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Kenyon v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric Boat Division, 4521 CRB-1-02-4 (June 4, 2002).
See, Kenyon, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Prior case at Kenyon, 4497 CRB-1-02-3, infra.
Kenyon v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric Boat Division, 4497 CRB-1-02-3 (March 13, 2002).
Commissioner acting for the First District granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss claimant’s claim for Sec. 31-290a benefits. Trier found claimant was discharged in 1985 and entered into a full and final award by stipulation in 1987. Claimant’s rights to have brought a Sec. 31-290a claim were effectively foreclosed by this stipulation. Stipulation does not except a 31-290a claim. Claimant, acting pro se, filed an appeal with the CRB. Jurisdiction over Sec. 31-290a appeals lies with the Appellate Court. The CRB lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, appeal was dismissed.
Somsky v. Bridgeport Hospital Foundation, Inc., 4336 CRB-4-01-1 (November 15, 2001).
See Somsky, § 31-301. Appeal Procedure (dismissal of unprosecuted appeal from § 31-290a and attorney’s fee order, partly on jurisdictional grounds and partly due to dilatory prosecution).
Knoblaugh v. Daniel Marshall, M.D., 4174 CRB-1-00-1 (February 4, 2000).
CRB lacks jurisdiction over claimant’s appeal. Statute requires that appeal proceed to Appellate Court. See, Knoblaugh v. Daniel Marshall, aff’d, 64 Conn. App. 32 (2001). Appellate Court affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof that her employer had terminated her employment for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
Prioli v. State/Connecticut State Library/Arts Commission, 3955 CRB-6-98-12 (January 13, 2000), aff’d, 64 Conn. App. 301 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 917 (2001).
Attorney procured finding that claimant was discharged in retaliatory manner, and claimant received a substantial award. Issue later arose regarding proper amount of attorney’s fee due. CRB noted trial commissioner’s ruling that this commission has jurisdiction to determine attorney’s fees in a § 31-290a action, as claimant chose this forum in which to try case. Although CRB lacks jurisdiction over merits of a § 31-290a appeal, a dispute over the correct amount of attorney’s fees that arises out of a § 31-290a case and spawns a separate award may still be appealed to the review board, as such fee amounts are regulated by this commission. Remedies under § 31-290a may not be a standard part of the overall workers’ compensation benefits package, but they still fall within the penumbra of the Act. See also, Prioli, § 31-278, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9, § 31-315, § 31-327. Subsequent ruling in Prioli, 3955 CRB-6-98-12 (October 16, 2000), § 31-301c.
Hall v. Residence Inn By Marriott, 4145 CRB-3-99-11 (December 14, 1999).
Board lacks jurisdiction over claimant’s appeal. Statute requires that appeal proceed to Appellate Court.
Brett v. Pratt & Whitney, 4137 CRB-1-99-10 (October 29, 1999).
CRB lacks jurisdiction over claimant’s appeal. Statute requires that appeal proceed to Appellate Court.
Bylo v. Pepsi Cola Company, 4058 CRB-3-99-6 (July 13, 1999).
CRB lacks jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal. Statute requires that appeal proceed to Appellate Court.
Chernovitz v. Preston Trucking Co., aff’d, 52 Conn. App. 570 (1999).
Appellate Court affirmed on appeal trier’s determination that the respondent employer had discriminated against the claimant by delaying his return to regular duties when he was released from work restrictions by his treating physician.
McKnight v. Dept. of Correction, aff’d, 52 Conn. App. 902 (1999).
Trier found claimant failed to establish that he was discharged or discriminated against for filing a workers’ compensation claim. In addition claimant filed a voluntary resignation with respondent employer. Affirmed on appeal.
Rapuano v. Yale University, 3868 CRB-3-98-7 (August 24, 1998).
The board lacks jurisdiction over appeals relating to § 31-290a, as that statute specifically provides: “Any party aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner may appeal the decision to the Appellate Court.” Accordingly, the board dismissed the claimant’s appeal.
Williams v. Shawmut Mortgage Co., rev’d, 49 Conn. App. 114 (1998).
Commissioner acting for the First District had dismissed claim before conducting a full hearing on the merits of the case. Trier found in accordance with Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992), that the stipulation in and of itself ended all rights to compensation. Appellate Court reversed the trier’s finding of no subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the preclusive effect, if any, of the stipulation. If the stipulation is found not to be preclusive, then a full hearing should be conducted on the merits of the case.
Loftus v. Vincent, rev’d in part, 49 Conn. App. 66 (1998).
Commissioner acting for the Fourth District found claimant was wrongfully discharged. Appellate Court affirmed trier’s finding. However, trier’s award of back wages was reversed, as trier failed to make due allowance for payments made by respondent during the period of claimant’s disability resulting from his injury.
Gilberto v. Colonial Sanitation, aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 907 (1998)(per curiam).
Appellate Court affirmed decision of trial commissioner dismissing § 31-290a claim.
Mikishka v. Meriden, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 178, 3574 CRB-8-97-3 (May 2, 1997).
See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Young v. SVG Lithography Systems, Inc., 3927 CRB-7-97-11 (November 18, 1998).
The trier dismissed the claimant’s § 31-290a complaint, finding insufficient proof that he had been terminated in retaliation for pursuing his rights under Chapter 568. Board dismissed appeal, as jurisdiction over § 31-290a appeals lies with the Appellate Court.
Czekala v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 287, 3325 CRB-4-96-4 (June 20, 1996).
Compensation Review Board lacks jurisdiction over appeals relating to § 31-290a. See, Rondini, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Pacheco v. Housing Authority of Willimantic, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 170, 2140 CRB-2-94-9 (March 6, 1996), aff’d, 40 Conn. App. 907 (1996)(per curiam).
The trial commissioner ruled that the claimant was discharged in violation of § 31-290a C.G.S and ordered the reinstatement of the claimant. The commissioner’s decision was based on a formal hearing held on July 27, 1994 at which only the claimant and her union representative were present. On August 24, 1994, the respondent filed a motion to open the award, arguing that the respondent’s representative was unable to attend the hearing at the scheduled time due to an emergency, and that the proceedings should have been delayed until his arrival. The trial commissioner denied the respondent’s motion to reopen after holding a formal hearing on the motion. As the Appellate Court has reviewed these issues and has found no error on the part of the trial commissioner, we will thus dismiss the respondent’s appeal to this board as moot.
Morales v. Bridgeport, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 190, 3087 CRB-4-95-6 (July 11, 1995).
Appeal dismissed. See, Rondini, infra.
O’Brien v. X-Pect Discount, 42 Conn. App. 905 (1996)(per curiam).
Appellate Court affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that the employer did not violate § 31-290a when it reduced claimant’s hours of work. The trier found that the claimant’s excessive absences from work served as a legitimate basis to reduce claimant’s hours.
Morales v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 10, 2155 CRB-6-94-9 (October 17, 1994).
CRB lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide § 31-290a appeals. See, Carreira v. Data Mail, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 268, 1391 CRB-6-92-3 (November 18, 1993); Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Dexter v. Anchor Glass Container, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 273, 1889 CRB-5-93-11 (November 18, 1993).
Respondents’ motion to dismiss filed on the basis that the CRB lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide § 31-290a claims granted. See, Rondini, infra.
Carreira v. Data Mail, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 268, 1391 CRB-6-92-3 (November 18, 1993).
Claimant’s appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Zienka v. New Britain, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 143, 1407 CRB-6-92-4 (August 2, 1993), aff’d, 34 Conn. App. 913 (1994), cert. denied, 230 Conn. 905 (1994).
CRB lacks jurisdiction over § 31-290a claims. See, Rondini, infra. See also, Zienka, § 31-313.
Erisoty v. Merrow Machine Company, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 131, 1639 CRB-6-93-2 (June 25, 1993), aff’d, 34 Conn. App. 708 (1994), motion for reargument denied (July 20, 1994), cert. denied, 231 Conn. 908 (1994).
CRB lacks jurisdiction over § 31-290a claims. See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Ayres v. United Methodist Homes of Connecticut, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 113, 1670 CRB-4-93-3 (June 9, 1993).
CRB lacks jurisdiction over § 31-290a claims. See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Parmanand v. Cushman Industries Co., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 64, 1283 CRD-1-91-8 (April 21, 1993).
See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Jones v. Middletown Manufacturing, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 1296 CRD-8-91-9 (April 5, 1993).
See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Krajewski v. Atlantic Aerospace, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 1387 CRD-6-92-2 (April 1, 1993).
CRB lacks jurisdiction to hear § 31-290a claims. See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Thorpe v. Ducci Electric Co., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 245, 1235 CRD-6-91-5 (January 7, 1993), aff’d, 33 Conn. App. 922 (1994)(per curiam).
See, Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
Rondini v. Tectonic Industries, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210 , 1231 CRD-6-91-5 (December 4, 1992).
CRB has no statutory authority or jurisdiction to hear or decide § 31-290a matters. Prior rulings as to the jurisdiction of the CRB to review § 31-290a appellate claims overruled. See, Anderson v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 958 CRD-5-89-12 (June 5, 1991) and Hill v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 832 CRD-7-89-3 (May 17, 1990). Also, a stipulation is a binding award which bars a further claim for compensation including a § 31-290a claim unless the requirements of § 31-315 allowing for modification are satisfied.
Anderson v. State/Correctional Dept., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 958 CRD-5-89-12 (June 5, 1991).
Trial commissioner affirmed where evidence below supports trier’s conclusion claimant’s dismissal was not in retaliation for claimant’s exercising his workers’ compensation rights but the result of unauthorized absences.
Hill v. Pitney Bowes, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 832 CRD-7-89-3 (May 17, 1990).
See also, Hill, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-313. Determination of whether employer was guilty of discriminatory discharge is a question of fact.
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