally related to the alleged workplace incident; trier is free to disregard all or part of a medical opinion and credibility assessments are not subject to second guessing at appellate level. On appeal, claimant filed a timely Petition for Review and submitted two additional documents which were partially accepted insofar as they constituted a rationale for the claimant’s appeal and partially denied insofar as they constituted a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence pursuant to Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9. See also, Kummer, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-9.

Smith v. Federal Express Corp., 5405 CRB-7-08-12 (December 1, 2009).

Claimant suffered compensable injury, received temporary total disability benefits and respondents later filed Form 36 to terminate benefits; asserting claimant had work capacity. Respondents introduced both medical evidence and surveillance evidence indicating claimant actively involved in son’s business. Claimant argued his medical and vocational witnesses supported continued total disability. CRB upheld commissioner’s decision on substance; decision went to weight of evidence. CRB reversed commissioner on effective date of Form 36; precedent was benefits could not be terminated retroactive to date Form is filed , see Torres v. Southern Connecticut Truck & Tire Center, 3144 CRB-3-95-8 (February 5, 1997). Prior decision in Smith v. Federal Express Corp., 4242 CRB-7-00-5 (August 22, 2001). See also, Smith, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

Camp v. State/Capital Community Technical College, 5401 CRB-1-08-11 (November 17, 2009).

Claimant asserted total disability, although testified at formal hearing that he “probably” had enough work capacity to sit at a desk. Trial commissioner credited treating physician who opined claimant could not do usual tasks either at work or at home. Respondents appealed finding of total disability. CRB upheld award. Trial commissioner relied on expert opinion and CRB unwilling to reverse award based on such evidence. In addition, claimant tried to return to work and failed; inability to perform work probative evidence of temporary total disability, see Howard v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 5063 CRB-2-06-3 (April 4, 2007). See also, Camp, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307, § 31-307b.

Ghazal v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 5397 CRB-8-08-11 (November 17, 2009).

Claimant suffered compensable back and psychiatric injuries. After receiving authorization for back surgery in the U.S. from trial commissioner, claimant decided against back surgery and relocated to home nation of Jordan to obtain psychiatric treatment. Respondents challenged reasonableness of treatment. Trial commissioner found for claimant. CRB remanded issues of medical treatment and “permanent total” disability to trial commissioner, and vacated order of sanctions. Record did not support finding of “undue delay.” On other issues, commissioner ruled based on 11th hour medical report before respondents had opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See also, Ghazal, § 31-288, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence, § 31-307.

Kaspern v. Estes Express Lines, 5391 CRB-8-08-11 (November 17, 2009).

Claimant sustained compensable left shoulder injury while employed by Estes Express as a tractor trailer driver for Home Depot. Claimant subsequently left Estes Express and went to work for Lowe’s as a tractor trailer driver. Claimant ultimately sought authorization for surgery to left shoulder and trier assigned liability to Estes Express. Respondent Estes Express appealed, contending claimant’s ongoing symptoms and need for surgery were due to his employment with Lowe’s in light of claimant’s testimony that jobs with Estes and Lowe’s were “identical”. Estes also argued trier erred in failing to find, consistent with Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008), Lowe’s was precluded from contesting liability based on its failure to file Form 43 in response to second Form 30C filed by claimant alleging repetitive trauma. CRB affirmed, citing medical reports in evidence and noting claimant testified he made more than twice as many deliveries per week for Estes and was required to lift heavier objects. CRB declined to address issue of preclusion given it could be reasonably inferred trier concluded claimant was entitled to recovery on basis of first, timely Form 30C and second Form 30C was unnecessary and legally irrelevant. Trier denied Motion to Correct. See also, Kaspern, § 31 275(1), § 31-301-4, § 31-307b, § 31-349.

Claros v. Keystone Pipeline Services, Inc., 5399 CRB-1-08-11 (October 28, 2009).

Claimant argued that trial commissioner’s decision insufficiently compensated him for compensable injuries. Trial commissioner concluded claimant’s narrative of injury as to injury not credible, and did not find claimant presented credible and persuasive medical evidence. Trial commissioner found Respondent’s expert witness credible. Claimant failed to file Motion to Correct. Trial commissioner’s decision was supported on evidence on the record, and therefore, upheld on appeal. See, Claros, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

O’Leary v. Wal-Mart Associates. Inc., 5395 CRB-3-08-11 (October 27, 2009).

Claimant asserted that Finding and Award inadequately compensated him for a compensable injury. Claimant believed that he should have received permanent partial disability benefits and a longer duration of temporary total benefits. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Commissioner concluded claimant was not credible on material issues, thus, medical evidence based on claimant’s narrative not reliable. CRB found Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008) on point and supported trial commissioner’s findings.

Williams v. State/Judicial Branch, 5359 CRB-1-08-6 (October 8, 2009).

Claimant, a Juvenile Transportation Officer, appealed trier’s decision dismissing claim on basis that claimant’s aggressive initiation of a physical confrontation with a detention center detainee during a supervised basketball game constituted willful and serious misconduct, an affirmative defense. CRB affirmed, as the trier’s conclusion was dependent upon the weight and credibility he assigned to the evidence which included the testimony of co workers and supervisors as well as surveillance camera footage. Claimant also claimed as error trier’s failure to draw an adverse inference on the basis of spoliation by virtue of respondent’s failure to preserve footage from a second surveillance camera operating in gym during the incident. CRB affirmed trier, noting that an adverse inference determination is factual in nature and respondent provided a credible explanation for its failure to preserve footage from second camera. CRB affirmed trier’s refusal to grant corrections, save for scrivener’s errors, in claimant’s Motion to Correct. See also, Williams, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-301-4.

Neville v. Baran Institute of Technology, 5383 CRB-8-08-10 (September 24, 2009).

Claimant suffered compensable injuries at prior employer and then was injured while employed at respondent. Injury to claimant’s cervical spine aggravated. Trial commissioner applied Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279 (2003) to determine that last employer should be fully responsible for claimant’s cervical spine condition going forward. CRB reversed on issue. There was no expert testimony that aggravation was more than temporary; statute (§ 31-349 (a) C.G.S.) requires aggravation to be material and permanent in order to apply Hatt. See Neville § 31-349, § 31-299.

Carroll v. Flattery’s Landscaping, Inc., 5385 CRB-8-08-10 (September 24, 2009).

Claimant suffered earlier compensable injury and asserted this injury was cause for cervical spine surgery. Respondent’s expert and commissioner’s examiner opined that pre-existing degenenerative condition caused need for surgery. Trial commissioner relied on these experts and dismissed claim. Claimant appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner; commissioner must usually explain reasoning for not following opinion of commissioner’s examiner; Ben-Eli v. Lowe’s Home Improvement Center, 5006 CRB-3-05-10 (November 16, 2006); reliance on his opinions in this case was not clearly erroneous. Claimant failed in his burden of persuasion Warren v. Federal Express Corporation, 4163 CRB-2-99-12 (February 27, 2001) See also Carroll § 31-294f; § 31- 301. Appeal procedure.

Sierra v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 5370 CRB-1-08-8 (Septembe 23, 2009).

See Sixto Sierra, § 31-308 (b), § 31-307.

Nicotera v. Hartford, 5381 CRB-8-08-10 (September 2, 2009).

Claimant argued that missed work and medical treatment related to compensable injury. Respondents argued that proximate cause was noncompensable motor vehicle accident. Trial commissioner pointed to credibility issue with claimant. CRB upheld, case indistinguishable from Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008). Issue of proximate cause cannot be retried on appeal. See also, Nicotera, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.

Seiler v. Ranco Collision, LLC, 5377 CRB-1-08-09 (August 27, 2009).

Claimant failed to disclose prior history of injuries to treating physicians. Trial commissioner discounted evidence from treaters and found respondent’s expert more credible, ultimately determining claimant failed to prove causation. CRB upheld; case indistinguishable from Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008). Burden on claimant to prove causation and to do so, claimant must be a credible witness. See also Seiler, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Vazquez v. John Christino d/b/a Jack’s Home Improvements, 5380 CRB-4-08-9 (August 19, 2009).

Commissioner’s determination as to the existence of an employment relationship supported by evidence and the weight and credibility commissioner accorded to same. See also, Vazquez, § 31-275(9).

Sobon v. Andrzej Oszmian d/b/a Andy’s Carpentry, 5368 CRB-8-08-8 (August 12, 2009).

Claimant sustained injury working for roofing subcontractor at new home construction site. Trial commissioner found injury compensable and assigned liability to subcontractor. Subcontractor did not have workers’ compensation insurance policy in force on date of injury and matter transferred to Second Injury Fund. Fund subsequently brought principal employer claims against both the architect hired by property owner’s husband to build cabinets and assist in supervising construction and the property owner’s husband who was working on-site as a mason. Trial commissioner dismissed claim against architect, concluded mason was acting as principal employer, and ordered him to reimburse Second Injury Fund. Respondent mason appealed, arguing Workers’ Compensation Commission lacked jurisdiction as neither roofing nor framing were a part or process of his regular trade or business as a mason and therefore statutory requirements set out by principal employer statute were not satisfied. CRB affirmed, noting trier’s findings were consistent with precedent and testimony of parties adequately supported his conclusions that architect was functioning as a part-time project manager while actual supervisory responsibility for and control of construction site rested with mason, who was essentially acting as a general contractor. See also Sobon, § 31-291, § 31-355(b).

Alvarez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5378 CRB-5-08-9 (July 27, 2009).

Claimant suffered prior injury in former employer and executed stipulation for lump sum that did not specify level of disability. Claimant later injured worked for Wal-Mart. Respondent argued that claimant had previously been paid for portion of present disability and appealed award. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Prior stipulation did not set disability level. Trial commissioner was not persuaded by commissioner’s examiner that prior injury was predominant factor in claimant’s current disability. See also Alvarez, § 31-294f, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(b), § 31-349.

Cuadrado v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5360 CRB-7-08-7 (July 2, 2009).

Pro se claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim after finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbar spine injury and alleged workplace lifting incident. Medical reports in evidence seemed to suggest injury may have occurred prior to date of incident, and although claimant did present a medical opinion in support of causation, trier ultimately concluded that neither the claimant nor the doctor in question were credible or persuasive. Respondents submitted employer time cards which also appeared to cast doubt on claimant’s narrative of events surrounding her injury. On appeal, claimant failed to provide Reasons for Appeal or a brief but did submit two documents which were partially accepted insofar as they constituted a rationale for the claimant’s appeal and partially denied insofar as they constituted a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence pursuant to Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9. CRB affirmed trier on basis that determinations relative to credibility of parties are not subject to second guessing at appellate level. See also, Cuadrado, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-9.

White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5363 CRB-2-08-7 (June 30, 2009).

See also White, § 31-294c C.G.S., § 31-294d C.G.S.

McInnis v. Shelter Workz, 5299 CRB-3-07-11 (June 11, 2009).

Claimant suffered compensable back injury and returned to work. He claimed he was unable to perform light duty work and was later terminated. Treating physician sought referral to specialist; which did not get approved for over a year. At that time claimant diagnosed with herniated disc and determined totally disabled. Trial commissioner ordered total disability from time of injury. Respondent appealed. CRB upheld. Trial commissioner could reasonably infer that claimant was totally disabled due to disc herniation for entire period claimed. Also termination from employment not an absolute bar to benefits, see Levey v. Farrel Corp., 3649 CRB-4-97-7 (July 30, 1998). Applying for unemployment benefits also not a bar, trial commissioner could conclude claimant was willing to work but not able. Latham v. Caraustar Industries, 5241 CRB-2-07-6 (June 25, 2008) See also, McInnis, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

Dahle v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5356 CRB-6-08-6 (June 5, 2009).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claimant’s request for additional medical care on grounds that pain management regimen sought was palliative and not curative and therefore did not constitute reasonable or necessary treatment. Claimant contended trial commissioner’s reliance on orthopedic surgeon’s opinion was in error as orthopedic specialist was not qualified to comment on efficacy of pain management. CRB determined that expert testimony contained in evidentiary record, along with medical reports from several experts, including a pain management specialist, provided adequate support for trial commissioner’s inferences regarding utility of pain management regimen. Trial commissioner also found claimant eligible for benefits pursuant to § 31-308a C.G.S. and awarded attorneys’ fees due to respondents’ unreasonable contest, which findings were not challenged on appeal. The claimant filed a Motion to Correct, which was denied in its entirety. See also, Dahle, § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-301-4.

Gilbert v. Ansonia, 5342 CRB-4-08-5 (May 14, 2009).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision to deny Respondents’ Medical Examination. Respondents alleged claimant, a volunteer fireman who was rendered a paraplegic when he fell from a ladder while fighting a fire, no longer satisfied the statutory conditions for collecting total incapacity benefits pursuant to § 31-307(c) C.G.S. Respondents contended that because medical reports indicated claimant’s paralysis was not complete and video surveillance showed claimant was able to walk and ambulate, trial commissioner’s refusal to authorize respondents’ medical examination constituted denial of due process. Trial commissioner found respondents had failed to challenge a prior trial commissioner’s finding in 2004 establishing claimant’s eligibility for permanent total incapacity benefits and also determined respondents had not adduced sufficient evidence of a change in claimant’s disability to warrant opening the voluntary agreement pursuant to § 31-315 C.G.S. See also, Gilbert, § 7-314a, § 31-294f, § 31-307, § 31-315.

Chmielewski v. Reno Machine Company, Inc., 5273 CRB-6-07-9 (May 4, 2009).

Claimant injured twice. Trial commissioner determined that medical evidence supported finding that initial injury was cause for claimant’s surgery. Carrier on first injury challenged sufficiently of evidence, citing no lost time after initial injury. CRB upheld trial commissioner; evidence supporting his decision constituted a competent medical opinion, see Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669 (2008), cert. granted, 286 Conn. 916 (2008). See also, Chmielewski, § 31-299b C.G.S.

Rakowski v. Marlin Firearms, 5340 CRB-3-08-4 (April 22, 2009).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim after finding no causal connection between claimant’s vocal cord injury and air quality at workplace. Claimant’s allegations relative to constant long term exposure to dust and other airborne contaminants were refuted by industrial hygiene and OSHA studies and by expert testimony from physician who performed IME on claimant and conducted site visit of employer’s facility. Despite lymph node biopsy which was positive for industrial particulates, no evidence of unsafe air quality was discovered at plant, and expert testimony suggested lymph node findings could be partially explained by claimant’s smoking history. Moreover, respondents’ expert could not attribute vocal cord paralysis to lymph node findings. Trier denied claimant’s Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed, noting claimant primarily performed wet rather than dry grinding and medical opinions in record supporting causation were heavily reliant on claimant’s history. See also, Rakowski, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-4.

Sockbeson v. AJS Enterprise, 5334 CRB-6-08-4 (April 1, 2009).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s Finding and Award ordering temporary total and temporary partial benefits for claimant who sustained a back injury in a workplace lifting incident. Respondents had argued claimant’s symptoms were due to prior injuries to her lumbar spine and/or a motor vehicle accident which occurred after the workplace incident. On appeal, respondents contend claimant was not credible regarding the medical history given to treating physicians and appeared to exaggerate her symptoms during an IME and commissioner’s examination. Respondents also allege, inter alia, lack of due process relative to numerous post-judgment motions which were denied by the trier, who also denied their Motion to Correct in its entirety. At trial, claimant testified plausibly regarding prior incidents involving her back and the motor vehicle accident, and CRB determined evidentiary submissions supported trier’s conclusions regarding causation. CRB also found respondents’ claims of error relative to their post-judgment motions were without merit. See also, Sockbeson, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-4, § 31-301-9.

Sapko v. State/Dept of Correction, 5335 CRB-8-08-4 (March 23, 2009).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion must stand unless question of causation lies clearly on one side or the other. See Sapko, §§ 31-275(1), 31-306.

Burns v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 5343 CRB-7-08-5 (March 23, 2009).

Claimant suffered compensable injury at CT store, relocated to SC and worked for respondent in that state. While in SC, back condition worsened and she had surgery. Respondent contested that surgery was due to CT injury. Claimant produced medical testimony linking present condition to CT injury. Commissioner issued award to claimant. On appeal, CRB upheld trial commissioner. Jurisdictional attack on award failed, record established CT had a significant interest in issuing award for CT injury as per Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323 (2008). Respondents proffered no expert testimony claimant suffered new injury in South Carolina. See Burns, § 31-278, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

King v. State/Department of Correction, 5339 CRB-8-08-4 (March 20, 2009).

See also, King, § 31-275(1).

Mallozzi v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5337 CRB-2-08-4 (March 4, 2009).

Claimant argued trial commissioner should have credited her testimony and documentation. CRB upheld trial commissioner; this decision was reserved to his discretion. Absence of Motion to Correct limits CRB to determine how commissioner applied law Stevens v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 5215 CRB-4-07-4 (March 26, 2008).

Lee v. Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc., 5284 CRB-7-07-10 (February 25, 2009).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s back injury was compensable although no medical expert directly commented on the relationship between claimant’s back injury and the claimant’s job as a home heating oil delivery person. The record before the trier reflected; the claimant carried heavy hoses filled with oil across various terrain in varying weather conditions, the claimant would often fall in the course of deliveries, and claimant had also sustained a hernia which was accepted by the respondent. The trial commissioner concluded applying common sense to the factual circumstances led her to conclude that claimant’s back claim was compensable. See, Lee, § 31-275(1).

Biasetti v. Stamford, 5320 CRB-7-08-2 (February 19, 2009).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for benefits for post traumatic stress disorder arising from claimant’s involvement in car chase and gun battle. Claimant also sustained injuries to knee and elbow which respondent accepted. Trier determined claim was controlled by pre July 1, 2005 revision to § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) excluding mental impairments that do not arise from a physical injury or occupational disease and, consistent with our Supreme Court’s holding in Biasetti I, concluded a direct causal relationship must exist between claimed mental impairment and physical injuries sustained by the claimant. Because trier found neither medical evidence nor claimant’s testimony supported such a finding, she dismissed claim. CRB affirmed, citing inter alia the lack of a direct physical assault on claimant and expert testimony that claimant would probably have gone on to develop PTSD irrespective of his physical injuries. See also, Biasetti, § 31-275 (1), § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), § 31-301-4.

Abrahamson v. State/Dept. of Public Works, 5280 CRB-2-07-10 (February 26, 2009).

Trial commissioner ordered interest on late payment of permanency pursuant to both § 31-295(c) C.G.S. and § 31-300 C.G.S. CRB remanded, seeking clarification as to which statute constituted basis for award and whether there had been undue delay. On remand, trier found no undue delay and awarded interest pursuant to 31-300 C.G.S. only. Claimant appealed, arguing respondents improperly contested permanency because of apportionment reimbursement concerns and claimant was therefore entitled to mandatory interest pursuant to § 31-295(c) C.G.S. plus interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to § 31-300 C.G.S. CRB upheld award of interest pursuant to § 31-300 C.G.S. noting permanency continued to be litigated after claimant was rated due to complications in claimant’s medical history and a potential statute of non claim defense. CRB also determined that unlike § 31-303 C.G.S, neither § 31-295(c) C.G.S. nor § 31-300 C.G.S. allow for simultaneous payment of interest. CRB upheld trier’s finding of no undue delay on grounds that, in addition to medical record issues, claimant’s availability for litigation was hampered by his ill health and residence out-of-state for part of the year. Trier denied claimant’s Motion to Correct in its entirety. See also, Abrahamson, § 31-295(c), § 31-300, § 31-303, § 31-301-4.

Smith v. Waterbury, 5326 CRB-5-08-03 (February 4, 2009).

Claimant asserted he was totally disabled based on treating physicians opinion’s. Trial commissioner denied claim, finding objective medical tests such as a stress test and a Holter monitor were consistent with sedentary work capacity; in addition, claimant testified to active home life. In addition, respondent’s expert testified claimant had sedentary work capacity. CRB upheld; commissioner had probative evidence to support his conclusions. See also, Smith, § 7-433a, § 31-307.

Darby v. Hart Plumbing Company, 5325 CRB-2-08-2 (February 4, 2009).

Claimant asserted back injury was result of lifting air conditioning motor at construction site. Prior to filing written notice of injury, claimant involved in altercation with other workers and fired from job. Trial Commissioner denied claim, crediting testimony of co-workers that they did not witness alleged injury; claimant did not tell them he was injured that day and did not appear injured. Claimant appealed, asserting trial commissioner failed to credit documentary evidence that claimant was in a place and doing work consistent with alleged injury. CRB upheld dismissal. Citing Toroveci v. Globe Tool & Metal Stamping Co., 5253 CRB 6-07-7 (July 22, 2008), claimant failed in his burden to prove not that injury could have occurred consistent with his narrative, but that it did occur as described.

Wiggins v. Middletown, 5300 CRB-8-07-12 (January 15, 2009).

Claimant asserted that shoulder injury was due to pulling equipment off fire truck. Claim filed in timely manner, but claimant treated for another ailments for two years prior to treating for shoulder injury. Respondents argued evidence unsupportive of claim, suggesting intervening motor vehicle accident was cause of current issues. Trial commissioner found claimant and treating physician credible, and awarded benefits. Respondents appealed. CRB upheld commissioner. Unlike Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669 (2008) treating physician’s opinions were definitive; hence this is a “dueling expert” case. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and a trial commissioner may rely on expert testimony which is grounded in a claimant’s narrative he or she finds credible. See also, Wiggins, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Torres v. New England Masonry Company, 5289 CRB-5-07-10 (January 6, 2009).

Claimant argued that his bilateral avascular necrosis in his hips was the sequelae of compensable injuries. Trial commissioner found testimony of the commissioner’s examiner and the surgeon who performed a hip replacement, who opined necrosis was idiopathic, more persuasive and credible than claimant’s treating physicians. Claimant appealed dismissal. CRB upheld. Trial commissioner had sufficient probative evidence to justify his decision. See also, Torres, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9.

Marroquin v. F. Monarca Masonry, 5310 CRB-4-07-12 (December 19, 2008).

Claimant sustained a compensable inguinal hernia in June 2001 for which he underwent surgical treatment. In September 2004, while working for a different employer, claimant alleged he injured himself in a lifting incident and underwent additional surgery in October 2004 and June 2005. Respondents, who were “on the risk” at the time of the original hernia injury, contend second incident represented an aggravation of the hernia injury which, per Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996), constitutes a separate and distinct disability and, consistent with the provisions of § 31-349 C.G.S., confers liability on the employer at the time of the second injury. Trial commissioner determined claimant’s need for surgery in October 2004 and June 2005 arose from complications stemming from prior surgical repair of the 2001 compensable hernia, thereby conferring liability on the respondents, consistent with the provisions of § 31-307b C.G.S. CRB affirmed on basis that matter could be distinguished from Epps in light of videntiary submissions. Trier also denied Motion to Correct. See also, Marroquin, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-4, § 31-307b, § 31-349.

Hernandez v. Pizzaria 101 and Family, 5254 CRB-2-07-7 (December 8, 2008).

Claimant sustained severe injuries in assault by co-worker which occurred in parking lot of respondent employer restaurant. Other co-workers, including the co-owner who was at the restaurant when the assault occurred, told police they were unaware of any problems between claimant and assailant. Claimant testified he had complained to the employer regarding several job-related issues between him and his assailant, but assailant told police he attacked claimant for allegedly telling people in assailant’s home town in Mexico that he and claimant had had a sexual relationship. Trier denied claim on basis that assault and resulting injuries occurred because of the personal relationship between claimant and assailant and were not due to conditions of employment. Trier also denied Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed. See also, Hernandez, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-4.

Flood v. Travelers Property & Casualty, 5267 CRB-1-07-8 (December 8, 2008).

Claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s determination that no causal connection exists between claimant’s neck and back complaints and a workplace incident of March 31, 2000 in which claimant fell on a temporary walkway. Respondents accepted compensability of left shoulder injury sustained at same time. Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct and Amended Motion to Correct. CRB affirmed, concluding trier reasonably relied on expert testimony and drew permissible inferences from the lack of contemporaneous medical records supporting claimant’s assertions relative to her back and neck complaints. CRB declined to address claimant’s request at hearing to submit additional evidence as no motion to that effect had ever been filed and materials in question were duplicative of documents already admitted. See also, Flood, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-4, § 31-301-9.

Carnes v. State/Department of Correction, 5308 CRB-8-07-12 (December 8, 2008).

See § 31-294d.

Ialacci v. Hartford Medical Group, 5306 CRB-1-07-12 (December 2, 2008).

See also, Ialacci, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Schenkel v. Richard Chevrolet, Inc., 5302 CRB-8-07-12 (November 21, 2008).

Claimant had been previously denied temporary total disability benefits filed at later date claiming he was totally disabled. Trial commissioner agreed and respondents appealed. CRB upheld. Respondent’s expert opined claimant was totally disabled; while he also opined claimant’s condition had not deteriorated trial commissioner could rely on opinion of treating physician on that issue and therefore had grounds to award benefits. See also, Schenkel, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

DaSilva v. Danbury Board of Education, 5263 CRB-7-07-8 (November 5, 2008).

See also, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Grant v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Co., 5292 CRB-4-07-11 (October 28, 2008).

Claimant sought award for temporary total and temporary partial disability following an assault by a co-worker. Trial commissioner determined the respondent’s Form 36’s should be granted; crediting testimony from the commissioner’s examiner that the claimant was psychiatrically able to work and testimony from fact witnesses the claimant had worked on remodeling homes. CRB upheld on appeal; weighing evidence is reserved to the trial commissioner who found this testimony credible. See also, Grant, § 31-307, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(a), § 31-301-9.

Hirth v. MG Electric, 5301 CRB-6-07-11 (October, 2008).

See Hirth § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Mele v. Hartford, 5286 CRB-1-07-10 (October 10, 2008), rev’d in part, 118 Conn. App. 104 (2009).

Claimant appealed from trial commissioner’s finding on remand that no causal connection exists between claimant’s current hip condition and need for surgery and two compensable injuries which occurred in October of 1996 and December of 2001. [See Mele v. Hartford, 4870 CRB-1-04-10 (September 29, 2005).] Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct and rejected findings of Commissioner’s Examiner. CRB affirmed, concluding trier reasonably relied on expert testimony and drew permissible inferences from the lack of contemporaneous medical records in file which would support claimant’s assertions relative to her hip condition. See also, Mele, § 31-294f, § 31-301-4.

Martinez-McCord v. State/Judicial Branch, 5275 CRB-7-07-9 (September 12, 2008).

When commissioner is asked to determine total disability status for some period following an earlier determination by a commissioner, it is reasonable that the trial commissioner will discern claimant’s physical status and work capacity existing at the time of the earlier consideration and determine what changes have occurred. The trial commissioner informed parties she was taking administrative notice of the record in the prior proceedings. Her conclusion on the basis of evidence in prior proceedings and the evidence proffered before her was not an abuse of discretion. See also, Martinez-McCord, § 31-307.

Biehn v. Bridgeport, 5232 CRB-4-07-6 (September 11, 2008).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant developed hypertension during pregnancy in 2001 which in subsequent years appeared to resolve only with medication. Trier determined claimant’s application for benefits filed in September of 2004 was untimely. Claimant argued McNerney v. New Haven, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 330, 2098 CRB-3-94-7 (June 25, 1996) (ten year lapse between manifestations of claimant’s hypertension symptoms led to finding that second manifestation was new injury) should have controlled. Claimant also filed Motion for Articulation seeking clarification of the category of injury, per § 31-294c, trier had used to determine applicable statute of limitations, which motion was denied. See also, Biehn, § 7-433c, § 31-294c.

Sweet v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 5262 CRB-1-07-8 (August 27, 2008).

Claimant asserted disc herniation was due to lifting pallets at work. Respondents challenged testimony as inconsistent. Trial commissioner found treating physician persuasive and found injury compensable, but also stated he thought injury was more likely “repetitive trauma”. Respondents appealed. CRB upheld If commissioner found claimant credible despite alleged inconsistencies, he was permitted to rely on doctor’s opinion as to causation. See also, Sweet, § 31-275(1), § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Strajkowski v. Pratt & Whitney, 5251 CRB-1-07-7 (August 27, 2008).

Claimant asserted rotator cuff injury was due to repetitive trauma at work. Physician ascribed injury to “overhead work.” Evidence was the claimant had engaged in substantial overhead work in prior years, but had not performed much in year prior to accident. Trial Commissioner denied claim as untimely. CRB upheld. Claimant failed in burden of persuasion work activities during year prior to claim were substantial factor in his injury. See also, Strajkowski, § 31-294c, § 31-275(16).

Young v. Bridgeport, 5266 CRB-4-07-8 (August 22, 2008).

Respondent’s argument certain facts admitted in counsel’s opening statement were binding was unavailing. The admission to which respondent refers was to a matter ultimately found not relevant as a matter of law. See also, Young, § 7-433c.

Bazelais v. Honey Hill Care Center, 5191 CRB-7-07-1 (August 21, 2008).

Respondents appealed from trial commissioner’s determination on remand that claimant was totally disabled, contending trial commissioner improperly used Motion for Articulation to change his original findings and issue a contradictory ruling. Respondents had filed Form 36 to discontinue temporary total benefits which was denied. On appeal, trier determined claimant was totally disabled. CRB remanded to trier for articulation and/or additional findings because Finding and Dismissal as written was unclear regarding (1) which medical evidence trier had relied on in determining total disability and (2) whether disability assessment had been based on medical or vocational factors. On remand, trier articulated which medical expert testimony he found most persuasive and indicated his initial assessment had been based on medical factors. CRB affirmed. See also, Bazelais, § 31-296, § 31-307.

Vitti v. Richards Conditioning Corp., 5247 CRB-7-07-7 (August 21, 2008).

Pipe fitter suffered heart attack at construction site. Trial commissioner credited expert witness who testified cause of heart attack was unrelated to work. CRB upheld on appeal. See also, Vitti, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.

Thompson v. New Canaan, 5228 CRB-7-07-5 (August 21, 2008).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim for lack of jurisdiction. Trier determined notice of claim was untimely as claimant was diagnosed with hypertension in May of 2003 but did not file application for benefits until June of 2004. Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct because proposed corrections primarily sought to reconfigure factual findings in a light more favorable to claimant. See also, Thompson, § 7-433c, § 31-294c, § 31-301-4.

Zolla v. John Cheeseman Trucking, 5261 CRB-5-07-8 (August 4, 2008), appeal dismissed, A.C. 30251 (March 5, 2009).

Claimant was interstate truck driver employed by Ohio firm who suffered heart attack on the job in New Jersey. Respondents failed to file disclaimer within statutory timeline to contest claim filed in Connecticut. Respondents argued claimant was barred by contract from filing claim in Connecticut, and that based on the facts, Connecticut lacked jurisdiction over injury. They also argued that they were misled by the claimant into believing he would not pursue his claim in Connecticut. Trial commissioner concluded claimant never waived his right to file in Connecticut. Commissioner further concluded the employment relationship was substantially in Connecticut; respondents operated a truck terminal in Connecticut and solicited drivers from the vicinity; claimant’s work prior to the injury was centered on picking up loads from a Connecticut manufacturer for delivery at New Jersey construction site. On appeal, CRB upheld trial commissioner. Issue of whether claimant told respondent he was waiving his CT claim goes to witness credibility and cannot be revisited Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 40 (2003). CRB found factual basis of employment relationship met test for jurisdiction promulgated in Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323 (2008). See also, Zolla, § 31-278, § 31-290, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Somma v. Norwalk Hospital, 5208 CRB-7-07-3 (July 24, 2008).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion claimant was not entitled to total disability for a specific period of time where evidence indicated the claimant made various trips to Italy during period of alleged total incapacity and the trial commissioner was not persuaded any such total incapacity was causally related to her work injury. See also, Somma, § 31-307.

Nettleton v. East Hartford, 5175 CRB-1-06-12 (July 23, 2008).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim as untimely. Claimant became aware of his high blood pressure in January of 1993 but did not file Form 30C until May of 1994. Claimant elected to seek benefits pursuant § 31-275, et. seq., rather than § 7-433c but evidentiary record did not support inference that injury had arisen out of or in the course of employment. Trier also denied Motion to Preclude as moot. See also, Nettleton, § 31-275(1), § 31-294(c).

Toroveci v. Globe Tool & Metal Stamping Co., Inc., 5253 CRB-6-07-7 (July 22, 2008).

Claimant appealed denial of claim following dismissal by trial commissioner, who found neither the claimant nor respondent’s witnesses credible. CRB upheld. Case governed by Warren v. Federal Express, 4163 CRB-2-99-12 (February 27, 2001); when trial commissioner decides neither party is credible the claim must be dismissed.

Diaz v. Jaime Pineda, a/k/a Jamie Pineda d/b/a J.P. Landscaping Company, 5244 CRB-7-07-7 (July 8, 2008).

Claimant asserted error in finding that he submitted no medical evidence supporting temporary total disability claim. CRB upheld, denial of motion to correct infers trial commissioner found the evidence submitted unpersuasive. See also Diaz § 31-307, § 31-355(b), § 31-294d, § 31-301-9.

Love v. William W. Backus Hospital, 5255 CRB-2-07-8 (June 24, 2008).

Employer appealed from award granting claimant § 31-308(a) benefits, contending medical reports in evidence were legally insufficient to support the trial commissioner’s conclusions regarding causation and whether injury was a substantial contributing factor in her ongoing disability per McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987). Employer argued that several medical reports appeared to be inconsistent, therefore award of benefits was not justified. At trial, claimant testified as to apparent inconsistencies, which were primarily due to her communications with her physician concerning her motivation to return to work. Employer sought to introduce additional medical report obtained after close of trial, motion denied as report was not germane to issues addressed at trial. CRB affirmed. See also, Love, § 31-275(1), § 31-308(a), § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Latham v. Caraustar Industries, 5241 CRB-2-07-6 (June 25, 2008).

Claimant proved to have punctuality/reliability issues during temporary job assessment. Trial commissioner concluded claimant met burden of establishing total disability as per holding in Howard v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 5063 CRB-2-06-3 (April 4, 2007). CRB upheld, cases indistinguishable. See also Latham, § 31-307.

Oliveira v. Antonio Braga d/b/a/ Braga Painting a/k/a Braga Painting & Drywall, Inc., 5209 CRB-7-07-3 (June 20, 2008).

CRB reversed trial commissioner as to his conclusion the respondent was the principal employer on the job site where the claimant sustained his compensable injury. There was no evidentiary support for the conclusion that the claimant’s employer was performing work at the request of the respondent, nor was there evidentiary support from which the trier could reasonably infer that the claimant sustained his injury at a work site in Wilton, CT. The claimant’s testimony was he was injured in Connecticut in a town that sounded like Newtown. See also, § 31-291.

Keeney v. Laidlaw Transportation, 5199 CRB-2-07-2 (May 21, 2008).

Claimant sought temporary total disability benefits asserting original work related back injury had been aggravated. Trial Commissioner awarded benefits and respondents appealed, asserting that claimant’s disability should be attributed to the later accident. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Issue governed by LaMontagne v. F & F Concrete Corporation, 5198 CRB-4-07-2 (February 25, 2008), trial commissioner credited evidence from a treating physician who opined that original injury was the cause of the present disability. See also Keeney, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-298, § 31-307.

Vitoria v. Professional Employment & Temps, 5217 CRB-2-07-4 (April 4, 2008).

Claimant asserted compensable back injuries from employment as well as injuries to exposure to fumes. Trial commissioner concluded claimant failed to prove such injuries were work related. CRB upheld dismissal of claim. Trial commissioner did not find claimant a credible witness and relied on respondent’s expert witnesses, who testified claimant’s ailment unrelated to work. See also, Vitoria, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Smith v. Salamander Designs, Ltd, 5205 CRB-1-07-3 (March 13, 2008).

Claimant asserted his shoulder and knee injuries were sustained in a fall at work. Trial Commissioner did not find claimant more credible than respondent’s witnesses and dismissed claim. CRB upheld decision on appeal. Resolving issues of credibility is uniquely and exclusively the province of the trial commissioner. Berube v. Tim’s Painting, 5068 CRB-3-06-3 (March 13, 2007). See also, Smith, § 31-275(1).

Dzienkiewicz v. State/Dept. of Correction, 5211 CRB-8-07-3 (March 18, 2008), aff’d, 291 Conn. 214 (2009).

Correction officer suffered stroke at home following shift. He sought benefits asserting he was totally disabled due to the stroke and that the stroke was caused due to stress at work. Trial commissioner presented with conflicting medical evidence, and credited evidence stroke was due to non-work related health issues, dismissing claim. See also, Dzienkiewicz, § 31-298, § 31-275(16).

Russell v. State/Dept. of Developmental Services/Southbury Training School, 5212 CRB-5-07-3 (March 18, 2008).

Claimant appealed denial of claim for temporary total disability benefits. Respondents had Form 36 granted, ending her benefits. CRB upheld trial commissioner. See also Russell, § 31-307, § 31-307a, § 31-308a.

LaMontagne v. F & F Concrete Corporation, 5198 CRB-4-07-2 (February 25, 2008).

Claimant asserted need for spinal fusion surgery due to compensable injury while employed by respondent F & F Concrete. Respondent argued some percentage of causation due to subsequent injury sustained by working for Haynes Construction. Trial commissioner levied award only against F & F Concrete. On appeal, CRB inferred the trial commissioner did not credit F & F Concrete’s evidence attributing percentage of disability to subsequent employer, even though trial commissioner credited their expert on other issues, commissioner need not credit every opinion offered by an expert whom she finds credible. O’Connor v. Med-Center Home Healthcare, Inc., 4954 CRB-5-05-6 (July 17, 2006). § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4, § 31-307.

Blades v. Redman & Turnquist, 5163 CRB-2-06-11 (February 26, 2008).

Affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion claimant not entitled to benefits for certain body parts where the determination was dependent upon the commissioner’s assessment of credibility and evidence supported trial commissioner’s conclusion.

Goncalves v. Nutmeg Big Brothers/Big Sisters, 5180 CRB-1-07-1 (January 22, 2008).

Claimant asserted she suffered from Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome (MCSS) which she asserted was due to work related exposures. Trial Commissioner dismissed claim as record indicated claimant had suffered similar aliments prior to employment with respondents and respondent’s expert testified her condition was not causally related to work environment. Respondent’s expert also indicated he did not believe MCSS was an actual disease. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Claimant failed to prove her condition was work related Lentini v. Connecticut College, 4933 CRB-2-05-4 (May 15, 2006). While claimant’s experts opined to the contrary, trial commissioner permitted to rely on respondent’s expert. Dellacamera v. Waterbury, 4966 CRB-5-05-6 (June 29, 2006). Issue of appropriateness of MCS diagnosis factual issue, and respondent’s expert offered reasonable diagnostic method for his conclusion. Strong v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 4563 CRB 1-02-8 (August 25, 2003) See also, Goncalves, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16).

Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corporation, 5167 CRB-8-06-12 (January 17, 2008), aff’d 118 Conn. App. 248 (2009).

Claimant was surviving spouse of worker who died of cardiac arrest. Claimant also had asbestosis. Trial commissioner concluded that claimant failed to produce any expert testimony that asbestosis from work was a substantial or significant factor in spouse’s demise. CRB upheld trial commissioner, who properly applied standard in McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987). Review of claimant’s evidence did not compel trial commissioner to issue an award. See also, Voronuk, § 31-306, § 31-275(15).

Solonick v. Electric Boat Corporation, 5170 CRB-2-06-12 (January 9, 2008), aff’d, 111 Conn. App. 793 (2008).

Claimant has worked career as engineer at Electric Boat. Upon retirement in 2003, he filed claim asserting that job related stress had caused cardiac problems which occasioned his retirement. Trial commissioner denied claim as he credited respondent’s expert witness who reached opposite conclusion. See also, Solonick, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16).

Christy v. Ken’s Beverage, Incorporated, 5157 CRB-8-06-11 (December 7, 2007).

Trial commissioner credited respondent’s doctor that claimant’s need for surgery related to earlier non-work accidents and injury at work was not a substantial factor for surgery. Factual evidence also justified trial commissioner on issue of approving a discogram, limiting duration of total disability benefits and awarding attorney’s fees. See also, Christy, § 31-307, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-300, § 31-294c.

Rizzo v. Stanley Works/Hand Tools Division, 5106 CRB-6-06-6 (November 21, 2007).

Following issuance of a Finding and Award, respondent filed Motion to Correct asserting medical evidence supported an earlier date of maximum medical improvement and justified ratification of a Form 36 approved at an informal hearing. Trial commissioner approved Motion to Correct and claimant appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Testimony could reasonably support the requested corrections. CRB rejected claim that date of medical report must be inferred to be date of maximum medical improvement, deposition testimony could yield reasonable conclusion physician believed she had “plateaued” much earlier. See also, Rizzo, § 31-301-4, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

Jolicoeur v. Duncklee, Inc., 5150 CRB-2-06-10 (November 8, 2007).

Trial commissioner is free to accept all, part or none of an expert’s testimony, and has sole authority to decide credibility of evidence. No error where trier failed to cite opinions of doctors who offered cumulative support for treating surgeon’s proposed surgical procedure. As per Admin. Reg. § 31-301-3, trier was not required to explain each reason for denying authorization of surgery. See, Jolicoeur, § 31-294d.

Reeve v. Eleven Ives Street, LLC, 5146 CRB-7-06-10 (November 5, 2007).

Claimant injured in barroom brawl asserted he was employed as bouncer at time of injury. Respondent-employer did not appear but advised respondent Second Injury Fund claimant not an employee. Claimant’s only evidence re: employment was uncorroborated testimony, he produced no pay stubs or other documentation. Trial commissioner concluded claimant had not established jurisdictional fact of employer/employee relationship and dismissed claim. CRB upheld on appeal. See also, Reeve, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9.

Heilweil v. Montville-Board of Education, 5161 CRB-8-06-11 (October 24, 2007).

Claimant suffered compensable injury while employed as bus driver. Respondents appealed award of temporary total disability benefits. CRB upheld. Vocational expert’s testimony established an Osterlund claim, respondent’s failure to submit contravening evidence meant that if trial commissioner credited claimant’s expert she was entitled to award. See also Heilweil, § 31-298, § 31-307.

Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007).

Claimant suffered compensable injury as construction worker. He alleged he was totally disabled following injury. CRB upheld trial commissioner denied this claim as she found respondent’s vocational expert more credible than the claimant’s expert. Trial commissioner’s determination of demeanor evidence of claimant regarding extent of disability is not amenable to appellate reversal. See also, Leandres, § 31-307.

DiLeone v. State/DMR, 5147 CRB-5-06-10 (October 5, 2007).

See, DiLeone, § 31-298. Conduct of hearings and § 31-307.

Houlihan v. Waterbury, 5141 CRB 5-06-10 (September 26, 2007).

Trial commissioner found injury compensable when police officer injured in motor vehicle accident between home and physical therapist. Claimant injured en route to treatment for previous compensable injury. CRB upheld trial commissioner. See also Houlihan, § 31-294c, § 31-275(1).

Velez v. LSP Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Domino’s Pizza, 5105 CRB-1-06-6 (September 26, 2007).

Trial Commissioner concluded after hearing evidence that principal of employer received actual notice of cancellation of worker’s compensation insurance, and correctly determined there was no workers’ compensation insurance coverage as of the date of injury. See also Velez, § 31-348, § 31-355(b).

O’Connor v. Med-Center Home Healthcare, Inc., 5142 CRB-5-06-10 (August 28, 2007), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 29187 (January 10, 2008), appeal dismissed (for failure to appeal directly to board following trial commissioner’s May 30, 2008 Finding on remand), A.C. 30200 (March 12, 2009), cert. granted, 292 Conn. 910 (2009).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusions that, (1) claimant was totally disabled, (2) respondent was liable for knee replacement surgery and for prescription drugs and mileage. Conclusions predicated on weight and credibility assigned to evidence will not be disturbed unless trier deemed to have abused his discretion. Evidence supported trier’s conclusions. Remanded for findings as to specific amounts to be paid for prescription drugs and mileage. See, O’Connor, § 31-294d, 31-301. Appeal procedure, 31-307.

Williams v. Bantam Supply Co., 5132 CRB-5-06-9 (August 30, 2007).

Trial commissioner determined claimant’s back injury was due to a 2000 work-related injury. Commissioner had testimony from claimant and medical evidence linking present condition to that injury. See also, Williams, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-294d.

Green v. General Motors Corporation New Departure, 5111 CRB-6-06-7 (August 21, 2007).

Claimant had suffered compensable injuries to each knee in 1990. Respondents filed Form 36 to discontinue temporary partial disability payments and award a permanent partial disability award. Claimant alleged she was still totally disabled. Trial commissioner granted Form 36 and awarded permanent partial benefits. Claimant appealed asserting commissioner failed to consider Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498 (1949) claim and challenging adequacy of evidence on permanency rating. CRB upheld on total disability issue. Claimant had burden of proof and did not persuade trial commissioner. Issue of permanency rating remanded due to trial commissioner’s award being inconsistent with expert witnesses’ testimony. See also, Green, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(b).

Asaro v. Waterbury Republican & American, 5121 CRB-5-06-8 (August 8, 2007).

See Asaro, § 31-275-1.

Mleczko v. Haynes Construction, 5109 CRB-7-06-7 (July 17, 2007), aff’d, 111 Conn. App. 744 (2008).

CRB cannot second guess trial commissioner who decided respondent’s witnesses more credible than claimant. See also, Mleczko, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16).

Meeker v. Knights of Columbus, 5115 CRB-3-06-7 (July 3, 2007).

Trial commissioner concluded that when claimant sustained injuries while walking on public highway from employer’s parking lot to her workplace. Neither “coming and going” rule or coverage exclusion for “social or recreational” activities implicated commission jurisdiction. CRB upheld. See also, Meeker, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16).

Greene v. Aces Access, 5114 CRB-3-06-7 (July 2, 2007), aff’d, 110 Conn. App. 648 (2008).

Claimant asserting he suffered disc herniation lifting wheelchair. Trial commissioner credited medical evidence herniation predated date of employment and was not materially worsened by claimed injury. CRB upheld trial commissioner who had sufficient evidence to support dismissal i.e. opinions of respondent’s examiner. Trial Commissioner need not rely on medical evidence which he believes is based on unreliable patient history see Do v. Danaher Tool, 5029 CRB-6-05-12 (November 28, 2006), Abbots v. Pace Motor Lines, 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 910 and Donahue v. Verediem Inc., 5074 CRB 6-06-3 (March 28, 2007). See also, Greene, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16).

Freel v. West Haven Board of Education, 5102 CRB-3-06-6 (June 1, 2007).

Schoolteacher filed claim for injury from science demonstration. Trial Commissioner determined injury was compensable, approved claim for myalgia, anxiety and gastrointestinal distress but denied claim for cervical spine injury. Claimant appealed this denial and CRB upheld decision. Trial Commissioner credited expert witnesses who opined spine ailment was unrelated to an electric shock injury. Remand to trial commissioner on whether any treatment at out-of-state clinic was consistent with § 31-294d. See also, Freel, § 31-294d.

Testone v. C.R. Gibson Co., 5045 CRB-5-06-1 (May 30, 2007), aff’d, 114 Conn. App. 210 (2009), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 914 (2009).

Trial commissioner determined that an IME report not submitted when a Form 36 was approved would have supported issuance of the Form 36. Commissioner also determined medical evidence did not support award of temporary partial disability benefits or award of attorney’s fees for unreasonable contest. See also, Testone § 31-300, § 31-307, § 31-308(a).

Walter v. Bridgeport, 5092 CRB-4-06-5 (May 16, 2007).

Claimant challenged trier’s conclusion that she was not totally disabled. Trier permissibly relied on opinion of respondents’ examiner that claimant’s medications would not prevent her from doing part-time sedentary work. Trier was also free to credit opinion of respondents’ vocational rehabilitation expert over claimant’s expert. See also, Walter, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

Jurado v. New Milford Nursing Home, 5089 CRB-7-06-5 (May 10, 2007).

See also, Jurado, § 31-279(c), § 31-294d.

Fratino v. Harry Grodsky & Co., Inc., 5087 CRB-7-06-5 (May 8, 2007).

Trier’s conclusion that the claimant’s need for shoulder surgery was as a result of the 1996 injury and liability for same rested with the carrier on the risk. See also, Fratino, § 31-294d and § 31-301-9.

Bond v. Monroe Group, LLC, 5093 CRB-3-06-5 (May 3, 2007).

Pro Se claimant appealed denial of claim for permanent partial benefits and temporary total benefits. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Case is similar to Dudley v. Radio Frequency Systems, 4995 CRB-8-05-9 (July 17, 2006). CRB must review findings solely to determine if they are supported by evidence. Evidence supported trial commissioner’s findings and CRB dismissed appeal. See also, Bond, § 31-294d, § 31-307, § 31-308(a), § 31-308(b).

Sutton v. Mercy Housing & Shelter Corp., 5085 CRB-1-06-2 (April 27, 2007).

See, Sutton, § 31-275(1) (apportionment was not achievable by argument that lung permanency was partly due to non-compensable separate and concurrent disease processes).

Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007).

CRB upheld factual findings of trial commissioner regarding physician authorization and length of total disability. See also, Hernandez, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-308(b), § 31-288(c), § 31-295(c).

Howard v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 5063 CRB-2-06-3 (April 4, 2007).

See Howard, § 31-307.

Mana v. SARAH, Inc., 5073 CRB 3-06-3 (March 22, 2007).

See, Mana, § 31-294d, § 31-307. Trial commissioner had sufficient evidence to find claimant’s disability sequelae of compensable injury.

Carlozzi v. State/DMR, 5072 CRB-5-06-3 (March 20, 2007).

Trial commissioner may accept or reject evidence, believe or disbelieve testimony, in whole or in part. Where testimony of treating physician conflicted with his own prior opinion and respondent’s examiner concurred with the treating physician’s earlier opinion, trier’s refusal to reach a conclusion consistent with the treater’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion. See also, Carlozzi, § 31-308a.

Gallagher v. John A. Dudley, DMD, 5067 CRB-4-06-3 (March 20, 2007).

Trial commissioner determined claimant suffered from brachial plexopathy or complex regional pain syndrome following a compensable shoulder injury. He found treating physician provided reasonable and necessary care by implanting spinal cord stimulator in claimant and this constituted curative care. Commissioner’s examiner disagreed, believing claimant did not suffer from brachial plexopathy or complex regional pain syndrome and did not need a spinal cord stimulator. Trial commissioner agreed with treating physician and respondents appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Trial commissioner may choose to rely on treating physician’s opinion over commissioner’s examiner if he provides justification , see Ben-Eli v. Lowes’s Home Improvement Center, 5006 CRB-3-05-10 (November 16, 2006). Treating physician provided competent medical testimony supportive of the Finding and Award. See also, Gallagher, § 31-293, § 31-294d.

Berube v. Tim’s Painting, 5068 CRB-3-06-3 (March 13, 2007).

Trial commissioner ordered temporary total disability payments to claimant who asserted he fell off roof working for respondent’s painting company. Trier later determined he had a herniated disc. Respondents challenged factual testimony of claimant regarding cause of injury and challenged sufficiency of medical evidence. Trial commissioner sole party empowered to determine witness credibility, see Liano v. Bridgeport, 4930 CRB-4-05-4 (April 13, 2006) and was entitled to believe claimant. Treating physician’s report offered competent medical evidence regarding causation, permanency and severity of injury, as respondents did not depose doctor or have him testify at the hearing, trial commissioner permitted to rely on his opinion. Trial commissioner’s omission of reliance on report in text of Finding and Award not erroneous, see Keenan v. Union Camp Corp., 49 Conn. App. 280, 285 (1998). See also, Berube, § 31-307, § 31-308(b).

Anderson v. R&K Spero Company, 4965 CRB-3-05-6 (February 21, 2007), aff’d, 107 Conn. App. 608 (2008).

Claimant suffered compensable 1997 injury which was aggravated at home. Claimant began treating with chiropractor on own initiative without obtaining authorization. Respondents contended treatment was not curative and claimant had reached maximum medical improvement. Trial commissioner adopted opinion of commissioner’s examiner that chiropractic treatment for claimant not justified as curative care. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Claimant did not meet his burden of persuasion. CRB cannot disturb a decision on whether care is curative unless it is unreasonable Carroll v. Flattery’s Landscaping, Inc., 4499 CRB-8-02-2 (March 25, 2003). See also, Anderson § 31-294d.

Martinez-McCord v. State/Judicial Branch, 5055 CRB 7-06-2 (February 1, 2007).

See, Martinez-McCord, § 31-298, § 31-307.

Kalinowski v. Meriden, 5028 CRB-8-05-11 (January 24, 2007).

Claimant sought 31-308(a) benefits and pain management treatment for 1990 injury. Trial Commissioner denied claims. Claimant appealed and CRB upheld trial commissioner, findings that claimant had slept on his rights and was receiving only palliative care were factual determinations for the trial commissioner to make which can only be disturbed if they are clearly erroneous. See also, Kalinowski, § 31-294d and § 31-308(a).

Huertas v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 5052 CRB-1-06-2 (January 22, 2007).

Claimant suffered knee injury while in employ of respondent. Treating physician concluded work was substantial factor in degenerative changes to both knees. Respondent’s expert witness disagreed, and ascribed ailments to excess weight and preexisting conditions. Trial Commissioner found treating physician most persuasive on issues of causation and compensability. CRB upheld on appeal. Respondent’s offered no legal authority for their argument the trial commissioner was required to give their expert greater weight due to his greater experience, having concluded the treating physician offered competent testimony, appellate inquiry ceases. In addition, respondent takes the employee in the state of health he finds him, Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 259 Conn. 29, 40 (2002).

McMahon v. Emsar, Inc., 5049 CRB-4-06-1 (January 16, 2007).

CRB may only disturb factual findings found without evidence. Issues dependent on questions of fact included whether claimant had marketable job skills, whether compensable back injury worsened preexisting degenerative back condition, and whether continued pain management treatment would play a curative role. Trial commissioner was not required to credit reports and records of treating physician over those of other doctors, and is not required to accept entirety of one physician’s report over that of another. Medical testimony supported finding that claimant was currently limited by preexisting condition, and that compensable sprain had not made degenerative condition worse even though sprain contributed to overall development of lumbar permanency. See also, McMahon, § 31-301-4, § 31-307, § 31-315, also cited at McMahon, § 31-294d.

Marra v. Ann Taylor Stores Corp., 5027 CRB-3-05-11 (December 29, 2006).

Claimant sought award for temporary total disability, pain management treatment, increased permanency rating, and attorney’s fees for unreasonable contest. CRB upheld trial commissioner’s Finding and Award. Treating physician’s testimony on chronic pain syndrome stated with reasonable degree of medical probability, and respondent’s examiner agreed on critical issues. Respondents’ reliance on Dixon v. United Illuminating, 57 Conn. App. 51 (2000) is unavailing; trier must determine what factors were substantial regarding causation. Sufficient evidence to support findings on pain management and unreasonable contest issues. See also, Marra, § 31-294d, § 31-300, § 31-307, § 31-308(b).

Distassio v. HP Hood, Inc., 5044 CRB-4-06-1 (December 20, 2006).

Trier did not err in assigning greater weight and credibility to treating physician’s opinion. Credibility assigned by trier to respondent’s expert witness was not unreasonable. See also, Distassio, § 31-275(1).

Do v. Danaher Tool Group, 5029 CRB-6-05-12 (November 26, 2006).

Trial commissioner concluded that evidence did not prove claimant had suffered a back injury at work. Claimant argued commissioner failed to credit undisputed evidence. Affirmed. Trier has sole authority to assess persuasiveness of evidence. See also, Do, § 31-275(1).

Ben-Eli v. Lowe’s Home Improvement Center, 5006 CRB-3-05-10 (November 16, 2006).

Issue at hearing was whether claimant’s foot injury was a sequela of an accepted back injury. Claimant’s treating physicians opined that it was; respondent’s examiner and commissioner’s examiner concluded otherwise. Commissioner found treaters’ opinions more credible, as respondent’s expert made apparent error as to earlier foot surgery and commissioner’s examiner relied in part on this report. CRB affirmed. Trier resolves inconsistencies in testimony and may reject a commissioner’s examiner’s report he finds unreliable. Evidence from treating physicians sufficient to support award. See also, Ben-Eli, § 31-308(a).

Bazelais v. Honey Hill Care Center, 5011 CRB-7-05-10 (October 25, 2006).

Trial commissioner determined at Form 36 hearing that claimant was still totally disabled. On appeal, CRB remanded for articulation and/or additional findings. Findings unclear as to what medical evidence commissioner relied on in determining total disability. Claimant’s expert witnesses did not present consistent testimony and trier needed to explain what evidence he relied on. It was also unclear whether disability was based on medical or vocational factors. See also, Bazelais, § 31-296, § 31-307.

Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 4986 CRB-1-05-8 (September 29, 2006).

Evidence showed totally disabled claimant was unable to sustain employment, as her condition deteriorated following approval of voluntary agreement on permanency. Evidence as to compensability of knee injury admissible, as trier not bound by strict rules of evidence. See also, Marandino, § 31-307, § 31-315.

Numan v. Warnaco, Inc., 5007 CRB-4-05-10 (September 22, 2006).

Trier found credible testimony of physician who was unsure that paresthesia in fingers was consistent with cervical neurologic involvement, and did not yet advocate surgery, but who also reasoned that seven-year absence of neck symptoms shows compensable injury exacerbated underlying spondylosis. Finding of compensable injury to cervical spine affirmed. See also, Numan, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.

Yurevich v. Dimitri Logvinski, 5013 CRB-7-05-10 (September 22, 2006).

Claimant injured thumb at construction site. He appealed finding that he was independent contractor at time of accident, asserting evidence showed he was employee. CRB affirmed. Employment status is patently a factual issue, and finding is subject to deference on review. See also, Yurevich, § 31-275(9).

Horvath v. State/Department of Correction, 5008 CRB-8-05-10 (September 13, 2006).

Trier makes factual determination as to whether medical care rendered within one year of accident in order to establish jurisdiction under § 31-294c(c) C.G.S. Trier found claimant’s testimony equivocal, while all payments regarding shoulder injury were made without prejudice. Respondents did not accept shoulder claim, and no prior finding of compensability binds them. See also, Horvath, § 31-294c, § 31-294d.

Palumbo v. Bridgeport, 4991 CRB-4-05-9 (September 7, 2006).

Commissioner’s role to make factual determination that pain management therapies kept the claimant in the work force and were curative. Subsequent accident did not cause need for further treatment. Commissioner could rely on IME doctor’s opinion on those issues to justify order. See also, Palumbo, § 31-294d.

Matteau v. Mohegan Sun Casino, 4998 CRB-2-05-9 (August 31, 2006).

See, Matteau, § 31-275(1).

Mankus v. Robert Mankus, 4958 CRB-1-05-6 (August 22, 2006).

Claimant has burden of proving injury occurs in course of employment in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Commission. If trier concludes injury did not occur in the course of employment, claim must be dismissed. Trier found based on testimony of alleged employer that claimant was not an employee when he was injured. Award reopened and case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Witness credibility cannot be reexamined on appeal. See also, Mankus, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10), § 31-315.

Krupa v. Marenna Amusements, LLC, 4980 CRB-7-05-7 (August 11, 2006).

Evidence supported findings that claimant’s injury occurred during course of employment. Respondent was claimant’s employer at time of injury. Respondent controlled worksite and elements of independent contractor status not present. Claimant’s testimony was found credible. Quantity of evidence presented at hearing does not dictate outcome; rather, quality and credibility are decisive factors. See also, Krupa, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10), § 31-307.

Abbots v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006).

Claimant said his disc herniation was a result of being forced to reload a truck. He produced a medical report finding a causal link, but had failed to originally advise treating physician of alleged injury. An eyewitness testified claimant complained of a sore back that day, but claimant did not file a report of injury. Respondent produced a number of witnesses who testified claimant told them he was hurt at home falling on ice. Trial commissioner found respondent’s witnesses more credible and discounted medical report. CRB upheld dismissal. No jurisdiction over injury. See also, Abbotts, § 31-275(1).

Corcoran v. Amgraph Packaging, Inc., 4948 CRB-2-05-5, 4819 CRB-2-04-6 (July 26, 2006).

Trial commissioner properly determined entire medical group served as claimant’s treating physician. Statement of one physician that claimant was totally disabled sufficient to support Finding and Award. Trial commissioner charged with duty to ascertain which medical evidence he finds credible. See also, Corcoran, § 31-307 and Corcoran, 4819 CRB-2-04-6 (July 26, 2006), infra.

Corcoran v. Amgraph Packaging, Inc., 4819 CRB-2-04-6, 4948 CRB-2-05-5 (July 26, 2006).

Trial commissioner denied partial disability payments for period after claimant was terminated from light duty job. Commissioner had sufficient evidence to determine termination was for cause. Claimant did not raise arguments regarding improper motivation by respondent and credibility of an eyewitness at the formal hearing. See also, Corcoran, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(a) and Corcoran, 4948 CRB-2-05-5 (July 26, 2006), supra.

Lopez v. Bradlees, Inc., 4968 CRB-7-05-7 (July 21, 2006).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s need for medical treatment to her lower back was not related to her right ankle work injuries of 1985 and 1988. Commissioner did not err in declining to apply the law of the case doctrine, as trier could look at new evidence despite earlier finding that claimant’s lower back and hip complaints were causally related to ankle injury. Collateral estoppel doctrine also inapplicable, as instant matter sought medical treatment for a different time period. No identity of issues.

Dudley v. Radio Frequency Systems, 4995 CRB-8-05-9 (July 17, 2006).

CRB cannot retry facts. Its role is limited to determining if trial commissioner had adequate evidence for his findings. Claimant’s evidence inadequate to permit award for temporary total disability. On issue of temporary partial disability, trier had discretion to deny award, and claimant did not establish actual wage loss. Claimant sought to reverse findings that urogenital ailments were not due to compensable injury and that bowel ailments not aggravated by injury. Medical evidence supported findings. Conflicting expert opinion on whether new accident increased permanency rating. Trier credited medical opinion that rating was unchanged. See also, Dudley, § 31-294d, § 31-307 and § 31-308(a).

O’Connor v. Med-Center Home Healthcare, Inc., 4954 CRB-5-05-6 (July 17, 2006).

Trial commissioner accepted evidence from treating physicians that claimant suffered an embolism. The commissioner may accept portions of opinion of expert witnesses who later opined embolism did not occur. No need for claimant to undergo angiogram to prove embolism when she had risk factors for additional respiratory or circulatory illness.

Kaminski v. Naugatuck, 4956 CRB-5-05-6 (June 28, 2006).

CRB remanded for clarification of finding that claimant’s blood pressure reading was documented by his “own primary care physician” where the only evidence indicated that said physician was retained by employer to perform yearly medical examinations on town firefighters. Finding material because it apparently served as key factor in concluding that claimant had been informed of high blood pressure reading in 1990, triggering statute of limitations to file § 7-433c claim. See also, Kaminski, § 7-433c.

Slater v. Broderick Macari, 4979 CRB-2-05-7 (June 27, 2006).

The trial commissioner found credible claimant’s testimony that she was employed by respondent at the time of injury. Respondent claimed this was inconsistent with subordinate facts. CRB determined subordinate facts consistent with finding of compensability (note: No Motion to Correct). See also, Slater, § 31-275 (10).

Sullivan v. Madison, 4893 CRB-3-04-12 (June 9, 2006).

Police dispatcher filed claim asserting hypertension was due to job related stress. While job conditions were stressful, trial commissioner granted an award based on inadequate medical evidence. Neither doctor who presented evidence testified unequivocally as to either the job causing hypertension or being the substantial factor aggravating a pre-existing condition. While commissioner is entitled to find facts, CRB retains power to correct misapplications of the law. Carroll v. Flattery’s Landscaping, 4499 CRB-8-02-2 (March 25, 2003). Appeal sustained. See also, Sullivan, § 31-275(1).

Buser v. G.R. Cummings Co., 4963 CRB-5-05-6 (June 8, 2006).

Widow pursued claim for § 31-306 benefits after husband, who had filed an occupational disease claim died. Husband had already prevailed on federal LHWCA claim. Trial commissioner found for claimant pursuant to precedent in Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric Boat Div., 255 Conn. 762 (2001). CRB upheld based on stare decisis. Facts as determined at LHWCA hearing sufficient to warrant compensability under Chapter 568. See also, Buser, § 31-299b.

Deschenes v. Transco, Inc., 4943 CRB-8-05-5 (May 22, 2006).

Liability for claimant’s entire lung permanency was apportioned among numerous insurers under § 31-299b. Medical evidence supported trier’s finding that a portion of the lung impairment was due to asbestosis, with the main cause being a separate and additional lung injury attributable to a long history of cigarette smoking. CRB held that these concurrently-developing injuries could not be separated for purposes of assigning lung permanency liability, as the Act does not allow apportionment under this circumstance. See also, Deschenes, § 31-349.

Fantano v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 4946 CRB-3-05-5 (May 19, 2006).

Trial commissioner credited medical opinion of treating physician that after subsequent motor vehicle accident claimant’s condition from original compensable injury returned to baseline. This was permissible factual finding for trier; therefore, respondents’ appeal was dismissed.

Duffy v. Greenwich-Board of Education, 4930 CRB-7-05-3 (May 15, 2006).

Claimant injured falling on ice in January. School had been ordered to close early due to winter storm, and was closed during the weekend. Claimant notified co-worker who notified supervisor next business day. Respondents not prejudiced by this report of injury. Respondents did not schedule medical examination for nearly ten months. Results of medical examination corroborated treating physician’s opinion claimant suffered compensable injury. Respondents did not execute a Voluntary Agreement, rather they continued to contest claim. Respondents also adopted claimant’s narrative of accident in letter to parents. Facts in record supported commissioner’s finding that respondents unreasonably contested the claim and justified an award of attorney’s fees. See also, Duffy, § 31-275(1), § 31-288(b), § 31-294b, § 31-300, § 31-307, § 31-308a.

Lentini v. Connecticut College, 4933 CRB-2-05-4 (May 15, 2006).

Claimant stated elbow injuries due to repetitive stress from computer keyboard use. Respondent’s medical examiner attributed injury to household activities. Trial commissioner permissibly found this testimony more credible than claimant’s medical evidence. See also, Lentini, § 31-275(1).

Bennett v. Wal-Mart, 4939 CRB-7-05-5 (May 15, 2006).

Claimant asserted total incapacity after refrigerator fell on her. Trier credited opinion of respondent’s physician that claimant had a light duty work capacity. See also, Bennett, § 31-297, § 31-308(a).

Wilbor v. Glastonbury, 4927 CRB-8-05-3 (May 12, 2006).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s factual finding that claimant’s cervical spine condition worsened following a compensable fall, as pre-existing spondylosis was asymptomatic prior to date of injury. Sufficient evidence in record to meet burden of proof.

Blizman v. First National Supermarkets, 4864 CRB-3-04-9 (April 26, 2006).

Trier’s conclusion legally proper where portions of expert testimony were relied on and considered in light of the claimant’s own testimony as to his back symptomology. See also, Blizman, § 31-275(1).

Samaoya v. William Gallagher, 4951 CRB-7-05-6 (April 26, 2006).

Claimant injured after falling off ladder while painting at construction site. Evidence, including town building permit, indicated respondent was general contractor and a principal employer. CRB upheld finding of commissioner, who credited public records over respondent’s hearing testimony. See also, Samaoya, § 31-291, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.

Mangual v. Andrew LeBlanc d/b/a Express Tiles, 4957 CRB-1-05-6 (April 26, 2006).

Claimant suffered near-amputation of finger in skill saw accident while working for a tile installer. Respondent’s admissions as to duties of claimant, and frequency and duration of his employment, were sufficient justification for finding claimant was not a “casual employee.” Injury compensable. See also, Mangual, § 31-275(9), § 31-298.

Doe v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4928 CRB-1-05-3 (April 13, 2006).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s dismissal of a Dept. of Correction mail handler’s claim for benefits due to Hepatitis B. Commissioner was not persuaded that Hepatitis B infection arose out of and in the course of claimant’s employment. Conflicting expert opinions as to causation were presented, and the trier assessed their weight and credibility, as was her prerogative.

Bailey v. Willimantic Dodge/Nissan Stripling Auto Sales, 4929 CRB-5-05-3 (April 13, 2006).

Claimant’s total disability was found by trier to be substantially caused by hip injury. Opinion stating that hip injury proximately caused total disability despite impairment from prior back injuries was expressed definitively, even though trier did not use words “reasonable degree of medical probability.” Doctor’s involvement as non-treating physician did not preclude trier from relying on his opinion as part of basis for ultimate finding. Expert testimony was not rendered inadmissible just because claimant may have retained his services for purpose of obtaining second opinion. Expert opinion is competent evidence if based on trustworthy information that expert can sufficiently evaluate based on his or her own experience, including patient’s out-of-court statements. See also, Bailey, § 31-298, § 31-307. prior decisions at Bailey, 4516 CRB-2-02-4 (May 8, 2003), § 31-298, § 31-307a; Bailey, 3461 CRB-3-96-11 (April 9, 1998), § 31-315, and Bailey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 3095 CRB-2-95-6 (June 28, 1996), § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-308a.

Liano v. Bridgeport, 4934 CRB-4-05-4 (April 13, 2006).

Trial commissioner found respondent’s medical testimony more persuasive than claimant’s. Trier also did not credit claimant’s testimony as to his level of impairment. Trier is sole person empowered to evaluate witness credibility. Claimant failed to meet his burden of proof regarding total incapacity to work. Claimant alleged “irrelevant issues” influenced trial commissioner. Since sufficient relevant grounds supported commissioner’s findings, precedent in Peters, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 91, 1679 CRB-5-93-3 (May 19, 1995) deems this immaterial. See also, Liano, § 31-307. prior decisions at Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999); Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999); Liano, 3299 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997); Liano, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996) and Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997).

Lopez v. Lowe’s Home Improvement Center, 4922 CRB-6-05-3 (March 29, 2006).

Claimant injured back when lifting gas grill. Trial commissioner could credit medical evidence that same incident caused neck injury. Commissioner may credit an expert’s testimony on one issue and find other experts more persuasive on another issue. See also, Lopez, § 31-300, § 31-308a.

Bonito v. ESPN, 4914 CRB-6-05-2 (March 3, 2006).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s dismissal for injury claims due to exposure to methanol, diesel fumes and carbon monoxide. Determination of whether claimant sustained any injury from exposure to these substances was dependent upon weight and credibility trier assigned to evidence presented. Here, trier’s findings were amply supported by the evidentiary record. Additionally, failure of expert’s opinion to include phrase “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty” does not render the opinion legally incompetent per se. Opinion must be reviewed in context of entire substance of expert’s testimony.

Arnott v. Taft Restaurant Ventures, LLC, 4932 CRB-7-05-3 (March 1, 2006).

Claimant asserts left elbow injured due to same repetitive motion injuries that caused compensable injury to right elbow. Employment as chef at Hot Tomato’s restaurant involved significant lifting. Trial commissioner was entitled to find claimant’s medical evidence that left elbow was injured due to work-related stress more credible and qualitative than evidence respondents offered to show otherwise.

Roussel v. Village Gate of Farmington, 4918 CRB-6-05-2 (February 28, 2006).

Claimant claimed present back ailments were related to a compensable 1992 injury. Trial commissioner found claimant’s medical evidence unpersuasive. Trier upheld, as credibility of witness is an issue which cannot be reversed on appeal. See also, Roussel, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Collazo v. Microboard Processing, 4912 CRB-4-05-1 (January 19, 2006).

Claimant injured falling on ice in employer’s parking lot. Trier found credible claimant’s medical evidence that fall resulted in disability. Factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal. See also, Collazo, § 31-300.

Daddona v. Waterbury Masonry and Foundation, Inc., 4897 CRB-5-04-12 (December 8, 2005).

See, Daddona, § 31-294e, § 31-307, § 31-308(b).

Cogle v. West Hartford, 4872 CRB-6-04-10 (November 17, 2005).

See, Cogle, § 31-308(a), § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments).

Shepard v. Wethersfield Offset, 4886 CRB-1-04-11 (October 20, 2005), aff’d, 98 Conn. App. 682 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911 (2007).

See, Shepard, § 31-308(a).

Claudio v. Better Bedding, 4786 CRB-1-04-2 (October 19, 2005).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion respondents did not sustain their burden of proof on the affirmative defenses raised pursuant to § 31-284(a). Conclusions as to affirmative defenses raised dependent upon the weight and credibility assigned to the evidence by the trial commissioner. CRB also affirmed trier’s conclusion as to the number of exemptions filed by claimant. See also, Claudio, § 31-284(a), § 31-307, § 31-310.

Sousa v. Intercity Development, LLC, 4878 CRB-8-04-10 (October 17, 2005).

See, Sousa, § 31-307 (claimant’s testimony combined with nature and circumstances of injury provided sufficient factual basis for finding of total disability).

Wilcox v. Danbury Hospital, 4838 CRB-7-04-8 (October 17, 2005).

Claimant experienced vision problems as a side effect of medication taken following compensable injury. Treating ophthalmologist performed surgery following diagnosis of superior oblique palsy, after which claimant began suffering convergence insufficiency and double vision. Trier accepted medical report of respondent’s examiner, Dr. M., who found only a small abnormality. Trier found no permanent partial disability. Trier then granted several of claimant’s requested corrections, including a finding that, in the opinion of Dr. K., the subjective and objective findings of claimant’s double vision tests were consistent. Trier meanwhile left intact a finding (¶ 35) stating that Dr. K. had acknowledged that some tests were subjective in nature, and may not have been substantiated by her objective observations of individual eye movement, which were normal. Claimant appealed, arguing that this inconsistency in findings affects a material fact. Held: trier’s description in ¶ 35 is inaccurate. However, trier was still unpersuaded by Dr. K.’s opinion, having found that Dr. M.’s opinion was expressed with reasonable degree of certainty, and was based on thorough testing showing no significant deviation in focus on targets. Misstatement in findings was harmless error at most. Affirmed. See also, Wilcox, § 31-301-4, § 31-308(b).

Nelson v. State/Judicial Department, 4783 CRB-7-04-2 (October 3, 2005), rev’d, 99 Conn. App. 808 (2007).

See, Nelson, § 5-142(a).

Mele v. Hartford, 4870 CRB-1-04-10 (September 29, 2005).

Claimant sought surgery and benefits for a hip injury alleged to relate to a 2001 date of injury. Trial commissioner found need for surgery was not causally related to the 2001 injury nor was it related to a 1996 injury. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s opinion as to 2001 injury but remanded on the causal relationship of the 1996 injury as claimant did not have adequate notice of the trier’s consideration of the 1996 injury and her claim. See also, Mele, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Parker v. Manafort Brothers, Inc., 4857 CRB-7-04-9 (September 19, 2005).

CRB upheld trier’s finding regarding causation. Respondents contended trier erred by not making findings regarding witness testimony that claimant said injury was not work-related. However, CRB found that testimony immaterial, as trier reasonably relied on medical evidence in record.

DeMagistris v. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 4862 CRB-5-04-9 (September 19, 2005).

CRB upheld trier’s finding that claimant was exposed to injurious repetitive trauma during her employment with a prior employer based on medical evidence in record.

Bravo v. John’s Best, 4801 CRB-7-04-4 (September 15, 2005).

Trial Commissioner’s finding and conclusion that claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment affirmed as there was evidence supporting trier’s conclusion. Inferences drawn were not an abuse of the trier’s discretion. See also, Bravo, § 31-275(1).

Capezzali v. Bridgeport, 4858 CRB-4-04-9 (September 7, 2005).

CRB found no error in trier’s reliance on respondent’s medical examiner’s opinion regarding the cause of decedent’s suicide. See also, Capezzali, § 31-301-4.

St. John v. Gradall Rental, 4846 CRB-3-04-8 (August 10, 2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s factual finding that claimant suffered from recurrences of the original work-related injury based on record.

Cooper v. McDermott Chevrolet, 4833 CRB-3-04-7 (July 21, 2005).

CRB reversed commissioner’s conclusion claimant’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was compensable. Trial commissioner specifically found medical reports proffered in support of claim were so inconsistent with each other as to render them unreliable. CRB acknowledged there are certain injuries in which the causal relationship is within the realm of common knowledge. The compensability of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is not such an injury.

Scharf v. Seymour, 4767 CRB-5-03-12 (July 15, 2005).

Claimant suffered heart attack four months after retirement from police force, and attempted to claim benefits under § 7-433c. Treating physician opined that heart attack was caused by long-standing coronary artery disease. Trier found doctor’s opinion unconvincing in light of medical history in claimant’s medical file, which contained no mention of symptoms of heart disease. CRB affirmed. Trier was entitled to disregard treating physician’s medical opinion, even if it appeared to be uncontradicted by other evidence. See also, Scharf, § 7-433c.

Chesler v. Derby, 4823 CRB-4-04-6 (July 15, 2005), aff’d, 96 Conn. App. 207 (2006), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 909 (2006).

See, Chesler, § 31-275(16).

Hicking v. State/Department of Correction, 4825 CRB-2-04-6 (July 14, 2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s credibility determination despite alleged inconsistencies in testimony. CRB affirmed finding that weakening of claimant’s knee causing a fall was not a new injury, but an incident caused by weakness from initial work related injury. See also, Hicking, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(a).

Piscitelli v. Textron Lycoming Division, 4793 CRB-4-04-3 (July 7, 2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s factual findings holding the trier is free to credit any opinion that is made within a reasonable degree of medical probability and supported by the evidence. Trier found claimant was not credible, therefore, he was free to discredit medical opinions regarding injuries claimant testified about. See also, Piscitelli, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

Carroll v. Flattery’s Landscaping, Inc., 4839 CRB-1-04-8 (June 29, 2005).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s dismissal of benefits claim where issue was previously litigated and determined and no new evidence offered in support of claims. See also, Carroll, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Previous decision at Carroll, 4499 CRB-8-02-2 (March 25, 2003).

Rodriguez-Colon v. Easter Seals Goodwill Industries, 4804 CRB-3-04-4 (June 22, 2005).

See, Rodriguez-Colon, § 31-294c (evidence supported finding that tennis elbow was caused by repetitive trauma through date of formal hearing). See also, Rodriguez-Colon, § 31-298, § 31-299b.

Milardo v. Hartford, 4808 CRB-1-04-5 (June 15, 2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s factual findings on review. See also, Milardo, § 31-307.

Lanteri v. New London Police Dept., 4752 CRB-2-03-11 (May 19, 2005).

Trial commissioner has sole authority to evaluate testimony and decide which, if any, of parties’ arguments are most believable. Trier found that claimant’s testimony concerning circumstances of injury was not credible, while contradictory testimony of co-worker was credible. Trier was free to evaluate demeanor of witnesses. Affirmed. See also, Lanteri, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.

Carter v. Aramark Corp, 4785 CRB-2-04-2 (April 28, 2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant’s pre-existing condition was substantially accelerated by her employment. See also, Carter, § 31-294f.

Orlando v. Reliable Construction Services, 4791 CRB-8-04-3 (April 6, 2005).

January 2001- compensable back injury. March 2001-disc surgery. October 2001-claimant reached maximum improvement. Claimant begins treating for deteriorating back condition while still working for Reliable. January 2002-claimant takes job with Brownstone. Pain steadily increases. July 2002- claimant feels severe pain while helping to lift a conveyor belt and is totally disabled from then forward. Treating physician opined that July incident did not produce neurological or other physiological change. Trier accepted that opinion as credible and persuasive, and held that Reliable was responsible for benefits, as there was no new injury in July 2002. CRB affirmed. Increase in pain based on July 2002 incident was not automatically an “aggravation” or “exacerbation” that constitutes a new injury. Treater explained that pain can flare up as a continuation of previous problem without subsequent events causing an aggravation or reinjury. Trier was entitled to rely on that testimony, and consider its totality. Treater did not identify a specific injury, aggravation or exacerbation within reasonable degree of medical probability, which is required to constitute competent medical evidence. Kisson v. Shawmut National Bank, 4188 CRB-5-00-2 (March 16, 2001), does not require contrary result; mere increase in pain or symptoms is not enough to trigger finding of new injury within meaning of Act. Law also requires some finding that subsequent work exposures have contributed to claimant’s condition. See also, Orlando, § 31-349.

Ryker v. Bethany, 4780 CRB-3-04-2 (February 16, 2005), aff’d, 97 Conn. App. 304 (2006), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932 (2006).

CRB affirmed trier’s credibility determination based on a review of transcripts where the parties agreed to submit transcripts to a subsequent commissioner in lieu of a trial de novo and where those determinations were supported by the substance of the testimony. See also, Ryker, § 31-275(1), § 31-298.

Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc., 4762 CRB-5-03-12 (February 3, 2005), aff’d, 92 Conn. App. 650 (2005).

See, Sellers, § 31-308(b).

Brennan v. Ursini, 4774 CRB-8-04-1 (January 21, 2005).

CRB remanded case for articulation of what payments made under stipulation after maximum medical improvement represented.

Byrd v. Bechtel/Fusco, 4765 CRB-2-03-12 (December 17, 2004).

Trial commissioner was entitled to rely on medical opinions of two physicians who did not find it medically probable that claimant’s back, knee, and hip symptoms were related to compensable ankle injury. See also, Byrd, § 31-279(c), § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Prior decision at Byrd, 4656 CRB-2-03-4 (July 14, 2004), aff’d, 90 Conn. App. 641 (2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919 (2005), § 31-278, § 31-280.

Russo v. Hartford, 4769 CRB-1-04-1 (December 15, 2004).

CRB remanded case where findings were contradictory with facts found and underlying evidence in record.

Horobin v. West Haven, 4724 CRB-3-03-9 (December 2, 2004).

Insufficient evidence in record to support finding of outstanding $2,860 medical bill dating back to 1993, given 2001 letter from same treater that lists unpaid balance as $460. See also, Horobin, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (approval of), § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-349, § 31-298.

O’Connor v. Mass. Electric Construction Co., 4734 CRB-2-03-10 (November 4, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant sustained an injury to his back which arose out of and during the course of his employment. It is the trier’s responsibility to make credibility determinations regarding the accuracy of the claimant’s testimony regarding how the alleged injury took place.

Malsan v. Town of West Hartford, 4746 CRB-6-03-10 (September 27, 2004).

Board reversed trier’s conclusion that the claimant’s September 2002 wrist pain was caused by an April 2001 compensable wrist injury. There was no medical opinion in the record to support causation. Board explained that it is not common knowledge that a wrist sprain would cause painful symptoms without further aggravation over a year later.

Carney-Bastrzycki v. Hospital for Special Care, 4722 CRB-6-03-9 (September 3, 2004).

CRB refused to remand case where mistake in dates was not instrumental to causation determination. CRB also upheld trier’s determinations regarding medical opinions. See also, Carney-Bastrzycki, § 31-301-9.

Strona v. Textron Lycoming, 4700 CRB-3-03-7 (August 6, 2004).

CRB remanded matter for trial de novo where trial commissioner’s findings were without evidentiary support. Subsequent decision at Strona, 4938 CRB-3-05-5 (October 3, 2005). Prior decision at Strona, 4398 CRB-4-01-5 (August 6, 2002).

Rego v. A1 Auto Detailing, 4704 CRB-8-03-7 (August 5, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant’s injuries were not caused by horseplay. See also, Rego, § 31-284(a).

Belanger v. J&G Belanger Concrete Construction, 4684 CRB-6-03-6 (July 28, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that incidents subsequent to 1997 compensable back injury did not constitute new or intervening injury that broke causal connection. CRB traditionally defers to trier’s findings as to whether or not a particular incident legally amounts to substantial cause of physical injury. Treating physician’s testimony did not cast doubt upon his written reports supporting compensability, as he maintained his position that claimant’s back weakness persisted following 1998 discectomy, and current L5-S1 disc problems were natural evolution of compensable injury process. See also, Belanger, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Kuelesza v. O & G Industries, 4692 CRB-4-03-7 (May 25, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding regarding causation where conflicting medical opinions existed. See also, Kuelesza, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Bowee v. Comcast Cablevision, 4604 CRB-3-03-1 (May 12, 2004).

CRB found trier’s finding regarding dates of temporary total supported by medical evidence. See also, Bowee, § 31-308(b).

Distassio v. HP Hood, Inc., 4592 CRB-4-02-11 (May 5, 2004).

CRB remanded case where trier failed to make factual finding regarding causation of injury. See also, Distassio, § 31-294c.

Papapietro v. Bristol, 4674 CRB-6-03-6 (May 3, 2004).

Whether claimant’s residence in an assisted living facility with some hours of nursing assistance was reasonable care is a factual determination. See also, Papapietro, § 31-294d and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Garcia v. John Bianchi d/b/a Complete Change Landscaping Tree Removal and Excavating Company, 4670 CRB-5-03-5 (May 3, 2004).

See, Garcia, § 31-307.

Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 4667 CRB-5-03-5 (May 3, 2004), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, 90 Conn. App. 9 (2005), cert. granted, 275 Conn. 913 (2005).

CRB upheld trial commissioner’s finding job-related stress and job’s limitations on time for other activities substantial factors in chain of events which led to claimant’s fatal heart attack. Appellate court reasoned determination of the amount of benefits to be paid was still pending before the trial commissioner, therefore, the case was dismissed for lack of final judgment. See also, Hummel, § 31-301 Appeal procedure. Subsequent decision at Hummel, 4760 CRB-5-03-12 (November 19, 2004).

Jacobson v. General Dynamics/Electric Boat Div., 4642 CRB-2-03-3 (March 12, 2004).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion claimant, dependent spouse, entitled to surviving spouse benefits. Decedent died as a result of lung cancer and was found to have been exposed to asbestos while working for EB at a facility in Conn. for some periods in the 1960’s and 1970’s. In the course of employment history, decedent also worked for EB at a site in R.I. and for Butler Bros, another R.I. employer. Trier found those exposures to asbestos, if any, were not significant. Appellant appealed trier’s failure to find asbestos exposure while decedent worked at Butler Bros and EB in Rhode Island. CRB affirmed. Decedent’s asbestos exposure is matter determined by the weight and credibility assigned. Evidence existed which supported decedent was not significantly exposed to asbestos while employed by Rhode Island employers. Thus, no factual basis for apportionment under § 31-299b exists.

Schenkel v. Richard Chevrolet, Inc., 4639 CRB-8-03-3 (March 12, 2004).

CRB standard of review for trial commissioner’s factual findings restated. Medical evidence supported finding that claimant was amplifying symptoms and no longer entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Trier was entitled to find treating physician’s opinion regarding percentage of permanency more persuasive than that of respondent’s examiner. However, remand was necessary to clarify degree of accountability of earlier compensable injury for post-fusion-surgery increase in disability. See also, Schenkel, § 31-294d, § 31-295(c), § 31-307, § 31-308(b), § 31-349.

Peck v. Somers, 4640 CRB-1-03-2 (March 5, 2004).

CRB upheld trial commissioner’s dismissal based on factual findings. See also, Peck, § 7-433c, § 31-301-4.

Parisi v. Yale University, 4606 CRB-3-02-12 (March 4, 2004), aff’d, 89 Conn. App. 716 (2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s factual findings as supported by evidence in record. Claimant needs to prove exposure to harmful substance at workplace caused physical injury and rendered him disabled.

Soto-Velez v. Michael’s Chrysler Plymouth, 4628 CRB-2-03-2 (February 3, 2004).

Trier’s factual findings were supported by evidence in the record, not contrary to law and not based on unreasonable inferences. Although the trial commissioner did not reference OSHA report specifically in his findings, he did consider it. Trier’s factual determination that the claimant did not suffer from R.A.D.S. was supported by the medical testimony in the record. See also, Soto-Velez, § 31-301-4.

Maitland v. Home and Buildings Control, 4623 CRB-3-03-2 (January 13, 2004).

Evidence supported trier’s finding that November 2000 injury produced only a temporary aggravation of pre-existing fibromyalgia, rather than a long-term disabling fibromyalgic condition with attendant depression. CRB could not override trier’s determination of credibility on appeal.

Paige v. Hartford Insurance Co., 4594 CRB-2-02-12 (January 9, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s factual findings as supported by the record, not contrary to law and not based on unreasonable inferences. Claimant’s burden of proof is to present sufficient evidence allowing the trier to make a finding in support of the claim. The claimant must go beyond merely presenting a prima facie case. See also, Paige, § 31-298, § 31-294c.

Sullivan v. H.W. Sandora & Sons, Inc., 4603 CRB-3-02-12 (December 29, 2003).

Testimonial and medical evidence supported trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s fall while shoveling snow (and resultant shoulder injury) was caused by sudden, severe arm pain attributable to earlier compensable injury. Mechanism of injury is readily understandable by lay person. Also, sufficient evidence existed to support finding that claimant was entitled to benefits under § 31-308a. See also, Sullivan, § 31-275(1), § 31-308a.

Fiorillo v. Bridgeport, 4585 CRB-4-02-11 (December 17, 2003), appeal dismissed for lack of a final judgment, A.C. 24991 (May 5, 2004).

Trial commissioner determines credibility of evidence. Statements that may not have been specifically contradicted need not be deemed probative. Where two doctors opined that claimant would not have work capacity given her various symptoms and complaints, trier was entitled to rely on those opinions and disregard evidence that would have supported a contrary outcome. See also, Fiorillo, § 31-298, § 31-301-4, § 31-307a, § 31-307. Prior decision at Fiorillo, 4337 CRB-4-01-1 (November 19, 2001), vacated, S.C. 16736 (December 16, 2002).

Murray v. Mass Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4590 CRB-1-02-11 (November 20, 2003).

Given context, ambiguous wording in finding did not indicate misunderstanding of case by trier. At most, it was scrivener’s error that did not require action on review. Cubital tunnel syndrome claim was properly found compensable given opinion of treating physician. Existence of total disability is also question of fact, and trier was not required to accept opinion of vocational rehabilitation specialist that claimant was completely unemployable given competitive nature of job market. See also, Murray, § 31-294d, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-300, § 31-307, § 31-308(a).

Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 4574 CRB-4-02-9 (September 30, 2003), rev’d, 86 Conn. App. 270 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 919 (2005).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding of temporary total disability benefits following this tribunal’s remand to the commissioner in Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 4332 CRB-4-00-12 (January 15, 2002). Trier articulated award, explaining that February 13, 1996 was date of maximum medical improvement. CRB was not persuaded by claimant’s argument that trier’s use of maximum medical improvement date reflected in the Voluntary Agreement signed by the claimant and approved by another commissioner was without legal foundation. Appellate Court reversed. Though CRB’s initial remand to articulate inconsistent findings was appropriate, following trier’s issuance of that articulation, CRB should have declared commissioner’s findings inconsistent, as trier failed to comply with remand order inasmuch as he substituted new findings on period of total disability. Board was directed to reverse decision and remand case to new commissioner for formal hearing. See also, Fantasia, § 31-307; Prior decision at Fantasia, infra, § 31-307.

Burke v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 4503 CRB-6-02-3 (August 25, 2003), appeal dismissed, A.C. 24693 (February 17, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim that cervical spine problems and surgery were causally related to the claimant’s employment with the respondent during which she worked in the deli department. While the evidence presented was conflicting, there was evidence to support the trier’s conclusion. Additionally, even though a trial commissioner may find a claimant’s testimony credible he is not required to accept the claimant’s opinion as to the causal relationship between the employment and the claimed injury where countervailing evidence is offered. See also, Burke, § 31-301-4.

Nau v. Polycast Technology Corp., 4555 CRB-7-02-8 (August 25, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant’s fall did result in an injury to his thumb but not his shoulder and neck in light of testimony of a previous automobile collision. See also, Nau, § 31-301-4.

Strong v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 4563 CRB-1-02-8 (August 25, 2003).

See, Strong, § 31-275(1)(no apportionment allowed for portion of disability due to pre-existing emphysema that was not work-related, even if condition developed simultaneously with work-related asbestosis); § 31-308(b)(trier had discretion to credit report of physician who was within AMA guidelines in diagnosing claimant with 48% lung impairment, despite evidence that could have supported a lower rating), § 31-275(15); § 31-349.

Monaco v. School Transportation Services, 4549 CRB-3-02-7 (July 8, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion claimant’s knee injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Claimant was a school bus driver who claimed that she fell on loose stones in the parking area of the employer. Claimant initially gave an incorrect date of injury. Respondents contended that the claimant’s testimony was not credible. CRB reminded parties that the trial commissioner determines the weight and credibility of the testimony presented.

Ciarci v. Niro Brothers/Mason Enterprises, 4536 CRB-1-02-6 (June 17, 2003).

See, Ciarci, § 31-275(1).

Salerno v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 4518 CRB-1-02-4 (April 9, 2003).

Whether claimant furnished medical care sufficient to satisfy constructive notice provision of § 31-294c(c) is a factually dependent question. See also, Salerno, § 31-294c.

Santiago v. PMI, Inc., 4513 CRB-6-02-4 (March 27, 2003).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s ruling that claimant was not entitled to a permanent partial disability rating of the upper extremity where claimant suffered the loss of use of several of his fingers. There was medical evidence to support his conclusion that the claimant’s claim of a disability to his shoulder was not related to the work place accident. See also, Santiago, 31-308(b).

Valletta v. State/DMR, 4543 CRB-5-02-6 (March 26, 2003).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding and conclusion claimant was entitled to temporary total disability for a period following the date of an approved Form 36. Respondent’s contention that no change of circumstance existed warranting an award of temporary total disability benefits not persuasive. Such determinations are factual in nature and thus, within the province of the trial commissioner. In this case the claimant suffered a 45% permanent partial disability to her back. A vocational expert testified as to claimant’s employment limitations. See also, Valletta, § 31-296.

Krajewski v. Atlantic Machine Tool Works, Inc., 4500 CRB-6-02-3 (March 7, 2003).

Claimant failed to meet burden of proof with regard to compensability of injuries that were claimed to be sequelae of 1981 shoulder injury, insofar as they were caused by falls due to effects of medication. Claim for increased permanency similarly dismissed on credibility grounds. However, CRB remanded for articulation on one issue where medical reports cited by trier did not clearly support dismissal of wrist injury claim, as stated by dismissal order. See, Krajewski, § 31-278, § 31-284b, § 31-290a, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9, § 31-312, § 31-313, § 31-315; prior decisions at Krajewski, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 2120 CRB-6-94-8 (November 28, 1995), § 31-308a; Krajewski, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 1387 CRD-6-92-2 (April 1, 1993), § 31-290a.

Vazquez v. Unifirst Corp., 4498 CRB-4-02-3 (March 7, 2003).

Trier accepted claimant’s explanation that language barrier caused certain doctors’ reports to omit mention of workplace duties as alleged cause of back injury. CRB affirmed. Evidence supported outcome of case. Trier was not required to specifically discuss co-workers’ testimony that claimant seemed to understand English reasonably well, and was free to draw his own inferences regarding credibility.

Dzialo v. B&B Industries, 4509 CRB-2-02-3 (March 5, 2003).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s findings and conclusion claimant did not suffer an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. Trier found claimant not to be credible and thus, dismissed his claim that he injured his back when he was struck by a blade on an excavator and knocked into a ditch. The trier found the testimony of another witness who testified that the claimant was not struck by the excavator to be more credible. Determinations as to weight and credibility assigned to testimony solely within trier’s purview.

Fiore v. House & Garden Shop, 4494 CRB-7-02-2 (February 28, 2003).

CRB explained finality of judgment concept to pro se claimant who sought to reopen claim in order to retry issues of credibility. See also, Fiore, § 31-315. Prior decision at Fiore, 3747 CRB-7-97-12 (April 5, 1999), infra; § 31-301-9.

Gagliardi v. Eagle Group, Inc., 4496 CRB-2-02-2 (February 27, 2003), aff’d, 82 Conn. App. 905 (2004)(per curiam).

Evidence adequately supported trier’s finding that claimant’s disability and need for surgery were not probable result of compensable fall suffered in January 2001, where he had suffered back problems since 1990, and experienced heightened pain during the several months prior to his fall. See also, Gagliardi, § 31-294f. Prior decision at Gagliardi, 4012 CRB-1-99-4 (July 20, 2000).

Bastek v. Camco Fittings Co., 4487 CRB-3-02-2 (February 25, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s compensability finding. Inconsistencies between claimant’s testimony and history in medical report were for trier to resolve, and he was entitled to accept claimant’s explanation of discrepancies. Ambiguity regarding date of injury (“on or about March 15, 1996”) was not problematic, as respondents did not allege prejudice from defect in notice. Claimant felt back pain while moving heavy steel bar. Compensability of initial injury could be established without expert testimony, but medical evidence needed to show that symptoms of two years later were attributable to that incident. CRB held that medical opinion relied on by trier was, in conjunction with other evidence, sufficient to show reasonably probable causal connection. See also, Bastek, § 31-294c.

Papa v. Jeffrey Norton Publishers, Inc., 4486 CRB-3-02-1 (February 25, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding of total disability based on medical reports that directly established said disability within reasonable degree of medical probability. Total disability was sufficiently documented. See also, Papa, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-301-9, § 31-307.

Avila v. Parcel Port, 4481 CRB-3-02-1 (February 13, 2003).

Board remanded for clarification of conflicting findings regarding cause of injury. Award created uncertainty as to whether trier was identifying specific date of injury, period of repetitive trauma covering claimant’s short-term employment at Parcel Port, or long-term repetitive trauma that included her 14-year history of physically taxing jobs. See also, Avila, § 31-307.

Caldwell v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 4493 CRB-3-02-2 (February 13, 2003).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s ruling that claimant’s bilateral trigger thumb condition was causally related to her employment.

Alling v. Davis & Geck, 4483 CRB-7-02-1 (December 20, 2002).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that workplace injury arose out of employment. Proposed corrections that trier denied were not material and undisputed facts. See also, Alling, § 31-275(1).

Bombardier v. CT Valley Fitness Center, 4475 CRB-6-02-1 (November 20, 2002).

See, Bombardier, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Bourgeois v. Meadow Lawn Care, 4463 CRB-6-01-11 (November 18, 2002).

CRB reversed trier’s conclusion that claimant sustained 35.7% hearing loss in left ear only. Physician had identified total hearing loss of 35.7% due to exposure from backfiring lawnmower. Board noted that trier may still accept or reject all or part of physician’s opinion. Case remanded. See also, Bourgeois, § 31-308(b).

Persico v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 4464 CRB-4-01-12 (November 15, 2002).

No error where trier failed to mention corroborative testimony of two of claimant’s co-workers in dismissal order. Claimant failed to file Motion to Correct as required by Admin. Reg. § 31-301-4; moreover, trier may omit evidential facts that are immaterial to outcome of case, such as those relating to testimony that trier deems unpersuasive.

Sprague v. Lindon Tree Service, Inc., 4460 CRB-2-01-11 (November 15, 2002).

CRB upheld trier’s finding of compensability, which was primarily based on claimant testifying that lower back pain began following a day of hard work cutting and moving trees. Relationship between lifting of heavy objects and low back injuries is matter of common understanding. Physicians’ reports adequately substantiated claim, despite being dependent on history provided by claimant. See also, Sprague, § 31-275(16).

Ortiz v. Highland Sanitation, 4439 CRB-4-01-9 (November 12, 2002).

See, Ortiz, § 31-295 (where interest award was inconsistent with corrected findings, CRB remanded for clarification); See also, Ortiz, § 31-300.

Duddy v. Filene’s (May Department Stores Co.), 4484 CRB-7-02-1 (October 23, 2002).

In affirming decision, CRB discussed roles of trier and review board for benefit of pro se claimant. No medical evidence in record linked degenerative lower back condition with 1999 compensable back injury, and trier did not err by dismissing claim. See also, Duddy, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-298, § 31-307.

Arcano v. Stamford, 4447 CRB-7-01-10 (October 10, 2002).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding as to period of total disability due to cerebral vascular accident, and amount of attorney’s fee awarded for undue delay. Findings will not be disturbed where there is evidentiary support. See also, Arcano, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Laneve-Annino v. Intracorp, 4441 CRB-8-01-9 (September 18, 2002).

Evidence supported trier’s finding that claimant did not prove entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits. Relationship of neck injury to 1996 compensable accident was uncertain, according to treating physician’s reports, and more than one doctor stated that effects of 1995 and 1996 compensable back injuries did not add to additional permanent back disability. See also, Laneve-Annino, § 31-308a, § 31-308(a).

Napolitano v. Bridgeport, 4388 CRB-4-01-5 (September 6, 2002).

Trier’s decision regarding permanent partial impairment rating of heart was based on opinions of independent medical examiner and commissioner’s examiner, both of which were stated within reasonable degree of medical probability. Physicians are not required to adhere to AMA Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment if alternate basis for assessment of loss of organ use is evident. Not reversible error where trier explains why he finds particular test unreliable, even if he is not required to give reasons for his conclusions under Admin. Reg. § 31-301-3. See also, Napolitano, § 31-278, § 31-301-9, § 31-308(b).

Prescott v. Community Health Center, Inc., 4426 CRB-8-01-8 (August 23, 2002).

Two of claimant’s three issues on appeal—failure of commissioner to make findings of (a) unreasonable contest and (b) total disability retroactive to date of injury—were “prototypical questions of fact,” to which CRB had to apply deferential standard of review. See also, Prescott, § 31-300, § 31-307, § 31-310.

Duval v. O-Z Gedney, 4440 CRB-5-01-9 (August 12, 2002).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that injury did not arise out of or in course of employment where claimant’s testimony was found not to be credible. Additionally, board affirmed trier’s alternative conclusion that, even if injury occurred as alleged, it was not a substantial cause of claimant’s medical condition.

Fox v. New Britain General Hospital, 4414 CRB-6-01-7 (August 6, 2002).

Medical evidence supported finding that 1998 hip injury was causal factor in claimant’s current symptoms. Chronic degenerative condition was rendered worse following that injury and resulting bursitis, which required surgery, and claimant did not recover to same degree as she had following earlier hip operation. Trier drew reasonable inferences from evidence. See also, Fox, § 31-294d, § 31-308(a), § 31-308a.

Phaiah v. Danielson Curtain, 4409 CRB-2-01-6 (June 7, 2002).

CRB set forth standard of review for fact-finder’s decision. Medical evidence supported trier’s findings, and denial of claimant’s request for back surgery was reasonable. See also, Phaiah, § 31-294d, § 31-294f.

Champagne v. O.Z. Gedney, 4425 CRB-5-01-8 (May 16, 2002).

Trier is entitled to accept all, part or none of any doctor’s medical opinion. No error where trier found testimony of independent medical examiner and commissioner’s examiner more persuasive with regard to absence of lung permanency or total disability, while also finding treating physician’s testimony more persuasive with regard to existence of early simple silicosis in lungs. See also, Champagne, § 31-294f.

Morneault v. D M & M Restaurants, 4389 CRB-3-01-5 (March 27, 2002).

Trier did not misapply law as to burden of proof in finding that respondents failed to posit theory as to source of claimant’s injury and need for medical treatment. Statement merely reflected that, where respondents’ defense largely consisted of attacks on credibility of witnesses, and claimant made out prima facie case, respondents failed to offer adequate grounds to maintain their defense. See also, Morneault, § 31-275(1).

Bellman v. Christy’s Market, 4387 CRB-6-01-5 (March 25, 2002).

See, Bellman, § 31-301. Appeal procedure (dicta regarding CRB’s obligation to uphold trier’s credibility determinations).

Sherman v. University of Conn./Dining Services, 4380 CRB-2-01-4 (March 1, 2002).

Question of fact as to whether claimant’s low back injury was caused by compensable incident where he was hit by garage door. Treating physician’s opinion supported trier’s conclusion that injury was compensable.

Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 3320 CRB-1-96-4 (January 29, 2002).

Pursuant to Appellate Court remand, CRB considered claimant’s appeal from trier’s original decision, and affirmed its finding that she suffered compensable back strain, but did not meet burden of proof that she also sustained shoulder injury or any internal/gastrointestinal or other injuries, including lost pregnancies. See also, Bryan, § 31-308a. See related cases: Bryan, 3730 CRB-1-97-11 (May 7, 1999), rev’d, 62 Conn. App. 733 (2001), § 31-298; and Bryan, 3320 CRB-1-96-4 (March 12, 1997), § 31-301-9.

Hamzi v. Danbury Hospital, 4352 CRB-7-01-2 (January 16, 2002).

Board affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant’s back condition and need for surgery were caused by lifting incident, although trier did not cite any medical opinion in support of causation. It is common knowledge that lifting something heavy, such as a patient, may cause serious back injury, especially where, as here, symptoms and need for treatment occurred immediately following incident.

Marcoux v. Allied Signal, 4366 CRB-4-01-3 (January 16, 2002).

CRB explained scope of its review to pro se claimant. Factual findings were supported by treating physician’s testimony regarding etiology of carpal tunnel syndrome and its distinction from prior treatment for lateral epicondylitis, which was an accepted injury. See also, Marcoux, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Nunes v. State/Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 4360 CRB-2-01-2 (January 16, 2002).

Testimony and medical reports supported trier’s findings that claimant’s post-traumatic stress disorder was related to earlier work incident at DMV along with incident that immediately preceded his departure; that disability was not caused by substance abuse; and that claimant was totally disabled for several months between leaving DMV and obtaining work at a laundry. See also, Nunes, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16).

Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 4332 CRB-4-00-12 (January 15, 2002).

Board remanded case to trier for articulation of decision where trier did not award total disability benefits, yet found persuasive a doctor’s opinion that claimant was temporarily totally disabled. See also, Fantasia, § 31-307. See subsequent decision at Fantasia, 4574 CRB-4-02-9 (September 30, 2003), rev’d, 86 Conn. App. 270 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 919 (2005). § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.

Fusciello v. Ronnie Demeo, Inc., 4340 CRB-6-01-1 (January 7, 2002).

Trier dismissed claimant’s request for temporary total disability or § 31-308a benefits. No proof that injury-related medical condition had significantly worsened from several years earlier, when previous claim for total disability benefits was dismissed. CRB noted that factual findings in prior decisions cannot be re-litigated under principle of res judicata. Thus, claimant would have had to demonstrate some change in condition in order to establish new disability claim. See also, Fusciello, § 31-307. prior decisions at Fusciello, 3406 CRB-8-96-8 (February 4, 1998), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307; Fusciello, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 283, 1535 CRB-6-92-10 (June 7, 1994), § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16), § 31-307.

Perrelli v. Yale University, 4350 CRB-4-01-1 (December 20, 2001).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding of compensability. Doctor’s inability to state that pneumothorax was caused by workplace lifting incident within “reasonable medical probability” was not solely dispositive of legal sufficiency of diagnosis, as one could conclude from substance of doctor’s opinion that claimant’s injury more likely than not caused him to suffer pneumothorax. No absolute requirement that doctor be able to assign numerical probability percentage, or be able to conclusively rule out all other possible causes.

Alicea v. ABCD of Bridgeport, 4318 CRB-4-00-12 (November 15, 2001).

Claimant’s failure to persuade trier that she was disabled from work as a result of compensable psychiatric condition was matter of evidentiary credibility. No error.

Kelly v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 4278 CRB-4-00-8 (November 1, 2001).

Trier permissibly ascribed claimant’s need for pain management to chronic complaints of shoulder pain rather than recent aggravation. Evidence supported finding that elbow injury was aggravation of previous injury, rather than completely new symptom. Further, insufficient evidence existed to establish causal basis for apportioning liability for injuries under common-law theory, as doctor’s report distinguished symptoms caused by recent aggravation from symptoms caused by ongoing complaints. See also, Kelly, § 31-299b, § 31-349. Subsequent decision at Kelly, 4621 CRB-4-03-2 (April 5, 2004). Section 31-299b, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-349.

Niklewski v. K-Tron Manufacturing, 4299 CRB-5-00-10 (October 25, 2001).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim. Decision depended on assessment of evidentiary credibility.

Briggs v. American Medical Response, 4302 CRB-3-00-9 (September 24, 2001).

Medical reports of claimant’s treating physician established permanent partial disability rating and, by implication, maximum medical improvement date. Respondents failed to show that physician’s method of gauging reduced heart function was scientifically incorrect. Absence of maximum medical improvement date in findings did not invalidate permanency rating, as one could infer that treater and independent medical examiner were both satisfied that claimant would not improve. Also, respondents did not seek articulation of maximum medical improvement date via Motion to Correct. See also, Briggs, § 31-298, § 31-301-9.

Benjamin v. Uniroyal Technology, 4304 CRB-7-00-10 (September 19, 2001).

CRB’s affirmance of dismissal order was based on trier’s authority to determine testimonial credibility. Here, witnesses testified that claimant did not have to do heavy lifting at workplace, and he did not ascribe his need for surgery to a work-related injury either prior to scheduled surgery or in a disability form he completed afterward. Trier was entitled to find that claimant offered insufficient proof to prevail on claim.

Garofalo v. Jarvis Products Corp., 4249 CRB-8-00-6 (September 12, 2001).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant suffered compensable repetitive trauma injury to knee, and trier’s authorization of medical bills and temporary partial disability period . Nature and etiology of injury were of moderate complexity; combination of testimony and Dr. Cambridge’s reports constituted sufficient evidence to support trier’s conclusions. Citing Keenan v. Union Camp Corp., 49 Conn. App. 280 (1998), CRB noted that, if record contains medical evidence that supports trier’s conclusion, it must infer that he considered and relied on that evidence even if this has not been explicitly stated in opinion itself. See also, Garofalo, § 31-294d.

Smith v. Federal Express Corp., 4242 CRB-7-00-5 (August 22, 2001).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision. Respondents objected to finding stating that “every doctor who treated Claimant” opined that he was totally disabled, as requested correction pointed out a doctor who had seen claimant for rehabilitation purposes and thought him capable of returning to sedentary work. CRB held that, by denying correction, trier was demonstrating that he did not find that doctor’s opinion credible. No need to cite mere evidential facts in decision. Also, finding that doctors concluded further surgery was “not an option” does not preclude future consideration of that issue should circumstances, or a doctor’s opinion, change.

Franco v. Dependable Motors, Inc. d/b/a Branford Dodge, 4281 CRB-3-00-8 (July 17, 2001).

Trier dismissed claim that employment caused emotional stress, exacerbating an underlying cardiac condition that caused claimant to suffer unstable angina. Trier concluded that underlying heart disease was not work related, and that as emotional stress caused only somatic symptoms of chest pain, it was not compensable under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii)-(iii). Claimant argued that employment stress exacerbated heart condition and led to angina, which constitutes a compensable mental-physical injury. CRB agreed that substantial aggravation of pre-existing condition may be sufficient to establish compensability. However, whether claimant’s alleged stress so aggravated his pre-existing non-work related cardiac condition so as to cause him to suffer a compensable injury was a factual issue for the trier. As record fully supported decision on causation, board did not address claimant’s argument that his angina condition constituted a mental-physical injury rather than a mental-mental injury under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii), and did not discuss whether claim was precluded by § 31-275(16)(B)(iii). See also, Franco, § 31-275(16).

Barretta v. Thermal Acoustics, Inc., 4142 CRB-3-99-11 (July 12, 2001).

Board affirmed trier’s finding that angina pectoris resulted from longstanding and pre-existing coronary arteriosclerosis, contributed to by multiple (non-work-related) risk factors such as heavy smoking. Claimant argued that it was precipitated by stress caused by his attendance at independent medical examination involving his accepted psychiatric claim. As there were conflicting medical opinions in record, this was factual decision for trier. See also, Barretta, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Christoforo v. Christoforo’s Northford Gardens, 4260 CRB-3-00-06 (July 2, 2001).

Claimant argued on appeal that trier should have identified his left knee condition, which manifested itself during a trip to Florida during the winter of 1997/1998, as an aggravation of a compensable May 10, 1996 injury. Board explained that causation of claimant’s condition was a question of fact for commissioner, and affirmed trier’s decision. See also, Christoforo, § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-4.

Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Servs., 4254 CRB-7-00-6 (June 21, 2001).

Where parties stipulated to facts, and offered no evidence other than sealed copy of claimant’s deposition, appeal raised only questions of law, which require less deference to trier’s conclusions on review. Parties agreed that NRS normally reimbursed claimant for travel between homes of NRS patients, but not from her own home to that of her first daily patient. Trier incorporated these findings with a reservation, stating that claimant was uncertain as to what was being reimbursed. CRB reversed. Claimant’s deposition indicated uncertainty as to how NRS calculated precise amounts of reimbursement, but she directly stated that they would not cover bus fare from her home to her first assignment. Parties’ stipulation postdated deposition. Trier thus had insufficient evidence upon which to contradict stipulated facts. See also, Labadie, § 31-275(1). Subsequent decision at Labadie, 4529 CRB-7-02-5 (June 3, 2003), rev’d, 84 Conn. App. 220 (2004), cert. granted, 271 Conn. 925 (2004), aff’d, 274 Conn. 219 (2005).

Cirrito v. Resource Group Ltd. of Conn., 4248 CRB-1-00-6 (June 19, 2001).

CRB must apply highly deferential standard of review to trier’s factual findings. Any doctor’s opinion averred within reasonable degree of medical probability may serve as foundation for trier’s findings. Establishment of maximum medical improvement date is such a factual issue. Here, treating physician had testified that he would defer to surgeon’s opinion in matters regarding back surgery, but expressed disagreement with surgeon’s assertion that claimant had reached maximum improvement given brief amount of time that had elapsed since surgery. CRB affirmed trier’s reliance on opinion of treating physician, which independently met “reasonable degree of medical probability” standard. See also, Cirrito, § 31-294d, § 31-300, § 31-298.

Ciocci v. Morrison Knudsen, Inc., 4244 CRB-1-00-5 (June 1, 2001).

Trier’s finding was subject to two readings, one of which was consistent with current compensation rate and trier’s denial of claimant’s motion to reopen. CRB must construe findings in manner consistent with conclusion, if possible. See also, Ciocci, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-310, § 31-315.

Fox-Gould v. Brooks Pharmacy, 4215 CRB-2-00-3 (May 23, 2001).

Board affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant failed to sustain burden of proof that she injured her back either by falling down or lifting a heavy container. Issue was one of credibility. Trier found claimant’s testimony not credible, and her version of events uncorroborated by any of her co-workers. See also, Fox-Gould, § 31-301-9.

Canevari v. C.R. Gibson Co., 4231 CRB-7-00-5 (May 14, 2001).

Circumstances of back injury allowed trier to rely primarily on claimant’s testimony in finding injury compensable. Physicians’ testimony linking herniated discs to lifting incident was optional in this case, as causal link between lifting heavy objects and lower back injuries falls within realm of common knowledge. Doctors’ opinions corroborated claimant’s physical condition, and indicated that back injury could plausibly have been caused by moving heavy boxes. Whether or not such a lifting incident occurred was the key question, whose resolution depended on trier’s evaluation of claimant’s testimony.

Freeman v. UTC/Sikorsky Aircraft, 4225 CRB-4-00-4 (May 4, 2001), aff’d, 68 Conn. App. 904 (2002)(per curiam).

Board affirmed trier’s decision that disc herniation was not caused by prior compensable back injury. Trier of fact had discretion to assess credibility of all evidence, including testimony of claimant and of independent medical examiner who reviewed medical records. Prior decision at Freeman, 3568 CRB-4-97-4 (June 3, 1998), infra.

Donaldson v. Duhaime, 4213 CRB-6-00-3 (April 30, 2001).

Doctor maintained opinion regarding cause of claimant’s disability even after being confronted with medical history information that might have altered his diagnosis. As opinion was stated within reasonable degree of medical probability, trier was entitled to credit it over opinion of respondents’ expert. No error in limitation of total disability award to period between commencement of claimant’s treatment with psychiatrist and last formal hearing, as trier was not required to accept physician’s description of claimant as victim of incurable mental illness. See also, Donaldson, § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-307.

Kisson v. Shawmut National Bank, 4188 CRB-5-00-2 (March 16, 2001).

Claimant suffered repetitive trauma injury to arm in 1995. CRB affirmed trier’s finding that current elbow symptoms were attributable to that injury in light of supporting medical evidence and corroborating testimony. Trier also found that increased work activity in 1998-99 aggravated claimant’s condition, but did not constitute either a new specific or repetitive trauma injury. Thus, trier ruled that liability did not have to be apportioned between earlier and later insurers. CRB remanded for articulation in light of Appellate Court decision in Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996), which held that such “aggravations” constitute compensable injuries under § 31-275(1)(D) (an occupational disease provision), as employer takes employee in the state of health in which it finds employee. Board stated that “aggravation” has certain legal implications, in light of Epps; some percentage of causation may have to be attributed to later repetitive trauma exposure that caused condition to flare up. See also, Kisson, § 31-301-9, § 31-299b.

Bond v. Stratford, 4167 CRB-4-99-12 (March 7, 2001).

Board affirmed trier’s finding that heart and hypertension condition was substantially enhanced by repetitive trauma that claimant experienced during his 20 years of employment as a laborer. Opinion of treating physician was stated within reasonable degree of medical probability, even though doctor acknowledged that other stressors probably also contributed to development of claimant’s condition. See also, Bond, § 31-294c.

Mosman v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 4180 CRB-4-00-1 (March 1, 2001).

Trier’s decision not to authorize surgery and to award further temporary total disability and temporary partial disability benefits was based on medical reports properly in evidence. Also a credibility issue. See also, Mosman, § 31-297, § 31-298, § 31-294f.

Garcia v. Tully, 4209 CRB-7-00-3 (March 1, 2001).

Existence of employer-employee relationship implicates trier’s subject matter jurisdiction over claim. However, appeal was filed late, so CRB was not in position to question accuracy of factual findings that established jurisdiction—which themselves were based on inferences of evidentiary credibility. See also, Garcia, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Warren v. Federal Express Corp., 4163 CRB-2-99-12 (February 27, 2001).

CRB provided detailed explanation for pro se claimant of trial commissioner’s role and CRB’s role on review. Trier’s decision affirmed, as it hinged on assessments of credibility and choice to believe independent medical examiner’s opinion over that of treating physician. Board stressed that claimant has burden of proof in case, which required convincing expert testimony to satisfy here due to nature of injury and facts surrounding treatment. See also, Warren, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9.

Piko v. Jarvis Products Corp., 4181 CRB-8-00-1 (February 23, 2001).

Board affirmed trier’s decision that claimant sustained compensable heart attack after broaching approximately 25 to 20 pieces of steel, which demanded considerable physical force. Respondents contended on appeal that trier erred in finding that claimant’s job duties included broaching on that day. Question of fact for trier.

Horn v. State/Department of Correction, 4177 CRB-3-00-1 (February 22, 2001).

CRB recapitulated standard of review of trier’s factual findings, and dismissed claimant’s allegations of error. Testimony of co-worker was sufficient to establish that claimant had admitted to having smoking habit prior to alleged onset of workplace stress. Also, independent medical examiner’s opinion fell within bounds of acceptable, reliable expert testimony. Diagnosis as to cause of heart attack was expressed within reasonable degree of medical probability, and doctor’s allegedly alternative medical practice did not raise obvious doubts regarding validity of his methodology. See also, Horn, § 5-145a. Prior decision at Horn, 3727 CRB-3-97-11 (December 16, 1998), § 31-294c, § 5-145a.

Daubert v. Borough of Naugatuck, 4189 CRB-5-00-2 (February 22, 2001), rev’d, 71 Conn. App. 600 (2002), rev’d, 267 Conn. 583 (2004).

In reversing CRB’s affirmance of trial commissioner’s decision, Appellate Court held that findings of fact consisting of recitals of witness testimony had not been incorporated into trier’s subsequent findings and conclusions, and thus could not serve as basis for decision. Supreme Court reversed Appellate Court ruling and reinstated decisions of trial commissioner and CRB, but did not address subsidiary issue of whether recitals of witness testimony had been incorporated into trier’s findings and conclusions. See also, Daubert, § 31-275(1).

Cartier v. National Graphics, Inc., 4115 CRB-3-99-8 (February 21, 2001).

Affirmance of trier’s decision that claimant sustained compensable back injury. In support of their appeal, respondents argued that trier erred by denying Motion to Correct, which they contended included “undisputed material facts.” Board explained that, to contrary, two findings that respondents were disputing clearly involved conflicting testimony, and thus trier was not required to grant corrections. Within discretion of trier to accept claimant’s testimony on this issue.

D’Agostino v. Hamilton Standard, 4146 CRB-6-99-11 (February 21, 2001).

Board affirmed trier’s conclusion that spinal condition was compensable, where pre-existing degenerative disease (which was not related to work) was aggravated by work duties, causing claimant to be symptomatic. Within trier’s discretion to choose among competing medical opinions.

Gimmartino v. State/Department of Veterans Affairs, 4150 CRB-6-99-11 (February 9, 2001).

Affirmance of trier’s conclusion that claimant’s condition subsequent to October 27, 1992 was not caused by compensable head injury, as it was based upon trier’s assessment of evidence, and was fully supported by record. Trier chose to disregard opinion of psychologist because (a) inaccurate medical history was provided to him, and (b) respondents were not able to complete his cross-examination.

Grajales v. Aero-Clean Demolition Contractors, 4202 CRB-7-00-3 (January 25, 2001).

Trier rejected testimony by claimant and witnesses regarding circumstances of alleged injury. Dismissal order affirmed.

Kuznier v. Modern Woodcrafts, Inc., 4156 CRB-6-99-11 (December 22, 2000).

Claimant alleged that someone at his workplace had drugged him with opiates. A toxicologist testified that, if the claimant’s version of the facts were true, the drugs were most likely administered at the workplace. Trier dismissed claim, finding claimant’s testimony unpersuasive and doctor’s opinion speculative. CRB affirmed, as claim depended wholly on the credibility of claimant’s story.

Goldberg v. Ames Department Stores, 4160 CRB-1-99-2 (December 19, 2000).

CRB affirmed finding of compensability and reliance on opinion of treating physician, despite alleged discrepancies in that doctor’s records and testimony. Trier was entitled to draw his own inferences from the evidence, and did not have to explain decision to credit claimant’s doctor over respondents’ doctor.

Ford v. Carpenter Chapman, 4128 CRB-3-99-9 (November 30, 2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant did not reach maximum medical improvement between February and October 1998. Though doctors offered permanency ratings, they did not state that claimant’s condition had stabilized, and treater indicated that he wanted to wait before declaring that MMI had been reached, as pain symptoms continued to evolve. Factual issue. See also, Ford, § 31-294d, § 31-308(a), § 31-308(b).

Bilotta v. Connecticut Natural Gas Corp., 4106 CRB-1-99-8 (October 5, 2000).

See, Bilotta, § 31-300, § 31-308(b) (briefly discussing validity of diagnostic methodology and trier’s authority to credit one doctor over another). Prior decision at Bilotta, 3536 CRB-1-97-2 (May 26, 1998), § 31-308(a), § 31-308(b).

Costa v. Torrington Company, 4097 CRB-5-99-8 (July 28, 2000).

Trier did not err by finding that physician’s deposition established causal connection between workplace chemical exposure and cirrhosis of the liver within reasonable degree of medical probability. Opinion not based upon conjecture despite lack of reported cases tying trichloroethylene and trichloroethane exposure to chronic liver disease as opposed to acute liver injuries. See also, Costa, § 31-301-4.

Noble v. Allstate Insurance, 4157 CRB-5-9-12 (July 28, 2000), aff’d, 67 Conn. App. 160 (2001).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant did not sufficiently prove that he suffered mental stress and physical illness as a result of harassment by supervisor. Decision was based upon credibility of evidence, and was further supported by opinion of independent medical examiner. Subsequent decision at Noble, 4074 CRB-5-99-7, 4096 CRB-5-99-7 (January 10, 2002), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Rodrigues v. American National Can, 4043 CRB-5-99-4 (July 26, 2000).

Trier did not err by awarding temporary partial disability benefits beyond alleged date of maximum medical improvement, as he had discretion to either ignore doctor’s report, or interpret it as stating that surgery might still benefit claimant. See also, Rodrigues, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(a). Subsequent decision at Rodrigues, 4329 CRB-7-00-12 (January 2, 2002), § 31-279-3, § 31-296, § 31-298, § 31-301-9.

Francis v. White Oak Corp., 4032 CRB-6-99-4 (July 20, 2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant failed to meet burden of proof regarding alleged back injury or alleged re-injury. Trial commissioner found claimant’s testimony unpersuasive. Trier not required to accept physician’s medical opinion regarding causation, especially where opinion was dependent in part upon claimant’s description and history of his injury.

Gagliardi v. Raimondo Maintenance, LLC, 4012 CRB-1-99-4 (July 20, 2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding of compensable injury. Respondents argued that claimant’s testimony was inconsistent and contradictory, and that employer’s evidence demonstrated injury could not have occurred in manner described by claimant. Trier specifically addressed credibility, and found claimant’s testimony to be more credible than that offered by respondent employer. See also, Gagliardi, § 31-307. Subsequent decision at Gagliardi, 4496 CRB-2-02-2 (February 27, 2003), aff’d, 82 Conn. App. 905 (2004)(per curiam).

Palma v. Manuel A. Pinho Landscaping, Inc., 4047 CRB-7-99-5 (July 18, 2000).

Trier ruled respondents’ evidence disputing occurrence of injury more credible than claimant’s evidence establishing said mishap. CRB construed erroneous listing of date of injury in findings as a scrivener’s error, as date was correctly reported elsewhere, trier’s decision did not presume claimant was reporting an inconsistent date of injury, and claimant did not move to correct errors. Reference by trier to statement made at informal hearing deemed harmless error where transcript unavailable for review, and trier found claimant’s testimony less credible than respondents’. See also, Palma, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Stankiewicz v. Rockville Memorial Nursing Home, 3959 CRB-2-99-1 (June 28, 2000).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim, which rested on negative assessment of claimant’s credibility, and was supported by some of the (conflicting) medical records.

Simmons v. Temporary Labor Corp., 3975 CRB-6-99-2 (May 25, 2000).

Claimant suffered from carpal tunnel symptoms in right wrist. Trier found that they were related to a one-week assignment she performed while affiliated with TLC, a temporary employment agency for whom she worked a total of 86 hours. CRB affirmed ruling. Issue was factual, and both medical and testimonial evidence supported compensability. Fact that claimant only worked briefly for TLC did not preclude finding that she sustained repetitive trauma during that period. Claimant began complaining of symptoms after sorting metal key rings for five days, and had never complained of wrist/hand pain before. Difficulty claimant had in comprehending questions and articulating certain responses did not require trier to draw a negative inference as to her credibility, as claimant was from Jamaica and had a limited educational and employment background. See also, Simmons, § 31-300, § 31-275(1).

Bennett v. Federal Express Corp., 4023 CRB-4-99-4 (May 22, 2000).

See, Bennett, § 31-296, Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments) (date of maximum medical improvement is a question of fact for trial commissioner).

Minck v. Truegreen Chemlawn, 4003 CRB-4-99-3 (April 18, 2000).

Regarding the issue of temporary total disability, trier found treating physician’s opinion did not rise to the “reasonable degree of medical probability” level. CRB reiterated that no “magic words” are required in a medical diagnosis. Because treating physician “unequivocally” opined that claimant was totally disabled for the period in question, it was error to conclude that his opinion did not possess required “degree of medical probability.” However, as the judge of credibility, trier may choose not to follow medical opinion where he finds it not to be credible or convincing. Unclear whether the trial commissioner had based his decision on these grounds, so matter was remanded for articulation.

Gibbons v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 4000 CRB-8-99-3 (April 12, 2000), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 482 (2001), cert. denied, 257 Conn. 905 (2001).

CRB found no error in trier’s dismissal of claim that heart attack was compensable injury. Claimant had stated that a particular supervisor had placed him in a stressful situation at the workplace on the date of injury, but respondents showed that said individual was not at work on that date. Trier has sole authority to determine credibility of witnesses.

Figliola v. Ogden Services, 4013 CRB-7-99-4 (March 27, 2000).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s approval of Form 36. Trier was not required to rely upon the report of the treating physician that described the claimant as being totally disabled just because it was the most recent medical record. Fact-finder has discretion to accept or reject any medical opinion in evidence. See also, Figliola, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Van Straten v. Hartford Courant, 3999 CRB-8-99-3 (March 23, 2000).

Commissioner properly concluded that claimant’s need for knee surgery was due to compensable injury. Medical opinions supported finding of causal connection, and trier was entitled to believe claimant’s explanation of discrepancy in the treating physician’s report concerning the date his symptoms began.

Outlaw v. Pray Automotive of Greenwich, 3981 CRB-7-99-2 (March 23, 2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that claimant’s continued symptoms of pain were related to 1988 compensable injury, as medical reports of two authorized treating physicians did not establish that subsequent events were responsible for her current pain symptoms. See also, Outlaw, § 31-294d.

Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 3986 CRB-2-99-3 (March 3, 2000).

CRB discussed denial of Motion to Correct as part of trier’s power to determine credibility of evidence. See also, Burse, § 31-284(a). Prior decision at Burse, 3480 CRB-2-96-12 (November 7, 1997), dismissed for lack of a final judgment, A.C. 17825 (January 14, 1998), rev’d, 262 Conn. 31 (2002)(Supreme Court held that CRB and trial commissioner improperly found that subject matter jurisdiction over claim existed in Connecticut, as contacts were legally insufficient), § 31-278.

Flemmings v. Waveny Care Center, Inc., 3963 CRB-7-99-1 (March 2, 2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision that claimant sustained compensable injury despite her poor memory and inconsistent testimony regarding date of injury. See also, Flemmings, § 31-279-3.

Sendra v. Plainville Board of Education, 3961 CRB-6-99-1 (January 20, 2000).

Trier evaluates proposed changes in Motion to Correct with same fact-finding discretion he uses to judge credibility of witnesses and evidence. No error in denial of Motion to Correct here. Requested corrections were based upon the testimony of witnesses, upon whom trier was not required to rely. Testimony also established a situation that was susceptible to different inferences regarding teacher’s relationship to school mountain biking club. Finally, proposed corrections were immaterial. See also, Sendra, § 31-275(16).

Dallaire v. Paper Delivery Inc., 3951 CRB-6-98-12 (January 19, 2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding of causal connection between compensable slip and fall injury and migraine headaches suffered later (as well as weight loss and dulling of certain senses). Claimant’s failure to disclose earlier treatment for headaches did not compel trier to discount his testimony, as those headaches appeared to be of a different nature. Medical opinions could be construed as stating diagnosis within reasonable degree of medical probability even though only objective evidence of migraines was in history that claimant provided to his doctors.

Pantanella v. Enfield Ford, 3937 CRB-1-98-11 (January 7, 2000), aff’d, 65 Conn. App. 46 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 (2001).

CRB affirmed trier’s factual finding that the appellant CIGA waived statute of nonclaim defense against claimant through a combination of inaction and the statements of its attorney at a formal hearing. CRB also affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Reopen record, as CIGA offered no new information to demonstrate that its attempt to depose doctor contrary to trier’s order was reasonable, nor did it show that a 1994 report of said doctor was actually withheld by other parties. Trier was entitled to rely on the tardiness of the appellant’s request to depose this physician as a ground for denying this request. See also, Pantanella, § 31-299b, § 31-300, § 31-298, § 31-315. Subsequent decision at Pantanella, 4220 CRB-1-00-4 (December 19, 2000), § 31-298, § 31-300; Prior decision at Pantanella, 3377 CRB-1-96-7 (January 28, 1998), infra and § 31-298, 31-299b, § 31-355(e).

Bailey v. State/Greater Hartford Community College, 3922 CRB-2-98-10 (November 30, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001).

See, Bailey, § 31-300, § 31-307, § 31-284b, § 31-294d. prior decisions at Bailey, 3694 CRB-1-97-9 (January 12, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure; Bailey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 433, 3152 CRB-5-95-8 (September 3, 1996), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Menard v. People’s Bank, 3887 CRB-2-98-9 (November 23, 1999).

CRB affirmed finding that claimant did not sustain burden of proof that she suffered a back injury at work. Trier’s decision was based upon assessment of evidentiary credibility, including testimony of the claimant that she found to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. As claimant failed to prove that she sustained a compensable injury, it is of no moment that respondents did not present any medical evidence.

Dubay v. D.R. Templeman Company, 3890 CRB-6-98-9 (October 14, 1999).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant failed to sustain burden of proof that her shoulder condition was caused by an alleged incident with a machine at work. Claimant’s credibility was at issue, as trial commissioner found that she did not give a history of a machine jamming and pulling her arm to any of her physicians prior to the independent medical examination. Trier chose to rely upon the IME doctor, who opined that claimant’s injury was not caused by her employment.

Pilewski v. Danbury Auto Park, 3916 CRB-7-98-10 (September 23, 1999).

Trier was not persuaded by claimant’s testimony that her need for back surgery increased as a result of her compensable injury. CRB affirmed dismissal of claim for compensation, and ruled that claimant’s total disability claim was also dismissed by implication when the trier denied her Motion to Correct, which sought to add a finding of disability.

Paradis v. Arnco Sign Company, 3773 CRB-8-98-2 (September 22, 1999).

Claimant sought payment of unpaid medical bills. Because trier made no findings regarding these bills, CRB could not review this issue on appeal. Panel advised claimant to request a hearing at the district level.

Saporoso v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 3759 CRB-1-98-11 (September 3, 1999).

Claimant argued that trier erred by finding that “litigation neurosis” caused her disability. Testimony of both medical experts established that the claimant’s anxiety over pending litigation was a major factor in causing her condition, so CRB affirmed the commissioner’s ruling. See also, Saporoso, § 31-300.

Mikishka v. Meriden, 3869 CRB-8-98-7 (September 3, 1999).

See, Mikishka, § 31-308 (b) and (c). Prior decision at Mikisha v. Meriden, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 178, 3574 CRB-8-97-3 (May 2, 1997).

Dubay v. M & R Express, 3847 CRB-1-98-6 (September 2, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that he suffered an injury to his shoulder while unloading a truck at work. It was within the discretion of the trial commissioner to assess the credibility of the testimony. Although the claimant testified that he was injured during an incident which occurred while unloading the truck, the testimony of witnesses along with other evidence supported the conclusion that the claimant was not involved in the unloading incident.

Lalanne v. Town of Greenwich, 3914 CRB-7-98-10 (September 2, 1999).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision that claimant failed to sustain burden of proof that he suffered compensable injury to his cervical spine while opening a door at work. Trial commissioner was not required to rely upon the report of the claimant’s treating physician regarding causation. See also, Lalanne, § 31-300.

Palandro v. Bernie’s Audio-Video T.V. & App., 3876 CRB-3-98-8 (September 2, 1999).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of compensation claim. Decision rested on issues of credibility, and the trier did not abuse his discretion concerning the inferences he drew from the evidence.

Malafronte v. Med-Center Home Health Care, 3888 CRB-7-98-9 (August 31, 1999).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant sustained a compensable injury to her back while pushing a patient in a wheelchair. Although there were inconsistent dates of injury in the record, it was within the discretion of trial commissioner to find claimant’s testimony credible. Furthermore, her treating physician opined with reasonable medical certainty that the injury was caused by claimant’s employment even though he did not use the “magic words” of reasonable medical probability. See also, Malafronte, § 31-300.

Moawad v. American Eagle, 3701 CRB-6-97-10 (August 25, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s compensable 1994 injury did not precipitate his need for surgery and was not a substantial factor in producing symptoms in August of 1995. The trier’s decision was fully supported by the record, including the opinion of the physician who conducted an independent medical examination (IME) at the request of the respondents.

Krevis v. Bridgeport, 3857 CRB-4-98-7 (August 18, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 328 (2001).

Claimant had burden of proving causal link between his § 7-433c hypertension claim and his current medical condition, including need for diabetes drug. Trier found that he had not done so. Affirmed; trier has authority to disregard any medical testimony to begin with, plus two doctors testified that hypertension and diabetes were unrelated. See also, Krevis, § 7-433c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307.

Funaioli v. New London, 3814 CRB-2-98-5 (June 16, 1999), aff’d, 61 Conn. App. 131 (2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision that claimant’s disability was caused by his obsession with his workers’ compensation claims, and was not substantially due to his 1992 compensable mental stress injury. Panel discussed meaning of “substantial causation,” and reiterated that trier is never required to believe the testimony of an expert medical witness, even if unopposed. Tanner v. Conservation Commission, 15 Conn. App. 336 (1988), distinguished (Appellate Court held that agency could not disregard expert testimony where its members lacked their own expertise and knowledge.). The experts in this case all testified that the claimant’s anger and depression, insofar as they existed, were caused to some degree by his agitation over his legal struggles. Trier was entitled to credit testimony of doctor who downplayed the severity of the claimant’s disability, and who expressed doubt as to the connection between his condition and his single 1992 depressive episode. Prior decision at Funaioli, 3346 CRB-1-96-5 (November 4, 1997), rev’d, 52 Conn. App. 194 (1999), § 31-294c, § 31-316.

Crouse v. A.A.I.S., Inc., 3797 CRB-3-98-4 (June 16, 1999).

It was within power of trial commissioner to rule that claimant’s hip condition was not aggravated by his 1997 compensable injury, and that he was capable of light duty work. See also, Crouse, § 31-301-9.

Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, 3780 CRB-3-98-2 (June 15, 1999), aff’d, 62 Conn. App. 440 (2001).

CRB reversed finding that February 1997 broken leg was related to August 1996 back injury. Trial commissioner relied exclusively on testimony of claimant and her brother that her fall down the stairs at her home was caused by lumbar spine instability. There was no medical evidence, however, to corroborate the connection in any way. See also, Dengler, § 31-307, § 31-348.

Soto v. Hawie Manufacturing, 3787 CRB-4-98-3 (May 21, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim. Trier committed no error in his interpretation of workplace videotape, nor did he err by relying on a certain doctor’s opinion regarding lack of causal connection between operation of foot press and repetitive trauma. Prior decision at Soto, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 196, 3238 CRB-4-95-12 (May 20, 1997), § 31-298.

Cabral v. Metropolitan District Employees, 3770 CRB-1-98-2 (May 13, 1999).

Doctor’s testimony established within reasonable degree of medical probability that claimant suffered 50% permanent partial lung disability due to toxic exposure at waste disposal plant. Trier had discretion to accept his diagnosis, even though it was based on methodology not widely implemented in area hospitals. CRB must presume that this particular diagnosis seemed scientifically tenable to the trier, and review board is not in a position to override trier’s judgment. See also, Cabral, § 31-298.

Wooten v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3674 CRB-6-97-9 (May 7, 1999).

Trier granted Motion to Correct, deleting findings of certain temporary total disability periods. Claimant argued on appeal that original findings were supported by evidence. CRB agreed, but the findings as amended were also supported by evidence, and it was the trial commissioner’s prerogative to choose between crediting the doctor’s medical reports and adhering strictly to the contents of his deposition. Also, in corrected findings, trier deleted order that respondents pay a certain physician’s outstanding bills. Because awards left intact the findings that physician was within chain of referral and that his care was required by the compensable injury, CRB ruled that any outstanding bills were still payable. See also, Wooten, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-294d.

Allen v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 3768 CRB-4-98-2 (April 27, 1999).

Factual findings supported trial commissioner’s conclusions (no Motion to Correct). CRB enumerated scope of its review of factual issues. See also, Allen, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Horne v. Phoenix Soil, Inc., 3824 CRB-5-98-5 (April 12, 1999).

Respondents appealed based on trier’s acceptance of claimant’s testimony over that of three other witnesses regarding circumstances of injury. Affirmed; simple credibility issue.

Fiore v. House & Garden Shop, 3747 CRB-7-97-12 (April 5, 1999).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision that claimant’s breathing condition was not caused by working conditions. It was within the discretion of the trial commissioner, as the trier of fact, to consider all of the testimony and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. See also, Fiore, § 31-301-9. See subsequent decision at Fiore, 4494 CRB-7-02-2 (February 28, 2003), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-315.

Granata v. Waldbaum’s, 3742 CRB-3-97-12 (March 11, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s wrist and thumb conditions were not caused by her employment. Claimant argued that the trier erred by relying on the opinion of the IME physician because his opinion was based on an inaccurate history of claimant’s surgery dates. This issue was delved into during the formal hearing, including extensive questioning of the IME physician. It was within the discretion of the commissioner to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. See also, Granata, § 31-301-9.

Croxford v. Columbia Mfg., 3758 CRB-2-98-1 (March 1, 1999).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s injury was compensable. Simple issue of choosing between conflicting medical opinions.

Hyde v. Stop & Shop Companies, 3728 CRB-4-97-11 (February 18, 1999).

Findings initially seemed to contain inconsistencies regarding claimant’s entitlement to § 31-308(b) benefits and attorney’s fees/interest for undue delay, and the respondents’ apparent award of an offset for benefits already paid. CRB held that the apparent discrepancies in the trier’s award could be resolved upon a closer reading of the decision. Trier’s finding that respondents had failed to issue Form 36 (thus preventing them from discontinuing temporary partial disability benefits) seemed to conflict with finding that respondents were “entitled to take credit for the above payments . . . as payment of § 31-308(a) benefits.” CRB explained that trier did not use “credit” to mean “an offset” in that context; she simply meant that the benefits were to be construed as paid temporary partial disability benefits. Such a reading was borne out by the fact that the trier awarded the claimant interest on the portion of the permanent partial disability award that was not timely paid; if an offset was appropriate, the portion of the award already tendered via check would have exceeded the amount of the benefits due after implementation of the offset. Further, the corrections denied by the trier are consistent with the non-offset meaning of the word “credit.” See also, Hyde, § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-300.

Sealey v. Pfizer, Inc., 3708 CRB-8-97-10 (January 28, 1999).

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of mesothelioma claim where decedent sustained insignificant asbestos exposure at respondent’s work site. Medical testimony was not misconstrued, and trier had discretion to disregard any testimony he found unpersuasive. Claimant failed to satisfy burden of proof.

Perry v. Carewell Rest Home, 3713 CRB-3-97-10 (December 29, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant’s back condition was not caused by an alleged lifting incident at work, where the conclusion was based upon credibility. Specifically, the trial commissioner found that the claimant did not give a history of a work-related injury to her treating physicians, and also found that the claimant’s history and symptoms which she gave to the various treaters were inconsistent. See also, Perry, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Grimme v. Railroad Stores, Inc., 3722 CRB-5-97-11 (November 17, 1998).

Where facts found are inconsistent with conclusion, or no facts have been found to support it, CRB cannot affirm. See also, Grimme, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-349.

Cramer v. Cramer, 3710 CRB-4-97-10 (November 9, 1998).

See, Cramer, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-9. Additional Evidence, § 31-301-4. Correction of finding.

Pyrdol v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 3504 CRB-2-96-12 (November 9, 1998).

Trial commissioner had discretion to accept one doctor’s opinion over another concerning the attributability of mesothelioma to asbestos exposure at Electric Boat versus earlier exposure at the Navy. Decedent testified that exposure was more severe at Electric Boat. See also, Pyrdol, § 31-310.

Pekar v. Warnaco, Inc./Warner’s Division, 3611 CRB-4-97-5, 3721 CRB-4-97-10 (October 16, 1998).

See, Pekar, § 31-294c.

Mendoza v. Cly Del Mfg. Co., 3655 CRB-5-97-8 (August 28, 1998).

Issue on appeal was dependent on testimony and within discretion of trial commissioner as the finder of evidentiary credibility. Affirmed.

Bratchell v. United Parcel Service, 3637 CRB-7-97-7 (August 10, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that claimant’s psychiatric condition was not caused by his compensable injury. It was within the discretion of the trial commissioner to credit the opinion of the independent medical examiner rather than the opinion of the claimant’s treating psychiatrist.

McCarthy v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 3689 CRB-6-97-9 (August 7, 1998).

Trial commissioner found that claimant’s alleged cervical problems were not related to her 1990 injury. There were medical reports that directly supported the trial commissioner’s decision, and it was within his purview as the finder of fact to disregard the testimony of the claimant in favor of other witnesses. See also, McCarthy, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Ivan-Marrotte v. State/DMR, 3599 CRB-2-97-4 (July 28, 1998).

CRB reversed trial commissioner’s decision that claimant’s right leg condition was caused by her compensable injury to her left leg. There was no medical opinion that diagnosed such an etiology with reasonable medical certainty.

Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July 17, 1998).

Claimant has burden of proving causal connection between compensable injury and disability, and trial commissioner is not required to credit any particular medical report. Here, respondents’ independent medical examiner issued a report questioning the link between claimant’s upper extremity impairment and his work injury. Trier’s refusal to find entire condition compensable affirmed. See also, Pallotto, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Cantoni v. Xerox Corporation, 3630 CRB-2-97-6 (July 17, 1998), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 18686 (December 2, 1998), aff’d, 251 Conn. 153 (1999).

Where trial commissioner clearly misinterpreted the substance of the treating physician’s report in discussing his testimony in her finding and dismissal, the CRB ruled that the case had to be remanded for a new trial. Doctor’s testimony was integral to case, and error could not be considered immaterial to its outcome.

Rivera v. Chesebrough Ponds, 3587 CRB-3-97-4 (July 14, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision, which was simply a matter of determining evidentiary credibility.

Roche v. Danbury Hospital, 3592 CRB-7-97-5 (July 13, 1998).

Commissioner found claimant’s injury compensable despite her inability to pinpoint the exact date upon which she was hurt. CRB held that the essential issues in the respondents’ appeal were factual, and that they came down to questions of credibility. See also, Roche, § 31-275(1), § 31-294c.

Carroll v. The Print Shoppe, 3614 CRB-4-97-5 (June 8, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision finding claimant’s injury compensable. Trier was the evaluator of credibility, and was entitled to credit claimant’s testimony over that of her employers despite the fact that she admitted to lying on her employment application and failed to mention previous back injuries at a deposition. Also, trier did not violate § 31-301-4 by phrasing certain findings with the preface “the claimant testified that . . . .” Contents of those statements recited in the findings directly supported the commissioner’s conclusions, and CRB was able to discern the basis of her decision.

Gaudino v. Chromium Process, 3585 CRB-4-97-4 (June 5, 1998).

See, Gaudino, § 31-294c notes.

Kingsland v. Mattatuck Manufacturing Co., 3619 CRB-5-97-5 (June 5, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision where the conclusion that the claimant’s cervical disc condition was caused by a prior automobile accident rather than by the claimant’s employment was fully supported by the record.

Talamona v. Dalton Enterprises, Inc., 3684 CRB-5-97-9 (June 5, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s right hand condition was caused by overuse due to a prior compensable left hand injury. The respondents contended that the claimant’s right hand condition was caused by repetitive trauma at work and therefore should be deemed a new injury. The CRB explained that the right hand condition constituted a medical sequela of the original compensable injury, and thus the date of injury remained the same.

Matejek v. Tilcon Tomasso Inc., 3584 CRB-6-97-4 (June 4, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant’s disability and medical treatment subsequent to the date of a non-work related accident was not caused by a prior compensable injury. The trier’s decision was supported by the opinion of the physician who performed the independent medical examination.

Freeman v. UTC/Sikorsky Aircraft, 3568 CRB-4-97-4 (June 3, 1998).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s dismissal of claim. Only evidence supporting occurrence of injury was claimant’s testimony, and the commissioner was not required to give it credence. Other evidence showed inconsistency in reported date of injury, and claimant’s supervisor did not recall being told of the injury, contrary to claimant’s allegation. Subsequent decision at Freeman, 4225 CRB-4-00-4 (May 4, 2001), aff’d, 68 Conn. App. 904 (2002)(per curiam), supra.

Perry v. Commercial Interior Systems, 3571 CRB-7-97-4 (June 3, 1998).

Dismissal of claim was affirmed, as credibility of a claimant’s description of how an injury occurred is a factual question for the trial commissioner.

Mancini v. Allied Signal Aerospace Co., 3565 CRB-5-97-3 (June 2, 1998).

Claimant was diagnosed with reflex sympathetic dystrophy by two doctors. Commissioner found accordingly, and found her condition was related to work injuries. Respondents sought reversal of that decision on grounds evidence did not support it. Affirmed. Commissioner was entitled to credit doctors’ testimony.

D’Onofrio v. Orange, 3564 CRB-3-97-3 (June 1, 1998).

Trial commissioner denied corrections that concerned either facts dependent on the credibility of witnesses or facts that would have been cumulative to the existing findings. Affirmed. See also, D’Onofrio, § 31-275(1).

Noga v. Colin Service Systems, 3361 CRB-6-96-6 (June 1, 1998).

Trial commissioner inferred from the testimony of two witnesses that the employer did not provide transportation to the claimant to and from work. The testimony supported that finding, and the trier’s decision to dismiss the claim for an injury arising out of a car accident on the way to work was affirmed by the CRB.

Caltabiano v. Tony’s Huntington Inn, 3544 CRB-8-97-2 (May 26, 1998).

Where, as here, the commissioner’s determination is based upon the weight and credibility that he has accorded the evidence, the CRB will not disturb such a determination. The trial commissioner found that the claimant’s testimony was not credible regarding his contention that he had been evaluating restaurants at the time of his automobile accident, and thus dismissed the claim.

Dalling v. Dalling Hauling, Inc., 3615 CRB-4-97-5 (May 26, 1998).

CRB remanded case to trial commissioner where findings did not address all of the issues raised during formal hearings. See also, Dalling, § 31-300.

Osos v. Tony’s Huntington Inn, 3545 CRB-8-97-2 (May 26, 1998).

Where, as here, the commissioner’s determination is based upon the weight and credibility that he has accorded the evidence, the CRB will not disturb such a determination. The trial commissioner found that the claimant’s testimony was not credible regarding her contention that she had been evaluating restaurants at the time of her automobile accident, and thus dismissed the claim.

Willett-Pine v. Community Residences, 3534 CRB-8-97-2 (May 20, 1998).

Decision of trial commissioner dismissing medical provider’s claim for payment of medical bills affirmed, as it was supported by the evidence in the record. See also, Willett-Pine, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Barron v. City Printing, Inc., 3497 CRB-3-96-12 (April 29, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 85 (1999).

See, Barron, § 31-294c, § 31-299b.

Tanzi v. New Britain, 3420 CRB-6-96-9 (April 28, 1998).

Doctor’s opinion regarding relationship of needle stick to contraction of hepatitis C was stated with sufficient medical probability to establish causation. Trier’s decision affirmed. See also, Tanzi, § 31-298.

Rivera v. New Britain, 3501 CRB-6-96-12 (April 28, 1998).

The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his back while breaking up a fight between two students. Where the medical evidence is conflicting, it is the trier of fact who must determine the weight and credibility of the evidence. See also, Rivera, § 31-294f, Medical examinations.

Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 3543 CRB-4-97-3 (April 9, 1998), aff’d, 57 Conn. App. 51 (2000).

Trial commissioner was impressed with testimony of psychologist, whose opinion she reasonably relied on in finding decedent’s suicide non-compensable. Further, claimant would have had to persuade commissioner that the opinions of certain doctors were reliable even absent the psychologist’s testimony, as the claimant had the burden of proof here. Commissioner was entitled to question the reliability of the other witnesses, and to find fault in the history provided to the doctors. CRB has no authority to reverse the factual inferences drawn by the trial commissioner. Also, proper test of legal causation for suicide was used. See also, Dixon, § 31-298.

Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., 3432 CRB-2-96-9 (April 6, 1998).

Commissioner’s findings regarding claimant’s need for medication and inability to return to work because of effects of work-related carbon monoxide poisoning were supported by both testimony and medical evidence. Failure to change findings in accord with respondents’ requested corrections was not error. See also, Coley, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-343. Prior decision at Coley, 3432 CRB-2-96-9 (February 28, 1997), rev’d, 243 Conn. 311 (1997), § 31-301(f).

Hurd v. United Methodist Homes, 3358 CRB-4-96-5 (April 1, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s depression and attempted suicide was compensable because it was caused by her prior compensable back injury. Whether the requisite causation existed was based upon the credibility of the testimony and the weight of the evidence. Trial commissioner was required to find that the compensable injury was a substantial cause of the incident, but was not required to find that it was the only cause. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) Claimant’s conduct constituted willful misconduct and thus should not have been found compensable. See also, Hurd, § 31-284(a).

Pontoriero v. Sanzo Concrete Construction, Inc., 3492 CRB-4-96-12 (March 6, 1998).

Panel affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for psychiatric overlay to 1987 back injury. Psychiatrist’s opinion supported decision, and trier found claimant’s testimony to be less than credible. See also, Pontoriero, § 31-308a.

Ramadhar v. Bourdon Forge Co., 3487 CRB-8-96-11 (March 6, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant did not suffer from silicosis. It was the trial commissioner’s duty to evaluate the claim based on the medical evidence currently before him, and to determine the credibility of the expert testimony. The trial commissioner’s conclusion is fully supported by the record and may not be disturbed.

Rolon v. Philson Inc., 3433 CRB-6-96-10 (February 25, 1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury to his knee while at work. The trial commissioner found that the claimant’s testimony was not credible.

DeMartino v. L.G. Defelice, Inc., 3524 CRB-4-97-1 (February 18, 1998).

Two medical reports in evidence supported dismissal of the claim for temporary total disability benefits. See also, DeMartino, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Cable v. Bic Corporation, 3387 CRB-3-96-7 (February 3, 1998).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s decision to dismiss claimant’s shoulder and elbow injury claims. Corrections were either dependent on credibility of claimant’s testimony or sought redundant findings, and were permissibly denied by the trier. Commissioner’s express doubt as to claimant’s credibility and the tentative nature of the medical opinions that had been offered to establish causation were consistent with the outcome of this case.

Savanella v. O&G Industries, 3396 CRB-4-96-8 (February 3, 1998).

Two doctors’ opinions supported the trier’s decision that the claimant’s employment and his 1985 compensable back injury did not contribute to his need for a hip replacement years later. Claimant had argued that one opinion was based on a faulty diagnosis and on pre-examination meetings with the respondents, while the other did not offer a conclusion as to the issue of aggravation of the prior hip condition. Affirmed.

Swaggerty v. Mattie’s Service Station, 3378 CRB-6-96-7 (February 3, 1998).

See, Swaggerty, § 31-298.

Celon v. Alternative Personnel Services, 3453 CRB-4-96-10 (January 30, 1998).

Trial commissioner determined that claimant’s testimony that he slipped and fell while working was not credible. Affirmed.

Pantanella v. Enfield Ford, 3377 CRB-1-96-7 (January 28, 1998), aff’d, 65 Conn. App. 46 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 (2001).

Medical opinion established apportionment of liability for permanent partial disability within reasonable degree of medical probability. Trier could have interpreted statements in report to refer to general difficulty of diagnosing apportionment percentages without precluding a more certain diagnosis in the instant case. Plus, level of diagnostic certainty that a doctor can reach regarding causation percentages is diminished by the difficulty of separating causal factors. Given the situation here, the doctor’s opinion sufficed as a medical basis for apportionment. See also, Pantanella, § 31-298, § 31-299b, § 31-355(e). Subsequent decisions in Pantanella, 4220 CRB-1-00-4 (December 19, 2000), § 31-298, § 31-300; Pantanella, 3937 CRB-1-98-11 (January 7, 2000), supra and § 31-298, § 31-299b, § 31-300, § 31-315.

Steigerwald v. U.S. Surgical, 3425 CRB-7-96-9 (January 28, 1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof that she suffered an injury to her back while walking from the employer’s parking lot. The claimant’s credibility was at issue due to the varied histories she had provided regarding the incident.

Pothier v. Stanley-Bostitch/The Bostitch Company, 3411 CRB-3-96-8 (January 21, 1998).

See, Pothier, § 31-275(16). See also reference in § 31-301. Factual findings.

Hurley v. Bridgeport, 3435 CRB-4-96-9 (January 20, 1998).

3435 CRB-4-96-9 (January 20, 1998). See, Hurley, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Buccieri v. Pacific Plumbing Supply Co., 3286 CRB-7-96-3 (December 30, 1997), aff’d, 53 Conn. App. 671 (1999).

Appeal from trial commissioner’s granting of Motion to Correct, which changed the trial commissioner’s conclusion. See also, Buccieri, § 31-301-4. Correction of finding, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Johnston v. AAR Circamet, 3363 CRB-1-96-6 (December 11, 1997).

Claimant argued it was unreasonable to infer from the facts that he was not entitled to benefits during the 15-month period between his layoff and his second surgery for torn knee ligaments. CRB explained that trial commissioner has the power to weigh the credibility of any medical opinion, even an uncontradicted one, and can choose to adopt part of a diagnosis while ignoring another part. Here, the trier cited testimony stating that the second tear probably occurred sometime during the six months prior to the second surgery, and the claimant could not prove exactly when that was. He was also collecting unemployment, which indicates he was capable of working. Affirmed.

O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 3339 CRB-2-96-5 (December 5, 1997), rev’d, 52 Conn. App. 813 (1999).

Trier accepted testimony of doctor regarding “synergistic relationship” between smoking and workplace asbestos exposure in causing lung cancer, and found case compensable. Although evidence supports findings that claimant was exposed to asbestos, treating physician never went beyond saying that this exposure “could” have played a significant role in claimant’s development of lung cancer. Doctor relied on general synergistic effect of asbestos exposure and smoking toward lung cancer in drawing this connection; he could not pinpoint the exact cause in this case. CRB ruled that testimony did not reach the level of diagnostic certainty necessary to qualify his opinion as being medically probable within a reasonable degree. Trial commissioner’s decision reversed. Appellate Court reversed CRB, however, stating that the testimony of the physician in question was indeed sufficient to support the trial commissioner’s decision, and that the absence of the magic word “probable” was not dispositive.

Kincaid-Ross v. State/State Library, 3350 CRB-1-96-5 (December 4, 1997).

Commissioner found that claimant suffered a compensable repetitive trauma injury, awarding permanency, temporary total, and interest and attorney’s fees. CRB reversed. Despite deferential standard of review on appeal, there must be competent medical evidence in the record to establish causation. Here, the trier did not state which doctor she was relying on, and did not discuss medical causation at all. It is questionable whether either of the medical opinions that addresses causation rises beyond the level of speculation, but trier did not even indicate which one she found persuasive. Remanded. Permanency award and unreasonable contest award reversed as well, as the respondent was not notified they were at issue at the formal hearing, and there are insufficient grounds for such awards given the panel’s decision on causation.

Campbell v. UTC/Norden Systems, 3295 CRB-4-96-3 (November 20, 1997).

Doctor testified that claimant suffered from degenerative disc disease, but that degeneration had been significantly augmented by repetitive trauma from employment. This supports finding of compensable injury. However, case remanded for further findings regarding permanent partial disability (doctor testified that impairment was only 15%, but commissioner found a 20% impairment), apportionment (no findings made regarding role of separate period of exposure while self-employed, and more than one insurer on risk), and the duration of temporary total disability benefits (indefinite period awarded in decision). See also, Campbell, § 31-299b, § 31-307.

Johnson v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3312 CRB-5-96-4 (November 19, 1997).

Commissioner found that increase in claimant’s work load, etc., led to her depression, although he dismissed permanent partial disability and hypertension claims. Respondents argued on appeal that he should have dismissed the occurrence of a compensable psychiatric injury in the first place. Held: trier determines credibility of medical opinions. Findings were a bit scant regarding medical evidence of causation, but one doctor did say that job stress caused her initial disability, and trier referred to his opinion with apparent approval. Affirmed. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) Doctor could not say claimant was disabled within reasonable degree of medical probability, and the remainder of the evidence is insufficient to establish a disability.

Ferrara v. The Hospital of St. Raphael, 3260 CRB-3-96-2 (November 18, 1997), aff’d, 54 Conn. App. 345 (1999), cert. denied, 251 Conn. 916 (1999).

Both parties argued that the medical testimony in this case did not support certain findings and conclusions. CRB reminded parties of trier’s discretion regarding the weight of medical opinions and the difficulty of overturning such findings on review. Here, none of the reports relied on by the trier were legally unreliable. Trier did not err in discontinuing disability benefits as of date of the report. See also, Ferrara, § 31-298.

Wilson-Shirley v. Yale University, 3355 CRB-3-96-6 (November 4, 1997).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s award of compensation for hip replacement surgery and associated disability. Corrections were properly denied, as they were largely attempts by the respondents to stress different aspects of facts already found. Trier was not required to credit the opinion of the § 31-294f examiner over the other doctors. The reasons she gave in her decision for disregarding his testimony were legitimate, and another doctor’s reports met the standard of reasonable degree of medical probability. See also, Wilson-Shirley, § 31-294f.

Muldoon v. New England Installation, 3345A and 3345B CRB-4-96-7 (November 3, 1997).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that the decedent’s exposure to asbestos from 1975 to 1984 significantly contributed to his death and constituted a proximate cause. Claimant had entered into a previously approved stipulation for asbestos exposure through 1975. See also, Muldoon § 31-349. See also Muldoon, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 255, 1226 CRD-4-91-5 (January 13, 1993), rev’d, 33 Conn. App. 695 (1994), rev’d, 231 Conn. 469 (1994), aff’d on remand, 37 Conn. App. 266 (1995). Muldoon, 3415 CRB-4-96-8 (November 3, 1997). Subsequent decision at Muldoon, 3552 CRB-4-97-3 (August 24, 1998).

Weiss v. Chesebrough Ponds, 3392 CRB-3-96-8 (September 23, 1997), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 106 (1998).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s carpal tunnel was caused by her work duties. Respondents contended that treating physician’s opinion was not reliable because it was based upon claimant’s oral history which was not stated in physician’s report. Trial commissioner was entitled to infer that claimant conveyed to her treating physician the same description of her work duties that she provided during the formal hearing. If respondents doubted this, they could have deposed the doctor.

Reeder v. Zohne Industries, 3313 CRB-5-96-3 (August 21, 1997), aff’d, 49 Conn. App. 904 (1998)(per curiam).

None of the doctors whose testimony the claimant offered into evidence said that his skin condition was probably caused by workplace chemical exposure. Fact that respondents offered no contrary evidence did not relieve claimant of burden of proving his case. Dismissal of claim affirmed. See also, Reeder, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Kolomiets v. Syncor International Corp., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 234, 3251 CRB-7-96-1 (June 23, 1997).

Commissioner justifiably denied corrections that were either recitals of testimony, cumulative and immaterial facts, suggested inferences from the evidence regarding which the trier permissibly drew contrary inferences, or conclusions of law dependent on those changes. See also, Kolomiets, § 31-275(1). Appellate Court reversed CRB on other issues. See subsequent decision at Kolomiets, 4578 CRB-7-02-11 (July 8, 2003).

Roy v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 179, 3131 CRB-1-95-7 (May 12, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 904 (1998)(per curiam), cert. denied, 245 Conn. 906 (1998).

Claimant alleged that his situation at work caused him stress, and led to his heart attack. The trier noted his personal and family history of heart disease, his voluntary entry into a program that made his job harder, and other factors in dismissing the claim. Held: claimant has burden of proving compensable injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability. Trial commissioner, as fact-finder, simply did not find evidence convincing enough. Medical reports were not overwhelmingly supportive of claimant’s case, and personal history placed claimant at high risk of heart trouble. Affirmed. See also, Roy, § 31-294c.

Evans v. Shelton, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 155, 3108 CRB-4-95-6 (May 2, 1997), dismissed for lack of a final judgment, A.C. 17196 (January 14, 1998).

Trier found that exposure to nonspecific workplace irritants resulted in a compensable repetitive trauma injury. CRB stressed trier’s power to review the evidence and draw his own factual inferences from the testimony. Two doctors testified that the claimant’s exposure to allergens at work materially contributed to the development of her asthma; the fact that the claimant’s own statements played a part in developing those diagnoses did not render them legally unreliable. Trier was not required to credit respondent’s time cards, nor should he have held claimant’s failure to submit a building inspection report into evidence against her under Secondino v. U.S. Gas Company, 147 Conn. 672 (1960). CRB also held that trier did not improperly “fuse” the definitions of repetitive trauma and occupational disease under the Act. Asthmatic conditions can be repetitive trauma injuries. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) Inconsistent factual findings and conclusions; claimant’s history inaccurate, and provides the basis for both doctors’ opinions. Attendance records indicate claimant stopped working at city hall two weeks before the doctor observed her wheezing. Based on treating physician’s logic, her symptoms should have been alleviated by then. Irritants cited are commonplace in everyday life. See also, Evans, § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, notes on Rules of Professional Conduct.

Hodgdon v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 164, 3150 CRB-1-95-8 (May 2, 1997).

Issue of maximum medical improvement date relates to extent of disability, and is a factual determination for the trial commissioner, who has the authority to weigh the credibility of the evidence and to choose among various medical reports or parts of reports. No error here. See also, Hodgdon, § 31-298.

Keenan v. Union Camp Corp., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 174, 3202 CRB-4-95-11 (May 2, 1997), rev’d, 49 Conn. App. 280 (1998).

Doctor relied exclusively on the history the claimant provided in relating his initial compensable leg injury to a subsequent fall down the stairs at home. He found no physical evidence linking the two events, and did not explain their connection in medical terms. CRB reversed trier’s decision to award compensation, as the substance of the expert testimony was legally insufficient to establish causation within a reasonable degree of medical probability. Appellate Court reversed CRB and held there was sufficient medical evidence before the trial commissioner for her to conclude that the claimant suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result of his fall, and that his fall was caused by leg weakness that resulted from a compensable workplace injury.

Benlock v. New Haven Terminal/Cilco Terminal, 3034 CRB-4-95-4 (April 25, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 250 (1998)(per curiam).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision that job stress superimposed on preexisting risk factors caused the claimant’s heart attack. As the finder of fact, the trier was entitled to deny the proposed corrections of the respondents, as some of the facts were irrelevant to the outcome of the case, while others depended on conflicting testimony. Doctor’s opinion that stress was “probably” a cause of his heart attack was given with a reasonable degree of medical probability. Traditional proximate cause concepts apply in heart attack cases. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) Claimant did not offer sufficient evidence to prove heart attack work-related under any test. Doctor’s opinion was clearly obtained after claimant’s counsel became aware she had insufficient proof to win her pending case, and doctor was aware he was testifying for this purpose. See also, Benlock, § 31-275.

Ubaldo v. Cold Metal Products, 3223 CRB-6-95-11 (April 25, 1997).

Claimant was injured climbing over a fence to get inside his employer’s premises, as he was late for work and no one was at the guard shack to let him in the gate. Case was dismissed. CRB ruled that trier did not have to explain which parts of the claimant’s testimony he didn’t find credible [See Admin. Reg. § 31-301-3]. His determination that the claimant was not a credible witness cannot be overturned by this board. No error.

Roy v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 3284 CRB-1-96-2 (April 14, 1997), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 924 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 907 (1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s physical and mental conditions were not causally related to his employment. CRB will not disturb a trial commissioner’s decision where, as here, the commissioner’s determinations are based upon the weight and credibility that he has accorded the evidence. See also, Roy, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Bell v. McCarthy, 3216 CRB-6-95-11 (April 10, 1997).

Claimant testified as to circumstances of his back injury, and explained why he did not tell respondent about injury right away. Trial commissioner was entitled to credit this testimony, and CRB may not reassess his decision. Award affirmed.

McQuiller v. The Miller Company, 3219 CRB-6-95-11 (April 10, 1997).

Trier did not have to grant respondents’ requested correction seeking alternate interpretation of doctor’s statement regarding absence of pre-existing problem in claimant’s wrist. Statement could be construed as trier interpreted it. Respondents’ failure to challenge findings regarding medical opinion that trial commissioner ultimately relied on means that those findings remain intact on review, and provide support for the decision. See also, McQuiller, § 31-349.

Brown v. Connecticut Aerosol, 3169 CRB-3-95-5 (April 7, 1997).

In reviewing denial of Motion to Correct, CRB may not reassess trier’s determinations of evidentiary credibility. Claimant has burden to prove causal link between employment and disability, and trier may choose to credit or ignore any of the medical evidence he presents, even if there is no contrary testimony. See also, Brown, § 31-298.

Smith v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3134 CRB-3-95-6 (April 4, 1997).

Trier dismissed claim for cervical and back injuries. Claimant argued that he disregarded undisputed evidence, and improperly based his decision on the fact that no doctor used the term “reasonable medical probability.” CRB explained that, although the “magic” words “reasonable degree of medical probability” are not necessary, the claimant must still prove causal connection based on the substance of the medical testimony. Here, the reports cited by the claimant do not reach a conclusion regarding the origin of the claimant’s symptoms, and the commissioner was not required to infer proof of causation from those reports.

Figueroa v. Laidlaw Transit, 3154 CRB-4-95-9 (March 4, 1997).

Factual determinations are within the province of the trial commissioner. The weight and credibility to be given the evidence presented is determined by the trial commissioner. Furthermore, the trial commissioner has the right to reject testimony even if seemingly uncontradicted. See also, Figueroa, § 31-294d, and § 31-308a.

Desantis v. Middlebury, 3182 CRB-5-95-10 (February 27, 1997).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s injury constituted a new and identifiable injury. The trial commissioner did not find the claimant’s prior injuries to be concurrent and contributing causes of the claimant’s nerve impingement and resulting need for surgery. As the trial commissioner’s determination was based upon the weight and credibility which he accorded the evidence, and is fully supported by the record, CRB will not disturb that determination.

Pronovost v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3166 CRB-6-95-9 (February 11, 1997).

Trial commissioner did not err in crediting opinion of independent medical examiner over that of treating physician. Medical expert’s opinion is seldom unreliable as a matter of law, and trial commissioner assigns degree of credibility to give evidence. Further, even if IME’s opinion was unreliable, commissioner would not have to credit opinion of treating physician. Claimant has burden of proof of showing causal connection between compensable injury and allegedly related injury to different body part. See also, Pronovost, § 31-301-9.

Jusiewicz v. Reliance Automotive, 3140 CRB-6-95-8 (January 24, 1997).

Commissioner found doctor’s arguments regarding permanent pelvic impairment unpersuasive. Claimant appealed, arguing no evidence was submitted to contradict that opinion. Held: trial commissioner is entitled to weigh credibility of all medical opinions, including uncontradicted ones. CRB may not reevaluate commissioner’s decision on credibility. Affirmed. See also, Jusiewicz, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Sherman v. Construction & General Laborers Union Local 390, 3056 CRB-5-95-5 (January 8, 1997).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s left shoulder injury was not caused by a compensable automobile accident. It was within the discretion of the trial commissioner, as the trier of fact, to accord greater weight to the opinion of the physician who conducted the independent medical examination than to the opinions of the claimant’s treaters.

Jaworski v. A.B. Chance Co., 3006 CRB-3-95-2 (January 6, 1997).

Trier can accept or reject the testimony of witnesses and draw inferences from evidence, but CRB may order remand in cases where the facts found are inconsistent with the trial commissioner’s conclusion. See also, Jaworski, § 31-294d and § 31-349.

Doyle v. New Haven, 3038 CRB-3-95-4 (January 3, 1997).

Findings supported conclusion that medical treatment (dental) was reasonable and related to claimant’s compensable injury; trier is arbiter of credibility battle among expert medical witnesses. See also, Doyle, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Simmons v. Hall’s Motor Express, 3055 CRB-1-95-5 (January 3, 1997).

The trial commissioner concluded that the claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that surgery was causally related to his prior compensable injuries. The claimant contended that the respondents’ attorney conceded liability for the surgery during the formal hearing. CRB discussed a Supreme Court decision which stated: “[if] a party... unequivocally concedes a fact, such concession for the purposes of the trial, has the force of a judicial admission, and a party is bound thereby unless the court, in its reasonable discretion, allows the concession to be later withdrawn, explained or modified, if it appears to have been made by improvidence or mistake.” CRB concluded that trial commissioner allowed the attorney to withdraw his initial concession.

Dakos v. Acme Wire, 3072 CRB-2-95-6 (December 23, 1996).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof that his asbestos pleuritis was caused by exposure to asbestos during his employment. Trial commissioner’s decision was based on his assessment of the facts and credibility of the witnesses.

Keating v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 3059 CRB-2-95-5 (December 20, 1996).

On appeal to CRB, the respondents contend that the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment was based upon insufficient medical evidence and impermissible factual inferences. Specifically, the respondents contend that the claimant had numerous cardiac risk factors which were not related to his employment, and that the medical evidence does not support a conclusion that factors relating to his employment caused his heart attack. CRB found no error on the part of the trial commissioner, as issue was one of fact and credibility.

Desrosier v. Newington, 3091 CRB-6-95-6 (December 16, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 920 (1997)(per curiam).

Claimant injured back; trial commissioner found that it was related to pre-existing spondylolysis, and not a prior work injury. Claim dismissed. CRB affirmed; medical expert’s opinion is seldom unreliable as a matter of law, as it would have to be so unreasonable that no rational person could believe it. Commissioner entitled to rely on doctor’s deposition in dismissing claim.

Minneman v. Norwich/Board of Education, 2294 CRB-2-95-2 (December 13, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 913 (1997)(per curiam), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 962 (1998).

Commissioner found that claimant failed to prove compensable injury from secondhand smoke and cold air exposure in Norwich school system. Affirmed; the credibility of the doctor whose testimony the commissioner relied on in his findings is an issue for the trier to address, not the CRB. Ultimately, this was a standard case of choosing between different doctors’ opinions. Trier did not accept claimant’s version of the facts, or the etiology of her condition. See also, Minneman, § 31-298, § 31-300.

Cooper v. Sisters of Mercy, 3218 CRB-6-95-11 (December 10, 1996).

Pro se claimant challenged commissioner’s findings based on contention that employer’s representatives lied at formal hearings, and that doctor’s records regarding claimant’s history were inaccurate. CRB explained that it cannot review decisions that rely on the credibility of expert and lay witnesses. Claimant has burden of proving existence of compensable injury to trial commissioner. Evidence supported findings here. See also, Cooper, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

White v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 139, 3048 CRB-8-95-3 (November 27, 1996).

CRB held that the record fully supported the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s acid burns were caused by his job duties. Where, as here, the commissioner’s determination is based upon the weight and credibility that he has accorded the evidence, we will not disturb such a determination. See also, White, § 31-308(c).

Ohlmann v. Canterbury Trails Farm, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 3075 CRB-7-95-6 (November 13, 1996).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s cervical condition was not caused by a compensable horseback riding accident of July 10, 1990. The trial commissioner found that the independent examiner, an orthopedic surgeon, issued a report that an MRI of the claimant’s spine did not indicate any abnormalities, and he found no ratable impairment of the spine. Moreover, the trial commissioner found that none of the medical reports in the record, with the exception of a report by a physical therapist, made any reference to a neck injury until 1993. It was within the discretion of the trial commissioner, as the trier of fact, to accord little or no weight to the claimant’s testimony that her neck condition was caused by the July 10, 1990 accident. Where, as here, the commissioner’s determination is based upon the weight and credibility that he has accorded the evidence, we will not disturb such a determination.

Brown v. Interstate Pallet Co., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 64, 3064 CRB-3-95-2 (October 25, 1996).

Claimant alleged low back injury at work. Commissioner found his recollection of events inconsistent with medical history, company records, testimony of witnesses, and climactological data, and ruled that he had not established his claim. Affirmed. Occurrence of injury is epitome of factual question reserved for trial commissioner, who determines the credibility of the evidence. CRB will not disturb findings unless unsupported by evidence. Corrections sought by claimant were completely dependent on assumption of his own credibility, which CRB cannot indulge in. See also, Brown, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Vasilescu v. Consolidated Freightways, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 2225 CRB-7-94-12 (October 18, 1996).

Commissioner failed to rule either way as to causal connection between compensable back injury and psychiatric treatment, finding that claimant’s testimony left the issue unclear. This was inconsistent with her order that all outstanding medical bills for authorized psychiatric treatment be paid upon proof of connection with back injury. Also, both treating physicians and both independent medical examiners linked back injury with psychiatric condition, so CRB was unsure what additional evidence the commissioner felt was necessary. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Kramer v. Johnson, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 2217 CRB-6-94-11 (October 16, 1996).

Trier failed to make any factual findings or conclusions as to whether the putative employer had control over the alleged employee’s work activities relating to a roofing project. Further, the finding lacks evidentiary support concerning payment for services and is unclear as to whether respondent and claimant had an employment agreement. Remanded.

Federchuck v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 476, 2298 CRB-2-95-2 (September 16, 1996).

Sufficient medical evidence existed to support conclusion that claimant suffered a compensable psychological injury from his employment. Adding further findings pursuant to respondents’ Motion to Correct would not change outcome of decision. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) (finding of compensable injury lacks evidentiary support. No identifiable workplace trauma to claimant; instead, evidence shows that lifelong emotional problems spilled over into claimant’s employment). See also, Federchuck, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, and § 31-284(a).

Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 455, 2295 CRB-8-95-2 (September 6, 1996), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 774 (1998).

Commissioner found that claimant had contracted occupational disease as a result of exposure to neurotoxic chemicals at workplace. CRB dismissed respondents’ appeal, as commissioner had authority to find facts and determine credibility of evidence. Expert medical testimony was provided to establish causal link between employment and disability. Witnesses testified to presence of chemicals in workplace, and doctor offered opinion linking neuropathy to workplace chemical exposure. CRB cannot reevaluate whether levels of chemical exposure were too low to be harmful on appeal. See also, Mulroy, § 31-298 and later Mulroy, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 2295 CRB-8-95-2 (October 2, 1996), § 31-301c (Interest added on award affirmed on appeal). See also Mulroy, 4083 CRB-5-99-7 (September 29, 2000), § 31-349.

Bailey v. State/Greater Hartford Community College, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 433, 3152 CRB-5-95-8 (September 3, 1996), appeal dismissed, A.C. 16397 (December 5, 1996).

Trial commissioner awarded temporary total disability benefits where claimant offered as sole evidence of disability period a letter from a treating physician assigning 33 months of disability without giving an underlying cause for diagnosis. Claimant had also been student teaching and attending school during that time period. Held, state’s failure to file transcripts of formal hearings would normally result in the dismissal of its appeal. However, the claimant did not argue that the missing transcripts would support her claim. Instead, she represented that the findings revolved around stipulated facts. Even taking into account the commissioner’s fact-finding authority, there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish a reasonably medically probable relationship between the claimant’s medical condition and her total disability through January 1994. Thus, the case was remanded for new proceedings concerning extent of disability. See also, Bailey, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Subsequent decisions in Bailey, 3694 CRB-1-97-9 (January 12, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings, Bailey, 3922 CRB-2-98-10 (November 30, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), § 31-300, § 31-307, and Bailey, supra, § 31-284b, § 31-294d and Bailey, 3694 CRB-1-97-9 (January 12, 1999), § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Monaco v. Metal Masters, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 415, 2245 CRB-3-94-12 (August 29, 1996).

See, Monaco, § 31-307.

Green v. State/University of Connecticut, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 412, 2283 CRB-2-95-1 (August 28, 1996).

Commissioner ruled that claimant failed to meet burden of establishing causal relationship between post-polio syndrome and work injury. Claimant argued on appeal that commissioner ruled she had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to meet her burden of proof, and that this amounted to a ruling on a nonsuit rather than a determination of the credibility of the evidence. Held, the commissioner discussed and considered the substance of the medical reports. This was not the equivalent of a nonsuit or summary judgment; rather, it was a standard evaluation of the evidence. Affirmed.

Landry v. North American Van Lines/Transtar, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 397, 1971 CRB-2-94-2 (August 16, 1996).

Trial commissioner had discretion to choose between two conflicting medical opinions. See also, Landry, § 31-294d, § 31-296.

Mierzejewski v. BIC Corporation, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 394, 3015 CRB-3-95-2 (August 14, 1996).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner, where it was clear that the commissioner’s decision was dependent upon the weight and credibility which he afforded the evidence. CRB will not disturb conclusions which are so based.

Lopez v. Chieppo Charter, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 378, 2269 CRB-3-95-1 (July 12, 1996).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that he suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent employer. The trial commissioner found that the claimant’s testimony that he fell from a ladder while at work was not credible. See also, Lopez, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Hayden-Leblanc v. New London Broadcasting Co., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 314, 2128 CRB-2-94-8 (June 24, 1996).

The commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s fall at work was not a substantial cause of her lumbar symptomalogy was clearly based upon the weight which he accorded the evidence, including medical records and testimony. CRB will not disturb such a determination. Earlier decision considered whether claimant filed a timely notice of claim. See, Hayden-Leblanc, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 1373 CRD-2-92-1 (January 5, 1994).

Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 318, 2154 CRB-3-94-9 (June 24, 1996), rev’d, 45 Conn. App. 204 (1997)(per curiam).

Commissioner has authority to determine credibility of witnesses and evidence in finding facts; findings can be changed only if they are unsupported by evidence or if they omit undisputed material facts, and legal conclusions stand unless they result from misapplied law or from illegal inferences drawn from facts. Here, commissioner relied on medical reports in finding knee surgery work-related. Medical expert must establish relationship as reasonable medical probability to qualify as competent evidence, although no “magic words” are necessary. Medical reports in question did not establish such a probability; statement of doctor was primarily a legal conclusion couched in language of § 31-349. No medical conclusions in the doctor’s reports supported his relation of medial meniscus tear to knee replacement surgery. Appellate Court reversed CRB with direction to affirm trial commissioner, noting appeal hearing is not a de novo hearing. Determination that knee replacement surgery was attributable to the claimant’s work injury is a question of fact reserved for the trial commissioner. See also, Rogers, § 31-349.

Glenn v. Glenn Fence Co., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 249, 2132 CRB-1-94-8 (May 21, 1996), aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 906 (1997)(per curiam).

Only proof of compensability of back injuries was claimant’s own testimony; no witnesses to injury produced, and confusion abounded over date of injury. It was not unreasonable for the commissioner to doubt the accuracy of the claimant’s testimony. Adverse inference rule in Secondino, 147 Conn. 672 (1960), held inapposite, commissioner did not hold against claimant his failure to produce a particular witness, but noted that no witnesses were produced to help him meet his burden of proof. See also, Glenn, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Casanovas v. Acme United Corp., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 235, 2179 CRB-4-94-10 (May 9, 1996).

Discrepancy in medical reports regarding circumstances of alleged injury supports commissioner’s conclusion that claimant did not sustain his burden of proof. Affirmed. See also, Casanovas, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Seeger v. Naugatuck, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 240, 2220 CRB-5-94-11 (May 9, 1996).

Sufficient evidence existed to support trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s employment aggravated his lymphedema.

Jarema v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 214, 2065 CRB-8-94-6 (April 29, 1996).

In a ruling the trial commissioner denied the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on statute of limitations, C.G.S. § 31-294, because there is evidence that claimant received medical care from the employer for the injury within one year of the date of the injury. However, the trial commissioner did not issue any findings of fact regarding the timeliness of the claimant’s notice of claim or regarding the furnishing of medical care. As the commissioner did not make any findings of fact and no transcript has been provided, CRB unable to adequately review the respondents’ appeal. Therefore, remanded to the trial commissioner.

Jarvis v. Lego Systems, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 202, 2210 CRB-1-94-11 (April 23, 1996).

Trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim was based on a determination of credibility between conflicting lay witnesses. Although the findings contain superfluous recitals of facts, the basis for the decision is still clear; Motion to Correct properly denied as well.

Sharkey v. Triangle/PWC, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 127, 2111 CRB-6-94-7 (January 17, 1996).

Motion to Correct properly denied; some corrections were immaterial, while as to others, commissioner has power to determine credibility of evidence.

Clinton v. Lego Systems, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 109, 2188 CRB-1-94-10 (January 11, 1996).

Commissioner found insufficient evidence to establish a compensable injury. Affirmed; records support finding regarding abdominal pain diagnosis, and CRB cannot re-evaluate the credibility of evidence on appeal.

Odom v. Sawyer Industrial Services, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 80, 2131 CRB-3-94-8 (December 7, 1995).

Trial commissioner found that claimant failed to prove repetitive trauma injury, as medical evidence was inconsistent. Affirmed; commissioner is charged with determining the credibility of witnesses.

Leroux v. Lenders Bagel Bakery, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 41, 2110 CRB-3-94-7 (November 28, 1995).

Trial commissioner concluded medical evidence insufficient to relate lumbar spine surgery to ankle injury. Affirmed. Some of corrections sought by claimant merely attempted to restate doctors’ medical conclusions regarding causation and to elaborate on his pain symptoms and medical treatment history; those could be denied because they had no impact on legal conclusion. Authority of commissioner to assess credibility of medical evidence entitled him to deny other suggested corrections.

Hunter v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 397, 1988 CRB-1-94-3 (October 17, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 918 (1996)(per curiam), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 902 (1997).

The commissioner ruled that the fatal cancer which was discovered during the surgery for the claimant’s compensable back injury was not causally related to his fall at work. The decedent’s widow contended that the fall hastened the death. The trial commissioner concluded that the decedent’s compensable back injury did not have a significant effect on the decedent’s survival or longevity. Therefore, CRB affirmed the commissioner.

Wheeler v. Brake Systems, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 400, 2015 CRB-4-94-4 (October 17, 1995).

The commissioner ruled that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving that his lung cancer was causally related to his asbestos exposure at work. The medical evidence was sufficient to support the commissioner’s determination, as there was medical evidence presented indicating that the asbestos was not a substantial cause of the lung cancer, and there was a medical opinion presented which indicated that the claimant’s smoking was the major cause of his lung cancer.

Smith v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 336, 2006 CRB-1-94-3 (September 20, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 910 (1996)(per curiam).

No error in denial of Motion to Correct; most of corrections would have had no impact on outcome, while others were inconsistent with existing findings or dependent on credibility of testimony. See also, Smith, § 31-294c, and § 31-298.

Dennis-Hoyle v. Omni Home Health, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 308, 2003 CRB-3-94-3 (September 14, 1995).

CRB affirmed the commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment as a visiting nurse’s aide. The commissioner found that the claimant’s injury occurred while the claimant was driving from her residence to visit her first patient scheduled for that day, and that the claimant had not yet commenced working, but was merely on her way to her first appointment.

Ferrigno v. Buffalo Specialty, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 303, 1953 CRB-2-94-1 (September 14, 1995).

See, Ferrigno, § 31-275(1).

Levesque v. Consumer Interstate, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 280, 1886 CRB-2-93-10 (September 11, 1995).

Trial commissioner determined that claimant did not prove causal relationship between disability and employment. Affirmed. Doctor’s medical opinion speculative; no error in commissioner’s failure to credit doctor’s opinion. Fact that back sprain occurred at work not controlling; an act can be too trivial to constitute a legal cause of injury.

Sylvia v. Victorian Salon, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 270, 1976 CRB-2-94-2 (September 6, 1995).

Commissioner found claimants had not proven compensability of heart attack. Affirmed; question of compensability is factual, and it is within commissioner’s purview to evaluate weight of testimony. Motion to Correct properly denied, as corrections were both superfluous to outcome of case and dependent on witness credibility. No conclusive evidence in record.

Gagne v. The Waterproofing Co., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 245, 1967 CRB-1-94-2 (August 30, 1995).

Evidence and testimony supported conclusion that knee injury suffered while arising from couch was causally connected to earlier compensable injury; inconsistencies in doctor’s testimony were explained. Case directly in line with Hernandez v. Gerber Group, 222 Conn. 78 (1992).

Prescott v. Echlin, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 191, 2029 CRB-3-94-4 (July 13, 1995), appeal dismissed, A.C. 16150 (February 5, 1997).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s injury occurred on June 14, 1991, and was not repetitive trauma continuing until 12/2/91. Notice of claim was thus late. Commissioner has discretion to interpret medical reports; evidence could have gone either way. Failure to use “reasonable degree of medical probability” in medical report not harmful. CRB also denied Motion to Submit Additional Evidence based on prior availability of report.

Coull v. Capitol Auto Service, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 187, 1966 CRB-8-94-2 (July 7, 1995).

Commissioner’s decision affirmed. No finding was made regarding the issue of future medical treatment, and further trigger point injection therapy was neither approved nor disapproved. Such a decision did not have to be made by the commissioner at that time, so there was no error.

Peters v. Corporate Air, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 91, 1679 CRB-5-93-3 (May 19, 1995).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of benefits where commissioner concluded that claimant failed to sustain burden of proving that back injury occurred in the course of employment. Commissioner found that claimant lacked credibility due to inconsistencies in his testimony and in evidence. See also, Peters, § 31-275(1).

Webb v. Pfizer, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s award of § 31-308(a) benefits for skull fracture and related symptoms. Role of CRB in reviewing factual findings addressed; commissioner has power to determine facts, weight of evidence, and credibility of testimony. Commissioner must include in findings only the ultimate facts essential to the case at hand, as well as his conclusions and the parties’ claims of law; opinions or beliefs of commissioner, and the reasons for his conclusions, do not belong in the Finding and Award. Commissioner may file memorandum of decision discussing reasoning behind decision if he so chooses. Motion to correct need not be granted if outcome of case will not be affected.

Nasinka v. Ansonia Copper & Brass, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 332, 1592 CRB-5-92-12 (April 27, 1995).

In deciding whether to apportion liability, commissioner must make factual determination as to cause of disability. Conclusions of commissioner must stand if supported by facts found, and if not the result of incorrect application of law to facts. Commissioner also entitled to determine credibility of doctors and other witnesses who testified, and to accept parts of expert testimony and reject other parts. See also, Nasinka, § 31-298.

Radzvilla v. Bridgeport Hospital, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 337, 1771 CRB-4-93-7 (April 27, 1995).

Existence of prior back injury and consistency of medical evidence are both decisions for trier of fact.

Ettienne-Modeste v. Bloomfield, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 327, 1789 CRB-1-93-9 (April 26, 1995).

Pro se claimant appealed from finding that evidence did not support further disability. Held, as the fact-finder, the commissioner was within his authority not to cite certain testimony in his findings, and to decide which medical evidence to accept.

Calinescu v. CFD Associates, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 298, 1794 CRB-8-93-8 (April 21, 1995), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 912 (1996).

Commissioner found that claimant did not establish that shoulder injury occurred by pulling refrigerator up stairs, as such motion was inconsistent with diagnosis of treating physician. Held, commissioner was entitled to decide that claimant’s testimony was not credible enough to support connection between injury and employment. CRB involvement in a decision regarding physical effects of lifting refrigerator would be inappropriate; factual issue. See also, Calinescu, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Paternostro v. Turner Construction Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 251, 1723 CRB-5-93-5 (April 18, 1995).

Testimony of claimant and treating physician supported findings that claimant was exposed to asbestos during all relevant periods and that exposure caused claimant’s disability, so CRB bound by commissioner’s findings. See also, Paternostro, § 31-275(1).

Hawley v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 246, 1663 CRB-4-93-3 (April 17, 1995).

Commissioner was not required to rely on treating physician’s testimony over that of independent medical examiner’s. Province of trier of fact to assess credibility; evidence to support conclusion that claimant was capable of light work.

Santry v. Fermont Division, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 230, 1768 CRB-4-93-6 (April 13, 1995).

Board cannot substitute its conclusions for commissioner’s; commissioner’s role to consider credibility of witnesses and determine facts. See also, Santry, § 31-294c.

Genovesi v. Choice Designs, Inc., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 218, 1745 CRB-5-93-6 (April 12 1995).

Commissioner was entitled to credit claimant’s testimony in determining wage-earning capacity. See also, Genovesi, § 31-308a.

Bowman v. Jack’s Auto Sales, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 192, 1721 CRB-1-93-5 (March 22, 1995), aff’d, 54 Conn. App. 296 (1999).

Remand needed to determine whether it was improper to credit respondents with payment against claimant’s specific award, as well as to determine relationship of disability to different injury. Reference to 1985 injury inconsistent with granting of Motion to Correct, as date of employment changed to May 1986; remand appropriate where conclusions inconsistent with facts found by commissioner. See also, Bowman, § 31-308a. Subsequent decision at Bowman, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 223, 3384 CRB-1-96-7 (June 18, 1997) and Bowman, 3622 CRB-8-97-6 (August 26, 1998), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-315.

Maio v. L.G. Defelice, Inc., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 197, 1734 CRB-5-93-5 (March 22, 1995).

Claimant argued that testimony of company foreman was inconsistent and unreliable. Held, commissioner has duty to decide whether testimony is believable; CRB cannot question that decision. Also, claimant not deprived of opportunity to cross-examine witness where his attorney was present at deposition. See also, Maio, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Griffith-Patton v. Department of Agriculture, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 177, 1888 CRB-1-93-11 (March 10, 1995), aff’d, 41 Conn. App. 911 (1996)(per curiam), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 930 (1996).

Commissioner entitled to determine whether witness’ testimony is believable, even where no contradictory evidence set forth. CRB does not review conclusions that depend on weight of evidence or credibility of witnesses. See also, Griffith-Patton, § 31-294c.

Wrighten v. Burns International Security, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 173, 1659 CRB-2-93-2 (March 10, 1995).

Commissioner found testimony of doctor that injury was not work-related more persuasive than testimony of claimant’s other doctors. As it is province of trier of fact to assess weight and credibility of testimony, CRB will not question his decision. Motion to Correct properly denied, as requested corrections would not alter legal conclusion. See also, Wrighten, § 31-308a.

Campbell v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 157, 1754 CRB-1-93-6 (March 8, 1995), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 14611 (May 24, 1995).

Commissioner not required to credit entirety of one doctor’s testimony; factual basis existed for findings, and this board did not disturb them. See also, Campbell, § 31-294c.

Nihan v. Bussman Cooper Industries, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 155, 1747 CRB-6-93-6 (March 8, 1995).

Evidence supported conclusion that employment did not exacerbate pre-existing sarcoidosis. Commissioner had discretion to determine which expert medical opinion to believe in face of conflicting opinions regarding occupational disease.

Knoblaugh v. Greenwood Health Center, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 150, 1608 CRB-1-92-12 (February 6, 1995).

Motion to Correct properly denied, as substitution of factual findings would not have had an impact on the decision even though some facts undisputed. Ultimate conclusion regarding occurrence of new injury supported by evidence and not to be disturbed by CRB; other corrections ignore authority of commissioner to determine credibility. See also, Knoblaugh, § 31-315, § 31-349, and § 31-355(b).

Lourenco v. Cammisa, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 118, 1661 CRB-1-93-3 (January 31, 1995).

Commissioner’s conclusion as to 6/21/91 date of temporary total disability inconsistent with facts found; no evidence in record that claimant’s condition changed between 8/8/89 and 1/22/92. CRB ordered remand for new hearing due to insufficient evidence.

Sargent v. Rybczyk Plumbing & Heating, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 128, 1974 CRB-6-94-2 (January 31, 1995).

Commissioner was entitled to credit report of doctor who had treated claimant until several weeks before the date of his report, even though the report of the succeeding treating physician was contradictory regarding date of claimant’s work capacity as projected into near future. This decision falls within the authority of the commissioner to determine witness and evidence credibility. See also, Sargent, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Uva v. Valleries Transportation Service, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 106, 1625 CRB-7-93-1 (January 30, 1995).

Where findings unsupported by evidence, CRB must remand for further proceedings. See also, Uva, § 31-307b.

Saporoso v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 1513 CRB-1-92-9 (January 23, 1995).

Remanded where trier’s finding approving respondent’s Form 36 contains summaries of medical evidence unsupported by factual findings.

Conetta v. Stamford, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 1491 CRB-7-92-8 (December 29, 1994).

Remanded where trier’s findings contain many recitals of evidence and claims of the parties. Additionally, conclusion dismissing police officer’s psychiatric claim was legally inconsistent with subordinate facts found. See also, Conetta, § 31-275(1) and § 31-294c. See also, Conetta v. Stamford, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 228, 3231 CRB-7-95-12 (June 23, 1997), appeal dismissed, 246 Conn. 281 (1998).

Phelan v. Soda Construction Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 1583 CRB-3-92-12 (December 20, 1994).

Determination of witness credibility and weight to give evidence within province of trial commissioner. See also later Phelan, 1979 CRB-3-94-3; 2107 CRB-3-94-7, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 389 (October 17, 1995) in § 31-310, infra. See also, Phelan, § 31-275(9), § 31-291, and § 31-355(b).

Smith v. Capiezello, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 37, 1712 CRB-2-93-4 (November 8, 1994).

Evidence supports finding claimant failed to establish a causal connection between an earlier accepted head injury and an alleged back injury for which treatment was not received until several years later. See also, Smith, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Plitnick v. Knoll Pharmaceuticals, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 26, 1699 CRB-8-93-4 (November 7, 1994).

Trier’s finding claimant’s back injury and subsequent surgery arose out of the course of employment supported by medical evidence. Remanded for further evidence where finding of incapacity is awarded beyond a date supported by evidence. Discussion of pertinent case law on what material facts are and what findings should include. See also, Plitnick, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Carr v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 1846 CRB-3-93-9 (November 4, 1994), appeal dismissed, A.C. 14126 (January 18, 1995), cert. denied, 233 Conn. 910 (1995).

Trier’s finding dismissed four of five alleged injuries. See also, Carr, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Colello v. Dresser Industries, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 1691 CRB-4-93-4 (November 3, 1994)

Commissioner credited testimony of claimant despite alleged inconsistencies and medical reports of two physicians who relied on subjective complaints of back pain by claimant. Held, witness credibility is determined by commissioner, who uses his judgment. Same goes for weight of medical reports. Not impermissible for doctor to take declarations of pain into account when making diagnosis. No unreasonable or illegal inference drawn from facts.

Searles v. West Hartford Board of Education, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 414, 1617 CRB-1-93-1 (September 28, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 902 (1996)(per curiam).

Evidence supports finding automobile accident did not occur on property under the control of employer nor was claimant, a school teacher, required to be present at school on that date. Additionally, disability from congenital aneurysm not causally related to employment. See also, Searles, § 31-275(1), § 31-294c and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Holmes v. G.A. Masonry Corp., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 1588 CRB-5-92-12 (August 11, 1994).

Factual finding as to apportionment of liability not supported by deposition testimony of physician. Trier’s decision vacated and matter remanded for further proceedings. See also, Holmes, § 31-294c and § 31-299b. Subsequent decision at Holmes, 3338 CRB-8-96-5 (December 16, 1997), § 31-294c, 4027 CRB-5-99-4 (November 7, 2000), § 31-349, Holmes, 4375 CRB-6-01-4 (March 4, 2002), aff’d, 76 Conn. App. 563 (2003).

Miller v. TVCCA, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 348, 1675 CRB-2-93-3 (July 29, 1994), aff’d, 39 Conn. App. 935 (1995).

Evidence supports trier’s finding of period of total incapacity and lack of causal relationship between compensable injury and later back surgery. See also, Miller, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 341, 1542 CRB-1-92-10 (July 11, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 36 (1996).

See, Cummings, § 31-296, § 31-298, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence and § 31-307.

Conroy v. Keri Corporation, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 321, 1534 CRB-3-92-10 (July 5, 1994).

See, Conroy, § 31-275(1) and § 31-306.

Ocasio v. Toyotomi, USA, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 330, 1668 CRB-7-93-2 (July 5, 1994).

Based on the credibility of claimant’s testimony and inconsistencies in evidence, trier properly concluded claimant failed to meet his burden of proof that he sustained a work related injury.

Ventresca v. Pathmark Supermarkets, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 328, 1655 CRB-4-93-2 (July 5, 1994).

Although medical opinions differed, trier’s finding that claimant’s cervical spine condition was not related to an earlier work injury is supported by evidence.

Orlando v. Makula, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 296, 1556 CRB-3-92-11 (June 13, 1994).

Respondents sought to correct trier’s finding to include the undisputed fact that claimant delayed knee surgery because of his inability to pay for the surgery. CRB held requested correction would not alter legal outcome. See also, Orlando, § 31-301. Appeal procedure and § 31-307.

Busak v. Stamford, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 291, 1562 CRB-7-92-11 (June 8, 1994), aff’d, 39 Conn. App. 919 (1995)(per curiam).

Dismissal of claim for low back injury and resulting surgeries affirmed. Within trier’s discretion to determine credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded their testimony. See also, Busak, § 31-294c.

Duncan v. Dow Chemical Company, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 276, 1442 CRB-2-92-6 (June 7, 1994).

Trier’s refusal to find facts as set forth in motion to correct proper where findings and conclusion are based on medical opinions as to causality. See also, Duncan, § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)].

O’Connor v. Connecticut Light & Power Company, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 265, 1536 CRB-8-92-10 (June 2, 1994).

Within trier’s discretion to specifically accept opinion of IME physician as opposed to other physicians in finding claimant’s depression was not caused by work stress. See also, O’Connor, § 31-275(1) and § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)].

Gesualdi v. Natkin & Company, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 250, 1493 CRB-6-92-8 (May 25, 1994).

See, Gesualdi, § 31-294(e). Medical care refusal.

Flowers v. Benny’s of Connecticut, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 162, 1527 CRB-2-92-10 (April 26, 1994).

Factual finding dismissing mental stress claim will not be disturbed where conclusions reached did not result from incorrect applications of the law or from inferences illegally or unreasonably drawn from these facts. See also, Flowers, § 31-275(1), § 31-298 and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Greenwood v. Perkin Elmer Corporation, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 160, 1517 CRB-7-92-9 (April 26, 1994), aff’d, 39 Conn. App. 907 (1995)(per curiam).

Medical opinion, although conflicting, supports trier’s finding claimant suffered a traumatic brain injury in addition to previously approved back and neck injuries. See also, Greenwood, § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)].

Morris v. A & A Acoustics, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 221, 1488 CRB-7-92-8 (March 22, 1994).

As an appellate tribunal, CRB will not disturb commissioner’s conclusions unless they are without evidence, contrary to law or based on unreasonable factual findings. See also, Morris, § 31-298 and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 103, 1383 CRB-2-92-2 (February 28, 1994), aff’d, 37 Conn. App. 903 (1995).

Trier’s finding that claimant suffers from chronic fatigue syndrome and that claimant’s symptoms are causally related to her 1980 compensable injury supported by medical evidence. See also, Besade, § 31-298 and § 31-308(a). Prior decision at Besade, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 593 CRD-2-87 (January 13, 1989), no error, 212 Conn. 441 (1989).

Scrivano v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 1501 CRB-1-92-9 (February 14, 1994).

Trier’s award vacated and matter remanded as evidence was insufficient to find claimant’s coronary artery disease which necessitated surgery in 1990 was causally related to his employment and further was related to a compensable angina attack in 1984.

Moffett v. Tighe Williams Salon, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 1489 CRB-4-92-8 (February 9, 1994).

Claimant’s challenge to correct trier’s findings unavailing where findings are supported by evidence. See also, Moffett, § 31-275(1).

Dusto v. Rogers Corporation, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 80, 1496 CRB-1-92-8 (February 4, 1994).

Where medical evidence is in conflict, trier’s determination that no causal relationship existed between compensable workplace groin injury and later back condition supported by medical evidence.

Gianfrancisco v. A & P Tea Company, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48, 1429 CRB-7-92-6 (January 26, 1994), aff’d, 36 Conn. App. 924 (1994)(per curiam).

Based on inconsistencies in the evidence, trier denied claimant’s alleged injury to her feet. Trier is free to believe all or none of claimant’s testimony.

Laprey v. N. Grondhal & Sons, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 324, 1380 CRB-2-92-1 (December 23, 1993).

Medical evidence fails to support claimant’s contention he suffered a knee injury during the course of employment.

Maylott v. Williams, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 320, 1353 CRD-6-91-12 (December 23, 1993).

Evidence supports trier’s finding that claimant’s work related fall was not the cause of a later left hip replacement. See also, Maylott, § 31-298.

Peterson v. The Hartford Courant, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 296, 1389 CRB-1-92-3 (December 8, 1993), aff’d, 36 Conn. App. 937 (1994)(per curiam).

CRB will not retry factual issues presented below where the trial commissioner failed to credit claimant’s version as to how alleged back injury occurred. Also, trier’s failure to draw adverse inference from respondents’ failure to produce witnesses to refute claimant’s testimony is not a basis for reversal. See also, Peterson, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Tscheppe v. H.B. Ives Company, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 281, 1386 CRB-3-92-2 (November 23, 1993), aff’d, 36 Conn. App. 903 (1994)(per curiam).

Trier did not credit claimant’s testimony concerning an alleged workplace back injury. CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim.

Davis v. New London/Board of Education, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 245, 1346 CRD-2-91-11 (November 10, 1993), dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 13053 (February 16, 1994).

Claimant’s date of injury and compensability of claim as found by trial commissioner must stand where evidence supports finding. However, matter remanded where trier made findings concerning amount of medical benefits, claimant’s compensation rate, date of maximum medical improvement, temporary disability and extent of permanent disability where parties stipulated to the issues before the trier and these issues were not among the issues stipulated. See also, Davis, § 31-294d.

Pinto v. B.C. Hardware Superior Products, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1351 CRD-6-91-12 (October 5, 1993), aff’d, 36 Conn. App. 905 (1994)(per curiam).

Trier found claimant suffered injuries to his neck, back, leg, shoulder and left knee when corrugated steel pipes fell from a flatbed truck entangling claimant as they fell to the ground. Respondents’ contention claimant only suffered a left knee injury erroneous as evidence presented supports trier’s finding.

Goodrow v. W.J. Barney Corporation, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 207, 1315 CRD-2-91-9 (September 27, 1993).

Sufficient evidence below to support trier’s conclusion that claimant suffered a new injury to his foot and did not aggravate a pre-existing injury.

Beninato v. Specialty Framing, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 200, 1306 CRD-8-91-9 (September 24, 1993), aff’d, 36 Conn. App. 911 (1994).

Trier’s factual findings and legal conclusions are based on IME psychiatrist’s testimony which directly disputes treating physician’s testimony. As findings support trier’s conclusion and evidence supports conclusion with a reasonable medical certainty, trier’s finding that the events at work were not a substantial factor in precipitating claimant’s disabling psychiatric condition will not be disturbed on appeal. See also, Beninato, § 31-275(1).

Fletcher v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 182, 1322 CRD-8-91-10 (September 13, 1993).

Claimant failed to establish that his low back injury arose out of a workplace incident. It is within the trier’s discretion to believe some or all of the testimony before him. Claimant’s version of how the claimed injury occurred apparently was viewed by the trial commissioner as incredible. CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim. See also, Fletcher, § 31-300.

Whalen v. General Building Supply Company, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 177, 1294 CRD-1-91-9 (September 3, 1993).

Testimony and evidence concerning claimed back injury conflicting. Trier dismissed claim as there existed inconsistent testimony as to the date, time and events occurring before and after claimant’s alleged fall. CRB affirmed as finding and conclusion was based on the weight and credibility of evidence before the trier of fact. See also, Whalen, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Clarke v. UTC/Sikorsky Aircraft, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 170, 1327 CRD-4-91-10 (September 2, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s back injury was causally related to the accepted work related neck injury sustained during the course of employment.

St. Germaine v. Consolidated Precast, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 139, 1290 CRD-5-91-9 (July 14, 1993).

Evidence supports trier’s finding that claimant sustained a new back injury, was totally disabled for a period and had an increased permanent partial disability. Respondents sought finding of relapse or recurrence of a previous compensable back injury. CRB affirmed trier’s finding noting, however, a different conclusion may have been reached had the CRB assessed the facts. However, trier’s conclusion was not so unreasonable to justify judicial interference. Also, CRB granted claimant’s counsel’s motion to withdraw upon completion of all matters relating to the appeal and the appellate process.

Hunt v. Mirror Polishing and Plating Co., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 61, 1254 CRD-5-91-7 (April 21, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s holding which found a number of successive employers liable for claimant’s back injuries and subsequent disabilities. See also, Hunt, § 31-300.

Boynton v. American Cyanamid, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 58, 1267 CRD-8-91-8 (April 6, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s back injury and subsequent permanent partial disability did not arise out of and during the course of employment. Conclusions of trier are supported by evidence. See also, Boynton, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Lange v. J & B Excavating & Paving, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 42, 1249 CRD-3-91-6 (March 18, 1993).

Trier’s determination claimant’s back injury did not arise out of or during the course of employment based on evidence. See also, Lange, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Fitzpatrick v. Wellington’s Auto Ranch, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 247, 1194 CRD-4-91-3 (January 11, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling disqualifying claimant’s counsel as the matter in dispute involved the interpretation and application of the language of a stipulation negotiated by claimant’s counsel. Claimant’s counsel was a necessary witness in the proceedings below. See also, Fitzpatrick, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Pereira v. State/Dept. of Children & Youth Services, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 229, 1209 CRD-7-91-4 (January 7, 1993), aff’d, 228 Conn. 535 (1994).

Where evidence before trier concerning claim for work related mental stress is in conflict and trier’s finding is supported by evidence, CRB will not disturb trier’s final determination. Claimant failed to meet her burden of proof that her claimed mental injury was a result of stress in the work place. See also, Pereira, § 31-275(1) and Pereira, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 906 CRD-7-89-8 (January 8, 1991), dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 9884 (March 20, 1991).

Lesczynski v. New Britain Memorial, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 205, 1289 CRD-6-91-9 (December 2, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant failed to provide any evidence as to an alleged period of total incapacity for a claimed recurrence of a previous compensable back injury. Also, there was insufficient evidence to causally relate certain medical expenses to the original injury or demonstrate a causal relationship between the claimed disability and a previous injury which arose out of and in the course of employment. See also, Lesczynski, § 31-307, and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Crochiere v. Enfield/Board of Education, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 165, 1069 CRD-1-90-7 (August 27, 1992), aff’d, 227 Conn. 333 (1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant’s claim for mental stress was compensable. Claimant, a music teacher, was accused of inappropriately touching a female student. As a result claimant received unfavorable publicity and was terminated from employment. The stress of these events resulted in claimant’s breakdown for which he was hospitalized. CRB’s review of case law and previous holdings reveal there need not be a physical component to a mental injury claim. See also, Crochiere, § 31-275(1), 31-284(a), § 31-294c, § 31-298, and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Migliaccio v. Sanzo Construction Co., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 161, 1197 CRD-7-91-2 (August 5, 1992).

Trier found claimant sustained a compensable head injury when he was hit by falling bricks and pieces of cement which totally disabled him for nine days following the injury. CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that he was entitled to temporary total benefits for the subsequent period claimed.

Neal v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 1199 CRD-8-91-3 (August 5, 1992).

See, Neal, § 31-275(1).

Chemero v. Westreco, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 142, 1081 CRD-7-90-7 (June 29, 1992).

See, Chemero, § 31-296 and § 31-315.

Germe v. Conway Eastern Express, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 148, 1180 CRD-3-91-2 (June 29, 1992).

Trier’s finding that claimant sustained an injury to his neck and right shoulder will not be disturbed on appeal where trier’s conclusion is based on weight and credibility accorded to claimant’s testimony. Also, as hearing notice referred to neck and shoulder injury, respondents had ample time to present evidence at the formal hearing below as to causation and employment relationship, and thus the scope of the formal hearing was not limited to the approval of the Form 36. See also, Germe, § 31-296.

Marzano v. Luis, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129, 1181 CRD-5-91-2 (May 21, 1992).

Factual finding claimant’s injury to his right index finger did not arise out of and in the course of his employment is supported by evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. Further, no Motion to Correct was filed. Therefore, the facts found by the trial commissioner must stand. See also, Marzano, § 31-294d.

Ward v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 1161 CRD-7-91-1 (May 8, 1992).

Trier concluded there were insufficient facts presented to sustain claimant’s burden of proof that his disability arose from exposure to asbestos in the workplace. While the CRB may not agree with the trier’s determination, the conclusions reached were not so unreasonable as to justify appellate interference. See also, Ward, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Miner v. Watertown, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 100, 971 CRD-5-90-1 (April 28, 1992).

Where there exists confusion over actual date of injury, date found by trial commissioner must stand. See also, Miner, § 31-308(a), § 31-308(b) and § 31-300.

Gianfrancisco v. A & P Tea Company, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 1124 CRD-7-90-10 (April 23, 1992).

Remanded. Where finding recites evidence and includes very few actual findings of fact, CRB unable to discern factual basis which resulted in legal conclusions reached.

Nasinka v. Ansonia Copper and Brass, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 85, 1153 CRD-5-90-12 (April 20, 1992).

CRB remanded trier’s finding with direction to grant claimant’s Motion to Reopen. Medical reports of independent medical exam ordered by trial commissioner and received subsequent to conclusion of formal hearings below must be entered into evidence. Additionally, trier cannot base his conclusions on medical reports not entered into evidence. See also, Nasinka, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence and § 31-315.

Altieri v. B.K.S. Excavating, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 1146 CRD-3-90-12 (April 10, 1992).

Reversed. Trier failed to allow Second Injury Fund the opportunity to litigate whether a potential principal employer liability claim existed pursuant to § 31-291. The fact that the trial commissioner found B.K.S. Excavating the uninsured employer does not eliminate the need to fully litigate and hear evidence regarding a possible § 31-291 principal employer claim. See also, Altieri, § 31-275(10), § 31-291 and § 31-355(b).

Zawadzki v. Kochanowicz, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 62, 1120 CRD-5-90-10 (February 26, 1992).

CRB review of record below indicates trial commissioner relied on the credibility of the witnesses in finding claimant was an employee and not an independent contractor. Also, as evidence could suggest an employer/employee relationship and trier found such existed, CRB cannot say trier’s conclusion arose from an unreasonable factual inference or that his conclusion was so unreasonable as to justify appellate interference. See also, Zawadzki, § 31-275(9).

Canfield v. Consolidated Freightways, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 59, 1125 CRD-7-90-10 (February 21, 1992).

See, Canfield, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Goncalves v. Cornwall & Patterson, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 1111 CRD-4-90-9 (January 28, 1992).

Remanded as trier’s conclusion claimant was able to work, however no work was found or available during period in question lacks evidentiary factual findings. Work search procedure is an informally accepted evidentiary basis to demonstrate a willingness to work. However, it is not the only evidentiary means by which a claimant may demonstrate reasonable efforts to find work. See also, Goncalves, § 31-296.

Deleon v. Dunkin Donuts, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 39, 1113 CRD-3-90-9 (January 23, 1992).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding claimant’s neck injury was related to his 1985 work injury. The CRB also affirmed findings as to the period of temporary total disability, date of maximum medical improvement and award of permanent partial disability benefits to the back and cervical spine as they were supported by evidence and the review of the CRD is limited. See also, Deleon, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Perkowski v. Walbro/Whitehead Engineering, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 37, 1101 CRD-8-90-8 (January 22, 1992).

Trier’s finding claimant failed to establish his cervical disc condition was work related will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, the ultimate determination was an assessment of credibility.

Black v. London & Egazarian, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 1098 CRD-7-90-8 (December 30, 1991), rev’d other grounds, 30 Conn. App. 295 (1993).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding dependent widow failed to sustain her burden of proof that decedent’s cardiac arrest and death arose in and out of the course of his employment as factual finding was based on the weight and credibility he gave to the evidence and medical testimony presented. Appellate Court found commissioner improperly denied Motion to Preclude, thereby reversing CRD’s ruling. Appellate Court found claimant’s notice complied with § 31-321 in that the notice was in fact properly deposited as certified mail. Postal worker’s unsuccessful attempt to obtain a signed receipt does not constitute non-compliance. Also, claimant’s letter included all the information necessary under § 31-294 to satisfy notice requirements. Furthermore, intend to file language in claimant’s letter apprised employer of an imminent claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See also, Black, § 31-294c.

Gurski v. Concessionair, Division of Delaware North, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 282, 1218 CRD-7-91-4 (December 16, 1991).

Trier’s finding claimant’s back injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment supported by evidence. No medical evidence to support claim. See also, Gurski, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Tessier v. Kogut Florist and Nurseryman, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 276, 1088 CRD-8-90-7 (December 13, 1991).

Remanded as factual findings concerning period of claimed total disability inconsistent with trier’s conclusion. See also, Tessier, § 31-301. Appeal procedure; § 31-290c, § 31-307.

Ruh v. Della Construction Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 269, 1034 CRD-7-90-6 (December 5, 1991).

Remanded as trier concluded evidentiary hearings without giving claimant the opportunity to cross-examine as provided by § 52-174(c). See also, Ruh, § 31-298 and § 31-307.

Carvalko v. Bassick Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 258, 767 CRD-4-88-9 (December 2, 1991).

Trier’s finding that claimant’s date of injury for hearing loss claim was the last date of exposure to the noisy environment will not be disturbed on appeal. See also, Carvalko, § 31-294c.

Fecto v. Kelly’s Contracting, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 256, 1027 CRD-5-90-5 (November 27, 1991).

Trier’s finding that claimant sustained an injury which arose out of and during the course of his employment will not be disturbed. Trier’s conclusions are based on the weight and credibility of conflicting evidence below. See also, Fecto, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Corcoran v. Corcoran Moving and Storage, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 237, 1030 CRD-5-90-6 (October 31, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s factual finding that claimant’s vehicular accident while trying to avoid striking a deer, which accident rendered claimant a paraplegic, was not caused by claimant’s intoxication. Claimant was within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See also, Corcoran, § 31-284(a), § 31-307 and § 31-308(b).

Colucci v. Mattatuck Manufacturing Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 234, 1000 CRD-5-90-4 (October 30, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s right knee injury, headaches and psychiatric difficulties were not causally related to her compensable cervical spine injury and carpal tunnel syndrome. The determination of causal relationship lies with the trier along with the weight and credibility to be accorded all the evidence. See also, Colucci, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Northrop v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 228, 1032 CRD-7-90-6 (October 30, 1991).

Trier’s finding that claimant’s back injury was causally related to a previous compensable back injury will not be disturbed on appeal unless found without evidence, contrary to law, or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences.

Higdon v. James O’Connell Moving Service, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 218, 1003 CRD-2-90-4 (October 1, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding that respondent employer’s spouse was cloaked with authority and acting as respondent’s agent in directing claimant to perform work. Therefore, claimant’s injury arose out of and during the course of his employment. See, Higdon v. James O’Connell Moving Service, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 392 CRD-2-85 (February 27, 1987).

Cummings v. Twin Manufacturing, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 199, 1023 CRD-1-90-5 (August 29, 1991), aff’d, rev’d in part; further proceedings, 29 Conn. App. 249 (1992).

Trier’s determination of date of maximum medical improvement supported by evidence. See also, Cummings, § 31-300, § 31-294d.

Imbrogno v. Stamford Hospital, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 174, 967 CRD-7-90-1 (August 2, 1991), aff’d, rev’d and remanded in part, 28 Conn. App. 113 (1992), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 920 (1992).

Factual findings concerning payment of medical expenses and unreasonable attorney’s fee will not be disturbed unless found without evidence, are based on unreasonable inferences or contrary to law. Appellate Court held § 31-300 allows a discretionary award of both interest and attorney’s fees or neither, but does not allow an award of one and not the other. Remanded for a further award of interest. See also, Imbrogno, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Benham v. Edgerton, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 169, 977 CRD-4-90-2 (July 17, 1991).

Trier’s finding that claimant suffered a compensable injury which accelerated or triggered an aseptic necrosis of the right hip will not be disturbed where issues raised on appeal concern conflicting evidence and corrections which would not alter the legal outcome. See also, Benham, § 31-275(1).

Tomkus v. Upjohn Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 972 CRD-3-90-1 (June 28, 1991).

Commissioner’s finding that claimant’s myocardial infarction arose in and out of the course of his employment will not be disturbed as there was sufficient medical evidence and testimony to satisfy proximate causation requirements. See also, Tomkus, § 31-275(1), § 31-294c and § 31-298.

Mecelli v. D’Addario Industries, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 959 CRD-7-89-12 (June 5, 1991).

There was sufficient medical evidence presented below to support trier’s denial of temporary total benefits during period claimant claimed total disability.

Moore v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 124, 947 CRD-3-89-11 (May 3, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding claimant failed to meet his burden of proof he sustained a compensable back injury where finding is supported by evidence.

D’Agostino v. Waterbury, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 4, 942 CRD-5-89-11 (April 15, 1991).

Trier’s factual finding claimant suffered a new back injury and claimant’s new back injury was not the result of an uninterrupted chain of causation stemming from a previous compensable event will not be disturbed as finding was supported by evidence.

Madden v. Moore Special Tool, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 107, 208, 834 CRD-4-89-3 (April 8, 1991) (September 3, 1991).

Remanded as factual finding that claimant underwent a myelogram, and one of claimant’s treating physicians had the benefit of that myelogram, was incorrect.

Charette v. Jensen Mobile Home, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 936 CRD-6-89-11 (March 19, 1991).

Remanded as trial commissioner’s finding that no medical provider ever concluded with reasonable medical certainty that claimant’s pre-existing condition was aggravated by his work fall only addressed medical causation not legal causation. Discussion of reasonable medical certainty and reasonable medical probability standard.

Pina v. Leitkowski Construction Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38, 907 CRD-2-89-8 (February 1, 1991).

Trial court has broad discretion to determine both the relevancy and remoteness of evidence. Also, unless the record discloses facts found without evidence or fails to include material facts, factual finding must stand. See also, Pina, § 31-291.

Ludwig v. PYA, Monarch Foods, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 26, 905 CRD-6-89-8 (January 17, 1991).

Finding that claimant’s work-related fall aggravated and accelerated pre-existing condition will not be disturbed unless conclusion was without evidence, contrary to law, or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences. Also, post-surgical condition found compensable.

Hoffman v. Platinum Vacations of New England, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 174, 867 CRD-7-89-5 (November 30, 1990).

Trier’s determination as to proximate causation will not be disturbed where medical expert testified within reasonable medical probability claimant’s myocardial infarction was not causally related to near miss motor vehicle accident.

Smeriglio v. Froelich Transportation, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 166, 872 CRD-7-89-6 (October 26, 1990).

Questions of causal relationship are questions of fact and findings on such factual issues will not be set aside unless resulting from an incorrect application of the law, based on illegal or unreasonable factual inferences, or without evidence.

Lathrop v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 852 CRD-7-89-4 (September 21, 1990), aff’d, 24 Conn. App. 837 (1991).

Factual finding that claimant suffered a new injury attributable in a material degree to the conditions described in two Certificates of Acknowledgment of Physical Defects will not be disturbed. See also, Lathrop, § 31-325 and § 31-349.

Sgambato v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 131, 825 CRD-3-89-2 (August 6, 1990).

See, Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, infra. See also, Sgambato, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Hill v. Pitney Bowes, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 832 CRD-7-89-3 (May 17, 1990).

The factual findings of a trial commissioner will not be altered even if the correction sought was not in dispute and if the requested correction would not alter the legal conclusion. See also, Hill, § 31-290a, § 31-313.

Knudsen v. GSD, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 81, 829 CRD-8-89-3 (May 9, 1990).

Where appellant failed to file a Motion to Correct trial commissioner’s factual findings must stand. See also, Knudsen, § 31-315.

Halliday v. Daw’s Critical Care Registry, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 797 CRD-7-88-12 (April 27, 1990).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion based on inconsistent factual findings remanded for further factual findings. See also, Halliday, § 31-291, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Belanger v. Bechtel Construction Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 72, 768 CRD-8-88-9 (April 25, 1990).

Where claimant failed to file a Motion to Correct, the factual findings of the trial commissioner must stand. See also, Belanger, § 31-275(1).

Velilla v. UTC/Hamilton Standard Div., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 66, 926 CRD-1-89-10 (April 17, 1990).

Decision of a Social Security Administrative Law Judge as to supplemental Social Security benefits is not res judicata as to findings and conclusions under our Act. See also, Velilla, § 31-315.

Cormier v. Macke Company, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 63, 799 CRD-2-88-12 (March 23, 1990).

Remanded to clarify date of injury to which trial commissioner was attributing disability. See also, Cormier, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Connell v. Long Line Trucking Co., Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 801 CRD-2-88-12 (March 21, 1990).

Commissioner’s finding will not be disturbed where physician’s testimony constitutes a sufficient basis to find reasonable probability claimant’s back injury arose in and out of the course of employment. See, Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 113, 238 CRD-7-83 (December 10, 1984), aff’d, 6 Conn. App. 45 (1986).

Kroczewski v. Old Fox Chemical, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 13, 730 CRD-1-88-5 (January 5, 1990).

Trial commissioner’s finding that claimant failed to meet the burden of proof as to the claimed additional disabilities will not be disturbed. While CRD may well have reached a different conclusion and given more weight to those doctors’ opinions which found a causal relationship, that decision was not one for the CRD to make. See also, Kroczewski, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Golymbieski v. GTE Sylvania, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 704 CRD-5-88-3 (September 25, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s finding claimant’s disabling illnesses resulted from personal problems which pre-existed employment and not from stress in the employment must stand where there is evidence to support such findings. See also, Golymbieski, § 31-275(1).

Samuel v. Housing Authority of Bridgeport, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 685 CRD-4-88-1 (August 10, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s finding claimant’s death was caused by a fall which arose out of and in the course of employment and award to surviving dependents will not be disturbed when there was evidence to support the trial commissioner’s finding and conclusion.

Grossman v. Darien Pool Service, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 28, 596 CRD-7-87 (July 12, 1989).

Sufficient medical testimony supports trial commissioner’s finding that subsequent injuries suffered are causally related to original compensable injury.

Henderson v. Electric Boat, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 26, 646 CRD-2-87 (July 12, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s injuries predate his compensable injury will not be disturbed on appeal.

Jagush v. Litton-Winchester Electronics, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 609 CRD-7-87 (June 9, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s finding as to causal connection must be based on reasonable medical probabilities. However, trial commissioner’s conclusion that the evidence proffered by the physician was not demonstrated with reasonable medical certainty was within trial commissioner’s discretion.

Laine v. New England Aircraft, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 138, 536 CRD-6-86 (April 5, 1989).

Where evidence in conflict as to reversibility of claimant’s lung condition award for loss of lung function permitted. Factual findings will not be disturbed where supported by evidence and conclusion not unreasonable. See, Fair, infra § 31-301. Factual findings.

Lester v. Edward McCarthy Construction, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 141, 600 CRD-7-87 (April 5, 1989).

Weight and credibility accorded to conflicting evidence is within the discretion of the trial commissioner.

Cholewinski v. Brake Systems, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 105, 601 CRD-4-87 (January 27, 1989).

Matters concerning the weight and credibility of witnesses and evidence are solely within the purview of the trial commissioner.

Cruz v. Consolidated Industries, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 92, 580 CRD-5-87 (January 20, 1989).

Failure to file a Motion to Correct the trial commissioner’s factual findings limits the CRD’s review to matters of law.

Hall v. The Dayton Rogers Corp., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 578 CRD-7-87 (January 5, 1989).

Within trial commissioner’s discretion to credit weight to evidence presented. No Motion to Correct limits review to questions of law.

Smith v. United Technologies Corp., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 61, 142 CRD-6-82(2) (November 14, 1988).

See, Smith, § 31-308(c).

Kwasnik v. Drico Corp., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 50, 549 CRD-1-87 (October 21, 1988).

Commissioner’s findings will not be set aside when based on weight and credibility of evidence.

Daniele v. Angelo Monarca, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 519 CRD-3-86 (1988).

Trial Commissioner’s factual findings not limited to issue of compensability where claimant’s attorney gave statement of issues and respondents made no objection.

Debarros v. A.L. Singleton, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 22, 498 CRD-5-86 (September 19, 1988), no error, 21 Conn. App. 107 (1990).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion that a physician’s testimony did not satisfy the parameters of reasonable medical probability is within his province. See also, Debarros, § 31-298.

Simpson v. Northeast Utilities, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 135 (July 12, 1988).

See, Fair, infra.

Gallagher v. Edmunds Manufacturing Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 494 CRD-6-86 (June 30, 1988).

Trial commissioner’s finding as to causal connection will not be disturbed unless based on impermissible inferences or contrary to law.

Delcarmine v. Fire Prevention Service, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 123, 311 CRD-7-84 (June 27, 1988).

The trial commissioner’s factual findings must stand where rooted in substantial evidence and not contrary to law.

Lorenzo v. Frank B. Hall Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 107, 478 CRD-6-86 (June 15, 1988), no error, 17 Conn. App. 824 (1989)(per curiam).

There was evidence to support commissioner’s finding as to claimant’s impairment of his cardiovascular system. See, Fair, infra.

Matey v. Dember, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 104, 516 CRD-5-86 (June 14, 1988), appeal dismissed, 210 Conn. 626 (1989)(per curiam).

See, Matey, § 31-310. Subsequent decisions Matey, 1189 CRD-5-91-3 (April 5, 1991), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, Matey, 3153 CRB-5-95-8 (January 10, 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 256 Conn. 456 (2001), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-315, § 31-355(a), Matey, 3848 CRB-7-98-6 (July 7, 1999), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 256 Conn. 456 (2001), § 31-355(b), Matey, 4488 CRB-7-02-2, 4532 CRB-5-02-5 (May 14, 2003), appeal dismissed for failure to comply with Supreme Court’s directive, 85 Conn. App. 198 (2004).

Mathieu v. C & M Corp., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 82, 463 CRD-2-86 (May 1, 1988).

The trial commissioner’s conclusion that the chain of causation to a previous injury was interrupted by a new injury would not be disturbed where not unreasonable.

Charland v. Hartford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 417 CRD-1-85 (April 8, 1988).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion would not be disturbed where supported by evidence and the evidence below was in conflict.

Bailey v. Guilford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 47, 464 CRD-3-86 (April 7, 1988).

Whether the claimant experienced a recurrence of a back injury while at work is a factual conclusion which will not be disturbed unless contrary to law or based upon impermissible factual inferences.

Carpentino v. Perkins Trucking Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 40, 488 CRD-3-86 (April 6, 1988), no error, 18 Conn. App. 810 (1989)(per curiam).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion predicated on evidence which was in conflict will not be disturbed on appeal.

Daniels v. Hartford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 459 CRD-1-86 (March 23, 1988), no error, 17 Conn. App. 819 (1988)(per curiam), cert. denied, 210 Conn. 809 (1989).

Trial commissioner’s findings will not be disturbed where supported by evidence and not so unreasonable as to justify judicial interference.

Hutchinson v. State, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 292 CRD-2-84 (March 23, 1988).

See, Hutchinson, § 7-433(c).

Horkheimer v. Stratford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 139, 163 CRD-4-82 (December 31, 1987).

Trial commissioner did not err in denying Motion to Correct where appellant failed to make specific references to evidence supporting motion.

Fusco v. TRW Geometric Tool, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 132, 472 CRD-3-86 (December 16, 1987).

Error for the trial commissioner to make any decision on issue of liability transfer to Second Injury Fund where parties had no opportunity to litigate issue.

Muir v. Trailways of New England, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 118, 480 CRD-6-86 (November 5, 1987).

There was evidence presented below which supported the trial commissioner’s finding as to the period for which temporary total benefits was awarded.

Laprade v. Robbins, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 100, 505 CRD-7-87 (June 12, 1987).

Where evidence below was in conflict factual findings of trial commissioner will not be disturbed where dependent on the weight and credibility of witnesses.

Hebert v. New Departure Hyatt Bearings, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 300 CRD-6-84 (June 12, 1987), no error, 14 Conn. App. 819 (1988)(per curiam).

Issues of causation are factual determinations which will not be disturbed if reasonably supported.

Morais v. Truelove & MacLean, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 295 CRD-5-84 (June 12, 1987).

Trial commissioner’s finding of 2 and 1/2% loss of foot remanded where unsupported by evidence.

Monroe v. Twin County Sanitation Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 78, 337 CRD-2-84 (June 2, 1987).

Factual findings will stand where supported by sufficient evidence.

D’Abbraccio v. Southern Conn. Gas Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 75, 441 CRD-3-86 (May 21, 1987).

CRD modified decision of trial commissioner to include finding second injury was materially and substantially greater.

Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 71, 289 CRD-4-83 (May 21, 1987), rev’d, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).

CRD made certain factual findings which reversed the conclusion of the trial commissioner. Supreme Court reversed CRD holding that the trial commissioner is the trier of facts and the conclusion drawn by the trial commissioner from the facts must stand unless without evidence, contrary to law or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences.

Schwartz v. Meriden, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 67, 291 CRD-6-83 (May 13, 1987).

Factual findings of trial commissioner will stand unless contrary to law or based on impermissible inferences.

Neumann v. Southern Conn. Gas Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 62, 265 CRD-4-83 (May 8, 1987).

See, Parandes, infra.

Parandes v. Hartford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 222 CRD-1-83 (April 20, 1987).

Factual conclusions of trial commissioner will not be disturbed unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from all inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. Adzima v. UAC/Norden Div., 177 Conn. 107, 118 (1979).

Damelio v. Anaconda, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 31, 281 CRD-5-83 (March 4, 1987), no error, 15 Conn. App. 805 (1988)(per curiam), cert. denied, 208 Conn. 814 (1988).

Factual findings based on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.

Morro v. UTC/Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 347 CRD-4-84 (March 2, 1987).

CRD will not substitute its judgment for that of trier of fact.

Higdon v. James O’Connell Moving Serv., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 392 CRD-2-85 (February 27, 1987).

A finding and award should contain subordinate facts pertinent to inquiry. If not conforming - remand for further proceedings.

Gadacy v. Busk, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 431 CRD-4-85 (February 26, 1987).

Appellate review of factual findings limited to a determination if there was an incorrect application of law or if findings are based on illegal or unreasonable factual inferences.

Fortier v. State, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 142, 230 CRD-4-83 (January 22, 1987).

Determination of maximum medical improvement date requires a finding of fact and will not be disturbed unless contrary to law, unsupported by evidence or unreasonable.

Parizeau v. State, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 137, 194 CRD-2-83 (January 22, 1987).

Commissioner’s factual findings will stand unless contrary to law or based on impermissible inferences.

Cuddy v. Greenwich Hospital, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 127 (December 23, 1986).

Where commissioner factually concluded no causal connection was shown between injury and workplace, the findings of fact will not be disturbed.

Magaraci v. AMF Alcort, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 119, 204 CRD-5-83 (December 23, 1986).

Findings of fact will not be changed unless they are the result of an incorrect application of law or based on impermissible or unreasonable factual inferences.

O’Leary v. New Britain, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 108, 236 CRD-6-83 (December 2, 1986).

Commissioner’s finding will not be disturbed where it was in his discretion to credit medical evidence.

Ashton v. Soneco Services, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 60, 359 CRD-1-84 (May 5, 1986).

Compensation Review Division will not substitute its findings or conclusions for that of the trial commissioner where the findings and conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence, although evidence was in conflict.

McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 184 CRD-2-82 (April 1, 1986), no error, 204 Conn. 104 (1987).

Where commissioner’s findings were based on sufficient medical evidence, findings will not be disturbed.

McGuire v. Capitol Magnetics, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 30, 257 CRD-7-83 (February 5, 1986).

Where trial commissioner’s Finding and Award is supported by sufficient evidence, although evidence was in conflict, appellate tribunal will not substitute its conclusions for those of the trial Commissioner.

Glabicki v. Stanley Works, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 26, 243 CRD-6-83 (January 23, 1986).

Where trial commissioner’s Finding and Award is inconsistent with evidence presented below, matter is to be remanded for correction and/or additional proceedings.

Chapo v. Westport, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 170 CRD-4-82 (August 20, 1985).

Trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Correct held proper.

Platt v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 164 CRD-6-82 (August 16, 1985).

Where trial commissioner’s Finding and Award did not state the claims of law, case remanded to determine the materiality of the factual findings and if it was error to deny appellant’s Motion to Correct.

De Lancy v. General Electric Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 105, 276 CRD-4-83 (October 19, 1984).

Finding as to date of total incapacity will not be disturbed where amply supported.

Ortiz v. Peabody Engineering Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 102, 239 CRD-7-83 (August 29, 1984).

Where commissioner’s finding is based on expert testimony, factual finding will not be disturbed.

Peura v. McLean Trucking Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 143 CRD-7-82 (July 24, 1984).

Where commissioner’s finding is based on conflicting testimony, conclusion will not be overruled when it is based on credibility.

Bowen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 60, 232 CRD-1-83 (June 19, 1984).

Where commissioner’s findings are based on evidence which is in conflict, commissioner’s findings will not be disturbed.

Kelesides v. Bongiorno’s Supermarket, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 152 CRD-7-82 (May 31, 1984).

Where commissioner’s factual findings are not without evidence, conclusions will not be disturbed.

Bass v. Highway Safety Division, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48, 241 CRD-1-83 (May 23, 1984).

Where medical evidence is in conflict, commissioner’s findings will not be disturbed unless unreasonably reached.

Gorneault v. United Cable T.V., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 160 CRD-6-82 (December 14, 1983).

Where evidence is in conflict, commissioner’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless unreasonable.

Emhoff v. State, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 139 CRD-2-82 (May 11, 1983).

Conclusion of commissioner where evidence is in conflict will not be overruled.

Gecewicz v. Sealtest Foods Div., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 195, 77 CRD-1-81 (October 21, 1982).

When commissioner’s factual conclusions depend on weight and credibility of witnesses, appellate panel will not disturb.

Luddie v. Foremost Insurance Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 187, 90 CRD-6-81 (September 13, 1982), no error, 3 Conn. App. 193 (1985).

Where commissioner’s finding was a conclusion without evidence, matter remanded for further factual findings.

Cable v. Torrington Special Products, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 168, 82 CRD-5-81 (August 18, 1982).

Appellate review of evidence is limited to whether commissioner’s conclusion was based on sufficient evidence.

Cortes v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 173, 61 CRD-3-81 (August 18, 1982).

Commissioner is the trier of facts and ultimate judge of credibility and weight to be accorded witnesses testimony.

Correa v. New England Forge, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 164, 48 CRD-6-81 (August 13, 1982).

Commissioner could award 5% permanent partial to the back rather than 10% permanent partial sought where evidence showed pre-existing injury.

Kasuba v. Hunt-Pierce Corp., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 157, 79 CRD-3-81 (August 6, 1982).

Although there may have been inconsistencies in the expert’s testimony, the conclusions of the expert are not necessarily vitiated.

Bielik v. Scovill Manufacturing Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 110, 52 CRD-5-81 (January 27, 1982).

Compensation Review Division is limited on appeal to affirming, modifying or reversing commissioner’s decision.

Minski v. Plastic Wire & Cable, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 73 CRD-2-81 (December 29, 1981).

Where there is some evidence which substantiates commissioner’s findings, findings must stand.

Mongillo v. New Haven, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 90, 55 CRD-3-81 (December 29, 1981).

Commissioner is the ultimate judge of witnesses credibility and the weight to be accorded to testimony when evidence is in conflict.

Moore v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 76, 44 CRD-7-80 (November 10, 1981).

Commissioner’s conclusion not unreasonable.

Perez v. U.S. Prolam, Inc., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 36 CRD-7-80 (November 4, 1981).

Commissioner under no duty to reveal which witnesses he did not believe.

Carlino v. Danbury Hospital, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 61, 25 CRD-7-80 (October 14, 1981). See also Carlino, Id. at 119 and 219, no error, 1 Conn. App.142 (1984), cert. denied, 192 Conn. 802 (1984).

Commissioner’s findings must contain relevant facts or matter will be remanded.

Pike v. Glass Containers Corp., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 9 CRD-2-80 (June 18, 1981).

Factual conclusions of commissioner will not be overturned unless unreasonably reached.

Starke v. State, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48, 21 CRD-2-80 (June 18, 1981).

Where evidence presented was conflicting, the commissioner’s findings will not be disturbed.

DeGeorge v. Casolo, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 34, 24 CRD-7-80 (May 26, 1981).

Factual conclusion of commissioner will not be disturbed unless reached without any evidence or contrary to all evidence.

McGrath v. New London, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 14 CRD-2-80 (May 14, 1981), aff’d, 38 Conn. Sup. 324 (1982).

Compensation Review Division panel will not substitute its conclusions of fact unless commissioner’s conclusion was wholly without basis.

Pashtenko v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 24, 22 CRD-3-80 (January 29, 1981).

Factual conclusions drawn by commissioner based on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.

Donato v. Pantry Pride, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 2 CRD-4-79 (January 26, 1981), aff’d, 37 Conn. Sup. 836 (1981).

Factual conclusions based on conflicting evidence and not the result of incorrect application of law will not be disturbed.

Miller v. Aisco Farms, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 13 CRD-2-80 (October 16, 1980).

Factual conclusions made by commissioner based on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.

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