CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-291

Trier did not err by declining to address § 31-291 principal employment issue, as she was within her authority to bifurcate proceedings. CRB remanded case for scheduling of hearing on possible principal employer liability. See also, Puchala, § 31-275(9).

Section 31-291 does not apply where claimant is not an employee, and thus no employment relationship exists. See also, Covillion, § 31-275(9)(10).

Trier ordered that “the respondent, Cesary Bartosiewicz and Elite Contracting, Inc., pay Claimant all monetary and medical benefits due. . . .” Bartosiewicz was found to be the claimant’s employer, while Elite Contracting was the general contractor. CRB reversed. Trier failed to distinguish the legal grounds for each party’s liability. As the award did not establish an employee-employer relationship between the claimant and Elite Contracting, the conditions of § 31-291 had to be satisfied before liability as a principal employer might be imposed. Trier did not discuss all three criteria of the “principal employer” test, and a remand was necessary for further findings. Also cited in Kogut, § 31-275(9) notes.

Hebert v. RWA Inc., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 169, 3128 CRB-2-95-7 (May 2, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 449 (1998), cert. denied, 246 Conn. 901 (1998).

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that Hansen was the principal employer pursuant to § 31-291 when the claimant sustained a compensable injury while working on a roofing job for RWA Inc. Decision includes a discussion of case law and requisites for finding a principal employer relationship. CRB was not persuaded by Hansen’s contention that in the absence of a claim by the claimant against him it was not proper for the Second Injury Fund to claim that he was the principal employer.

Jones v. Lillibridge, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 143, 3149 CRB-2-95-6 (November 27, 1996).

Commissioner found that Second Injury Fund failed to establish that third party was a principal employer. Whether elements of principal employer statute have been satisfied is a question of fact; however, commissioner appears to have applied test for existence of employment relationship rather than principal employer-subcontractor relationship. Findings that were on point support conclusion that third party was a principal employer. Remanded for further findings. See also, Jones, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

CRB reversed commissioner’s decision that Rocky Hill Enterprises was not a principal employer, and thus CRB held Rocky Hill Enterprises liable for an accident which occurred to a claimant who worked for Jodar Blasting. CRB concluded that the blasting and rock removal performed by Jodar was indeed a necessary and expected part of the construction of a residential subdivision which was being done by Rocky Hill Enterprises. Accordingly, CRB concluded that as a matter of law the rock removal function was a “part or process” of the construction of residential subdivision. Discussion of requirements of § 31-291.

Where trial commissioner found that truck driven by claimant had been leased by employer to third party contractor at time of injury, sufficient evidence existed to require further findings as to potential liability of third party as principal employer under § 31-291. Remanded. See also, Walton, § 31-355(b).

Record contained evidence of all three conditions necessary under statute to find liability as principal employer. Respondent also argued that § 31-355 requires Second Injury Fund to pay award because subcontractor uninsured, and statute in conflict with § 31-291. Held, statutes not in conflict; inconsistent with purpose or language of either statute to require principal employer to pay where subcontractor is uninsured. See also, Phelan, § 31-275(9), § 31-301. Factual findings, and § 31-355(b). See subsequent Phelan, § 31-310.

Hebert v. RWA Roofing & Sheet Metal, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 1750 CRB-2-93-6, 1899 CRB-2-93-11, 2129 CRB-2-94-8 (December 6, 1994).

Further proceedings below are necessary for determination of principal employer status where no record or transcript of evidence exists. See also, Hebert, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Smith v. Boland, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 234, 1502 CRB-7-92-9 (March 28, 1994).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that at the time of claimant’s injury no relationship of general contractor and subcontractor existed, thereby concluding uninsured employer, Boland, liable absent a principal employer relationship. See also, Smith, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Altieri v. B.K.S. Excavating, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 1146 CRD-3-90-12 (April 10, 1992).

Reversed. Trier failed to allow second injury fund the opportunity to litigate whether a potential principal employer liability claim existed pursuant to § 31-291. The fact that the trial commissioner found B.K.S. Excavating the uninsured employer does not eliminate the need to fully litigate and hear evidence regarding a possible § 31-291 principle employer claim. See also, Altieri, § 31-275(10), § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-355(b).

Pina v. Leitkowski Construction Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38, 907 CRD-2-89-8 (February 1, 1991).

Trial commissioner’s decision as to principal employer status will not be disturbed on appeal where totality of evidence and factual findings were sufficient to conclude work performed was delegated by Leitkowski, was under the control of Leitkowski, and was a part or process in Leitkowski’s trade. Where statutory elements are met the assessment of liability does not require a finding of a contractual relationship per se. See also, Pina, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Munoz v. Richard Surface Construction, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 11, 875 CRD-4-89-6 (January 8, 1991), aff’d, 27 Conn. App. 906 (1992)(per curiam).

Sufficient facts were found to conclude employer, Richard Surface, had control over the premises claimant was working at the time of his injury so as to conclude Surface was the principal employer.

Powers v. Savage, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 178, 892 CRD-4-89-7 (November 30, 1990).

CRD remanded for further proceedings in order to provide S.I.F. an opportunity to litigate issue of principal employer. See also, Powers, § 31-355(a).

Halliday v. Daw’s Critical Care Registry, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 797 CRD-7-88-12 (April 27, 1990).

Remanded. Trial commissioner’s finding that claimant was not an employee of subcontractor inconsistent with finding and conclusion that respondent was the principal employer. See also, Halliday, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. See later case, Halliday, § 31-275(9).

CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-291

Principal employer, contractor and subcontractor.