CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-296

Physician felt claimant capable of light duty. No error in granting Form 36 on strength of independent medical examiner’s report, after which claimant was no longer entitled to continue her light duty status by working four-hour days. See, Duddy, § 31-298; § 31-301. Factual findings; § 31-307.

Trier appropriately construed pro se claimant’s letter as an objection to Form 36. Formal hearing affords de novo review of ruling on Form 36. Claimant’s subsequently-hired counsel did not object to second Form 36, but trier permissibly held that an objection was unnecessary given that the parties were already debating the issues raised by that Form 36 via the hearing process. Trier may take into account the context of events. See, Covaleski, § 31-294d, § 31-307.

CRB affirmed trier’s granting of Form 36 effective April 3, 2001 where claimant did not receive updated report of independent medical examiner until May 18, 2001, three days before the formal hearing. Claimant was aware that benefits had been discontinued, and doctor had stated in prior report that he was of the opinion that she could perform light work, provided that her blood tests came back negative for an occult infection. It was reasonable for trier to infer that claimant was not unfairly prejudiced by the delay in providing the report, though the terms of § 31-294f(b) were technically violated. See, Carozza, § 31-294f.

Total disability issue raised at outset of hearings had been settled via stipulation through October 1999. Testimony of doctor gave rise to new issue of possible sedentary work capacity for claimant. CRB affirmed trier’s omission of a ruling on this issue, as Form 36 was not filed until formal hearings had essentially concluded. See, Irizarry, § 31-294d.

Pro se claimant argued that employer should have filed Form 36 before ceasing “without prejudice” disability payments after 23 weeks, as Admin. Reg. § 31-296-2 only allows six weeks of payments without prejudice. CRB disagreed that payment beyond six weeks constitutes acceptance of claim for disability, thereby obligating employer to file Form 36. 1993 amendment to § 31-294c discussed, by which legislature extended employer’s time for contesting compensation or extent of disability to one year; regulation was not amended to conform to change in § 31-294c, and CRB noted this conflict, along with importance of “without prejudice” payments. See Sellers, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Board found no error in trier’s approval of form 36 discontinuing ongoing total disability benefits. Claimant’s argument on appeal was that trier based her conclusion that claimant was no longer totally disabled on Dr. Luchini’s medical opinion, which, the claimant argued, was based upon misinterpretation of surveillance videotapes. Board found that trier addressed claimant’s contention that tapes were misleading and that the physician misinterpreted them, and trier had discretion to accept Dr. Luchini’s medical opinion.

Trier properly approved Form 36 where he found that claimant was capable of non-strenuous work and had reached MMI based upon the medical report of the independent medical examiner. See, Rodrigues, § 31-279-3; § 31-301-9; 31-298.

The respondents argued that it was error to reverse the approval of the Form 36, as the trial commissioner who granted that motion had the discretion to grant it based upon the medical evidence available at that time. The board explained that to the contrary, at a formal hearing, the trial commissioner may review the approval or denial of a Form 36 which was made at an informal hearing, and must make his determination based upon the evidence presented at the formal hearing. See, Brinson, § 31-301-4, 31-308(a).

Board affirmed trier’s award of four weeks of temporary total disability benefits, and disagreed with the claimant’s argument that a Form 36 was necessary where there was no evidence that the respondents agreed to pay total disability benefits, or that ongoing total disability benefits were being paid to the claimant. See, LaPierre, § 31-307 and 31-308(a).

See, Audi, § 31-298, § 31-301-9, § 31-315 (CRB affirmed trier’s reopening of voluntary agreement and Form 36); cited at Audi, § 31-307.

See also, Christman, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(a)(CRB found error in post-filing approval date of Forms 36).

Board affirmed trier’s ruling that claimant was no longer disabled, as evidenced by a medical report issued by a § 31-294f examiner. Trier found that Form 36 had properly been granted effective April 30, 1998 (the date it was filed), and that medical treatment was not reasonable or necessary subsequent to that date. Issue was one of fact for the commissioner to decide. See also, Covert, § 31-294d, § 31-301-4, § 31-301-9.

See, Brown, § 31-298 (trier in subsequent proceeding did not err by awarding total disability benefits predating an earlier formal hearing, as previous commissioner had only considered issue of disability through date Form 36 was filed). See also, Brown, § 31-307. Prior decision in Brown, 3100 CRB-2-95-6 (December 23, 1996), infra, also cited at § 31-298.

Trier denied claimant’s request to reopen Form 36 in order to change maximum medical improvement date of March 12, 1996, presumably relying on a medical report upon which the commissioner who presided over the initial Form 36 proceeding had also relied. CRB held that trier had discretion to choose among various reports in ascribing MMI date, as question was purely factual. Claimant also failed to offer into evidence any documentation to show that the parties had previously agreed to set an MMI date of November 1997 should he decline surgery. No error in trier’s failure to discuss this alleged agreement. However, CRB ruled that MMI date would have to be amended because Form 36 was not filed until August 19, 1996, and claimant continued to maintain that he was entitled to temporary disability benefits. Permanency benefits cannot commence retroactively to MMI date if it occurs prior to filing of Form 36. Also cited at Bennett, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Lirot v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming, 4015 CRB-2-99-3 (March 13, 2000), aff’d, 62 Conn. App. 908 (2001)(per curiam), cert. denied, 257 Conn. 908 (2001).

CRB affirmed granting of Form 36 where physician did not sign form, but signed note was attached releasing claimant to light duty.

Auger v. Stratford, 3944 CRB-4-98-12 (January 14, 2000), rev’d, 64 Conn. App. 75 (2001).

See, Auger, § 31-284b, § 31-300. Also cited at Auger, § 7-433c.

Trier found that claimant had not been totally disabled during disputed period, and then concluded that he had “most probably [been] partially disabled” through date of maximum medical improvement. Although neither party had alleged temporary partial disability, the distinction (which was supported by medical evidence) was irrelevant for the purposes of this case. Respondents had not filed a Form 36 seeking to discontinue payment of benefits, and whether paying temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits, the respondents were required to file a Form 36 before discontinuing payment. See also, Hyde, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB reversed decision of trial commissioner granting Form 36 effective as of formal hearing date. Absent evidence of extenuating circumstances, Form 36 must be granted effective the date it is filed. (Miles, C., dissenting) CRB should remand to give trier opportunity to explain whether the use of formal hearing date had a basis.

Trial commissioner affirmed Form 36 effective on date filed. Respondents argued on appeal that it was undisputed that the maximum medical improvement date was actually several months earlier, and that the trier should have made the Form 36 ceasing payment of § 31-308(a) benefits effective at that time. CRB held that § 31-296 specifically requires a Form 36 to be filed before benefits for total or partial incapacity are discontinued, which includes benefits being paid under § 31-308(a). Trier correctly ordered that the maximum medical improvement date be treated as the date the Form 36 was filed. See also, Jones, § 31-308(a).

Form 36 filed December 21, 1994. Trier discontinued benefits effective October 3, 1995. CRB explained that trier should discontinue benefits effective on the filing date of a Form 36 unless extenuating circumstances indicate a later date is more appropriate. There was no hint of such circumstances here. See also, Santala, § 31-307.

See, Liano, § 31-279-3, § 31-298, § 31-307. Subsequent decisions at Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999), § 31-300; Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999), § 7-433c; companion decision at Liano, 3299 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-294c, § 31-297, § 31-301. Factual findings; prior decision at Liano, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996), § 7-433b, § 31-300, § 31-310.

Commissioner approved Form 36 effective on its filing date of January 3, 1994, on the ground the claimant had not proven total disability subsequent to that date. Claimant argued error in that the Form 36 was based on failure to continue treatment, which became moot when he agreed to treatment; second Form 36 was not filed until March 10, 1994, and could not be effective any earlier. Held: although trier is normally restricted to the grounds listed in the Form 36 at the “speedy emergency informal hearing” that must be held soon after the claimant objects to discontinuance of benefits, the same is not true at a later formal hearing on the matter. There, the trier may consider a broader range of issues, including the existence of total disability. Also: Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied; failure of counsel to anticipate need for claimant to be present to testify at formal hearing is not an adequate reason for allowing additional evidence on appeal. Existence of total disability is a factual issue based on trier’s evaluation of credibility of evidence; accuracy of doctor’s reports could reasonably be questioned by commissioner. See also, Ryba, § 31-301-9 and § 31-307.

Claimant entered into stipulation with insurer for over $40,000 three days before claimant died of terminal cancer. Insurer was not aware of terminal illness, and potential entitlement to future benefits was considered in calculating stipulation. Commissioner declined to enforce stipulation on ground it would be inequitable. Claimant appealed. Held: most caselaw regarding stipulations concerns protection of claimant’s interests, but protecting employee’s rights does not mean ignoring the rights of the employer or insurer. Fairness and equity are two-way streets. Commissioner found respondent no longer agreed with stipulation at time it was submitted for approval, and had the authority to withhold approval of that contract.

Trial commissioner erred by approving Form 36 effective on date claimant reached maximum medical improvement, as Form 36 was not filed until 1½ years later. Respondent must notify commissioner and employee of proposed discontinuance of benefits prior to the proposed cut-off date, and Form 36 may not become effective before date it is filed. Also, commissioner should not hold Form 36 in abeyance for more than 30 days, as a hearing should be completed as soon as possible after a claimant objects to a Form 36. (Brouillet, C., concurring) (limited situations exists where Form 36 should be approved retroactively, such as where claimant has returned to work, or where award paid pursuant to approved voluntary agreement has run out.

Fund filed Form 36 on May 18, 1993 along with April 1993 medical report stating claimant had light duty capability. Commissioner found claimant not totally disabled, but with severely limited work capability; approved Form 36 as of date of decision, which was almost two years after Form 36 was filed. CRB held that no finding supported the use of a severance date for total disability benefits later than the filing date of the Form 36, which should have been ruled on soon after it was filed to avoid undue delay. Reversed. See also, Stefenski, § 31-308a.

Trial commissioner ruled that 1992 stipulation did not preclude carpal tunnel claim. Affirmed. Stipulations are intended to foreclose future claims flowing from a compensable injury. However, a release will not be construed to include claims not contemplated by the parties. Absence of relationship between carpal tunnel syndrome and previous injury, coupled with finding that claimant did not make a claim for carpal tunnel before stipulation approved, supports commissioner’s decision.

Herwerth v. Groton, 3105 CRB-2-95-6 (December 24, 1996), aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 922 (1997)(per curiam).

Form 36 procedure reviewed; as claimant maintained continuing total disability, commissioner inappropriately ordered retroactive commencement of permanent partial disability benefits prior to filing date of Form 36, even though maximum medical improvement may have been reached earlier. Claimant had no notice until 1993 that respondent was contesting disability back to 1990. See also notes on § 31-301. Appeal procedure re: Motion to Dismiss for late Reasons of Appeal.

Claimant appealed approval of Form 36 to CRB. Issue regarding authority of Acting Commissioner to rule on Form 36 at informal hearing was moot, as issue tried de novo at a later formal hearing, superseding the first ruling. At formal hearing, trial commissioner was entitled to use doctor’s testimony in assessing meaning of report, even though doctor failed to sign report. Commissioner could rely on it in later proceedings, as doctor authenticated it in his deposition. Evidence thus supported discontinuation of total disability benefits. No improper shifting of burden of proof; claimant simply failed to rebut respondent’s evidence. Also cited at Brown, § 31-298. Subsequent decision in Brown, 4053 CRB-2-99-5 (July 27, 2000), § 31-298, § 31-307, and cited infra.

Respondents failed to file Form 43, and stopped noting that payments to claimant were being made without prejudice over six years before they attempted to discontinue payment. CRB affirmed finding that they had accepted compensability of claim, noting that Admin. Reg. § 31-296-2 allows payments without prejudice for only six weeks. See also, Infante, § 31-294d, and § 31-315.

Dichello v. Holgrath Corporation, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 441, 2249 CRB-5-94-12 (September 5, 1996), aff’d, 49 Conn. App. 339 (1998).

No error in granting Form 36; trial commissioner was not required to credit doctor’s testimony that claimant’s disability continued over conflicting testimony by other doctors. Unchallenged findings also supported decision. See also, Dichello, § 31-294d, and § 31-300.

No error for commissioner to fail to penalize respondents for failing to file Form 36 before discontinuing benefits. Claimant had ceased performing light duty work and was cleared for regular work by treating physician and attempted to resume regular work before payment stopped, thus ending period of partial incapacity under § 31-308(a). Fact that compensability had been presumed under § 31-294c(b) did not change fact that claimant had to allege continuing incapacity to be entitled to advance notice under § 31-296. See also, Landry, § 31-294d, and § 31-301.

Kelley v. New England Railroad, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 206, 2274 CRB-2-95-1 (April 23, 1996), rev’d, 45 Conn. App. 448 (1997).

Retroactive approval of Form 36 permissible, as claimant did not allege continuing incapacity. See also, Kelley, § 31-349 (transfer to Second Injury Fund upheld, notice timely; Appellate Court reversed).

Petition for review from approval of Form 36. No formal hearing yet, so case remanded to district.

Hurley v. Bridgeport, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 366, 2037 CRB-4-94-5 (September 26, 1995).

The commissioner determined that the employer’s payments to the claimant did not constitute temporary total or partial disability payments, but rather constituted a continuation of his salary pursuant to his employment contract. In the absence of an order or a written or oral agreement to make workers’ compensation payments, the trial commissioner properly concluded that the employer was not required to file a notice prior to discontinuing such payments. See also, Hurley, § 31-307.

Crowe v. DBD, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 283, 1941 CRB-7-93-12 (September 11, 1995), correction, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1 (September 27, 1995).

Commissioner approved Form 36 retroactively effective to maximum medical improvement date. Held, earliest date on which Form 36 can become effective is its filing date. Case remanded.

Anguish v. TLM, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 195, 2286 CRB-7-95-1 (July 13, 1995), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 15034 (October 26, 1995), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 934 (1995).

In light of Conaci v. Hartford Hospital, 36 Conn. App. 298 (1994), notice of decision on Form 36 was not deemed sent until claimant was actually notified of its approval. Thus, petition for review was timely. Also, a formal hearing is unnecessary before rendering a decision on a Form 36; a single emergency informal hearing will suffice, as discussed in Stryczek (below). However, the claimant was entitled to challenge the Form 36 in a subsequent formal hearing, which ordinarily should be held shortly after the Form 36 is approved. Remanded.

1980 injury accepted by voluntary agreement; Form 36 request to discontinue benefits filed on 8/8/88. Commissioner found on 3/10/92 that respondents had met burden of proving claimant no longer disabled, and ruled that benefits should be discontinued as of the last formal hearing date on 11/14/91. Held, when Form 36 procedure is considered with § 31-307, it is evident that the legislature intended that claimants should stop receiving total disability benefits effective on the date incapacity ceases. No reason why same rule should not apply where voluntary agreement in effect. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, a commissioner should grant a Form 36 effective on the date of its filing. The word “hearing” in § 31-296 refers to a single emergency informal hearing, which should be held as soon as possible after the claimant objects to the Form 36.

Appeal dismissed absent a record of the trial proceedings wherein respondents’ Form 36 was approved. See also, Eldridge, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Santiago v. Metropolitan Insurance Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 388, 1631 CRB-6-93-1 (September 1, 1994), appeal dismissed (February 3, 1995).

CRB held ten day provision is directory as opposed to mandatory. When ten day provision is not complied with, it is within the trier’s discretion whether to permit claimant to contest and challenge an already approved Form 36. See also, Santiago, § 31-307 and § 31-315.

Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 341, 1542 CRB-1-92-10 (July 11, 1994), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 36 (1996).

No Form 36 required where previous finding awarded total disability benefits and limited those benefits through the date of the decision. A claim for further total disability benefits therefore is a matter of continuing proof. See also, Cummings, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence and § 31-307.

Mulligan v. N.C.H. Corporation, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 223, 1499 CRB-7-92-8 (March 22, 1994).

See, Mulligan, § 31-293(a) Reimbursement and third party suits. See, Mulligan v. Hall, 32 Conn. App. 203 (1993).

Lee v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 50, 1416 CRB-4-92-5 (January 27, 1994).

CRB affirmed trier’s determination that respondents had disputed liability, and thus respondents were not required to either issue a voluntary agreement or to follow Form 36 procedure in order to terminate temporary total benefits. Respondents’ payment of temporary total benefits did not constitute acceptance of compensability under § 31-296-2. See also, Lee, § 31-307.

Byars v. Whyco Chromium Company, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 39, 1257 CRD-5-91-7 (March 10, 1993), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 33 Conn. App. 667 (1994).

Evidence supports trier’s determination claimant was no longer totally disabled and could perform selected work. See also, Byars, § 31-294d, § 31-300 and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Graziano v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 1230 CRD-5-91-5 (February 8, 1993).

Notice to discontinue benefits not required for discontinuing partial incapacity benefits for a neck and shoulder injury where temporary total benefits are being paid for a separate right leg injury. See also, Graziano, § 31-307, § 31-308a and § 31-310.

Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 255, 1226 CRD-4-91-5 (January 13, 1993), rev’d, 33 Conn. App. 695 (1994), rev’d, 231 Conn. 469 (1994), aff’d on remand, 37 Conn. App. 266 (1995).

See, Muldoon, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(15), § 31-284(a) and § 31-299b.

Pulcinella v. Prudential Insurance Company, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 251, 1236 CRD-6-91-5 (January 11, 1993).

Trier found claimant had some work capacity and was not totally disabled due to chronic pain syndrome. Where the medical testimony is conflicting and there is supporting evidence, trier’s conclusion must stand.

Molbury v. Midwest Drivers Corporation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 202, 1278 CRD-7-91-8 (November 12, 1992).

Medical evidence, although conflicting, supports trier’s conclusion claimant was no longer totally disabled. See also, Molbury, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Gillette v. State/J.B. Gates Correctional Unit, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 1145 CRD-2-90-11 (March 26, 1992), vacated and reissued (July 8, 1992).

No grounds exist under § 31-315 for modification of a voluntary agreement for claim of state employee to receive benefits pursuant to § 5-142(a). Trier found claimant was not in the actual performance of guard duties at the time of his injury thereby not entitled to receive benefits under § 5-142(a). See also, Gillette; § 5-142(a) and § 31-315.

Germe v. Conway Eastern Express, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 148, 1180 CRD-3-91-2 (June 29, 1992).

Any Form 36 issue as to whether claimant remained totally disabled should have been made at the formal hearing below. As hearing notice referred to neck and shoulder injury, respondents had ample time to present evidence at the formal hearing below as to causation and employment relationship, and thus the scope of the formal hearing was not limited to the approval of the Form 36. See also, Germe, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Chemero v. Westreco, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 142, 1081 CRD-7-90-7 (June 29, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling approving respondents’ Form 36. Also affirmed finding that claimant was not psychiatrically temporarily totally disabled as that finding was supported by evidence. Further, where finding is clear as to basis for conclusion and additional evidence proffered is merely cumulative trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion for Articulation and Motion for Modification will not be disturbed. See also, Chemero, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, Factual findings, § 31-315.

Goncalves v. Cornwall & Patterson, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 1111 CRD-4-90-9 (January 28, 1992).

Remanded as trier’s conclusion claimant was able to work, however no work was found or available during period in question lacks evidentiary factual findings. Work search procedure is an informally accepted evidentiary basis to demonstrate a willingness to work. However, it is not the only evidentiary means by which a claimant may demonstrate reasonable efforts to find work. See also, Goncalves, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308a.

Fiore v. Office Furniture Depot, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 15, 1093 CRD-3-90-8 (December 27, 1991).

Remanded as employment contract provided for time and a half for each Sunday worked and two (2%) commission on sales. The computations on which the voluntary agreement was based derived from inconsistent or mistaken facts. See also, Fiore, § 31-310 and § 31-315.

Holevinski v. State/Southbury Training School, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 215, 988 CRD-5-90-3 (September 12, 1991).

Where claimant returns to work after sustaining a compensable injury and then suffers a new and separate injury, no Form 36 is required. See, Platt v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 164 CRD-6-82 (August 16, 1985). See also, Holevinski, § 31-300, § 31-307. Remanded on § 31-300 issue.

Haluschak v. J.F. Barrett & Sons, Inc., & S.I.F., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 93, 925 CRD-3-89-10 (March 1, 1991).

A party without notice or participation in proceedings involving an approval of a voluntary agreement cannot be held liable for payments.

Applebee v. State/Southbury Training School, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 142, 841 CRD-5-89-4 (August 20, 1990).

See, Applebee, § 31-294f.

Minotti v. State, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 165, 611 CRD-2-87 (June 2, 1989).

Evidentiary basis for trial commissioner to discontinue § 5-142(a) temporary total disability benefits based on maximum medical improvement.

Hankey v. Hamden Steel and Aluminum Corp., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 644 CRD-5-87 (April 28, 1989).

Remanded where trial commissioner’s finding failed to apprise respondents of why their Form 36 was not proper. See also, Hankey, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Richardson v. H.B. Sanson, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 107, 590 CRD-1-87 (February 23, 1989).

Remanded. A voluntary agreement is a consensual agreement requiring the approval of both parties. A trial commissioner may not order its enforcement on a party that has not consented to it.

Stearns v. First National Supermarkets, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 103, 588 CRD-1-87 (January 26, 1989).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion as to continuing total incapacity will not be disturbed where evidence in conflict. See also, Stearns, § 31-307.

Muir v. Trailways of New England, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 120, 419 CRD-6-85 (November 9, 1987).

A valid approved Form-36 is a condition precedent to the discontinuance of payments.

Damelio v. Anaconda, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 31, 281 CRD-5-83 (March 4, 1987), no error, 15 Conn. App. 805 (1988)(per curiam), cert. denied, 208 Conn. 814 (1988).

Validity of Form-36 (Discontinuance) upheld where physician’s signature could be incorporated by reference to another form.

Platt v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 164 CRD-6-82 (August 16, 1985).