 |
||||||
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soares v. Glass Industries, 4140 CRB-3-99-10 (April 10, 2001).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Second Injury Fund’s § 31-301(g) claim. Fund sought reimbursement from insurer of overpayments made to claimant while Fund was paying pending appeal pursuant to § 31-301(f). Under statute, claimant must ultimately make restitution, as he is the one unjustly enriched. See also, Soares, § 31-300; prior CRB decision at Soares, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 189, 1377 CRB-3-92-1 (May 4, 1994), § 31-297, § 31-300, § 31-307b, § 31-315.
Karnane v. Saks Fifth Avenue, 4214 CRB-7-00-3 (March 29, 2001).
See, Karnane, § 31-349 (§ 31-301(f) was not dispositive in this case because the appeal was taken from a transfer order rather than from an award of benefits).
Muldoon v. New England Installation, 3552 CRB-4-97-3 (August 24, 1998).
See, Muldoon, § 31-300.
Dowling Considine v. Slotnik, 3468 CRB-4-96-11 (May 6, 1998).
See, Dowling, § 31-290, § 31-296, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., 3432 CRB-2-96-9 (February 28, 1997), rev’d, 243 Conn. 311 (1997).
Amendment to statute in P.A. 95-277 made employer or insurer liable for unpaid awards pending appeal instead of Second Injury Fund. CRB held that this change did not have a retroactive effect, despite Annechiarico v. Friendly Ice Cream Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 18, 640 CRD-7-87 (September 16, 1988). Good sense and justice require interpretation of statute consistent with remedial spirit of Workers’ Compensation Act. Allowing Fund’s layer of protection to be removed makes a claimant less likely to receive benefits until his appeal is resolved, as happened in this case. CRB will not read statute to affect more claimants than required by the express language of the amended statute. Use of “date of injury” rule affirmed. Reversed by Supreme Court, which held that the legislative change must be applied retroactively. The court explained that the legislation was procedural in nature and did not affect the parties’ substantive rights, and that the legislative intent to reduce the financial burden on the Fund would be undermined if it were applied prospectively only.
Yablonski v. Danbury Hospital, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 166, 3107 CRB-7-95-7 (February 13, 1996).
The commissioner’s order that the Fund pay compensation benefits pursuant to § 31-301(f) C.G.S is not proper as there was no underlying order that the employer or its insurer pay the claimant any specified benefits.
Pereira v. Taylor & Fenn Co., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 16, 1816 CRB-1-93-8 (April 28, 1995).
Where underlying order being appealed is against Second Injury Fund itself, the Fund is still required to pay the award pending outcome of the appeal. See also, Pereira, § 31-298.
Laine v. New England Aircraft, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 138, 536 CRD-6-86 (April 5, 1989).
See, Annechiarico, § 31-301(f) infra [formerly 31-301(b)].
Brown v. Bon Dental Lab, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 132, 594 CRD-7-87 (March 28, 1989).
See, Annechiarico, § 31-301(f) infra [formerly 31-301(b)].
Waddington v. Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 127, 720 CRD-2-88-4 (March 27, 1989).
See, Annechiarico, § 31-301(f) infra [formerly 31-301(b)].
Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 593 CRD-2-87 (January 13, 1989), no error, 212 Conn. 441 (1989).
Second Injury Fund liable for payment pending appeal even though claim predated statute’s enactment.
Annechiarico v. Friendly Ice Cream Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 18, 640 CRD-7-87 (September 16, 1988).
Application of law permitting payment of benefits pending appeal may be applied retrospectively.
|
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|