CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-294c

NOTE: ALL CASES FORMERLY REFERENCED UNDER SEC. 31-297(b) ARE NOW INCLUDED IN SEC. 31-294c.

There was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that claimant was incapacitated and incompetent to file a claim at the time the one-year anniversary of his last date of exposure to repetitive trauma elapsed. Further, claimant cited no authority in support of proposition that this Commission’s jurisdiction can be expanded beyond the one-year limit where claimant is legally incapacitated during last several days of notice period. See, Malchik, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(15).

Claimant’s death occurred within two years of his last date of employment with respondent, so counsel raised argument (on appeal) that his claim for HIV exposure should be deemed timely. Aside from the fact that this claim was not raised at trial, or in the claimant’s brief, thereby making it a poor candidate for review, CRB noted that infectious exposure to HIV under “accidental injury” theory of Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692 (1997) would be problematic due to long incubation period of HIV virus and claimant’s manifestation of immune deficiency symptoms more than two years before HIV was finally diagnosed and claim was filed. See Doe, § 31-275(15); also cited at Doe, § 31-275(16).

CRB affirmed trier’s granting of Motion to Preclude where employer did not receive certified letter containing Form 30C despite five delivery attempts by post office. Though sufficiency of notice of claim in triggering employer’s investigative responsibilities is a question of law, factual inferences may be drawn concerning procedures that were followed in attempting delivery of certified letter containing that notice. Evidence indicated that absence of street number for restaurant on envelope at time of mailing did not affect post office’s attempts to deliver letter. CRB distinguished Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 250 Conn. 581 (1999) [see § 31-301. Appeal procedure] and similar cases, as policy behind preclusion statute differs from that regarding rights of appeal, and respondents here did not show that restaurant’s conduct warranted a finding that it was not at fault for failure to receive letter. Claimant need only demonstrate that adequate Form 30C had been sent by certified mail to employer’s place of business in order to satisfy general notice requirements of § 31-321. See, Morgan, § 31-321.

The board affirmed the trier’s conclusion that the claimant’s claim was not time barred. The trial commissioner had discretion to decide that the employer’s provision of a back brace satisfied the medical care exception of § 31-294c(c), under the particular circumstances of this case, including the fact that it was given to the claimant under the auspices of a supervisor and registered nurse, the fact that the claimant’s use of the back brace was monitored, and the fact that the employer had notice of the claimant’s injury.

The trier denied the claimant’s motion to preclude which sought to preclude the respondents from presenting evidence regarding the claimant’s alleged intoxication at the time of the alleged injury, as the intoxication defense had not been listed on the Form 43. The trial commissioner explained that whether the claimant was intoxicated at the time of the injury implicated the jurisdiction of the commission, and thus concluded that the issue of intoxication should be presented and decided. However, the board explained that because an issue in the case was whether there existed an employer-employee relationship (i.e., whether the claimant was acting as an independent contractor), that issue must be decided first as it implicates subject matter jurisdiction. On the other hand, the issue of intoxication does not involve subject matter jurisdiction, but constitutes an affirmative defense. See Mason, § 31-284(a), § 31-298, § 31-301, Appeal Procedure.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision to grant motion to preclude. Respondents did not raise jurisdictional issue by arguing that the claimant was performing an errand for a second employer during her lunch break, which is when her claimed accident and injury occurred. This was not a dispute that there was an existing employer-employee relationship between the parties at the time of the injury; rather, it was a dispute over causal connection, which is not a jurisdictional matter under Del Toro v. Stamford, 64 Conn. App. 1 (2001). Also, initial notice of claim was not legally defective, and respondents’ duty to respond to claim was triggered.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that surviving spouse’s September 1997 notice of claim was timely, following her late husband’s heart attack and death on November 29, 1995. Claimant had two years from date of injury/death to file her notice under the plain language of § 31-294c(a). Construction of statute by reference to legislative history was unnecessary, as no exception is made for deaths that occur on the same day as the injuries themselves.

Claimant, a landscaper, allegedly contracted Lyme Disease from tick bite during his employment sometime before May 17, 1994. Lyme Disease symptoms were claimed prior to that date, but claimant could not specifically recall a previous tick bite. Doctors noted symptoms that appeared to be consistent with Lyme Disease, and opined that illness was related to employment. Respondents initially contested injury on grounds that “The claimant’s Lyme Disease did not occur in and out of the course of employment” and “no medical substantiation to prove work injury.” Four years later, independent medical examiner opined that claimant did not have Lyme Disease. Claimant moved to preclude respondents from raising this defense. Trier denied this motion, and relied on doctor’s opinion in holding that claimant had failed to prove that he had Lyme Disease, or that he had been infected by a deer tick. CRB affirmed. Respondents validly contested claim under § 31-294c, and listed defenses placing claimant on notice that he would need medical evidence showing that he (a) had Lyme Disease (b) which was causally connected to workplace tick bites. Although respondents deserved criticism for waiting four years to actively contest, claimant still retained burden of proving that he had a compensable illness in the first place. See also, Kuba, § 31-298.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s granting of Motion to Preclude where Form 30C was sent via certified mail to employer’s house rather than to post office box, and was enclosed in an envelope with the return address of claimant’s doctor on it. Notice substantially complied with requirements of § 31-294c(a). Parties adequately adhered to Admin. Reg. § 31-297(b)-1 in presenting and defending Motion to Preclude.

Board affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant widow failed to file timely notice of her claim for widow’s benefits as required by § 31-294c. Whether the respondents’ pleadings in a third party law suit demonstrated substantial compliance with the notice requirements of § 31-294c was a question of fact for the trial commissioner. Additionally, the board was not persuaded by the claimant widow’s argument that her knowledge of her husband’s death and of her potential claim for widow’s benefits should be imputed to the employer and to the insurer on the basis that the claimant widow ran the day-to-day operations of the respondent employer business. See Kuehl, § 31-306.

Board briefly addressed the claimant’s contention that the respondents waived any right to deny compensability of his knee injury pursuant to § 31-294c(c) because they paid medical bills and temporary total disability payments after his surgery. The board explained that the claimant’s reliance upon § 31-294c(c) is misplaced, as that section is a “savings provision” which aids claimants by allowing for alternatives to the strict requirement that a written notice of claim be filed within one year of the accidental injury or three years of the occupational disease. The board noted that claimant did not argue that the respondents were precluded from defending the claim pursuant to § 31-294c(b), presumably because the claimant did not file a timely written notice of claim for the knee injury. See Christoforo, § 31-301. Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings; and § 31-301-4.

The trier concluded that the claimant failed to provide timely notice pursuant to § 31-294c of his claim for a left knee injury which occurred on December 22, 1997, as his Notice of Claim incorrectly listed December 29, 1997 as the date of injury. The claimant contended on appeal that his Notice of Claim constituted timely but defective notice under § 31-294c(c), and that the defect does not affect his claim as the respondents failed to allege any prejudice as a result of the incorrect date. Board explained that it is apparent that the one-year statute of limitations was satisfied if the incorrect date on the Notice of Claim is construed as a “defect or inaccuracy” under § 31-294c(c) rather than an invalidation of said notice. Therefore, board remanded this matter to the trial commissioner in order to address the provision in § 31-294c(c) which provides that an inaccuracy in a notice of claim shall not bar maintenance of proceedings “unless the employer shows that he was ignorant of the facts concerning the personal injury and was prejudiced by the defect or inaccuracy of the notice....”

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s granting of Motion to Preclude. Respondents were unable to authenticate Form 43 sufficiently to get it into evidence at trial, and without it, the Form 30C was not properly challenged. Confusion regarding date of injury did not render notice insufficient to support preclusion, as trier accepted claimant’s testimony that accidental injury occurred on the date alleged by the claimant-which was the same date cited in the notice of claim. See, Scott, § 31-301-9.

Where claimant failed to file a written Form 30C, she could not attempt to invoke preclusion remedy in § 31-294c(b). See also, Wierzbicki, § 31-300, § 31-307.

CRB affirmed decision of trial commissioner granting Motion to Preclude. Notice provisions of § 31-294c apply to dependents seeking benefits following death of claimant whose compensation claim has been previously accepted. Both case law and language of § 31-306b favor separate notice requirements. Thus, respondents are required to file notice of intention to contest liability. Here, absence of place of death and inclusion of claimant’s name and date of original injury were consistent with the instructions on the Form 30C, and did not constitute significant inaccuracies that would prevent triggering of obligation to file disclaimer. Respondents could have timely investigated claim based on information in Form 30C. CRB also affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant’s attorney did not “fish for preclusion” by misleading respondent insurer into believing no claim had been filed, and rejected respondents’ argument that the Form 36 they filed to discontinue total disability benefits following the decedent’s death operated jointly as a notice of intention to contest liability under § 31-294c(b). Also cited at Tardy, § 31-306.

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant failed to provide sufficient notice of knee injury claim where his notice listed as the date of injury the date of a prior compensable injury that had occurred nine years prior. Even under the totality of the circumstances, claimant’s notice did not “substantially comply” with the notice content requirements of § 31-294c. Specifically, claimant’s incident report (filed on the date of the alleged injury) did not in any manner indicate that he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim for this injury.

CRB affirmed the trier’s granting of the claimant’s Motion to Preclude. Notice of claim listed the date of diagnosis of the decedent’s pancreatic cancer, which was alleged to be an occupational disease on said notice. The claimant had stopped working for the respondent employer two days prior. Respondents were incorrect in their argument that the claimant had to prove causation in order for preclusion to lie.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision to grant Motion to Preclude. Description of injury as “Fibromyalgia/Myofacial pain due to repetitive nature of job” provided employer with sufficient information to trigger investigative responsibilities. A specific body part did not have to be cited in lieu of the illness itself, given the nature of claimant’s condition.

CRB affirmed trier’s granting of Motion to Preclude respondents from contesting compensability. Notice of claim satisfied the requirements of § 31-294c(a), triggering respondents’ obligation to file a timely disclaimer. Delivery of letter to corporate headquarters’ payroll office was proper under § 31-321, and letter contained essence of warning to employer that preclusion would result if it did not file a notice of contest within 28 days.

Insurer did not waive defense that no policy was in effect with the employer on the date of injury by failing to clearly mention that issue in its Form 43, as notice of intent to contest liability is intended to apprise claimant of employer’s reasons for contest. See also, DiBello, § 31-278, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9, § 31-348.

Trier determined on remand that claimant’s right and left hand injuries arose from the same repetitive trauma that had caused an earlier right thumb injury, which was an accepted claim. Absence of timely notice for later injuries thus not fatal to case, as separate notice was unnecessary for those injuries. Respondents’ issues on appeal were essentially raised in prior Khazzaka decision, 3508 CRB-5-96-12 (May 26, 1998) (cited infra), and CRB declined to readdress them.

CRB reversed trier’s granting of Motion to Preclude where notice of claim alleged a mental injury, but alleged no physical injury. Board held that trial commissioner lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged injury was excluded from the definition of personal injury under the Act. See, Reaves, § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Del Toro v. Stamford, 3731 CRB-7-97-11 (October 22, 1999), rev’d, 64 Conn. App. 1 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 913 (2001).

Claimant alleged repetitive trauma injury with July 1995 date of injury, and described injury as “officer injured shooting 11-30-85.” Respondents failed to file timely disclaimer. Trier denied Motion to Preclude on ground that notice did not allege a compensable injury under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii), which excludes mental and emotional impairments from definition of personal injury unless they arise from physical trauma or occupational disease. CRB affirmed. Following Supreme Court ruling in Biasetti v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 65 (1999), under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) no remedy lies within the Workers’ Compensation Act for emotional or mental impairment unless it arises from a personal injury or occupational disease. Biasetti is factually indistinguishable from this matter and thus there is no subject matter jurisdiction. (Delaney, C., concurring) Binding precedent requires affirmance, but Supreme Court’s ruling in Biasetti is disturbing. (Miles, C. dissenting) Supreme Court’s ruling in Biasetti runs afoul of purpose of Act. Claimant’s notice did not exclude physical injury as cause of stress claim on its face, thereby triggering employer’s obligation to file disclaimer. Ambiguity must be resolved in claimant’s favor. Appellate Court ruled that motion to preclude should have been granted, as compensability of an injury under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) does not implicate this Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Also cited at Del Toro, § 31-275(16).

Pernacchio v. New Haven, 3911 CRB-3-98-10 (September 27, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 570 (2001).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant provided timely notice of hypertension claim, even though he did not file a timely Form 30C. Specifically, the claimant’s First Report of Injury and the employer’s investigation form drafted in response thereto were adequate to fulfill the notice requirements set forth in § 31-294c. Medical care exception was met where employer’s paramedic took claimant’s blood pressure and accompanied him to hospital in employer’s emergency vehicle.

Respondents accepted back injury caused by a 1993 assault on claimant, but contested alleged foot injury. Trier found foot injury compensable. In support of appeal, respondents argued that claimant did not file a timely notice of claim for his foot injury. Board explained that a claimant who provides timely written notice of claim is not required to file a second notice of claim for another injury that arose from the same incident. Case remanded to trial commissioner for findings regarding initial notice of claim.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant failed to file timely notice of claim for upper respiratory condition which was allegedly caused by airborne particles at work. Trier found that claimant’s condition did not constitute an occupational disease, and thus, in order to be timely, notice of claim had to have been filed within one year following last date of injurious exposure. See also, Ryan, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Claimant, a prison guard, was cursorily examined by on-site medic following attack by inmate. Employer supplied her with information regarding a peer counseling session that was offered to all employees who were involved in inmate-related incidents. Claimant participated in that meeting, and expressed her belief that by doing so, she was receiving medical care. Trier found that totality of these circumstances satisfied the medical care exception to late notice in § 31-294c(c). CRB reversed and remanded, explaining that the direct or indirect participation of a physician is necessary because such care is required by § 31-294d. Claimant’s perception of the nature of her treatment is immaterial given that the statute specifically defines “medical treatment.” Trier did not state whether a physician either participated in or supervised the initial treatment or the group counseling session, so CRB remanded for further findings.

See, King, § 7-433c, § 31-284(a).

Nurse instructed claimant to seek medical attention after he complained of chest pain at work. Doctor at hospital diagnosed dyspepsia. Eight days later, claimant had myocardial infarction. Trier found that first incident was manifestation of coronary insufficiency rather than dyspepsia in accordance with medical report, and held that claimant met medical care exception of § 31-294c(c). CRB affirmed. Case similar to Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607 (1947); trier had reasonable basis upon which to conclude that respondent was aware of claimant’s condition and the possibility that he would file a workers’ compensation claim. See also, Horn, § 5-145a (remanded).

Trial commissioner found claimant’s cryptococcal meningitis was contracted during the course of his employment, and ruled claim compensable. CRB held that medical reports supported factual finding that, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, the claimant’s exposure to pigeon droppings at work caused him to become infected with the fungus. However, CRB remanded case for further findings regarding notice, as trial commissioner did not specify whether this condition constituted an accidental injury or an occupational disease for purposes of notice under § 31-294c. See also, Pekar, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant was exposed to asbestos from 1950 until he retired in 1987. Claimant was diagnosed with asbestosis prior to 1987, but never missed any time from work due to asbestosis. CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s date of injury for purposes of § 31-294c was November 27, 1997, the date on which there was sufficient medical evidence to establish asbestosis. However, the relevant date for purposes of calculating the claimant’s weekly benefit rate hinges on incapacity rather than diagnosis, and thus the CRB remanded the matter for a determination of the claimant’s date of incapacity. See also, Shea, § 31-310.

Trial commissioner ruled that notice, which specified that claimant was pursuing a § 7-433c claim, was insufficient to provide adequate notice of a workers’ compensation claim under § 31-294c. Commissioner pointed out that notice did not specify place of injury as well. CRB reversed. Despite difference between § 7-433c claim (which does not require proof of causal connection) and a chapter 568 claim, notice still contained the basic requisite elements of notice under § 31-294c. Employer must show that it was ignorant of the circumstances of injury and that it was prejudiced by the defects in the notice under § 31-294c(c). (Frankl, C., dissenting) By specifying that he was proceeding under § 7-433c, claimant did not inform his employer that he proposed to claim benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Commissioner reasonably concluded notice was insufficient. See also, Demello, § 7-433c.

Marshall v. UTC/ Pratt & Whitney, 3623 CRB-1-97-6 (August 20, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 902 (1999)(per curiam), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 904 (1999).

The trial commissioner concluded that the claimant failed to prove that his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was caused by toxic exposure at his workplace rather than by cigarette smoking. In support of his appeal, the claimant contends that his Motion to Preclude should have been granted because the respondents’ disclaimer was legally insufficient. The board declined to rule on that issue, as it had already issued a decision regarding the Motion to Preclude in Marshall v. UTC/ Pratt & Whitney, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 204, 1317 CRD-1-91-10 (September 27, 1993) (see notes infra and at § 31-301. Appeal procedure). Thus, the September 27, 1993 decision by the board became the law of the case, subject to a right of appeal to the Appellate Court.

Comparison of instant case with Troske v. Wolcott Manor, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 323, 1687 CRB-5-93-4 (April 26, 1995), insofar as claimant could not identify specific date of compensable injury. CRB affirmed finding that injury was compensable. See also, Roche, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s granting of the claimant’s Motion to Preclude. The claimant’s notice of claim accurately listed the date of the claimant’s alleged cardiomyopathy as the date he was rushed to the hospital and diagnosed with congestive cardiomyopathy. Also, although respondents contend that claimant was on the payroll of Hendel, Inc., the claimant was hired by Hendel Petroleum Co., worked under the control of Hendel Petroleum Co., and was never advised that the payor of his wages had been changed.

Employer #1 claimed that responsibility for disability should be apportioned with employer #2, and requested an informal hearing within one year of the date of last exposure to repetitive trauma. Commissioner apportioned liability for permanency. Employer #2 appealed, claiming that first employer did not have standing to request a hearing pursuant to Figueroa v. C&S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1 (1996). CRB affirmed. Figueroa states that a claimant must initiate workers’ compensation proceedings where a claim has not been filed. Once a claim has been filed, however, an insurer or employer may seek apportionment by the commissioner for its liability, where appropriate. Also, CRB held that the medical evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the claimant’s subsequent employment with Employer #2 exacerbated his back condition, which began with his injury while working for Employer #1. See also, Gaudino, § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude. The claimant contended that the respondent’s Form 43 was insufficient because it named the claimant’s deceased husband rather than the claimant dependent widow. CRB held that respondent’s Form 43 was sufficient, as it was sent to the correct address and listed the reasons the respondent contested the claim.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant’s notice of claim filed on May 29, 1987 was timely where the claimant’s date of injury was February 10, 1987 (her last date of employment). The employer contended that the trial commissioner failed to address the issue of whether the claimant’s notice was timely in light of the employer’s argument that the claimant was aware of her lung injury in 1979. No error, as date of knowledge is not relevant in determining statute of limitations in repetitive trauma cases.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision to dismiss repetitive trauma claim for hearing loss. Trier’s finding that claimant had not established his condition to be an occupational disease was not contradicted by material, undisputed facts, so one-year statute of limitations applied. Also, claimant’s annual hearing tests did not constitute medical treatment under § 31-294c(c) sufficient to trigger the exception to the notice requirement. Employer provided tests to all employees, and was not reacting to a claimed injury or a potential workers’ compensation claim by requiring claimant to see audiologist every year.

CRB reversed trial commissioner’s finding of timely notice based on claimant’s lack of knowledge of relationship between injury and employment. Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), establishes that there is no knowledge-based exception for accidental injury claims. No evidence presented of occupational disease here, so claim had to be treated as an accidental injury for jurisdictional purposes. CRB also determined that case should be remanded for finding as to whether or not the repetitive trauma that caused the instant claims also caused the claimant’s right thumb injury, which was accepted in 1993. If so, Landrette v. Bristol, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 149, 1279 CRD-6-91-8 (August 19, 1993), applies, and no separate notice of claim would have been necessary in the first place.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Preclude, where the Form 30C was incomplete and did not provide sufficient notice to the employer regarding any claim for hypertension.

Decedent worked for numerous printing companies, where he was allegedly exposed to toxic fumes that contributed to his death from lung cancer. None of the respondents contested liability, and the claimant filed a successful Motion to Preclude in 1988 against the decedent’s last employer and the insurer most recently on the risk. Later, they attempted to apportion liability among prior employers and insurers, but trial commissioner denied their request. CRB affirmed. Issue of whether or not causation was proved is a question of fact and evidentiary credibility for trial commissioner, and there were doctor’s reports that held the claimant’s smoking habit to be totally responsible for his lung cancer rather than his chemical exposure. Failure to apportion claim with the other insurer who allegedly was on the risk during claimant’s employment with City Printing is also not erroneous. Claimant’s Motion to Preclude did not address a second insurer for the claimant’s alleged term of employment with City Printing, and it was not contemplated at that time that the Motion to Preclude concerned any parties other than City Printing and Chubb & Son, Inc. See also, Barron, § 31-299b, § 31-301. Factual findings.

The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant failed to file a timely notice of claim for a seizure disorder caused by an accident in which the claimant was hit in the head with a crow bar. The claimant did not file a notice of claim until eight years later, contending that he did not know that his seizure disorder was caused by the incident at work. Held that because the injury was an accidental injury locatable as to time and place, the claimant was required to file a notice of claim within one year regardless of his alleged lack of knowledge. Furthermore, a co-worker’s application of a bandage to the claimant’s head did not satisfy the “furnishing medical care” exception of § 31-294c.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision granting the claimant’s Motion to Preclude. The claimant sent a Notice of Claim by certified mail to the employer’s address where she worked. The respondents contended that the Notice of Claim was insufficient, arguing that it listed both the employer’s name and the date of injury (for repetitive trauma) incorrectly, and that it was sent to the wrong address. The Notice of Claim was legally sufficient pursuant to § 31-294c(b).

Based on Supreme Court decision in Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), CRB reversed trial commissioner’s ruling that claimant’s lack of knowledge of relationship between employment and carpal tunnel syndrome until fall 1992 made March 1993 notice of injury timely. (Last date of employment was March 15, 1991). Claimant would not be allowed to raise occupational disease argument, either, as nothing was ever alleged concerning that possibility. However, trier had not made a finding regarding sufficiency of 1986 notice of claim for tendonitis in middle finger of right hand; case remanded for findings regarding relationship of carpal tunnel symptoms to 1986 tendonitis symptoms.

Claimant, the decedent’s spouse, sought benefits pursuant to § 31-306 for the death of her husband. The decedent was exposed to asbestos in the workplace, and developed a lung disability. However, the decedent also received various diagnoses, treatments, and opinions as to causation. The decedent was treated with high doses of steroids and immunosuppressing agents. Consequently, the decedent developed leukemia and in 1991, died. In 1988 the decedent filed a claim for benefits under the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and stopped working due to his lung disability. On the actual LHWCA claim form the decedent noted that he was making a claim for benefits under the LHWCA and the State of Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act. The decedent, however, never pursued his rights under chapter 568. Shortly, after the decedent’s death the claimant filed her claim for widow’s benefits. The respondents contended that the claimant’s claim was untimely because, although the surviving spouse’s claim was filed within one year of the date of death, the claim filed by the decedent was legally insufficient and untimely. The trial commissioner held that the claimant’s claim was timely. The CRB affirmed and held that while the filing of a claim pursuant to the federal Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is not legally sufficient notice per se under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act, under the instant circumstances, the notice was sufficient to apprise the employer that a potential claim may be pending. The CRB referred to its analysis in Buck v. General Dynamics Corp.,/Electric Boat Division, 3324 CRB-2-96-4 (January 21, 1998) as to the timeliness of the widow’s claim. See also, Algiere, § 31-296, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

The CRB reversed the trial commissioner’s determination that the dependent spouse’s claim for benefits was timely. In this instance, the decedent suffered a heart attack in 1975 and filed a claim under the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The decedent received benefits pursuant to that act. The decedent died in 1986 due to a heart attack which was alleged to be causally related to the 1975 work-related heart attack. The claimant filed her claim for survivor’s benefits within one year of the decedent’s death but more than a decade after the decedent’s heart attack, which was alleged to be the causal nexus. The CRB dismissed on the basis of failure to file a timely notice. The CRB noted that, in this case, the notice under the LHWCA was not notice under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act. There was nothing in the LHWCA form which would have put the employer on notice that the decedent was also seeking benefits pursuant to chapter 568, particularly because this alleged compensable event occurred some years prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 417 U.S. 713, 100 S.Ct. 2432 (1980), permitting concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. The CRB also found the trier’s conclusion that the decedent was rendered medical treatment to be without legal support.

CRB reversed trier’s conclusion that claimant provided timely notice of claim for a repetitive trauma injury. The trial commissioner concluded that, because a hearing was held within one year following the date that the claimant first had knowledge of the repetitive trauma injury, an exception to the one-year statute of limitations was thus applicable pursuant to § 31-294c. However, recent Supreme and Appellate Court decisions hold that the claimant’s lack of knowledge is not a legally sufficient basis for allowing more than one year to file a repetitive trauma claim.

Trier did not err by assuming claimant alleged repetitive trauma injury rather than occupational disease, as Form 30C described injury as repetitive trauma, and there were no findings or proposed corrections tending to establish that hearing loss is a disease peculiar to the occupation of construction worker. Issue of “knowledge exception” to one-year statute of limitations for repetitive trauma injuries was irrelevant, as the claimant was aware of the connection between injury and employment 1½ years before he filed a notice of claim. strong>Concurrence: there is no knowledge-based exception to one-year repetitive trauma notice period.

New York injury, Massachusetts-based decedent (including business office), Connecticut employer. Trier concluded that notice of claim was untimely. Letter to employer’s human resources manager requesting forms for filing workers’ compensation claim was insufficient to notify employer that claimant sought relief under Chapter 568. The letter did not indicate that the attorney represented the decedent’s wife, did not specify in which state, if any, a claim was being filed, and did not state that an action was definite. Affirmed.

Funaioli v. New London, 3346 CRB-1-96-5 (November 4, 1997), rev’d, 52 Conn. App. 194 (1999).

Trial commissioner improperly found that employer’s first report of injury amounted to timely notice of claim. CRB explained that the Form 15 filed by the claimant with this Commission would not be treated like a notice of claim, and would not signal a Commission employee that someone was filing a claim for compensation, even if it referred to the injured worker as “claimant” and contained other elements required by § 31-294c. Appellate Court reversed board and held commissioner’s conclusions were based on and supported by factual findings. Therefore, trier’s conclusion that documents submitted by the claimant met the notice requirement should be affirmed on appeal. See also, Funaioli, § 31-316.

Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, 3274 CRB-2-96-2 (October 24, 1997), aff’d, 52 Conn. App. 255 (1999), rev’d, 252 Conn. 596 (2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Preclude. Date of injury listed as “9/23/94,” which was not the last date of the claimant’s exposure to incidents of repetitive trauma, nor was it the date of a particular shoulder separation. Trier could reasonably have determined that that date did not give the respondents legally sufficient notice to allow a proper investigation of the claim. The respondents’ Forms 43 also may have been adequate notice of intent to contest, as the 5/2/91 date of injury listed there was the date of the initial shoulder separation, and the trier found that this was a recurrent injury situation, not repetitive trauma. CRB also held that first report of injury did not constitute a notice of claim under § 31-294c. Following affirmance of CRB’s decision by Appellate Court, Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the notice of claim was sufficient to support preclusion because it provided adequate information as to period of time over which injury occurred, and there were no other defects. Respondents had failed to file a sufficient notice contesting liability because none of its notices listed the date of the alleged injury or provided specific substantive grounds for contesting compensability. See also, Russell, § 31-316.

Notice was sent by the claimant to the district office and, apparently, to the statutory agent for service listed at the secretary of state’s office, rather than to the employer’s address. CRB held that, although minor defects in notice will be overlooked as long as a respondent is not prejudiced in investigating claims, service of a Form 30C upon a statutory agent is not likely to inform an employer that there is a claim pending. Furthermore, § 31-321 prescribes a different procedure. Certain corrections should have been made, and the trier’s granting of the Motion to Preclude was reversed. However, the commissioner also addressed the merits of the case, and he reasonably credited the testimony of the claimant and his brother in support of the instant claim. CRB cannot reassess his credibility determinations. Affirmed on the merits. See also, McKenna, § 31-321.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that claimant failed to file a timely notice of claim for a repetitive trauma knee injury. CRB explained that it need not reach the legal issue of whether lack of knowledge may extend the statute of limitations period for repetitive trauma injuries. This is because the trial commissioner specifically found that the claimant knew or should have known that his right knee condition was related to his masonry work when he stopped working for the respondent employer.

Perrelli v. Stack, Inc., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 211, 3243 CRB-3-95-12 (June 6, 1997).

As there was no timely written notice of claim for the injuries at issue, the trial commissioner properly denied the claimant’s motion to preclude. The trial commissioner found that pursuant to an approved voluntary agreement, the respondents substantially accepted all of the injuries as set forth in the claimant’s original notice of claim. The claimant later filed a notice of claim for additional alleged injuries. The trial commissioner found that the claimant did not file a timely notice of claim within one year of the date of injury for said additional injuries. See also, Perrelli, § 31-301.

Roy v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 179, 3131 CRB-1-95-7 (May 12, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 904 (1998)(per curiam), cert. denied, 245 Conn. 906 (1998).

Form 43’s reference to date of injury as May 17, 1993 instead of May 3, 1993 did not require that the claimant’s Motion to Preclude be granted. A Form 43 need not be technically perfect as long as specific substantive grounds for contesting a claim are stated. Trier correctly determined that intent to disclaim the alleged stress-induced heart attack was clear, as the description of the respondents’ objections was specific enough to compensate for the incorrect date. See also, Roy, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Trial commissioner erred by granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude the respondents from contesting the circumstances of her injury. As long as substantive grounds for contest are stated, a Form 43 need not be technically perfect. Here, the Form 43 listed five separate grounds for contest, including “any injury to lower back did not arise out of or in the course of employment,” and “no causal connection between the lower back injury and the claimant’s employment.” As claimant must show proof that an incident occurred during her employment in order to prove a causal connection, the respondents’ disclaimer framed this issue as one in dispute. Reversed.

Motion to preclude properly denied where claimant had failed to file a timely notice of claim. See, Liano, § 31-297, § 31-301. Factual findings. See, Liano, § 31-297, § 31-307; also cited at § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments). Subsequent decisions at Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999), § 31-300; Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999), § 7-433c; companion decision at Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-279-3, § 31-298, § 31-307; prior decision at Liano, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996), § 7-433b, § 31-300, § 31-310.

Marandino v. Marandino’s, 3130 CRB-6-95-7 (March 20, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 916 (1998)(per curiam), cert. denied, 245 Conn. 919 (1998).

In order to entertain Motion to Preclude, trier had to first determine whether subject matter jurisdiction over claim existed. No error in considering whether claimant had elected to be covered as sole proprietor. See also, Marandino, § 31-275(10).

Bonin v. Thames Valley Steel, 1492 CRB-2-92-8 (February 14, 1997), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 16963 (May 28, 1997).

Respondents failed to file timely disclaimer to Form 30C, but commissioner denied Motion to Preclude because of five-day discrepancy in date of injury on notice of claim for repetitive trauma injury. Commissioner then granted claimant’s Motion to Correct in light of Quinn v. Knapp, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 334, 1470 CRB-8-92-7 (July 8, 1994), and granted Motion to Preclude because it substantially complied with § 31-297b. CRB affirmed; five-day discrepancy not likely to mislead employer as to nature of injury under circumstances of this case. See also, Bonin, § 31-321.

Form 30C and voluntary agreement only referred to left leg and ankle injuries. Claimant subsequently made a back injury claim arising from same incident 19 months after the accidental injury occurred. Held: once trial commissioner determined that back injury was related to compensable injury, no additional notice of claim was necessary. See, Landrette v. Bristol, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 149, 1279 CRD-6-91-8 (August 19, 1993).

The determination of when the claimant had sufficient knowledge to commence the running of the three-year statute of limitations period for occupational disease claims is normally a question of fact for the trial commissioner. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s notice of claim for asbestosis timely filed. See also, Uttenweiler, § 31-308(b).

See, Cunningham, § 31-275(16) notes on personal injury.

Denial of Motion to Preclude included no findings of facts, and thus no specific reasons for denying preclusion. Review impossible. Remanded.

Britt v. Wallace Manufacturing, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 147, 2284 CRB-1-95-2 (November 29, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 902 (1997)(per curiam).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s dismissal of claim on ground of untimely notice. Law allowed trier to find that last day of exposure to incidents of repetitive trauma predated last date of employment. (Wilson, C., concurring) (awareness of causal relationship between injury and employment is always irrelevant for purpose of repetitive trauma injury one-year notice period).

CRB reversed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant had filed a timely notice of claim for carpal tunnel. Citing Dorsey v. UTC/Norden Systems, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 447, 2268 CRB-7-95-1 (September 6, 1996), aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 707 (1997), remanded to Appellate Court in light of Supreme Court’s decision in Discuillo, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), aff’d on remand, 47 Conn. App. 810 (1998) the CRB held that the claimant’s lack of knowledge does not extend the time period for filing a timely notice of claim for repetitive trauma. (Frankl, C., dissenting) (the dissenting opinion explained that a lack of knowledge should extend the time period for filing a timely claim).

Claimant sent letter enclosing Form 30C to employer, who responded by filing a Form 43 stating that “employee’s allegations of cancer relating to original incident appear to be non-work related, liability and medical denied. Non-claim statu[t]e.” Form 43 referenced a 1979 date of injury, however, which was for a chemical exposure incident unrelated to the claimant’s kidney cancer claim. Trial commissioner ruled that Form 43 sufficiently conformed with specificity requirements of § 31-294 to withstand Motion to Preclude. Affirmed; remedial purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act mandates that CRB overlook minor defects in notice as long as party is not prejudiced in ability to investigate claims. Similar policy applies here, as employer’s notice clearly contested both elements of claimant’s prima facie workers’ compensation case. Reference of 1979 date of injury not necessarily misleading to claimant, especially since Form 43 mentioned cancer.

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that notice of carpal tunnel claim was untimely. Commissioner based his decision on finding that claimant knew or should have known of causal link between employment and injury on March 17, 1989, triggering one-year notice period for repetitive trauma injuries; notice was not filed until May 24, 1990. Testimony supported that finding; fact that claimant was not completely certain of diagnosis until June or July did not reduce awareness of causal link to a mere suspicion. Moreover, date of injury in repetitive trauma case is last date of exposure; findings indicated that exposure to incidents of repetitive trauma ceased in 1980, when claimant was promoted. Thus, operative last date of employment was much earlier. Recent decisions overrule doctrine that delayed running of non-claim statute until claimant did/should have realized causal link between employment and injury. (Frankl, C., concurring) (doctrine delaying running of statute of non-claim based on lack of knowledge of causal link should not be overruled).

Cislo v. Shelton, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 2291 CRB-4-95-2 (October 4, 1996).

Claimant sent letter to chief of police informing him of claimant’s ongoing treatment for hypertension and asking him to take “any necessary steps.” Commissioner ruled that said letter provided timely notice of injury under statute. Reversed: documents submitted by claimant did not strictly comply with § 31-294c, nor did they substantially comply with the statute’s purpose. Claimant’s letter did not indicate that claimant was seeking workers’ compensation benefits, and employer had no way of knowing that a claim was being pursued and that it should commence an investigation of the claim.

Felix v. Merriam Manufacturing Co., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 466, 2288 CRB-3-95-2 (September 12, 1996) (corrected September 16, 1996).

Claimant began developing carpal tunnel symptoms in 1989, had surgery on left wrist in August 1990. Claimant filed Form 30C in December 1991, listing date of injury as August 22, 1990 (the surgery date), and stating that she was unaware her repetitive trauma injury was work-related until September 1991. In three separate opinions, the CRB affirmed the commissioner’s decision that medical bills associated with the August 1990 surgery should not be the respondents’ responsibility, but that the claimant’s last date of employment was September 27, 1991, thus making notice timely with respect to carpal tunnel in her right hand and potential post-surgery trauma to her left hand. (Frankl, C.). Repetitive trauma injury occurs on last date of exposure to incidents of trauma, which is usually last date of employment. Only exception is where claimant is unaware that disabling condition is work-related until after she leaves employment. Here, commissioner found that claimant should have known August 1990 surgery was related to employment. Surgery marked close of trauma period to left hand, so notice would have been due within one year from that date. However, notice was sufficient to preserve claim for potential exposure to right hand, or post-surgery exposure to left hand. (Santos, C., dissenting in part) (no finding that claimant ceased being exposed to incidents of repetitive trauma during course of her employment; no legal basis to establish that trauma period was somehow broken by August 1990 surgery. Whole claim should be compensable). (Wilson, C., dissenting in part) (whole claim should be dismissed; claimant could have introduced evidence of repetitive trauma following her return to work after surgery, but did not do so. Piecemeal presentation of cases is not allowed in workers’ compensation proceedings. Also, trial commissioner’s finding that claimant “knew or should have known” August 1990 surgery was work-related was not relevant, as § 31-294c only allows one year from the date of last exposure to file a claim. The knowledge-based exception for late manifestation of symptoms only applies to occupational diseases).

Dorsey v. UTC/Norden Systems, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 447, 2268 CRB-7-95-1 (September 6, 1996), aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 707 (1997), remanded to Appellate Court in light of Supreme Court’s decision in Discuillo, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), aff’d on remand, 47 Conn. App. 810 (1998).

The trial commissioner found that the claimant retired from the respondent employer on March 11, 1990, but did not become aware that he had suffered a hearing loss which may have been connected to his work until he went to a doctor on January 5, 1993. The commissioner thus found the claimant’s January 14, 1993 notice of claim to be timely. CRB reversed, holding that the claimant’s lack of knowledge regarding his hearing loss does not extend the time period for filing a timely notice of claim for repetitive trauma. CRB thus reversed Boutin v. Industrial Components, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 237 CRD-6-83 (March 3, 1987). (Frankl, C., dissenting) (the dissenting opinion, citing legislative histories of related statutes and development of case law, explained that a lack of knowledge should extend the time period for filing a timely claim).

Trial commissioner dismissed claim for late notice. Affirmed. Claimant had forwarded reports of medical care and bills to insurance company, but had not filed a Form 30C with this Commission or his employer. Also, there was confusion surrounding the exact date of injury. Commissioner reasonably concluded that § 31-294c was not substantially complied with. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed contending the board failed to consider one of claimant’s appellate arguments - the insurer in this case set up a claim file at least one day prior to the date the statute of limitations expired. CRB noted issue was considered. Knowledge of the place of accident and nature of injury are not conveyed by assigning a claim number and claim file. Motion denied. See, Altamura, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1. See also, Altamura, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-278 Jurisdiction/Disqualification.

Drivas v. Fair Auto Park, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 366, 2279 CRB-7-95-1 (June 28, 1996).

Commissioner properly denied Motion to Preclude. Where date of heart attack was one day off in notice of claim, notice could not be presumed legally sufficient to notify employer that injury occurred a day earlier. Where there is doubt, decision to proceed on merits is a wise one.

Riccio v. Windsor, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 279, 2232 CRB-1-94-12 (June 20, 1996).

The commissioner found that the claimant, a police officer, failed to give notice of his claim for heart and hypertension benefits as required by § 31-294c C.G.S., and therefore dismissed the claim. CRB noted that the Appellate Court recently held that a § 7-433c hypertension claim is not presumed to be an occupational disease. Zaleta v. Fairfield, 38 Conn. App. 1, 7 (1995). The commissioner specifically found that the employer-provided routine medical examination, along with a referral for an echocardiogram, did not constitute the furnishing of medical treatment so as to obviate the need for filing a proper notice of claim. See also, Riccio, § 7-433c.

Gaffney v. Stamford, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 257, 2219 CRB-7-94-11 (May 24, 1996).

Claimant did not file Notice of Claim within one year of her 1/25/89 injury; although claimant filed accident report with employer, she did not seek treatment for eye injury until 1/2/90, and did not file Form 30C until 3/9/90. Held, none of the exceptions under § 31-294 was met, oral request for hearing on 1/23/90 at District Office was insufficient to apprise employer of the existence of a claim, and no exception can be created for filing of Form 43 by respondents. CRB cannot broaden express language of statute, especially where subject matter jurisdiction is implicated. There is no knowledge-based exception to the one-year requirement, either. (Vargas, C., dissenting) (employer clearly had notice of injury immediately following incident, as first report of injury and Form 43 demonstrate. Substantial compliance with the notice content requirements tolls running of statutory period). See, Hayden-Leblanc, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3. Humanitarian purpose of Act also favors allowing claimant to pursue the merits of her claim.

Commissioner erred in granting Motion to Preclude. Although rule of strict compliance has been modified by CRB pursuant to Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994), the basic elements of a notice of claim must still be present to trigger an employer’s investigative responsibility. Here, claimant did not describe time and circumstances of injury with sufficient accuracy.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for myocardial infarction which was filed more than one year following the heart attack. CRB has consistently ruled that a heart attack is an injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred and not as an injury which is the direct result of repetitive trauma or occupational disease.

The commissioner found that on November 5, 1992, the claimant, a state police trooper, filed a timely notice of claim for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which was initially caused by an August 19, 1988 shooting incident. The determination of whether a claimant is exposed to repetitive trauma up until his last date of employment is a question of fact to be made by the trial commissioner. The commissioner concluded that the claimant’s notice was timely because the claimant had been subjected to repetitive trauma until his last day of employment on October 22, 1992. As there were no findings of fact on the continued repetitive trauma, CRB remanded the case to commissioner. (D’Oyen, C., dissenting) (claim was not timely as it was not filed within one year from the August 19, 1988 incident, and as that was the only work related cause of the PTSD, the claim should have been filed within one year of that date).

Motion to Preclude is final judgment for purposes of appeal to CRB. Where claimant filled out report of injury for employer, but did not file Form 30C, commissioner was entitled to deny Motion to Preclude that was based on late filing of employer’s Form 43. Documents filed by claimant did not necessarily provide sufficient notice to investigate claim, as no claim for compensation was actually filed. Clarity of date, time, place of injury are not the only considerations.

Smith v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 336, 2006 CRB-1-94-3 (September 20, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 910 (1996)(per curiam).

Claimant’s exposure to repetitive trauma ceased after he left the workplace; notice of claim filed over 15 months later was thus untimely. Commissioner disregarded claimant’s testimony that he did not realize injury was work-related until four months after he left work, thus Boutin, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19 (March 3, 1987), does not apply. See also, Smith, § 31-298, and § 31-301. Factual findings.

Knapp v. New London, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 325, 2002 CRB-2-94-3 (September 15, 1995), aff’d, 44 Conn. App. 465 (1997).

The commissioner properly dismissed the claimant’s claim for hearing loss due to failure to file notice within one year pursuant to § 31-294c(a). The claimant filed his claim for workers’ compensation on October 25, 1991, alleging that he sustained permanent partial binaural hearing loss. The commissioner found that the claimant’s hearing loss occurred prior to 1985, and that subsequent to 1985, because he was promoted to foreman, he was no longer exposed to repetitive trauma in the form of noise exposure.

Commissioner properly denied Motion to Preclude; notice of claim was untimely on its face as to one date of injury, and the other date of injury for repetitive trauma claim postdated last day of employment, thus failing to sufficiently notify respondent of details of injury. Also, Motion to Preclude was premised on failure to send Form 43 by certified mail; spirit of Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994), requires CRB to consider fact that notice was in fact received by both claimant and commissioner.

CRB affirmed commissioner’s decision that claimant’s notice of claim for asthma, an occupational disease, was timely filed. Statute of limitations begins to run when symptoms are manifested, which is a factual question.

CRB found that claimant filed a late notice of claim for occupational lung disease, thus reversing commissioner’s decision. CRB found that statute of limitations period began running when claimant’s physician told him that his lung disease was related to his employment.

Dismissal for lack of timely notice affirmed. Fact that claimant told her supervisor of her accident is not the equivalent of filing a workers’ compensation claim under Connecticut law. None of the exceptions under § 31-294(b) were met, either; medical treatment paid for by group health policy, not employer. Circumstances of injury (car accident) did not automatically put employer on notice that injury was employment-related.

Duni v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 137, 2052 CRB-1-94-5 (June 12, 1995), aff’d, 239 Conn. 19 (1996).

Given virtual identity of facts surrounding Form 43 with those in Walter, infra, denial of Motion to Preclude affirmed. Also, § 31-294c gives claimant one year from date of death to file claim in all cases. See, Capen v. General Dynamics Corp., 38 Conn. App. 73 (1995). See also, Duni, § 31-306.

Similar facts as Walter decision below, except defective notice was sent to decedent employee in care of law firm rather than at claimant’s address. Held: since lawyer did receive notice, and did file a timely Motion to Preclude on claimant’s behalf, and considering our decisions in Walter and in Robinson, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69 (August 28, 1989), equity and justice would not be served by precluding employer from contesting this case. Reversed.

State failed to include names of claimants on Form 43s; instead, forms were addressed to deceased employee. Commissioner granted claimants’ Motion to Preclude. Held, in light of emphasis in Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994), and other recent decisions on remedial purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act, rule of strict compliance must be relaxed. Question is now whether notice to contest substantially complied with § 31-294c(b) and sufficiently apprised claimants of reasons for denying compensability. CRB also noted that Form 43 did not instruct preparer to specify name of claimant rather than name of employee. Here, state substantially complied with statute, and claimants did not suffer prejudice from deficiency. Reversed and remanded.

Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 95, 1935 CRB-2-93-12 (May 19, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 224 (1996), aff’d, 242 Conn. 570 (1997).

CRB reversed the trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s September 1984 notice of claim for a heart attack which occurred November 1982 was compensable. The CRB noted that such injuries are considered as accidental injuries and not the result of repetitive trauma. Thus, the claim should have been filed within one year from the date of claimant’s heart attack.

Giovino v. West Hartford, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 1912 CRB-1-93-12 (May 12, 1995).

Claimant alleged repetitive trauma due to exposure to gunfire. Issue was whether notice of claim was timely filed. CRB cited Borent v. State, 33 Conn. App. 495 (1994), and held that last date of exposure is usually but not necessarily the last date of employment. Respondents contended that claimant was not exposed to gunfire during the end of his employment period. CRB remanded for determination of date of last exposure to gunfire. See also, Giovino, § 31-298 and § 31-310.

Claimant, a workfare recipient, sent notice of claim to Mission instead of City of Hartford. Held, § 17b-689(g) provides that workfare employees are employees of the town for purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Fact that Mission may have had control over claimant’s employment within meaning of § 31-275(10) irrelevant given language of workfare statute. Also, no agency relationship shown between City and Mission for purpose of receiving notice. Commissioner properly dismissed claim; employer was not made party to proceedings.

CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of claimant’s motion to preclude, even though employer had filed an untimely disclaimer. Claimant’s notice of claim was not sufficient to support preclusion under the test in Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994). Specifically, notice of claim was insufficient to allow for timely investigation of claim by employer because it directly contradicted the claimant’s prior acknowledgment of physical defect.

Keegan v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 340, 1793 CRB-1-93-8 (April 27, 1995), aff’d, 42 Conn. App. 803 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942 (1996).

Statute is jurisdictional in nature; one-year time limit for filing claims not ambiguous. Claimant’s accidental hip injury was not an occupational disease; see § 31-275(15); and thus the one-year statute of limitations applied. Notice untimely. (Santos, C., dissenting) (claimant assumed injury was a minor bump on her hip; purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act is not to require an employee to file a claim for every minor injury. Date of incapacity should be applied under Mulligan v. F.S. Electric, 231 Conn. 529 (1994), where immediate disability did not occur). See also, Keegan, § 31-275(15).

Where claimant could not remember and did not allege exact date of injury, claimant’s notice defective. Notice otherwise timely. Commissioner should have given employer opportunity to demonstrate prejudice as result of defect; further proceedings necessary. See also, Troske, § 31-275(16).

Otero v. Bridgeport, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 248, 1713 CRB-4-93-4 (April 17, 1995).

Claimant followed police procedure in reporting injuries to employer, which consisted of filling out accident and personal injury reports signed by superior officer and directed to Board of Police Commissioners. Notice of claim not filed with Workers’ Compensation Commission until almost five years later. Held, claimant did not give timely notice of existence of claim to his employer or this commission by simply reporting his injury to the police department. Thus, commission has no jurisdiction over claim.

Because notice of claim was defective (incorrect date of injury), commissioner denied claimant’s motion to preclude the respondents from asserting the defense of “horseplay.” CRB affirmed denial of preclusion, citing Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994). See also, Simmons, § 31-275(1), § 31-298 and § 31-284(a).

Where connection between employment and injury is not initially apparent, statute of limitations begins running on date that employee knew or should have known that disabling condition arose out of and in course of employment. Here, testimony of claimant supported commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s suspicion of injury did not rise to level of known manifestation of symptom until 11/29/91. See also, Santry, § 31-301. Factual findings. NB: But see later cases, such as Dorsey, supra, (this section).

One-year rather than three-year limitation on filing a claim applies where the claimant’s psychiatric condition was not shown to be an occupational disease. See also, Nanni, § 31-275(15).

Griffith-Patton v. State/Dept. of Agriculture, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 177, 1888 CRB-1-93-11 (March 10, 1995), aff’d, 41 Conn. App. 911 (1996)(per curiam), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 930 (1996).

One-year notice exception for employer-furnished medical care not applicable where claimant’s psychiatric treatment was paid for in part by claimant and in part by health insurance policy. Commissioner could determine that employer not aware of potential workers’ compensation claim within meaning of Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607 (1947). See also, Griffith-Patton, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Notice of claimant’s claim for benefits timely, as Form 30C filed within three years of date claimant became aware of occupational disease. Dependent widow’s failure to file Form 30C was not fatal to her claim because hearing on her entitlement to death benefits was held within one year of the date of claimant’s death. See also, York, § 31-298.

Campbell v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 157, 1754 CRB-1-93-6 (March 8, 1995), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 14611(May 24, 1995).

Repetitive trauma injury cannot be definitely located as to time and place, so last day of exposure or employment is date of injury as a matter of law, and date notice period begins to run. The fact that the claimant was aware of her condition and its relation to her work prior to that date is irrelevant. See also, Campbell, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Though sufficiency of notice is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, the respondent was not entitled to raise questions as to timeliness that could have been raised in a prior appeal to this board. See, Peters I, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 1103 CRD-3-90-8 (January 13, 1992). As the same issue was considered before, CRB declined to reconsider it in interest of finality. See also, Peters, § 31-308(b) (c).

Claimant insisted injury occurred on 11/4/91, although commissioner found injury occurred on 10/29/91. Thus, Motion to Preclude denied even though employer failed to file Form 43. Held, Motion to Preclude is a final judgment and can be appealed under § 31-301(a). Rule that strict compliance with notice requirements of § 31-294c is necessary before preclusion can lie abandoned in light of Supreme Court decision in Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994); question is now whether notice sufficient to allow investigation of claim. Also, commissioner should not have made finding as to incorrect injury date; Motion to Preclude should have instead been granted as to 11/4 date of injury, with employer retaining right to litigate compensability of injuries in fact occurring on other dates.

Conetta v. Stamford, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 1491 CRB-7-92-8 (December 29, 1994).

See, Conetta, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Factual findings. See also, Conetta v. Stamford, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 228, 3231 CRB-7-95-12 (June 23, 1997), appeal dismissed, 246 Conn. 281 (1998).

Searles v. West Hartford/Board of Education, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 414, 1617 CRB-1-93-1 (September 28, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 902 (1996)(per curiam).

Notice of claim filed in 1988 for a 1982 aneurysm filed beyond time prescribed by statute. See also, Searles, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Denicola v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 393, 1919 CRB-3-93-12 (September 6, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 916 (1996).

Notice of claim need not state claimant’s home as the place of injury in order to comply with statute. Also, notice of claim mailed to employer at various addresses excluding employer’s corporate insurance department address complied with § 31-321. Therefore, trier’s finding granting claimant’s motion to preclude affirmed where employer failed to disclaim within twenty eight (28) days and notice of claim satisfied statutory requirements.

Britt v. Fiskars/Wallace Manufacturing, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 375, 1503 CRB-1-92-9 (August 17, 1994).

Remanded where trier failed to make specific findings as to claimant’s last date of exposure to repetitive trauma in determining claim was untimely filed. See also, Britt, § 31-275(16) [formerly 31-275(8)].

Holmes v. G. A. Masonry Corp., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 1588 CRB-5-92-12 (August 11, 1994).

Remanded where trier failed to make necessary findings with respect to timeliness of claim. See also, Holmes, § 31-299b and § 31-301. Factual findings.

Quinn v. Standard Knapp, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 334, 1470 CRB-8-92-7 (July 8, 1994), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 40 Conn. App. 449 (1996).

Motion to preclude granted for work related stress claim. CRB previously held in repetitive trauma cases the last day worked is the date of injury. Here, claimant’s notice of claim stated the date of injury as being one day after the last day worked, the date of claimant’s incapacity, an insignificant inaccuracy which will not prevent preclusion. Discussion of importance of date of injury in notice of claim for accidental injury and repetitive trauma cases.

Seymour v. Charles A. Bleich, D.D.S., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 312, 1484 CRB-6-92-8 (June 24, 1994).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s motion to preclude. Notice of claim filed in January, 1990 for a repetitive trauma low back injury which occurred from January 2 to June 30, 1989, the last day worked, complies with jurisdictional time limitation prescribed by statute. Additionally, claimant is only required to show an employer/employee relationship existed at the time of the injury, not at a later time when the notice of claim was filed.

Micklos v. Iseli Company, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 302, 1450 CRB-5-92-7 (June 17, 1994).

Trier erred in denying Motion to Preclude where claim for hearing loss was timely filed. Nevertheless, trier’s inquiry as to the extent of disability permitted and his conclusion that claimant’s hearing loss was not worsened by work related noise incidents affirmed. See, Borent v. State, 33 Conn. App. 495 (1994). See also, Micklos, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Busak v. Stamford, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 291, 1562 CRB-7-92-11 (June 8, 1994), aff’d, 39 Conn. App. 919 (1995)(per curiam).

Notice of claim filed in 1990 for a 1988 injury time-barred where trier found no specific injury or repetitive trauma. See also, Busak, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Freeman v. Hull Dye & Print, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 259, 1516 CRB-5-92-9 (June 2, 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 39 Conn. App. 717 (1995).

Widow’s claim for dependent’s benefits dismissed where trier found widow failed to file a timely claim or request a hearing regarding dependent’s benefits within statutory time period. See also, Freeman, § 31-275(15) and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Sellew v. Northeast Utilities, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 135, 1422 CRB-8-92-5 (April 7, 1994), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A. C. 13541, 13542 (6/14/94).

Remanded for determination whether widow’s notice of claim was timely filed absent a factual finding as to whether a timely informal hearing satisfies exception to § 31-294 notice requirements. See also, Sellew, § 31-275(15), § 31-310 and § 52-572r.

Zaleta v. Fairfield, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 125, 1453 CRB-4-92-7 (February 28, 1994), rev’d, 38 Conn. App. 1 (1995), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917 (1995).

CRB found claimant’s request for a hearing within three years from the date of diagnosis of hypertension satisfied notice of claim requirement. Court reversed CRB’s conclusion that firefighter’s hypertension was presumptively an occupational disease. Because there was no evidence that the hypertension was an occupational disease, three-year statute of limitation did not apply. See also, Zaleta, § 7-433c.

Buck v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 1374 CRB-2-92-1 (February 28, 1994).

Remanded as timeliness of notice of claim is a jurisdictional requirement which must be satisfied. Trier’s decision lacked a factual finding on this issue. See, Buck, supra.

Schena v. State/Connecticut Correctional Institute, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 75, 1530 CRB-8-92-10 (February 3, 1994).

Notice to contest liability must be filed within statutorily prescribed time to the workers’ compensation commissioner. Employer is not required to send notice to employee within the same period. See also, Schena, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Seymour v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 30, 1477 CRB-6-92-8 (January 20, 1994).

CRB held disclaimer language does not appreciably differ from the language held sufficiently specific by the appellate court in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Peddle v. Finish Line Cafe, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 27, 1396 CRB-2-92-2 (January 18, 1994).

Motion to preclude denied where it was found claimant was not an employee of the respondent employer and claimant’s injuries were the result of her own intentional acts. See also, Peddle, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Mingrone v. Burndy Corporation, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 1403 CRB-7-92-3 (January 13, 1994).

Respondents’ attempt, after remand, to raise additional non-jurisdictional grounds before trier in opposition to claimant’s motion to preclude where CRB previously rendered a decision in Mingrone, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 252, 1109 CRD-7-90-9 (November 21, 1991) properly rejected. Additionally, any new grounds raised in opposition to motion would allow an unreasonable delay of the ultimate determination of the claim. See also, Mingrone, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Paresi v. American Cruise Lines, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 15, 1378 CRB-8-92-1 (January 13, 1994).

Medical care received by claimant at the expense of the employer within one year of the injury constituted the furnishing of medical care where employer had knowledge of circumstances surrounding the injury. See, Paresi, § 31-340, § 31-343.

Velazquez v. Dresser Industries, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 6, 1423 CRB-4-92-5 (January 6, 1994).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s motion to preclude. Claimant’s date of injury occurred prior to the effective date of the warning requirement language of P.A. 90-116 § 9 which required notices of claim to contain a provision as to the preclusive effects of failing to timely disclaim liability. Even though notice was not served until after the effective date of P.A. 90-116 § 9, CRB held § 9 is not applicable where the date of injury proceeds the effective date of P.A. 90-116 § 9, October 1, 1990.

Hayden-Leblanc v. New London Broadcasting, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 1373 CRD-2-92-1 (January 5, 1994).

Written group medical form and group insurer’s written rejection constituted written notice within one year where employer advised claimant that the time for filing a claim had lapsed when in fact the time had not passed and claimant later filed a claim. CRB held under the totality of circumstances notice requirements of § 31-294 were substantially complied with.

Capen v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 326, 1394 CRB-2-92-3 (December 30, 1993), aff’d, 38 Conn. App. 73 (1995).

Trier properly concluded that widow’s claim for dependency benefits filed within one year of the death of the decedent was timely thereby satisfying the requirements of § 31-294c (formerly § 31-294). See also, Capen, § 31-306, § 31-299b.

Bayne v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 310, 1361 CRD-7-91-12 (December 23, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s back injury was the result of years of repetitive trauma at work rather than one single lifting incident. Claimant’s notice of claim was timely filed.

Crute v. Arthur Fletcher Fuel Oil Company, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 283, 1390 CRB-2-92-3, 1685 CRB-2-93-3 (December 2, 1993).

Claimant’s notice of claim listed a number of injuries which allegedly arose out of and during the course of employment. Respondents’ first disclaimer was valid however it only contested the carpal tunnel syndrome. A subsequent disclaimer contesting the rest of the injuries alleged in claimant’s notice of claim was untimely filed for § 31-294c purposes. Trier found, and CRB affirmed, trier’s ruling granting claimant’s motion to preclude as to other injuries and limiting respondents’ contest to whether claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome arose out of and in the course of employment.

Marshall v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 204, 1317 CRD-1-91-10 (September 27, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s Motion to Preclude as respondent’s disclaimer language was sufficiently specific applying appellate court’s standard in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989). See also, Marshall, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Subsequent decision at Marshall, 3623 CRB-1-97-6 (August 20, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 902 (1999)(per curiam), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 904 (1999), supra.

Lilley v. Larry’s Sales & Repair, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 188, 1408 CRB-2-92-4 (September 16, 1993).

When calculating twenty-eight day period for contesting a claim for compensation, calculation begins on the day after receipt of a notice of claim for compensation. CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that respondents’ disclaimer was timely filed. Further, CRB held disclaimer language sufficiently specific, applying the standard accepted by the court in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Magram v. Middletown, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 167, 1348 CRD-8-91-11 (September 1, 1993).

Trier’s ruling granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude reversed. Respondents’ notice to contest liability was timely filed with the compensation commissioner. Statute does not require claimant receive notice to contest within time prescribed. See, Vachon v. General Dynamics Corp., 29 Conn. App. 654 (1992).

Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 1300 CRD-2-91-9 (August 23, 1993), aff’d, 232 Conn. 780 (1995).

[Note: J. Berdon, Dissenting] CRB reversed trial commissioner. CRB held trier failed to apply the statute of limitations provision of § 1330e pertaining to occupational disease claims as it existed in 1942. Additionally, application of statute is substantive and may not be applied retrospectively. CRB relied on Niedzwicki v. Pequonnoch Foundry, 133 Conn. 78 (1946) as directly on point.

Landrette v. Bristol, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 149, 1279 CRD-6-91-8 (August 19, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that police officer’s mouth injury was causally related to an altercation wherein claimant suffered an accepted compensable injury to his ankle. Respondents contended claimant’s written notice of claim failed to identify the mouth injury and therefore written notice was untimely. CRB held once trier determined the mouth injury was causally related to a work injury the need for any further notice was unnecessary. See, Hebert v. New Departure Hyatt Bearings, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 300 CRD-6-84 (June 12, 1987), no error, 14 Conn. App. 819 (1988).

St. Amour v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 146, 1286 CRD-2-91-8 (August 10, 1993).

Remanded. Trier made no factual finding concerning timeliness of widow’s claim for benefits due to decedent’s asbestos exposure and CRB was unable to determine whether a timely notice was filed. Record below lacks reviewable evidence in order for CRB to make a proper determination. See also, St. Amour, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Galgano v. Torrington, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 1280 CRD-5-91-8 (June 30, 1993).

Absent a timely notice of claim, an independent medical examination does not constitute the furnishing of medical care.

Meaney v. State/Dept. of Mental Retardation Region 1, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 1284 CRD-7-91-8 (May 17, 1993).

As notice failed to properly identify employer the technical requirements of § 31-294 were not satisfied. See, Pereira v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 906 CRD-7-89-8 (January 8, 1991), aff’d, 228 Conn. 535 (1994). Additionally, even if the prior forwarding of two Reports of Accident or Occupational Disease (First Report of Injury) satisfied the technical requirements of § 31-294, claimant failed to serve these documents in accordance with § 31-321. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude.

Litke v. Crowell Builders, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 1215 CRD-5-91-4 (May 4, 1993).

Remanded as trier failed to determine whether an employer-employee relationship existed. This requisite relationship must be established before a Motion to Preclude can lie.

Niles v. Autac, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 45, 1261 CRD-3-91-7 (March 18, 1993).

Section 31-297(b) does not preclude an employer from contesting extent of disability. Claimant filed a notice of claim August 16, 1990 for injuries sustained January 23, 1990. Respondent accepted initial liability, however, their disclaimer although filed late, disputed extent of disability and not compensability. Therefore, CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude.

Kari v. Wallingford, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 1242 CRD-8-91-6 (February 23, 1993).

Disclaimer in response to notice alleging emotional disorder, physical and mental stress, anxiety and depression, found sufficiently specific to avoid statutory presumption of liability.

Borent v. State/Dept. of Transportation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 219, 1302 CRD-2-91-9 (December 17, 1992), aff’d, 33 Conn. App. 495 (1994).

CRB reversed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s motion to preclude as claimant’s notice of claim for hearing loss was filed within one year from the last day worked. CRB relied on previous decisions that hearing loss results from repetitive trauma and the date of injury is the last day of exposure. Medical treatment received prior to last day worked does not start the clock running for statute of limitation purposes in repetitive trauma claims.

Pickard v. Manchester Gardens Condominium Association, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 216, 1331 CRD-1-91-9 (December 17, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant’s notice of claim failed to comply with technical requirements of § 31-294. Claimant failed to sufficiently establish a date of injury for his alleged back trauma claimed as work related, although CRB noted that, ordinarily, a trial commissioner need not inquire beyond the face of the documents submitted on a Motion to Preclude.

Wald v. Hitchcock Chair Co., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 192, 1281 CRD-5-91-8 (September 14, 1992).

Language in notice does not require a medical diagnosis nor does claimant need to prove compensability. See, Shira v. National Business Systems, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 140, 840 CRD-6-89-4 (August 16, 1990).

Halliday v. Daw’s Critical Care Registry, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 187, 1196 CRD-7-91-3 (September 14, 1992), dismissed lack of final judgment, A.C. 11770 (January 7, 1993), cert. denied, 225 Conn. 905 (February 18, 1993).

Remanded. CRB held it was not improper for trial commissioner to grant preclusion without an evidentiary hearing once jurisdiction was no longer an issue. However, record below fails to disclose whether claimant actually filed a Motion to Preclude in accordance with Adm. Reg. § 31-297(b)-1. Therefore, trier’s granting of said Motion violated respondent’s due process right to oppose such Motion by filing opposing affidavits, further documentation and memoranda of law. See also, Halliday, § 31-275(9).

Chute v. Mobil Shipping and Transportation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 183, 1321 CRD-7-91-10 (September 1, 1992), aff’d, 32 Conn. App. 16 (1993), cert. denied, 227 Conn. 919 (1993).

Motion to Preclude denied where trier found no employer/employee relationship existed as decedent was an independent contractor. See also, Chute, § 31-275(9) and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Chase v. State/Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 181, 1305 CRD-2-91-9 (September 1, 1992), rev’d, 45 Conn. App. 499 (1997).

CRB held Pereira v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9 (January 8, 1991) directly on point. Notice of claim failed to identify employer as State of Connecticut, Department of Motor Vehicles. See, Chase, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 292, 2185 CRB-2-94-9 (June 20, 1996), in notes on § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Crochiere v. Enfield/Board of Education, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 165, 1069 CRD-1-90-7 (August 27, 1992), aff’d, 227 Conn. 333 (1993).

In repetitive trauma cases the last day worked is the last day of exposure. The last day of claimant’s exposure to the work related mentally traumatizing events was October 21, 1987, the last day worked. Notice of claim was filed September 22, 1988. Clearly, a repetitive trauma claim was timely filed. For occupational disease cases, the time of injury is the date of total or partial incapacity to work. A three year limit is set by statute for filing a claim for occupational disease. Claimant’s psychotic breakdown for which he was hospitalized occurred December 25, 1987. Therefore, the first day of disability, December 25, 1987, and a September 22, 1988 notice clearly fall within § 31-294’s occupational disease limits. See also, Crochiere, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

Campbell v. Manchester Memorial, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 1182 CRD-5-91-2 (June 30, 1992).

Remanded as trier made no factual finding as to when claimant knew or should have known that her right shoulder disability (i.e. repetitive trauma injury) was causally related to work. See, Edmounds v. Machlett Laboratories, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 241, 1119 CRD-7-90- 10 (October 31, 1991). See also, Campbell, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Prisco v. North & Judd, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 1190 CRD-8-91-3 (June 30, 1992).

Occupational disease claim timely filed. Respondents failed to set out the specific parts of the evidentiary record which support their claim that claimant should have known in 1984 and possibly as early as 1981 that his symptoms were occupationally related. See also, Prisco, § 31-275(1).

McGowan v. Robin Michaels Beauty Center, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 121, 1246 CRD-3-91-6 (May 15, 1992).

Notice of claim complied with technical requirements of § 31-294. CRB affirmed trier’s finding that Robyn Michaels Beauty Center is an entity against whom liability may attach and was claimant’s employer despite the fact that no trade name certificate had been filed.

Rodriguez v. Bruce Manufacturing, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 118, 1268 CRD-6-91-7 (May 15, 1992), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 30 Conn. App. 320 (1993).

CRB unpersuaded by respondents’ argument that claimant’s notice fails to state in simple language but rather provides too much information and that the notice of claim was merely a request for information.

Paccadolmi v. Newtown, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 116, 1270 CRD-4-91-8 (May 13, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant knew or should have known he had heart disease as early as 1985 when medical treatment was rendered. Claim filed in 1989 does not meet § 31-294’s statutory limitations. See also, Paccadolmi, § 7-433c.

Polleto v. New Milford Septic, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 105, 1174 CRD-7-91-2 (May 6, 1992).

Disclaimer sent to address listed on claimant’s driver’s license properly filed as claimant’s address, i.e., a P.O. Box, is the equivalent of his residence. CRB affirmed trier’s finding disclaimer was timely filed and sufficiently specific.

Murach v. New Britain, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 1172 CRD-6-91-2 (April 20, 1992).

CRB reversed trier’s finding awarding claimant § 7-433c benefits. Trier found 1988 notice of claim timely as hypertension was controlled by medication from 1978 through claimant’s first manifestation of a symptom, an aortic aneurysm in 1988. CRB found first manifestation was in 1978 as claimant’s condition was then disabling as claimant required medication to continue to work. Therefore, notice in 1988 was untimely filed. See also, Murach, § 7-433c, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Romeo v. H & L Chevrolet, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 72, 1149 CRD-7-90-12 (March 31, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision dismissing claimant’s claim where claimant failed to prove notice was given within one year of the injury as district had no record of such notice being filed. See also, Romeo, § 31-278 and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Yankus v. Post College, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 1159 CRD-5-91-1 (February 19, 1992).

Reversed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s motion to preclude as disclaimer filed timely, properly addressed to the trial commissioner and sent to the chairman’s office was properly served. At the time the disclaimer was filed the trial commissioner was a commissioner at large assigned to the chairman’s office. Also, § 31-280 as it existed gave the chairman statewide jurisdiction.

Vachon v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 1137 CRD-2-90-11 (February 19, 1992), rev’d, 29 Conn. App. 654 (1992), cert. denied, 224 Conn. 927 (1993).

CRB held as respondent failed to serve disclaimer on the claimant within twenty days upon receipt of claimant’s notice of claim, motion to preclude granted. PUBLIC ACT 90-116, § 9, which requires notices of claim contain a warning provision as to the preclusive effects of § 31-297(b), affects a substantive right and should not be applied retroactively. Appellate Court reversed and remanded. Appellate Court held employer not required to send notice to employee within 20 days as § 31-297(b) does not contain language specifically directing the sending of a disclaimer notice to employee within 20 days.

Peters v. State/Southern Connecticut State University, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 1103 CRD-3-90-8 (January 13, 1992).

Whether a claim is timely filed is a jurisdictional question which can be raised at any time. See, Pelletier v. Caron Pipe Jacking, Inc., 13 Conn. App. 276 (1988). Evidence supports trier’s conclusion statute began to run when claimant became aware of the possible link between his work place and his cancer. Therefore notice satisfies jurisdictional and technical prerequisites for an occupational disease notice of claim. Additionally, as respondents previously withdrew their appeal in an earlier decision granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude, contention as to whether notice met all the technical requirements of § 31-294 was waived. See, Peters, Remanded on § 31-308(c) issue, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Black v. London & Egazarian, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 1098 CRD-7-90-8 (December 30, 1991), rev’d, 30 Conn. App. 295 (1993), cert. denied, 225 Conn. 916 (1993).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding dependent widow failed to sustain her burden of proof that decedent’s cardiac arrest and death arose in and out of the course of his employment as factual finding was based on the weight and credibility he gave to the evidence and medical testimony presented. Appellate Court found commissioner improperly denied Motion to Preclude, thereby reversing CRD’s ruling. Appellate Court found claimant’s notice complied with § 31-321 in that the notice was in fact properly deposited as certified mail. Postal worker’s unsuccessful attempt to obtain a signed receipt does not constitute non-compliance. Also, claimant’s letter included all the information necessary under § 31-294 to satisfy notice requirements. Furthermore, intend to file language in claimant’s letter apprised employer of an imminent claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See, Black, infra.

DeAlmeida v. M.C.M. Stamping Corporation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 1097 CRD-7-90-8, 1139 CRD-7-90-11 (December 30, 1991), aff’d, 29 Conn. App. 441 (1992).

Public Act 90-116 provided notices of claim must be properly served and include a warning to the employer they shall be precluded from contesting liability unless a notice contesting liability is filed within the time prescribed. Respondent’s contention P.A. 90-116 should be applied retroactively is erroneous as P.A. 90-116 affects substantive rights. Further, issues of causation are not jurisdictional and cannot be raised if respondent is precluded from asserting defenses to a claim pursuant to § 31-297b. See, Marchesseault v. Guerrera, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 104, 850 CRD-5-89-4 (November 9, 1989).

Carvalko v. Bassick Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 258, 767 CRD-4-88-9 (December 2, 1991).

CRD affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s date of injury for hearing loss claim was the last date of exposure to the noisy environment. Further, where notice of claim set out specific period of time for which hearing loss was attributed and evidence during proceedings below indicates exposure at a different period, and trial commissioner finds that subsequent period to be the date of injury, statute of non-claim satisfied. Notice was filed within one year from the date of injury, i.e. date of last exposure. See also, Carvalko, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Mingrone v. Burndy Corporation, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 252, 1109 CRD-7-90-9 (November 21, 1991).

Remanded as CRD disagreed with trier’s interpretation of § 31-294 concerning statute of limitations for occupational disease and surviving widow’s claim for compensation. A possibility or mere suspicion does not satisfy statutory intent when a symptom should plainly appear. CRD also found surviving widow’s notice of claim for compensation met all the statutory requirements under § 31-294. Trier erred in concluding notice was insufficient. CRD found notice did in fact state surviving widow’s name (Mrs. Bruno Mingrone), her address, identified her claim properly and reason why a claim was being filed. Place of accident as used in § 31-294 does not pertain to occupational disease notice requirements. No need to include address of deceased person.

Edmounds v. Machlett Laboratories, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 241, 1119 CRD-7-90-10 (October 31, 1991).

Remanded as CRD unable to determine on what legal basis the trier concluded that § 31-294’s exception to a written notice of claim was not satisfied. Here claimant suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. It is not clear when the claimant knew or should have known of the disabling condition. CRD opinion also discussed § 31-294’s provision of furnishing medical care as interpreted by case law.

Collins v. Jiffy Auto Radiator, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 232, 993 CRD-3-90-3 (October 30, 1991).

Medical bills paid by group health insurance does not constitute furnishing of medical care. See, Clapps v. Waterbury Iron Works, Inc., 38 Conn. Sup. 644 (1983).

Tomkus v. Upjohn Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 972 CRD-3-90-1 (June 28, 1991).

Where company nurse performs an EKG and subsequently drives claimant to the hospital the statutory requirements of furnishing medical care are met. See also, Tomkus, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-298.

Dubois v General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 160, 1095 CRD-2-90-8 (June 25, 1991), aff’d, 222 Conn. 62 (1992).

Notice of claim under § 31-294 does not require address of deceased employee where name and address of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed appears on the notice. Also, statutory language of § 31-297(b) makes it clear that the twenty day window for filing a disclaimer begins when the employer receives the notice of claim not when the commissioner receives the notice of claim.

Lorusso v. State/Southbury Training School, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 158, 1059 CRD-5-90-6 (June 13, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer contained even more specificity than that in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Greger v. State/Southbury Training School, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 1016 CRD-5-90-5 (June 10, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Marchesseault v. J.P. Guerrera, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 982 CRD-5-90-2 (May 22, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer language was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Melvin v. Mattatuck Manufacturing Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 131, 964 CRD-5-89-12 (May 16, 1991).

CRD reversed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer language was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Synnott v. Waterbury, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129, 962 CRD-5-89-12 (May 16, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Deangelo v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 126, 970 CRD-8-90-1 (May 16, 1991).

Statute of limitations as to occupational disease begins to run from the first manifestation of symptoms which plainly appear, not when suspected or doubtful.

Dattillo v. Yale University, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 118, 1074 CRD-3-90-7 (April 26, 1991).

CRD held notice of claim met statutory requirements of § 31-294. Employer failed to serve disclaimer in accordance with § 31-321, therefore any objections to causation are irrelevant and preclusion must lie.

Hushin v. Hawthorne Inn, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 931 CRD-6-89-10 (March 5, 1991).

CRD remanded matter as trier’s conclusion that respondents mailing of a disclaimer to claimant’s attorney’s address published in a then current telephone directory therefore satisfying § 31-321 was not supported by the evidence in the record below.

Colas v. Marriott Food Services, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 939 CRD-7-89-11 (February 26, 1991).

Trier’s failure to admit document into evidence or take administrative notice of it would not have affected the result of the decision. One respondent sought to admit a letter (notice of claim) from claimant’s counsel in order to support a Motion to Preclude. CRD held that while the letter which purported alternative theories for the basis of the compensation claim was sufficient notice under § 31-294, the letter would not support the preclusive effects of § 31-297(b) as it was not a direct assertion of a claim against the other respondents. See also, Colas, § 31-298, and § 31-307b.

Baldoni v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 916 CRD-5-89-9 (February 1, 1991).

Where two timely disclaimers are filed and trier fails to consider one disclaimer which satisfies the specificity requirements of § 31-297(b) as held in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989), trier’s decision reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Pereira v. State/Dept. Children & Youth Services, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 906 CRD-7-89-8 (January 8, 1991), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 9884 (March 20, 1991).

Notice failed to properly identify employer for § 31-297(b) purposes when employer was designated as Dept. Children & Youth Services and no reference was made to State of Connecticut. But see, Pereira, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 229, 1209 CRD-7-91-4 (1993), aff’d, 228 Conn. 535 (1994), § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Factual findings. Supreme Court noted that CRB’s strict compliance with notice requirements was inappropriate. See, Pereira, supra at 542-43, note 8.

Hveem v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 897 CRD-5-89-7 (January 4, 1991).

Reversed decision of trial commissioner. Disclaimer language sufficiently specific. See, Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989). See, Hveem, § 31-321.

DiBenedetto v. State/University of Connecticut Health Center, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 862 CRD-6-89-5 (January 3, 1991).

Remanded to establish compensability as proper disclaimer filed before proper notice of claim does not render it deficient. See, Gelinas v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 65, 705 CRD-5-88-3 (August 16, 1989); Lopez v. Peerless Aluminum Foundry, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 654 CRD-4-87 (October 18, 1988); Elmassri v. Vinco, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 584 CRD-7-87 (June 2, 1988); Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 338 CRD-3-84 (April 1, 1985). See also, DiBenedetto, § 5-142(a), § 5-145a.

Rogers v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 878 CRD-2-89-6 (September 27, 1990).

Proper disclaimer filed before written notice of claim satisfies § 31-297(b) requirements. See, Elmassri v. Vinco, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 584 CRD-7-87 (June 2, 1988); Lopez v. Peerless Aluminum Foundry, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 654 CRD-4-87 (October 18, 1988).

Shira v. National Business Systems, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 140, 840 CRD-6-89-4 (August 16, 1990), remanded, lack of final judgment, 25 Conn. App. 350 (1991).

Notice of claim need only state the nature of injury in simple language. The only defenses which survive an elapsed disclaimer are jurisdictional ones. If they are satisfied, preclusion must lie.

Orcutt v. Ohmweave Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 125, 822 CRD-2-89-2 (August 2, 1990).

Law which governs is the law at the time of the injury. For occupational disease the time of injury is the date of first known manifestation. See also, Orcutt, § 31-307.

Fleming v. New Haven Register, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 108, 827 CRD-5-89-2 (June 19, 1990).

Remanded where trial commissioner failed to state specific reasons for denying preclusion.

Dorsett v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 805 CRD-2-88-12 (May 8, 1990), aff’d, 23 Conn. App. 827 (1990)(per curiam), cert. denied, 218 Conn. 901 (1991).

Statute does not require address of deceased employee. Address of dependent widow claiming benefits pursuant to § 31-306 sufficient to satisfy notice requirements. Notice filed within limitation period, therefore complied with jurisdictional prerequisite.

Trantolo v. Trantolo & Trantolo, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 823 CRD-6-89-2 (April 17, 1990).

Respondent’s attack on constitutionality of § 31-297(b) requirement that disclaimer be filed within 20 days could not be decided by commission as it lacks jurisdiction over such issues. See also, Trantolo, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Deck v. Groton, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 745 CRD-2-88-6 (December 12, 1989).

Motion to Preclude denied where notice of claim for heart attack failed to meet one year statute of limitation under § 31-294. Further evidentiary hearings necessary to determine if claimant’s § 7-433c claim for hypertension met 3 year statute of limitation for occupational disease.

Delos v. United Illuminating, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 751 CRD-4-88-7 (November 30, 1989).

For hearing loss, the date of injury is last date of exposure to repetitive trauma.

Marchesseault v. Guerrera, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 104, 850 CRD-5-89-4 (November 9, 1989).

Remanded. Commissioner’s jurisdictional analysis as to the applicability of § 31-297(b) was incorrect. Employer-employee relationship existed at the time of injury, however, whether injury arose out of or during the course of employment requires a separate determination.

Cousins v. Hartford, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 101, 676 CRD-1-87 (November 8, 1989).

Employer’s treatment of claimant’s nosebleed, eye infection and thrombosis of the retinal blood vessels was not the furnishing of medical care sufficient to toll statute of limitations where claimed disability was for heart and hypertension. See also, Cousins, § 7-433c.

Guinan v. Direct Marketing Association, Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 93, 734 CRD-7-88-5 (October 4, 1989), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 21 Conn. App. 63 (1990), appeal reinstated, 22 Conn. App. 515 (1990), aff’d, 23 Conn. App. 804 (1990)(per curiam).

Due process does not require notice of claim inform respondents as to possible preclusion of defenses under § 31-297(b). If notice provides an address where mail or other communications will be received, that address is sufficient. See also, Robinson v. Miller, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 686 CRD-1-88-1 (August 28, 1989). Note: See, P.A. 90-116.

Velez v. Richard Zappone, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 79, 693 CRD-5-88-2 (September 14, 1989), no error, 21 Conn. App. 812 (1990)(per curiam).

Motion to preclude cannot lie where Commission lacked jurisdiction over the res as there was no employment relationship. See, Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988). See also, Velez, § 31-275(9).

Paul v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 75, 684 CRD-7-88-1 (September 5, 1989).

Notice was sufficient under § 31-294 for the claim to survive the statute of limitations, however, such notice would not satisfy 31-297(b) requirements under DeLeon v. Jacob Bros., 38 Conn. Sup. 331 (1981); Secor v. C.A. Parshall, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 158 (March 8, 1988); Brown v. Bonvini Dental Lab, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 132, 594 CRD-7-87 (March 28, 1989); Salvaggio v. Candlewood Valley Bus Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 731 CRD-7-88 (May 1, 1989). Claim dismissed on alternate ground failure to sustain burden of proof where evidence of causality insufficient.

Lopez v. Penny’s Restaurant, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 67, 697 CRD-7-88-2 (August 23, 1989).

Remanded. Where letter from employer sent regular mail raises jurisdictional issue as to employment status, late or improperly filed disclaimer will estop § 31-297(b) presumption.

Gelinas v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 65, 705 CRD-88-3 (August 16, 1989).

Remanded. Notice contains all elements necessary to comply with § 31-294 requirements. Place of injury and place of employment are the same in this instance. Notice satisfies simple language requirement. Disclaimer filed early does not render it deficient. However, disclaimer did not comply with § 31-321, therefore preclusion must lie.

Robinson v. Miller, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 686 CRD-1-88-1 (August 28, 1989).

Reversed & remanded, where notice of claim designates a place where mail or other communications could reach claimant (in the hospital) and additionally gave the address of claimant’s lawyer, the requirements of § 31-294 have been satisfied.

Durante v. Amity Regional School District #5, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 59, 701 CRD-3-88-3 (August 11, 1989).

Disclaimer not sufficiently specific where language constitutes a general denial.

Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 51, 680 CRD-2-88-1 (August 10, 1989), no error, 21 Conn. App. 610 (1990), aff’d, 218 Conn. 181 (1991).

Allegation of improper venue incorrect as § 31-278 and § 31-294 permit notice and jurisdiction of claims with any commissioner. Where trial commissioner finds employer-employee relationship exists and there were significant contacts with this jurisdiction, Motion to Preclude will lie. See also, Cleveland, § 31-278.

Garthwait v. Banner State Rail, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 24, 605 CRD-3-87 (July 12, 1989).

Remanded. Failure to properly identify employer and employer’s address renders notice insufficient to meet technical requirements of § 31-294.

Wagner v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 637 CRD-1-87 (June 23, 1989).

Motion to Preclude upheld on the basis that notice of claim was proper and timely filed within the three year limit for an occupational disease.

Salvaggio v. Candlewood Valley Bus Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 731 CRD-7-88-5 (May 1, 1989).

Notice of claim which stated employer’s name incorrectly is insufficient to preclude liability. See also, Fuller v. Central Paving Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 92, 655 CRD-1-87 (April 6, 1988).

Ebrech v. Cadbury Schweppes, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 120, 687 CRD-7-88-1 (March 2, 1989).

Section 31-294 only requires statement of claim and nature of injury in simple language. See also, Pagan v. Paparazzo & Son, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38 (September 30, 1988). Disclaimer sent by ordinary mail to compensation commissioner not in compliance with § 31-321, See, Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 338 CRD-3-84 (April 1, 1985); Ricci v. Peabody N.E. Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 738 CRD-3-88-6 (October 26, 1988).

Piscitelli v. Connecticut Coke/Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 575 CRD-3-87 (January 26, 1989).

Statute of Limitations for occupational disease runs from date of first known manifestation.

Collins v. Seal Products, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 90, 702 CRD-5-88-3 (January 19, 1989).

Disclaimer not sufficiently specific.

Falcigno v. Joseph Feldman, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 733 CRD-3-88-5 (January 13, 1989).

Remanded as trial commissioner did not take evidence as to jurisdictional defenses. See also, Falcigno, § 31-278. See, Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988).

Schenkel v. Ken Yoos Valley Services, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 78 (January 6, 1989).

Remanded to establish jurisdictional facts as to the timeliness of the claim.

Ricci v. Peabody N.E., Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 738 CRD-3-88-6 (October 26, 1988).

Disclaimer sent regular mail to commissioner’s office invalid.

Lopez v. Peerless Aluminum Foundry, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 654 CRD-4-87 (October 18, 1988).

A motion to preclude will not lie where a valid notice of disclaimer [Form 43] was filed prior to a notice of claim.

Pagan v. Paparazzo’s & Son, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38, 653 CRD-5-87 (September 30, 1988).

Section 31-294’s requirement as to statement of nature of injury does not require a medical diagnosis.

Barron v. East Hartford, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 15, 534 CRD-1-86 (September 13, 1988).

Medical care provided to claimant by respondent-Town’s Director of Health who was also a physician constituted furnishing of medical care.

Grady v. G & L Oxygen & Medical Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 12, 572 CRD-6-87 (September 12, 1988).

Where claimant alleges injury due to repetitive trauma, § 31-294 requirement of specific accident dates not applicable. Further, in order for claim to meet statute of limitations repetitive trauma must have existed 1 year prior to claim filing.

Jarret v. Clairol, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 540 CRD-7-86 (August 16, 1988).

Trial commissioner must rule on jurisdictional issues before further action on a motion to preclude.

Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 617 CRD-4-87 (August 2, 1988), remanded, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989), cert. denied, 212 Conn. 814 (1989).

Disclaimer language, “Injury did not arise out of or in the course and scope of employment,” held not sufficiently specific. See later case, Tovish, § 31-275(1).

Gallagher v. Edmunds Manufacturing Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 494 CRD-6-86 (June 30, 1988).

The recitation of specific disabling conditions in a Voluntary Agreement does not preclude a claimant from asserting disabilities other than those specifically cited in the Voluntary Agreement if the injuries were causally related.

Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 126, 483 CRD-7-86 (June 29, 1988), rev’d, 30 Conn. App. 295 (1993), cert. denied, 225 Conn. 916 (1993).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s notice was not filed in conformity with § 31-321 was not based on impermissible inferences or contrary to law. Further rulings on Motions to Preclude are permitted under § 31-301(a). See later case, Black, supra.

Chute v. Mobil Shipping and Transportation Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 119, 579 CRD-7-87 (June 21, 1988).

Claimant’s notice of claim failed to properly identify claimant and therefore did not contain all elements necessary under § 31-294. Held no § 31-297 (b) preclusion could lie. See later case, Chute, § 31-275(9), § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Elmassri v. Vinco, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 584 CRD-7-87 (June 2, 1988).

See, Fuller, infra. Also a perfect disclaimer of liability filed before a notice of claim is a proper disclaimer and therefore the preclusive effects of § 31-297(b) cannot lie.

Fuller v. Central Paving Company, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 92, 665 CRD-7-87 (April 6, 1988).

Notice of claim must meet all technical requirements of § 31-294 before the preclusive effects of § 31-297 (b) will be triggered. Substantial compliance is not enough to trigger § 31-297(b).

Paladino v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 522 CRD-6-86 (May 17, 1988).

Respondents’ failure to send its disclaimer within statutory period and as directed by § 31-321 rendered the disclaimer a nullity. The respondents’ attempt to cure the defective filing after the 20 day statutory period for filing was untimely and therefore, Motion to Preclude granted.

Lumley v. Fairfield, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 439 CRD-4-85 (May 10, 1988).

See, Pelletier, infra.

Foley v. New Britain, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 404 CRD-7-85, Gavin v. New Britain, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 405 CRD-7-85 (April 28, 1988), no error, 17 Conn. App. 834 (1989) (per curiam).

The furnishing of medical care does not trigger need for a disclaimer.

Kalaky v. State, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 66, 520 CRD-4-86 (April 28, 1988).

Sinaguglia v. Stamford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 62, 435 CRD-7-85 (April 26, 1988).

Claim for job-related stress benefits time barred under § 31-294 where the first manifestation of symptom was found to be in 1978 and the notice of claim was in 1982.

Wilcox v. Naugatuck, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 518 CRD-5-86 (April 8, 1988), no error, 16 Conn. App. 676 (1988)(per curiam).

Language of disclaimer lacked specificity required under Menzies, infra. See also, Tovish, supra.

Kelly v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38, 469 CRD-4-86 (April 6, 1988).

Disclaimer not served in accordance with § 31-297(b) and § 31-321 failed to satisfy requisites of statute.

Gardella v. The Torrington Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 33, 471 CRD-5-86 (April 6, 1988).

Preclusion does not apply to issue of extent of disability.

Pagliuco v. United Illuminating, 5 Conn. Worker’s Comp. Rev. Op. 27, 427 CRD-4-85 (March 29, 1988).

Medical care furnished to claimant by a registered nurse employed in employer’s health department and under the supervision of a physician was held to meet exception to requirement of written notice of claim.

Bjelka v. Norwalk Hospital, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 370 CRD-7-84 (March 28, 1988).

Trial commissioner’s reliance on C.G.S. § 7442 (Rev. 1949) may be misplaced where later evidence was found tending to show claimant’s first exposure to deleterious substance was not during employment with respondents. CRD remanded as the date of death and first manifestation of symptom were November, 1977 and March 1978 (respectively) and thus, § 31-297(b) preclusion might lie.

Maher v. State, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 374 CRD-4-85 (March 24, 1988).

Trial commissioner’s finding that notice was sent by certified mail will not be disturbed on appeal. See also, Maher, § 31-306.

Pich v. Pratt & Whitney, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 354 CRD-6-84 (March 9, 1988).

Informal hearing met statute’s hearing exception for written notice and date of injury for hearing loss was last day worked.

Morton v. Vallerie’s Transportation, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 161, 343 CRD-7-84 (March 9, 1988).

Calling for an ambulance when worker complained of internal pain was not furnishing of medical care where pain was not readily distinguishable as symptom of a work injury. Further, payment of medical expenses through union administered group insurance plan was not furnishing of medical care.

Secor v. C.A. Parshall, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 158, 340 CRD-7-84 (March 8, 1988).

A notice of claim for § 31-294 purposes need not be served in accordance with § 31-321. Cf. § 31-297(b).

Butkus v. Bethlehem, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 421 CRD-5-85 (February 23, 1988).

Notice of Intent to Contest must be sent certified or registered mail as provided in § 31-321.

Laprade v. Robbins, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 100, 505 CRD-7-87 (June 12, 1987).

Respondent argued that it should not be precluded from contesting liability where it alleged fraud in the making of the claim. Held commissioner’s factual determination that there was no fraud in the making of the claim should be upheld.

Bull v. Raymark Industries, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 91, 474 CRD-4-86 (June 8, 1987).

Disclaimer stating grounds of contest as alleged injury found lacking specificity.

Castro v. Viera, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 64, 442 CRD-1-86 (1987), error, 207 Conn. 420 (1987).

CRD held respondent could not assert defense of no employer-employee relationship when it failed to file a timely disclaimer. Reversed by Supreme Court.

Squier v. Raymark Industries, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 406 CRD-4-85 (April 3, 1987).

Use of the term “alleged” before “injury” on Form 43 did not meet Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973) specificity requirements.

Janov v. General Electric Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 491 CRD-4-86 (March 27, 1987).

A recurrence of injury relates back to the date of original injury and therefore does not time bar claim.

Ash v. New Milford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 41, 433 CRD-7-85(a), 433 CRD-7-85(b) (March 26, 1987), no error, 207 Conn. 665 (1988).

Non-compliance with 20-day disclaimer rule precludes right to assert defenses against both dependent widow and dependent minor son. Also flooding of municipality which did not actually close municipal government office did not excuse Town from compliance with 20-day period.

Boutin v. Industrial Components, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 237 CRD-6-83 (March 3, 1987).

Repetitive trauma statute of limitation starts to run from when claimant knew of disability and its work connection. But See, Dorsey, supra.

Barnett v. Stafford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 219 CRD-1-83 (March 2, 1987).

Disclaimer held sufficiently specific under Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973).

Pelletier v. Caron Pipe Jacking, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 132, 487 CRD-6-86 (December 29, 1986), rev’d, 13 Conn. App. 276 (1988), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 805 (1988).

Employer’s failure to file disclaimer (Form 43) within prescribed time stated in § 31-297(b) results in preclusion. Reversed and set aside by Appellate Court.

Vallee v. Curtis Packaging Company, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 124, 336 CRD-4-84 (December 23, 1986).

Failure to file a written notice of claim within statutory period prescribed by § 31-294 does not prevent preclusion of compensability if employer fails to file a timely Form 43, Notice of Contest, once employee files a written claim.

Oliver v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 117, 225 CRD-2-83 (December 23, 1986).

Exception to written claim requirement where claimant has requested a hearing applies to both formal and informal hearing requests. Furnishing medical attention is an exception to filing written notice of claim within 1 year.

Weston v. Avco Lycoming, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 279 CRD-4-83 (November 26, 1986).

Motion to Preclude granted when Notice of Contest not filed within prescribed time period. See, Bush and LaVogue, infra.

Murphy v. West Haven, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 126 CRD-3-82 (November 13, 1986).

Failure to negate existence of medical care exception will justify refusal to reopen award on ground that no notice was given by claimant within 1 year.

O’Neill v. New King, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 190 CRD-6-82 (November 13, 1986).

As notice to the respondent was not forwarded in prescribed statutory manner, claimant’s Motion to Preclude must be denied.

Brusca v. Color Tech, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 81, 50 CRD-7-81 (November 6, 1986).

Notice of claim must comply with § 31-321 before motion to preclude will be granted.

Sartirana v. Winchester, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 67, 368 CRD-5-84 (July 15, 1986).

Defenses limited to those raised in Notice to Compensation Commissioner and Employee of Intention to Contest Liability to Pay Compensation (Form 43).

Stasolla v. Fairfield, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 63, 328 CRD-4-84 (July 15, 1986).

Defense of untimely filing of claim notice precluded when employer failed to file a timely Notice to Contest Liability (Form 43).

LaVogue v. Cincinnati, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 51, 263 CRD-1-83 (April 15, 1986), no error, 9 Conn. App. 91 (1986)(per curiam), cert. denied, 201 Conn. 814 (1986).

Failure to file timely Notice of Contest (Form 43) precludes employer from asserting jurisdictional defense.

Yuknat v. State/State Police, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 274 CRD-2-83 (March 19, 1986), no error, 9 Conn. App. 425 (1987)(per curiam).

Where letter and accompanying documents were to serve as written notice of claim and employer did not contest liability within twenty (20) days, compensability is presumed.

Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op.133, 338 CRD-3-84 (April 1, 1985).

Filing of proper notice of claim (Form 30-C), in accord with § 31-321 requirements, must be disclaimed within twenty (20) days.

De La Torre v. State, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 95, 148 CRD-1-82 (August 6, 1984).

Notice of disclaim of liability sent to estate of deceased and not dependent minor child does not operate against interests of dependent minor child where proper notice of claim was filed.

Cuccuro v. West Haven, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 103 CRD-3-81 (July 27, 1984), no error, 6 Conn. App. 265 (1986), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804 (1986).

See, Spragg v. West Haven, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 125 CRD-3-82, no error, 6 Conn. App. 265 (1986), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 805 (1986) (same issues). Notice requirements may be satisfied by means other than written notice.

Bush v. Quality Bakers of America, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 36, 132 CRD-7-82 (October 4, 1983), no error, 2 Conn. App. 363 (1984), cert. denied, 194 Conn. 804 (1984).

Compensation awarded due to employer’s failure to file a timely notice of contest where injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment.

Timothy v. Upjohn, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 150 CRD-3-83 (February 25, 1983), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 3 Conn. App. 162 (1985).

Notice of claim for chapter 568 benefits must be made in accordance with § 31-321 if claimant seeks to preclude respondent from contesting liability.

Janco v. Fairfield, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 189, 102 CRD-4-81 (September 13, 1982), reversed and remanded, 39 Conn. Sup. 403 (1983).

Compensation Review Division held furnishing group health benefits constituted furnishing medical care. Appellate court reversed and remanded.

Cortes v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 173, 61 CRD-3-81 (August 18, 1982).

Statute of limitation did not commence until claimant knew or should have known that he was experiencing a manifestation of occupational disease symptoms.

Ciotti v. Morani Tile Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 141, 35 CRD-4-80 (July 29, 1982).

No written notice of claim necessary where employer furnished medical care under group plan. Where notice of claim was filed but not necessary, disclaimer of liability must be filed within twenty (20) days.

Graf v. Genovese & Massaro, Inc., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129, 59 CRD-3-81 (July 13, 1982).

Claimant furnished care within one year.

Clapps v. Waterbury Iron Work, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 115, 20 CRD-5-80 (February 19, 1982), error; judgement directed, 38 Conn. Sup. 644 (1983).

Payment of medical expenses by group health plan constituted furnishing of medical care under statute. Appellate court set aside and remanded.

DeLeon v. Jacob Brothers, Inc., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 18, 23 CRD-4-80 (January 26, 1981), aff’d, 38 Conn. Sup. 331 (1981), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 952, 102 S. Ct. 2026 (1982).