CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-284(a)

The board affirmed the trier’s conclusion that the claimant’s accident was caused by his intoxication and thus was not compensable. The claimant, employed as a chef, was intoxicated and fell while carrying a vat of hot oil across a slippery kitchen floor. In his appeal, the claimant contended that his conduct was not wilful and serious misconduct. The board explained that the wilful misconduct exclusion is separate from the intoxication exclusion, and therefore an injury caused by intoxication does not also have to be wilful and serious misconduct.

The trier denied the claimant’s motion to preclude which sought to preclude the respondents from presenting evidence regarding the claimant’s alleged intoxication at the time of the alleged injury, as the intoxication defense had not been listed on the Form 43. The trier ruled that whether the claimant was intoxicated at the time of the injury implicated the jurisdiction of the commission, and thus concluded that the issue of intoxication should be presented and decided. However, the board explained that because an issue in the case was whether there existed an employer-employee relationship (i.e. whether the claimant was acting as an independent contractor), that issue must be decided first as it implicates subject matter jurisdiction. On the other hand, the issue of intoxication does not involve subject matter jurisdiction, but constitutes an affirmative defense. The board further explained that the issue of whether the respondents could present evidence of intoxication was an evidentiary issue rather than an issue of preclusion. See Mason, § 31-294c, § 31-298, § 31-301, Appeal Procedure.

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant, who suffered serious injuries from decompression sickness, did not commit willful misconduct by increasing the altitude of the unpressurized aircraft he was piloting above 10,000 feet, and ordering the crew to continue on to their scheduled destination wearing oxygen masks. Primary issue was a question of fact, and the commissioner found the claimant’s testimony most credible. CRB was not in a position to find as a matter of law that the claimant’s decisionmaking as a pilot was so egregious as to constitute misconduct. Also cited at Burse, § 31-301. Factual findings; prior decision in Burse, 3480 CRB-2-96-12 (November 7, 1997), appeal dismissed, A.C. 17825 (January 14, 1998) (subject matter jurisdiction over claim exists in Connecticut), § 31-278.

Respondent offered no evidence to support affirmative defense of willful misconduct. See also, King, § 7-433c; cited at King, § 31-294c.

Paternostro v. Arborio Corp., 3659 CRB-6-97-8 (September 8, 1998), aff’d, 56 Conn. App. 215 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 (2000).

Trial commissioner found that decedent was intoxicated and was attempting to cross limited access highway on foot against employer’s rules when he was struck by a car and killed. Trier ruled that this constituted willful and serious misconduct, and dismissed dependents’ claim for benefits. CRB affirmed. Toxicological analysis of decedent showed that his blood alcohol content was .18 at time of death, which occurred shortly after the accident. Expert testified that this constitutes intoxication pursuant to AMA guidelines. Commissioner was entitled to find that these circumstances amounted to willful misconduct. Trier did not need to find that decedent’s misconduct or intoxication was the sole proximate cause of the accident; Connecticut law uses substantial factor test to determine necessary causal connection in workers’ compensation cases.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s depression and attempted suicide were compensable because they were caused by her prior compensable back injury. The trial commissioner’s rejection of the respondents’ defense of willful misconduct indicates that he did not accept as a factual matter that the claimant’s conduct constituted willful misconduct. It was within the discretion of the trial commissioner to determine as a factual issue whether the claimant’s conduct constituted willful misconduct; he was certainly not required to find as a matter of law that such actions amounted to willful and serious misconduct under § 31-284(a). (Frankl, C., dissenting) Claimant’s conduct constituted willful misconduct and thus should not have been found compensable. See also, Hurd, § 31-301. Factual findings.

See, Swaggerty, § 31-298.

See, Ogdon, § 31-275(9).

Kish v. Nursing and Home Care, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 3068 CRB-2-95-6 (November 12, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 620 (1998), aff’d, 248 Conn. 379 (1999).

See, Kish, § 31-275(1).

Willful and serious misconduct is an affirmative defense, and respondents had burden of proving those allegations. Where commissioner rejected corrected findings offered by respondents on that issue, it indicated that he did not believe that the claimant’s conduct, although questionable, was of a sufficiently grave character to warrant a finding of willful misconduct. See also, Federchuck, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

CRB affirmed denial of benefits where alleged injury at work occurred due to horseplay initiated by claimant. See also, Simmons, § 31-298, § 31-294c, and § 31-275(1).

Colon v. Savin Brothers, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 299, 1574 CRB-1-92-11 (June 13, 1994), aff’d, 37 Conn. App. 912 (1995)(per curiam), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 903 (1995).

Compensation denied where claimant’s injuries to his shoulders were the result of his intentional interference with a police officer which constituted willful and serious misconduct.

Peddle v. Finish Line Cafe, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 27, 1396 CRB-2-92-2 (January 18, 1994).

Trier found claimant’s involvement in a fight at a cafe where she sustained injuries to her knee, neck, elbow and head were the result of her own intentional acts. Further, trier found no employer-employee relationship existed at the time claimant sustained her injuries. See also, Peddle, § 31-294c, § 31-275(1), § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Nolan v. Brennan Concrete Corporation, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 224, 1362 CRD-7-91-12 (November 4, 1993), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 13041 (January 5, 1994).

Reversed and remanded. Trier’s conclusion claimant’s injury was the result of willful and serious misconduct failed to address the mental state or intent of the injured employee (claimant) in engaging in the misconduct. Discussion of personal injury and Connecticut’s rule in determining whether a workplace assault between fellow employees is considered to arise out of the employment and whether recovery will be denied pursuant to § 31-284(a) because the injury was caused by willful and serious misconduct. See also, Nolan, § 31-275(1) and § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)].

Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 255, 1226 CRD-4-91-5 (January 13, 1993), rev’d, 33 Conn. App. 695 (1994), rev’d, 231 Conn. 469 (1994), aff’d on remand, 37 Conn. App. 266 (1995)(per curiam).

Alleged willful misconduct in continuing to work where there was asbestos exposure after being diagnosed with pulmonary asbestosis due to employment related asbestos exposure dismissed. See also, Muldoon, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(15), § 31-296, § 31-299b, § 31-315.

Crochiere v. Enfield/Board of Education, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 165, 1069 CRD-1-90-7 (August 27, 1992), aff’d, 227 Conn. 333 (1993).

Accusation that claimant, a music teacher, inappropriately touched a female student which resulted in his being terminated from employment does not prove willful misconduct where trier found and evidence supports mental stress claim arose out of and in the course of employment and was not the result of willful misconduct. Also, CRB dismissed respondent’s claim that the trial commissioner was collaterally estopped from inquiring into claimant’s alleged willful misconduct on the basis that respondent employer’s termination proceedings had decided that issue. Additionally, as a collateral estoppel defense was not raised at the trial level the issue need not be considered an appealable issue. See also, Crochiere, § 31-275(1), § 31-294c, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

Richard v. Catholic Mutual Relief Society of America, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 272, 1067 CRD-1-90-7 (December 6, 1991).

Trier’s conclusion that respondents failed to sustain their burden of proof as to the affirmative defense of intoxification affirmed as there were facts found from which the trier could have concluded that intoxification did not cause the automobile accident. See, Corcoran v. Corcoran Moving and Storage, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 237, 1030 CRD-5-90-6 (October 31, 1991) reviewing Liptak v. State, 176 Conn. 320, 322 (1978). See also, Richard, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Corcoran v. Corcoran Moving and Storage, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 237, 1030 CRD-5-90-6 (October 31, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s factual finding that claimant’s vehicular accident while trying to avoid striking a deer, which accident rendered claimant a paraplegic, was not caused by claimant’s intoxication. Claimant was within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

Johnson v. West Haven, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 792 CRD-3-88-12 (March 21, 1990), no error, 23 Conn. App. 818 (1990).

Where evidence below is conflicting, we will not disturb the commissioner’s finding that injuries sustained to police officer were not a result of his own willful and serious misconduct. See also, Johnson, § 31-275(1).

Daniels v. Hartford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 459 CRD-1-86 (March 23, 1988), no error, 17 Conn. App. 819 (1988)(per curiam), cert. denied, 210 Conn. 809 (1989).

Burden of proof that injury was the result of intoxication is an affirmative defense and is on the respondents.

CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-284(a)

Defense(s) to liability. (Wilful and serious misconduct.)